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The main topic of this dissertation is to clarify the relationship be-
tween groups and individuals in the evolutionary explanation of hu-
man social behaviour. To the extent that we can understand human 
social behavioural traits as adaptations, are they adaptations of indi-
viduals (explanatory individualism) or groups (explanatory holism)? 
I will distinguish three different causal dimensions in an evolutionary 
explanation: proximate, developmental, and evolutionary proper. An 
evolutionary explanation makes (implicit) assumptions about how the 
behaviour is produced (the proximate dimension), and how it is re-
produced (the developmental dimension). Both can involve either in-
dividual causal factors only or include supra-individual social factors. 
The main issue in the evolutionary dimension is whether group selec-
tion is an important factor in evolution. The group selection contro-
versy is not, however, only about the nature of selection in the hierar-
chical biological organization, but also about the two other dimen-
sions, as I will argue. 
The first topic that I discuss is what evolutionary explanation of 
a behavioural trait is. I will develop an evolutionary functionalist ac-
count of how to individuate a behavioural trait, and I will discuss 
adaptationism in this context. I will show that there are three distinct 
defensible ideas of what an evolutionary function of a trait is, all of 
which are relevant. I will also distinguish between psychological, 
agentive, and behavioural traits in the human context, arguing that 
our usual way of classifying behaviour into traits is biased by folk psy-
chology. After this, I will demonstrate how behavioural traits may be 
interactive traits that emerge in interaction and are not reducible to 
individual traits. This entails a non-individualist approach to adapta-
tions even without group selection. As for the developmental dimen-
sion, I will discuss culture and innateness within the Extended Syn-
thesis interpretation of evolution. I will discuss the complexities in un-
derstanding the roles of culture in evolution, and how exactly culture 
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contributes to holism. My main interest in this context is, however, 
innateness and nativist evolutionary psychology. I will develop a new 
definition for innateness and defend nativism, understood in this 
sense, as a plausible methodological choice, while at the same time I 
will highlight reasons for holistic alternatives of evolutionary psychol-
ogy. Finally, I will discuss the group selection controversy. I will clar-
ify some of the confusions in the debate using my work in the previous 
chapters about the other dimensions and their relevance to selection. 
In particular, I will clarify the difference between kin selection and 
group selection, and the controversy over group adaptations. 
 
 
Key words: evolutionary explanation, social evolution, multilevel se-
lection, group selection, culture in evolution, innateness, altruism, 
evolutionary psychology, evolutionary anthropology, folk psychol-
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1.  Introduction 
 
Humans are social beings who evolved in groups. If we take an evo-
lutionary perspective on human social behaviour, should we under-
stand its evolutionary functionality from the individual or group per-
spective? In other words: if we apply adaptationist heuristics in our 
attempts to understand human sociality, should we adopt individual-
ist or holist approaches and frameworks? This is a question about the 
methodological choices in evolutionary explanations for social behav-
iour. The main aims of this dissertation are: 1) To explicate the differ-
ences between individualist and holistic explanations (and individu-
alistic and holistic presuppositions in explanations) in the context of 
the evolution of human social behaviour. This involves three explana-
tory dimensions in which the relationship between individual and su-
pra-individual causal factors may matter: proximate, development, 
and evolutionary. 2) To make arguments for explanatory holism. As 
the first approximation, the individualist alternatives approach hu-
man social behavioural adaptations as individual adaptations in a so-
cial context, while the holistic alternatives approach humans as inher-
ently social beings, and the evolutionary functionality of social behav-
iour is an approach from the group perspective. I call these ap-
proaches explanatory individualism and holism regarding evolutionary so-
cial science. 
The central theme in this issue has been the controversy about the 
levels of selection, but in the human context, the relevance of the 
group structure is connected to other questions. What is an adequate 
way to identify the behavioural traits and the mechanisms that pro-
duce social behaviour? What is the role of socio-cultural environment 
in the development? How are these issues connected? In other words, 
what is the relevance of supra-individual level causal factors in various 
explanatory dimensions for the evolutionary explanations of human social 
behaviour? To answer these questions, I will dissect some aspects of 
proximate, developmental, and evolutionary explanations of social 
behaviour, and their connections, from a biological point of view. The 
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distinction between these explanatory dimensions is based on Niko 
Tinbergen’s (1963) classic distinction between the four questions of 
behavioural biology. I will also connect Elisabeth Lloyd’s (1992, 2001 
& 2017) discussion on the different issues within the group selection 
controversy to these dimensions. I will concentrate especially on the 
proximate dimension and argue for a form of holism about social be-
havioural traits. To prepare to address these questions, I will begin by 
discussing evolutionary explanations of behavioural traits in general. 
I will discuss this through a combination of the contrastive-contrastive 
theory of causal explanation, the accompanying manipulationist account of 
causation, and the New Mechanistic Philosophy.  
The main questions of the thesis fall in the intersection of philos-
ophy of biology and philosophy of human behavioural sciences.1 The 
topic has direct relevance for some areas of empirical research as well; 
in particular, there are consequences for methodological choices in hu-
man evolutionary sciences. Many of the points emerging along the 
thesis will be implicitly critical of some common approaches in evolu-
tionary human sciences, but the aim is to be constructive and argue 
for better approaches instead. I will not, for example, use space to crit-
icize evolutionary psychology. Instead, I will articulate some conse-
quences for evolutionary human sciences from my discussion. My dis-
cussion will also have wider philosophical consequences for theory of 
explanation, how we understand human behaviour and action, the 
underpinnings of human sociality and morality, as well as “human 
 
1 “Human behavioural sciences” refers to the multidisciplinary set of fields 
that aims to understand behavioural interactions between humans and their 
environment, and includes various research fields in psychology, anthropol-
ogy, and biology, and some unique fields. The philosophical issues related to 
human behavioural sciences are customarily included in the philosophy of 
social sciences, the philosophy of psychology, and the philosophy of biology, 
but this characterization is more accurate. The empirical fields in focus are 
evolutionary psychology (broadly understood), biological anthropology, and 
evolutionary biology proper, but I will discuss some issues related to various 
other parts of behavioural sciences, psychology, anthropology, and biology. 
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nature”. The secondary field of philosophy that the thesis belongs to 
could be called naturalistic philosophical anthropology: a philosophical 
analysis of (one part of) the scientific image of human being and the 
philosophical consequences of this image.2 
I will now briefly discuss the concepts of levels and explanatory 
dimensions, and what I mean by individualism and holism having 
three explanatory dimensions in evolutionary explanation. After this, 
I will make a few remarks on evolutionary explanation in the human 
context, this being a contested issue. I will finish the introduction by 
giving a more precise characterization of the research question and an 
outline of the contents. 
 
 
1.1.  Levels and Dimensions 
 
The topic of the dissertation is about how the various levels of biological 
organisation are related to each other in three different dimensions of 
explanation (proximate, developmental, and evolutionary), and how 
these dimensions are related to each other within the evolutionary 
framework. The motivation behind this endeavour is to clarify the 
methodological basis of evolutionary social science: when and how is 
the group level relevant to the explanatory point of view? The main 
substance of the dissertation will be the explication of the difference 
between individualistic and holistic approaches on these explanatory 
dimensions and how these issues are connected to each other in the 
substantial presuppositions of evolutionary explanation. The facts 
about other dimensions – proximate and developmental – have 
 
2 Peter Godfrey-Smith (2009) has re-introduced the old concept of philosophy 
of nature to distinguish the philosophical work on the subject matter of science 
from the philosophy of science focusing on methodology, epistemic practices, 
and related epistemological questions. “Philosophical anthropology” is a 
more fitting expression when these issues concern humans, but given its other 
uses, the attribute “naturalistic” is apposite. 
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indirect consequences for the debate on the levels of selection in the 
human context. These dimensions are related to independent explan-
atory questions, but the answers and their explanatory presupposi-
tions are connected. Before articulating the main idea in more detail, I 
will clarify what I mean by “levels” and “dimensions”. 
 
1.1.1.  The Concepts of Level and Explanatory Dimensions 
 
There are different notions of level. The metaphor of “higher” and 
“lower” levels may refer to ontological fundamentality, degrees of ab-
straction, structural hierarchies, part-whole relationship (for example, 
in composition or in mechanistic explanation schemes), aggregation, 
or simply the scale (see Craver 2007 & 2015; Brooks 2019). The various 
levels, regardless of how they are characterized, are often considered 
to form quasi-separate layers with their own generalizable regulari-
ties. According to the traditional, “layer-cake model” of the organiza-
tion of science, there is a hierarchy of “basic” sciences that study dif-
ferent levels and their unique characteristics, while the relationship 
between the levels can be studied as wholes (Oppenheim & Putnam 
1958). This view seems to require that the ways in which levels are 
characterized capture more or less the same hierarchical organization 
of the reality. This does not seem to be the case, and, consequently, 
there have been calls to either stop using the misleading metaphor al-
together (for example, Potochnik & McGill 2012; Eronen 2013 & 2015; 
Thalos 2013) or to use it in a pluralistic manner, recognizing multiple 
“dimensions” of hierarchy (for example, Wimsatt 1974, 1976 & 1997; 
Craver 2001, 2007 & 2015; Brooks 2019). Daniel S. Brooks, in turn, has 
recently argued that the notion of level should be understood as a tool 
for structuring problems (Brooks 2019). Levels-talk is a way to relate 
research questions and approaches that are distinct but systematically 
related. It is an imprecise but productive notion, and its content and 
relevance depend on the local epistemic goals. Following this plural-
istic, pragmatic, and explanatory-goal dependent notion of levels, I 
consider “levels” to be a part of how we frame some questions in 
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philosophy and science. Furthermore, which dimensions of levels co-
incide in which cases is context-dependent. It is possible that the prop-
erties associated with levels cluster globally (see Wimsatt 1976; Ero-
nen 2015; Brooks 2019) or locally. I will not make any specific assump-
tions about this. I will employ the concept of level in a narrow and 
local way, but in a couple of different senses.  
The primary meaning of “level” in this context will be the level of 
biological organization. This notion is still somewhat imprecise as a gen-
eral notion (Potochnik & McGill 2012; Eronen 2013) but the relevant 
levels of organization for the topic at hand are sub-individual pro-
cesses, individuals, groups of individuals, and the population.3 These 
are clear enough in what they are and how the levels form a mereo-
logical hierarchy. I do not assume any other level-relations to hold au-
tomatically. The causal and explanatory relationships between these 
levels (and the individual and group levels especially) are the subject 
matter of the dissertation. What I call “dimensions” (proximate, de-
velopmental, and evolutionary) are sometimes also called “levels” 
(see Sherman 1988; Mitchell 1992; Reeve & Sherman 1993; Longino 
2013). This scheme is derivative of Niko Tinbergen’s famous “Four 
Questions of Ethology”: cause, development, evolution, and function 
(Tinbergen 1963). I will discuss functions and evolutionary functional 
explanations, as well as its relation to the “dimensions”, at length 
later. They do not presuppose integrated fields of explanation; there 
are different, separate explanatory approaches within each. Neither 
are the approaches partial replies to one “big question” of a field. 
Moreover, explanations in different dimensions are not indifferent to 
facts of each other. They are, however, three different categories of 
 
3 It should be noted here that genes are not a level of biological organization. 
They are, of course, a part of the structure of the cell and they play a crucial 
role in evolutionary explanations, but their role is very different from the one 
that is captured by this particular way of thinking about biological hierarchy. 
They play no role in the perspective taken here. I will discuss genes later; for 
now, this can be taken as a stipulation. The “lower levels” of biological hier-
archy (such as cells) are outside the scope of this thesis in any case. 
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research questions that should not be conflated. I will examine their 
relation in general and in the context of the case at hand in particular 
at some length later.  
There are other relevant concepts of level. First, the mechanistic 
levels in the mechanistic philosophy of science. These levels do not al-
ways coincide with the organizational levels (see Carver 2001, 2007 & 
2015). I will argue that mechanistic thinking connects the explanatory 
dimensions, but this is a substantial claim about the relationship be-
tween kinds of explanatory projects in a very local case (evolutionary 
explanation of behaviour), not a statement about biological explana-
tion in general. Second, there are levels of abstraction (or analysis) in the 
context of psychological explanation (for example, Marr 1982), which, 
again, do not neatly coincide with either of the two other level-distinc-
tions. Furthermore, there is the distinction between different stances 
(Dennett 1987) that is substantially different from all of the above, alt-
hough it is related to the levels of abstraction in psychological expla-
nations. In my discussion, the notion of level referred to will be clear 
from the context and all these issues will be discussed later. Now I will 
give a general characterization of levels of the organization and the 
explanatory dimensions and how they are related. 
 
1.1.2.  Individualism and Holism in Three Dimensions 
 
Humans are social animals and adapted to their ancestral environ-
ments as groups. My main question is, should we understand this ad-
aptation process from the individualistic or holistic (that is, social or 
group) perspective? What kind of entities are groups, when seen from 
an evolutionary functionalist perspective? The main evolutionary is-
sue is about whether group selection exists and is an important 
enough factor to be accounted for, and whether there are group adap-
tations. I will discuss group selection and the levels of selection issue 
directly in the last chapter, and, as we shall see, the issue is messier 
than just a question about the levels of biological organization at 
which natural selection operates. As Elisabeth Lloyd (1992, 2001 & 
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2017) has argued, the levels of selection debate has four different com-
ponents that are distinct issues, often confused in the debate: the in-
teractor question, the replicator question, the beneficiary question, and the 
manifestor-of-adaptation question. I will return to this in detail later, but 
the rough idea is the following. The interactor question is about the 
levels on which the selection processes take place – this determines 
fitness consequences. The replication question is about the level at 
which the replication process takes place, which determines whose fit-
ness we are talking about. The manifestor-of-adaptation question is 
about the level of organization at which the evolving traits exist. I will 
call these three questions individualism versus holism issues in the 
three causally relevant dimension in the evolutionary explanation: 
evolutionary, developmental, and proximate, respectively.4 These causal 
explanatory dimensions are connected in the evolutionary explana-
tion even without the levels question, and an evolutionary explana-
tion makes assumptions about all of them. I will discuss their connec-
tion without the levels-aspect at length first, before discussing the in-
dividualism and holism issue in each dimension, and in connection to 
each other. 
In the human context specifically, the proximate question is 
about whether there are only individual behavioural traits evolving, 
or also supra-individual traits that are of the group or of the interac-
tions within the group, and whose evolutionary function cannot be 
understood at the individual level alone. I will argue that some social 
traits are the latter. I will argue further that although this does not 
necessarily require group selection, it can facilitate group selection. 
The developmental question is about whether the traits under selec-
tion are transmitted through individualistic processes (roughly speak-
ing, they are innate) or if the development is systematically influenced 
 
4 The beneficiary question is about the level at which the entities that ultimately 
benefit from the evolution exist, which is not an explanatory question but a 




by the social environment in a way that binds the outcome to belong-
ing to a particular group. Holism in this dimension has two conse-
quences: it facilitates proximate holism by causing uniformity, and it 
facilitates group selection by connecting the fitness of individuals. 
To illustrate what I mean by individualism and holism in this 
specific context, here are two examples. An example of purely indi-
vidualistic evolutionary human science would be nativist evolutionary 
psychology, which has individual behavioural dispositions (identified 
with an individual’s psychological states and/or mechanisms) as its 
explananda, assumes all interesting properties to be (mostly) innate, 
and employs individualistic selection models in its explanations. A 
purely holistic evolutionary human social science would consider the 
explananda to be the properties of groups that are assumed to be trans-
ferred (partly) culturally (and through other means of social transmis-
sion) and explained using group selection models. Various combina-
tions of these three forms of holism are possible and there are more 
moderate and more extreme positions on each dimension. I will not 
defend or criticize any particular approach as such, for two reasons. 
First, the truth of the matter in each aspect is partly an empirical issue. 
Second, the correct approach may turn out to be different with respect 
to different types of social behaviour (when there is an adequate evo-
lutionary approach in the first place, which is not always the case). It 
is possible that there will be no methodologically and theoretically 
unified evolutionary human science, but a pluralistic combination of 
different approaches instead. Approaches that seem to be problematic 
in some cases (and have been heavily criticized for good reasons, such 
as the nativist evolutionary psychology mentioned above) may still 
work in others. I will not discuss this topic in this dissertation directly. 
Instead, I will focus on explicating the differences in presuppositions 
that can be conceptualized as “individualist” and “non-individualist” 
alternatives, and the consequences of those presuppositions for evo-
lutionary explanations, without taking sides. My dissertation will con-
stitute a conditional argument for holistic approaches by explicating the 
criteria for the methodological choices regarding the issue. The 
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satisfaction of these conditions is an empirical and case-by-case ques-
tion that cannot be given a general answer. 
There is an old but ongoing debate in the philosophy of social 
sciences on whether social interactions can be adequately understood 
and explained in terms of individuals and their behavioural disposi-
tions, or if a more holistic approach, building on “higher-level” prop-
erties, is needed (see Zahle & Collin 2014a; Ylikoski 2017). To put it 
simply, individualism is a position according to which individuals, 
their reactions to the environment (partly constituted by other peo-
ple), and the aggregative consequences of those reactions are suffi-
cient for understanding social phenomena. 5  According to holism, 
there are social structures that are not reducible to individuals and 
their dispositions alone, as well as cultural meanings and norms that 
play a role in explaining behaviour. The questions I am exploring are 
analogical in part and have some substantial overlaps with the issues 
in this debate. The proximate dimension is about the sufficiency of in-
dividual perspective to address what constitutes social behavioural 
traits in both cases, and the role of social learning and culture in the 
developmental dimension is an issue in both. Some evolutionary psy-
chologists used to predict that evolutionary psychology would take 
 
5 To be more precise, there are two different but related areas in the individu-
alism vs. holism debate in the philosophy of social sciences: the ontological 
status of social entities, and the methodological issues about to what extent 
should the research concentrate on individual and social level properties in 
e.g. explanation. On the methodological side, there are two different issues: 
the dispensability debate and the microfoundations debate. In the dispensa-
bility debate, the issue is about what the proper focus of explanation is: indi-
viduals (methodological individualism), social phenomena only (strong methodo-
logical holism), or both (weak methodological holism). What exactly counts as 
what position (e.g., what is the border between individualism and weak ho-
lism), is a contested issue itself. The microfoundations debate is about 
whether holistic causal claims need to be supplemented with mechanistic ac-
counts that show how the social level causal relations emerge from individ-
ual-level interactions. (Zahle & Collin 2014b.) 
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over the social sciences as the naturalist foundation for understanding 
human sociality. From the social science point of view, this project 
would clearly have been an example of methodological individual-
ism. Some of the responses from the social scientists included pointing 
out the holistic nature of human societies – but very similar objections 
could be made to evolutionary psychology as a form of evolutionary 
human social science already. Social sciences are, however, mostly 
about larger-scale social phenomena and kinds of interaction and so-
cial institutions that are too recent for these debates to be directly rel-
evant to the topic. The possible direction of influence goes in the other 
direction: if there are good reasons to think that human sociality is 
fundamentally built on supra-individual connections that cannot be 
understood individualistically, that could become an argument for ho-
lism in social sciences – but that is a further issue that I do not go into. 
Additionally, there are some similarities in how to interpret seemingly 
individualist models (sometimes even the same game-theoretical 
models that travel between substantially distinct disciplines) and, as 
we will see, the issues about agency in understanding social behav-
iour are issues for evolutionary social science, too. These connections 
are, however, a side issue to the main topic and will not be discussed. 
The third explanatory dimension I discuss is the group selection 
controversy within evolutionary biology (and in its philosophy). Can 
evolution of social behaviour be adequately described and explained 
in terms of the characteristics of individuals and their fitness differ-
ences alone (as individual adaptations to the environment partly con-
stituted by other individuals), or is the evolution of behaviour some-
times due to its “higher-level” fitness consequences? This is the debate 
between individualist and group-level (or, rather, multi-level) selection 
theorists (see Okasha 2006). The levels of selection debate is vast and 
most of the issues are not relevant here, but I will discuss some issues 
in the last chapter of the dissertation.6 
 
6The methodological Individualism issue in evolutionary biology is substan-
tially distinct from the methodological individualism issue in social sciences, 
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In all three dimensions, the object of interest is social behaviour 
in the context of a wider social group. The issue is whether the per-
spective should be individualist, or the group more holistically. This 
makes the terminology of “individualism” and “holism” appropriate 
whether the connection to the similar issues within the philosophy of 
social science are substantial or merely analogical. 
I will discuss all three explanatory dimensions only from the per-
spective of evolutionary explanation, which narrows down and de-
fines the objects of the discussion in proximate and developmental di-
mensions. The proximate dimension of evolutionary explanation relates 
the behaviour being explained to its proximate causes. This is a central 
issue for individuation of the explananda of the evolutionary explana-
tory questions. Is the object of the evolutionary explanation the indi-
vidual dispositions or the forms of interaction in which they partici-
pate? The main focus of the discussion will be on altruistic and proso-
cial behaviour, since this is the context that most clearly evokes the 
possible inadequacy of the individualistic approach. I will frame the 
issue in terms of evolutionary functionalism. In this framework, the 
function of a behavioural trait is what it does to increase the adaptivity 
of individuals or groups of individuals who participate in the behav-
iour, and this function individuates which occurrences of behaviour 
form a behavioural trait. The behaviour is a product of capacities and 
behavioural dispositions, and these capacities and dispositions consti-
tute a mechanism for the behaviour. These parts may be properties of 
one or several individuals, which in turn determines whether we 
should consider behaviour to be individualistic or holistic. The ap-
proach is not meant to be a universal approach to behaviour, but I will 
 
although some forms of structural functionalism might have appealed to 
some rudimentary evolutionary ideas. Elliot Sober (1980) and David Sloan 
Wilson (1989), however, have pointed out the parallels between the two and 
used the terminology of individualism and holism in the context of levels of 
selection, but in an obviously analogical way instead of connecting the de-
bates as such. 
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argue that it is an adequate framework for thinking evolutionary ex-
planations of some social behaviour. 
Another dimension is the developmental dimension of evolutionary 
explanation. Cultural inheritance is an important alternative route for 
genetic inheritance for passing on behavioural traits. Should we un-
derstand this individualistically or through holistic cultural frame-
works? Does culture, to some extent, “build” us to be part of a bigger 
whole, and if so, what is the evolutionary significance of this charac-
teristic of our development? These are familiar questions, again, from 
the individualism and holism debate in the philosophy of social sci-
ence, and they are partly empirical questions, but I will focus on their 
meaning and consequences for evolutionary explanation by discuss-
ing how to conceptualize the causal interaction between the individ-
ual and the developmental environment, including the social and cul-
tural environment. The importance of this issue lies especially in the 
link between group selection and cultural evolution proposed by 
some evolutionary human scientists (for example, Boyd & Richerson 
1985 & 2005; Wilson 2002), which is juxtaposed with the position of 
some evolutionary psychologists that the true locus of evolutionary 
explanations is the innate structure of the human mind. Much of the 
discussion will be on the concept of innateness and its explanatory 
relevance for evolutionary explanations, and on how culture figures 
as a significant route for inheritance in human context.  
Lastly, I will discuss the consequences of these two dimensions 
for the relation between the individual level and supra-individual 
level in evolutionary explanations and to the levels of selection debate. 
I will discuss the levels of selection issue in a specific context only: 
humans. This particular context may be a special case and the results 
are not necessarily generalizable to, for example, eusocial insects like 
(most) ants and (some) bees, presocial mammals like wolves, chimpan-
zees, and meerkats, or any other forms of sociality found in non-hu-
man animals, no matter how analogical they seem to be with some 
aspects of human sociality. On the other hand, this context excludes 
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some issues that might be relevant in some other contexts of evolution 
of social behaviour. 
 
 
1.2.  On the Evolution of Human Social Behaviour 
 
Behaviour is a more complicated object for evolutionary explanation 
than physical characteristics and social behaviour is trickier than be-
haviour in general. Social behaviour involves fitness effects for more 
than one individual at a time and the selective environment of the evo-
lution of social behaviour is in continuous change, which causes the 
evolutionary functionality of the behavioural trait to be in constant 
flux. The evolution of social behaviour became an object of systematic 
study only after a new framework of mathematical models was intro-
duced in the 1960s and 1970s, particularly by William D. Hamilton 
(1964a & 1964b), Robert Trivers (1971 & 1974), and Edward O. Wilson 
(1975), who gave the field its name, sociobiology, and systematized it 
(see also Dawkins 1976 and Alcock 2003). Soon after this, the same 
explanatory models were applied to human social behaviour, with 
varying degrees of success (see Kitcher 1985 for a review and criticism 
of much of the early work). After the partial failure of these early at-
tempts, as well as some failures in the sociobiological approach over-
all, several different styles of evolutionary human sciences were de-
veloped, dealing with social behaviour that ranged from the general 
basis of the socially tuned mind and cooperation to specific issues con-
cerning, for example, family relations, mating, religion, morality, and 
so on.7 
There is a tendency in evolutionary human sciences to be meth-
odologically individualist and this is partly for good reasons. The 
early forms of what was known as group selection (e.g. Wynne-Ed-
wards 1962) had serious problems in its unsupported, ambivalent as-
sumptions about the “good of the group” and could not come up with 
 
7 I will briefly review evolutionary human social sciences in chapter 4. 
14 
 
a mechanism for group-level selection to overcome individual selec-
tion (see Maynard Smith 1964; Williams 1966). The biggest problem 
was that there is always individual selection between the members of 
a group and therefore, if all individuals get the fitness benefits due to 
belonging to the group, individual selection overrides the group se-
lection whenever individual and group selection pull evolution in dif-
ferent directions. If only behaviour that maximizes the individual fit-
ness is selected, there is no need for group selection in models and 
explanations. Much of sociobiology aimed at showing how social evo-
lution can be understood while staying in the individualist frame-
work. An individual’s fitness, at least in an inclusive sense (which 
then became the “gene’s point of view” of evolution; see Dawkins 
1976; Sterelny & Kitcher 1988), became the universal viewpoint for 
evolutionary explanations. Altruism became a central theoretical 
problem for sociobiology, but in most cases it was assumed that altru-
istic behaviour could be explained through kin selection (Hamilton 
1964a&b) as maximizing one’s own genes’ fitness through relatives 
that share the genes, or as reciprocal helping (Trivers 1971). In both 
cases, altruism was only “apparent” from the evolutionary point of 
view. 
The renewed idea of group selection has since been re-introduced 
by a handful of biologists and philosophers (see for example Wilson 
1975 & 1989; Sober 1984a; Heisler & Damuth 1987; Damuth & Heisler 
1988; Goodnight et al 1992; Wilson & Sober 1994; Goodnight & Stevens 
1997; Sober & Wilson 1998; Okasha 2006; Goodnight 2012). Some evo-
lutionary human scientists (for example, Boyd & Richerson 1985 & 
2005; Gintis 2000b; Henrich & Henrich 2007; Bowles & Gintis 2011) 
have taken this approach seriously, but it is still not a widely, let alone 
a universally, accepted idea. There are several good reasons for this: 
the apparent weakness of group-level selection in competing with in-
dividualist counter-selection, the possibility of alternative (seemingly) 
individualist models when group selection seems to take place, and 
difficulties in finding unequivocal empirical evidence for it (for exam-
ple, Kerr & Godfrey-Smith 2002; West et al 2008; Gardner 2013). I will 
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argue that some of the discussion on group selection is, after all the 
philosophical scrutiny over it, still somewhat ambiguous, and argue 
that group selection would be, in some of its senses, credible in the 
human context even if it was rare or non-existent elsewhere. But there 
are also human-specific concerns about the applicability of evolution-
ary explanations to human social behaviour in the first place, given 
the plasticity of the human mind, the power of culture to guide behav-
iour, and the novel complexity of human societies. I will not argue for 
the relevance of evolutionary approaches in this dissertation, but I will 
next discuss this topic and provide arguments for why such ap-
proaches may at least be worth trying. 
 
1.2.1.  Evolutionary Explanations in Human Context 
 
Humans are biological beings whose basic characteristics are products 
of an evolutionary process. These include human behaviour and cul-
ture – they are biological phenomena. This claim does not imply any-
thing specific as such, for example, about the freedom of the will; fix-
edness or plasticity of behaviour, or its development; the range of pos-
sible cultural variation in behaviour; the applicability of evolutionary 
models to contemporary human behaviour; or the relevance of prima-
tology or any other field of biology to human social or behavioural 
sciences. All these issues depend on what kind of biological beings hu-
mans are.8 The evolutionary origin of human social behaviour would 
be a theoretically important issue even if it did not have any conse-
quences for any other scientific pursuits that build our understanding 
 
8 Neither is this an issue about whether humans are “blank slates” or not 
(Pinker 2002). Human mind has gene-related evolved developmental tenden-
cies that guide, skew, and constrain the psychological make-up we can end 
up having as the end result of psychological development, but this general 
fact alone leaves open a wide range of possibilities from innate, massively 




of ourselves. The knowledge of the origins and the naturalized version 
of “design” is an essential part of what can be called “naturalized phil-
osophical anthropology”, a science-based (but not necessarily reduc-
tionist) view of humanity, and of humans as “fundamentally social 
animals”, as it were. Whether or not the evolutionary approach has 
more concrete consequences for human sciences depends on what the 
actual evolution has produced. The evolutionary history of the human 
species is what determines how much our knowledge of this very his-
tory helps us to understand the social behaviour of contemporary hu-
man beings. 
There is a range of theoretical possibilities on this issue. On one 
end of the spectrum, evolutionary history does not have any conse-
quences for any other epistemic pursuits about human beings. On the 
other end, the evolutionary perspective is a central organizing princi-
ple and a set of heuristics for generating fruitful research questions 
and hypotheses within other human sciences. Which theoretical pos-
sibility is the actual case, is, however, something we cannot know be-
fore the very research that evolutionary approaches are supposed to 
help. This is because of two things. First, given the epistemic con-
straints we have in tracing our evolutionary history, figuring out the 
past involves finding out what has evolved: it involves not only theo-
retical knowledge on evolutionary processes in general and evidence 
through fossils, but also some knowledge of the end-product, as well 
as comparative studies on the variation in contemporary humans and 
in our closest living relatives. Discovering our evolutionary history is 
dependent on our systematic knowledge of contemporary humans. 
Second, we cannot know how useful the heuristics based on the evo-
lutionary “reasons” for our behavioural dispositions are in the process 
of building this systematic image of humans in contemporary settings, 
except by comparing the speculations based on evolution and the even-
tual empirical discoveries. We need to see where evolutionary specu-
lations lead us, what we discover empirically, and how often the for-
mer helps with the latter.  
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In other words, whether evolutionary approaches are helpful for 
other fields of inquiry or not, is already a substantial hypothesis about 
what human beings are like and what their evolution was like, and 
this cannot be known prior to research. On one hand, we cannot draw 
the evolutionary picture without the systematic picture, and on the 
other hand, theoretical considerations alone, be they philosophical or 
evolutionary, cannot resolve the issue of how much help the evolu-
tionary history provides us for drawing the systematic picture. Con-
sequently, if we suspect evolutionary considerations to be useful in 
generating knowledge on human behaviour, we need to build both 
pictures – evolutionary and systematic – in close interaction. Since the 
usefulness of evolutionary approaches depends on what kind of be-
ings we are, which is discovered through empirical research, and since 
we want to know whether the evolutionary approach is helpful in this 
empirical project or not, the only way to approach the question is 
through testing evolutionary ideas in empirical research. Hypotheses 
that are inspired by evolutionary considerations and the speculative 
history of our species may or may not turn out to be an important and 
fruitful part of this empirical project, but testing these ideas is the only 
way to know this.9 The ideas to be tested include both the known de-
tails of the actual human evolutionary history and the knowledge about 
the kinds of causes that guide evolutionary processes in general for hy-
pothesizing what psychological and social phenomena (and the prox-
imate mechanisms producing those phenomena) could, could not, 
should, and should not exist. If this strategy for generating hypotheses 
turns to be successful, we have implicitly produced evidence for evo-
lutionary history being important to understanding our contempo-
rary selves. 
The above is, in part, why I do not evaluate the evolutionary hu-
man behavioural sciences as such but rather concentrate on some 
 
9 This is a variant of the Lakatosian idea of how the core assumptions of re-
search programmes get tested: not directly, nor by theoretical arguments, but 
through their usefulness in research (Lakatos 1970 & 1978). 
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methodological issues of what this science should be like if it is going 
to be successful. Philosophers have contributed their criticism volubly 
(and deservedly) in general, and I have little new to add. Instead, I 
will try to make a positive contribution to the theoretical basis. Even 
if the evolutionary social science turns out to be impossible, the same 
issues will still turn up in the study of the “mere” evolutionary history 
of human sociality, and evolutionary history and its guiding princi-
ples are interesting enough issues even as stand-alone questions. The 
topics I am exploring have consequences for this stand-alone project, 
at the least. They will be, when combined with direct empirical 
knowledge of human behaviour and psychology, a part of our under-
standing of what human sociality and culture are in the first place. 
Most scientific approaches to human behaviour are interested in 
proximate causes. The developmental perspective, however, is at least 
an important heuristic regarding what behavioural dispositions there 
can be (they need to be possible to develop, after all) and what external 
factors the individual is sensitive to. For example, all theories that pre-
suppose culture to have something to do with differences in human 
behavioural dispositions also presuppose that some cultural entities 
(whatever they are) play a causal role in individual development. The 
evolutionary perspective, in turn, focuses on the history of the behav-
ioural disposition on a population level. An evolutionary history of a 
trait is essentially a descriptive history, which includes, to some ex-
tent, explanatory factors that tell us why certain behavioural disposi-
tions exist in the population rather than some other dispositions. At 
minimum, then, evolutionary knowledge increases our self-under-
standing by telling us how the phenomena under investigation came 
to be, historically. This in turn may include understanding the con-
straints and scope of the behaviour. At maximum, the evolutionary his-
tory of a behavioural trait can highlight the function of behaviour in 
respect to its environment in a way that links certain environmental 
factors with the behaviour. If this is the case, the evolutionary perspec-
tive tells us why the behavioural disposition under study is coupled 
with certain environmental stimuli (including stimuli in the social 
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environment) and why certain environmental factors (including fac-
tors in social and cultural environment) have the influence they have 
in the developmental process. This knowledge can also help us dis-
cover the range of environmental variation in which the behaviour can 
be expected to emerge, by turning our attention to what is relevant in 
the environment (see Narvaez et al 2012 & 2014, for example).10 If some 
position at the maximal end of these possibilities proved to be true – 
if we could rely on the connections between environment, behaviour, 
and the evolutionary function to hold – then we could turn evolution-
ary speculations into useful heuristics for hypothesizing about proxi-
mate mechanisms and behavioural phenomena. 
To use an example of human social intelligence to illustrate these 
ideas, an example of a “minimal” project would be something like 
some of the more general explanatory work on what is called “Mach-
iavellian intelligence”11 (Byrne & Whiten 1988; Whiten & Byrne 1997; 
 
10 There is a net of proximate causal factors (both internal and external to the 
individual) that bring about the external behaviour in the context of the actual 
behaviour.  Another net of causal factors (both internal and external to the 
individual) guides the development of these behavioural dispositions. Yet an-
other set of causal factors explains the evolutionary history of those disposi-
tions and interactions between an individual and its environment in both the 
proximate causal context of behaviour and its development. Any causal factor 
of the same descriptive type (e.g. a specific feature of environment) may be an 
explanatory factor in all dimensions. For example, in the human context, a 
type of interaction with other human beings (including cultural transmission) 
may be a part of the causal environment of the actual behaviour, of the devel-
opment of the behavioural dispositions, and of the selective environment dur-
ing the evolution of behaviour to the extent that it is similar to the ancestral 
social environment. The functionality of a trait may depend on these factors 
to be the same. If the environment changes from the evolutionary context, the 
functionality, the development, or both may change as well. 
11The basic idea of “Machiavellian intelligence” is that the roots of human so-
cial intelligence (and primate intelligence in more general – the term was in-
troduced by Frans de Waal (1982) for a chimpanzee social intelligence) lie in 
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Byrne 1997; see also Corballis & Lea 1999). A “maximal” project on the 
same issue would be to use the knowledge of or speculations on the 
context of the evolutionary origins, the models related to that context, 
and the plausible predictions they generate, as a basis for directly test-
able hypotheses on psychological capacities and biases, such as the 
evolution-based work on the “Wason Selection Task” (Wason 1966) 
and its connection to social adaptativeness in cheater detection (Cos-
mides 1987; Cosmides & Tooby 2005b).12 Both approaches may be val-
uable at times – it is a trait-by-trait issue, not an issue with a general 
answer. 
Even for the “mere” understanding of ourselves (or, the minimal 
contribution), the evolutionary perspective is not only an extra dimen-
sion to our self-understanding, but a fundamental piece of knowledge 
to satisfy the intellectual curiosity that often drives scientific and phil-
osophical pursuits. It makes things (that would stay either messy or 
mysterious without the evolutionary perspective) intelligible. As The-
odosius Dobzhansky (1973) famously put it, “nothing in biology 
makes sense except in the light of evolution.” This quote should not 
be taken as a point about our inability to understand how the proxi-
mate mechanisms work in biology without the evolutionary perspec-
tive – we are perfectly capable of doing so – but the evolutionary per-
spective enables us to make sense of why the things are the way they 
are. Where did the apparently purposeful, often holistic, design come 
from? Why are there dysfunctionalities and faults in this design, from 
an intelligent designer point of view, that tend to be similar in kind to 
 
the evolutionary “arms race” of social cognitive capacities in the environment 
of social competition, politics, coalition building, and manipulation. 
12The idea here is that the capacity to formally infer along the lines of a mate-
rial implication has been selected for detecting cheaters of social norms or 
contracts and therefore is activated in contexts involving social norms, mak-
ing the inference practically automatic in these contexts, whereas in non-social 
contexts people make mistakes and find the formally similar inference tasks 
much more difficult. This hypothesis has a number of testable consequences. 
For criticism of the idea, see Davies et al 1995; Sperber & Girotto 2003. 
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other such faults – often as if some parts were taken from another de-
sign? Why are there clusters of characteristics across groups of species 
without any apparent reason for these characteristics to cluster? The 
same applies to human social behaviour to the extent that we can un-
derstand it from an evolutionary point of view. When we can cast an 
evolutionary light on it, we start making more sense of it. For example, 
suppose we discovered the evolutionary origins of morality. That is, 
we could explain why we are interested in the categories of right and 
wrong in the first place, and why we feel that we need to act in ac-
cordance with what we perceive to be right. This would deepen our 
understanding of ourselves even if it had no consequences for our 
moral practices or ethical theories – or even for our scientific under-
standing of moral psychology. If we did not have even plausible spec-
ulations about its origins, it would be mysterious and possibly, alt-
hough not necessarily, a challenge to a naturalistic world view as 
well.13 
 
1.2.2.  Evolution as an Integrative Perspective 
 
There is, however, a more important way in which evolutionary per-
spective strengthens our understanding: scientific integration.14 Evolu-
tionary perspective provides a framework for understanding how 
 
13 Even a plausible speculation may do some important intellectual work on 
this even if we had no way to confirm our speculations. William Dray’s idea 
of how possible explanations in history proper was exactly that even though we 
cannot always provide verifiable explanations for historical events, we can 
make them intelligible by producing a narrative that makes them fit with what 
we know (Dray 1963; see also Persson 2012). The event or phenomenon under 
interest ceases to be a mystery or an anomaly, even if we do not know if the 
provisional explanation we give it is correct or not. I will briefly return to how 
possible explanations in chapter 3. 
14 This is also discussed in Dobzhansky’s 1973 paper, although from a peda-
gogical point of view. 
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various properties of an organism and its behaviour are functionally 
related to each other. Consequently, this perspective makes intelligi-
ble how the different fields of biology are related, through giving a 
perspective on how their explananda are related. This integrative un-
derstanding comes from the idea that biological organisms are func-
tional wholes that have parts and behaviours that relate to each other 
as if the organisms had been designed to function in certain ways in 
certain environments. This design stance (Dennett 1989 & 1995) toward 
biological organisms is made possible, justified, detailed, and con-
strained by the evolutionary histories of biological entities.15 In the 
case of human behaviour, this turns into interdisciplinary integration. 
This has been an important piece of rhetoric behind much of evolu-
tionary human science. Evolutionary psychologists of the nativist 
school in particular (see Tooby & Cosmides 1992; Cosmides & Tooby 
2005a; Pinker 2002) have been optimistic on this point, expecting the 
evolutionary theory to become the foundational theory of all human 
science: concepts, theories, models, and methods from evolutionary 
biology would be a reductive basis for all human research. This kind 
of reductive unification would be the theoretically maximal contribu-
tion of evolutionary biology to human sciences. The idea has many 
problems, some of which I will discuss later. However, there is a less 
ambitious and more realistic variant of evolutionary unification that 
gives evolutionary approach a special role. 
Even if the proximate-level approaches to human behaviour re-
main independent of evolutionary theory (and presumably of each 
other as well) both in their content and in how to characterize the 
proximate mechanisms, the evolutionary approach can nevertheless 
provide an integrative perspective on how the phenomena are related: 
it can be a tool for a pluralistic integration instead of reductive 
 
15However, the design stance, if adopted, and its usefulness need not coincide 
with the actual evolutionary history or be adaptationist throughout. I will dis-




integration. Scientific pluralism is the idea that even if the world is on-
tologically unified,16 our epistemic practices are constrained to frag-
mented partial perspectives (either de facto or necessarily), and there-
fore our best theories and the knowledge produced by our best scien-
tific practices could not be neatly integrated even if they were all true. 
Acknowledging this should also guide our epistemic practices. Plu-
ralism has been developed by Helen Longino in particular (1990, 2002 
& 2013). The idea of integrative pluralism is argued by Sandra Mitchell 
(2002 & 2003). According to this view, since reality is ontologically 
unified, even if the knowledge produced by different epistemic pro-
jects could not be simply added up, they refer to fragments of the same 
phenomena and we should be able to integrate these fragments of 
knowledge in practice. The locus Mitchell gives for this integration is 
explanation. Although she would probably disagree with the special 
role for the evolutionary approach, I consider my stance on explana-
tion in general, and biological explanation of behaviour in particular, 
to be that of integrative pluralism. 
Both Longino and Mitchell pay attention to explanatory interests 
and practices in their discussion. I agree that explanation is the key to 
understanding the connections and disconnections between the “ep-
istemic units of science”. However, I would argue that the relevant 
epistemic units for integration must be wider than individual explan-
atory models (Mitchell’s focus) yet smaller than disciplines: the prime 
epistemic units of science are local epistemic projects that use models, 
theories, and other epistemic tools in an integrated manner. Individ-
ual explanatory models cannot be isolated from their explanatory 
practices and wider contexts of use, including substantial presuppo-
sitions, when compared. Disciplines, on the other hand, are far too 
broad and heterogeneous to function as epistemic units, which is re-
flected by Mitchell’s examples from biology. If the evolutionary ap-
proach will help in integration in any practical way, it will be by 
 
16 John Dupré (1993) would be among the very few philosophers disputing 
even this.  
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providing a theoretical perspective to more local integration rather t                       
han a general conceptual or theoretical framework that spans disci-
plines. The integration by evolution needs to be done separately in 
every case, and in the substance, not by re-conceptualizing behaviour 
and psychology in evolutionary terms, for example. However, I will 
argue that this can sometimes be done, and I will present a framework 
for doing so, based on the New Mechanistic Philosophy. 
To sum up the above with an example, consider an evolutionary 
account of the foundations of culture (for example, Boyd & Richerson 
1985 & 2005; Sperber 1993) and the evolutionary reasons for plasticity 
in behaviour and its development (West-Eberhard 2003). They trans-
form the juxtaposition of the cultural and biological into an integrated 
image. This is enough to increase understanding on the philosophical 
level, and therefore evolutionary considerations should not be over-
looked in social theory or philosophy. Nevertheless, this alone does 
not imply much in terms of empirical inquiry. Something more sub-
stantial is needed. One direction is to use the evolutionary perspective 
as a framework for thinking about the division of labour between var-
ious explanatory projects within human sciences. This could generate 
new research questions and hypotheses in interdisciplinary contexts 
even among “traditional” human sciences. Even if evolutionary con-
siderations of this kind have, in the end, little to offer the actual scien-
tific practices and substantial theories about the nature of phenomena 
under investigation, evolutionary understanding of the nature of cul-
ture and sociality would still have theoretical significance and could 
be used as an organizing perspective on human sciences. 
 
1.2.3.  Evolving in Groups 
 
One of the most striking changes in human species during the period 
that most shaped human mind, from the early homo species to the 
emergence of anatomically modern humans with advanced tool cul-
tures, is the increased intensity of sociality and the various intercon-
nected, co-evolving phenomena related to it. These include collective 
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hunting and gathering; sharing food (as well as other goods and in-
formation) in growing frequency; increasing male participation in 
raising children (which also promoted monogamy, egalitarianism, 
and skill-based authority instead of individual-based hierarchy); 
more sophisticated tools and weapons requiring cumulative culture, 
which in turn requires (or is at least reinforced by) social learning; the 
increasing importance of social learning in general, which requires 
prolonged childhood, and a bigger brain that requires being born im-
maturely, both implying personal vulnerability and, probably, collec-
tive upbringing of children, including support from individuals of 
post-reproductive age, resulting in exceptionally long lifespan; folk 
psychology and language (as cognitive capacities and cultural media) 
to enable and intensify the above phenomena; social norms and sanc-
tioning for cheaters; long-distance trading; pro-sociality and proto-
morality, eventually full-blown morality; and many others.17 Humans 
were essentially evolving in groups. They were adapting to their en-
vironments as social collectives much larger than extended families, 
with cultural differences between them, and these groups had relation-
ships with other groups that transcended mere relations between in-
dividual members of the respective groups. Instead of all this sociality 
and culture being an argument against evolutionary approaches to 
human social behaviour, I take this to be an argument to approach the 
groups as evolving units in human evolution. The design that the so-
cial behaviour is a part of belongs to the evolutionary design of the group, 
and the adaptationist heuristics to human behaviour as well as to 
 
17 I will not provide a review of the vast literature on these issues here, but 
data and discussion on various aspects of growing sociality and the interac-
tion between its different aspects can be found, for example, in Bar-Yosef 2002; 
Boehm 1999; Boyd & Silk 2003; Byrne 1997; Cela-Concode & Ayala 2007; Cor-
ballis & Lea 1999; Enfileld & Levinson 2006; Foley & Lahr 2003; Hatfield & 
Pittman 2013; Henshilwood & Marean 2003; Kaplan et al 2000; Levinson & 
Jaisson 2006; Lewin & Foley 2004; McBrearty & Brooks 2000; Mithen 1996; To-




psychology should take this seriously – as I will argue during the 
course of the dissertation. 
The evolution of individual capacities and behavioural tenden-
cies took place in a highly social context, partly for the needs of inten-
sified group living. It is more than plausible that some of the behav-
iour has been selected for its social consequences that are not per-
ceived by the agents and that are non-consciously triggered by social 
factors. This means, I will argue, that individualistic conceptualization 
of this particular kind of behaviour is not adequate – one has to go 
both beneath and above the individual level. The evolutionary “de-
sign” exists partly on the group level. It is likewise plausible (and 
there is backing empirical evidence) that a great part of what guides 
our behaviour is based on attitudes, norms, behavioural scripts, or 
some other behaviour-guiding psychological entities that are acquired 
from others during individual development through a process that 
cannot be described as reflective learning, and both integrates the be-
haviour of individuals in the group and separates it from other 
groups. An additional question is: can all this be understood as a prod-
uct of individualist selection processes? I will argue that although 
there is no conceptual or theoretical necessity, both of these other 
forms of holism are connected with the group-level perspective in the 
evolutionary explanation of behaviour and arguments for group se-
lection in explaining the evolution of human social behaviour. Fur-
thermore, I will argue that these two aspects – group as an interactor 
(the proximate dimension) and group as a replicator (the develop-
mental dimension) – imply different kinds of group selection pro-
cesses, although mutually enforcing ones, that should be treated sep-






1.3.  Individualism and Holism in the Evolutionary Social 
Science 
 
All behaviour, including social behaviour, depends on psychological 
capacities and tendencies, but not exclusively. Even if mind’s struc-
ture was modular18 and each module could be identified with a spe-
cific adaptive function, as some evolutionary psychologists think (for 
example, Cosmides & Tooby 2000 & 2005a; Buss 2003), the behaviour 
that these modules generate in contemporary environments might be 
very different from the behaviour they produced in the environments 
of their evolutionary origin. Furthermore, independently of the previ-
ous point, even the same behaviour might have different functions in 
the overall behaviour of an individual in the current social complex 
than it had in the adaptive context. Consequently, the relevance of 
evolutionary considerations seems to be limited to what can be said of 
individuals. This is not necessary, but even if it were true, it would not 
imply that evolutionary considerations should be individualistic in 
any other way. That is a further assumption. Furthermore, there are two 
versions of holism, interactive and collective, in each of the dimensions. 
 
1.3.1. Individualism, Interactionism, and Collectivism 
 
The central idea of my approach is the following. The question about 
explanatory individualism is the question about the explanatory rele-
vance of the properties on different levels of biological organization. 
 
18 That is, the structure of cognition is such that there are functionally inde-
pendent cognitive capacities that take the input information from a limited 
number of other modules, process it independently and mechanically, and 
then put forward output information to a limited set of other modules, some 
of the modules taking information from perceptual organs and some having 
bodily behaviour as the outcome of processing. (For the idea of modularity, 
see Fodor 1983; Sperber 1996; Carruthers 2006; Anderson 2007; for criticism, 
see Karmiloff-Smith 1992 & 2006; Woodward & Cowie 2004; Buller 2005.) 
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This is a local question and may have different answers regarding dif-
ferent explanatory interests even about the same biological phenome-
non. Furthermore, there are three dimensions along which the evolu-
tionary explanation may or may not be individualistic or holistic: 
proximate, developmental, and evolutionary. The explanation is indi-
vidualist in the proximate dimension, if it requires considerations 
about the individual-level behavioural traits only (and the environ-
mental context, including the behaviour of others, is treated as the se-
lection environment only) and about the proximate mechanisms un-
derlying this behaviour on the individual level, and those individual 
traits are the target of the evolutionary explanation. The explanation 
is holistic if the assessment of evolutionary functionality requires su-
pra-individual attributes (for example, social mechanisms and struc-
tures, group properties, or something like that) to be the object of se-
lection. That is, the social-level properties are not just a consequence of 
the individual characteristics that are being selected, but there is a se-
lection between forms of interaction or interactive phenotypes (Moore et al 
1997; Wolf et al 1999) and their consequences, or between group traits.  
An evolutionary explanation is individualistic in the develop-
mental dimension if all the components of the development that are 
relevant to explaining how these behavioural capacities came about 
are insensitive to the relevant variation in social and cultural sur-
roundings. This does not require the development be causally inde-
pendent of social factors but that the same behavioural tendencies 
emerge in any social and cultural environment. In other words, an in-
nate psychological trait 19  is an individualist trait, and individually 
learned behavioural tendencies are individual traits. But if the 
 
19 I will return the concept of innateness in detail later. An archetypical indi-
vidualistic evolutionary approach to human behaviour in this dimension is 
nativistic evolutionary psychology, and I will argue that there is an adequate 
notion of innateness that captures what nativistic evolutionary psychologists 
consider to be their object of research. Whether this is an adequate research 
paradigm or not, is another issue. My interest here is only in explicating what 
this approach is about, in a charitable reading. 
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development is dependent on specific social or cultural variables that 
may vary from group to group, the development – and therefore the 
reproduction of the behaviour – has a holistic component. And, simi-
larly, in the evolutionary dimension, the individualism-holism issue 
is defined by whether the explanation by fitness consequences re-
quires only differences in properties on the individual level or also 
group-level differences. I consider all these issues to be methodologi-
cal, pragmatic issues, not ontological. The relevance of the group level 
in any of these dimensions requires a holistic approach of some sort 
in the evolutionary explanations. I will discuss the levels of selection 
issue in the last chapter of this dissertation. I will argue that the prox-
imate and developmental dimensions have direct consequences for 
the levels of selection issue in the evolutionary dimension and that 
this is already implicitly a part of the levels-of-selection discussion. 
However, not distinguishing between the three different dimensions 
leads confusions. Moreover, there are different degrees of holism in 
each of the dimensions. At the extreme end, the traits and processes 
of interest are on group level exclusively. I call this collectivism. How-
ever, the relevant traits and processes can be neither individual or col-
lective-level – they may be “in between” the levels, emerging in the 
interaction of individuals in the group structure without being reduc-
ible to individuals only. I call explanations referring to such properties 
and processes interactionist. 
Generally, I will call the assumptions that individual perspective 
is what we should be exclusively interested in, when it comes to evo-
lutionary explanations, explanatory individualism. To give a prelim-
inary characterization of pure individualism, it is a view in which so-
cial behavioural traits 
Ind.1 can be adequately described in terms of individualistic 
goals and/or behavioural dispositions and mechanisms 
for evolutionary explanatory purposes,  
Ind.2 are innate, and 
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Ind.3 have functions that they have been selected for that are 
exclusively for the benefit of the individual’s (inclusive) 
fitness in the social context of the selective environment. 
The polar opposite of individualism is collectivist explanatory holism. A 
preliminary characterization for the three collectivist dimensions is this:  
Col.1  Behaviour and the underlying mechanisms are fully so-
cially contextualized in their function. That is, the proper 
function of the behavioural response to a social stimulus, 
for explanatory purposes, is on the collective level, not 
on the level of goal-oriented individual agents. The be-
havioural traits are traits of a collective (a group). 
Col.2 The behaviour and its underlying (psychological) mech-
anisms develop in interaction with the socio-cultural en-
vironment in a way that makes them highly culture-de-
pendent: we are constituted by the culture we grow in. 
In order to understand social behaviour, we should un-
derstand culture and social structures, not psychology. 
Col.3 All this has been evolved on the group level and for di-
rected, functional plasticity: there has been group selec-
tion between social behavioural traits that has de-cou-
pled the social level function and individual goals and 
has directed the learning biases and heuristics in social 
learning in a way that makes cultural groups cohesive 
adaptive entities, individuals in their own right.  
The last claim is not derivative of the first two. Behaviour could have 
functional social-level consequences not reducible to goal-oriented ac-
tions of the agents without this being the locus of selection; even if 
selected, the selection could be individual-based; and the behavioural 
plasticity of social learning and culture could have a general evolu-
tionary function (that is understandable through individual selection) 
instead of group-related functionality. If human groups were superor-
ganisms, not just collections of individuals, the full-blown collectivistic 
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holism would be true in general in all dimensions. This is not the case, 
but there might be some traits that are collectivist in this sense, in one 
or more dimensions.20  
I call the middle range option interactionist explanatory holism. It 
can be characterized (preliminarily) along the three dimensions as follows: 
Int.1 Social behaviour has both causes and consequences that 
are not a part of agent’s individualistically definable 
goal-oriented psychology but have a (selected) social 
function that is not reducible to the agent’s own goals. 
The social behavioural traits are interaction types between in-
dividuals. 
Int.2 Social behaviour is acquired from others, but it is not uni-
form across the collective.  
Int.3 The selection between behavioural traits is between 
groups of interacting individuals within the collective – 
neither between individuals nor between collectives.  
I call this interactionist explanatory holism, since the focus is not on 
groups as cohesive collectives, but on the kind of interaction between 
individuals in a social context that is not reducible to individual be-
havioural dispositions alone. The views I mostly explore in this dis-
sertation are interactionist, and the point is to contrast them it with 
methodological individualism. If the term “holism” is used without 
qualification, I am referring to the interactionist form of anti-individ-
ualism. I will discuss the more precise contrast between collectivism 
and interactionism and their consequences more concretely during 
the discussion of each dimension. The intuitive idea, however, is this. 
The whole group of individuals sharing space and interacting with 
each other is the group as a collective. Humans were organized for 
most of our species history into these concrete, distinct groups. If this 
is the level at which the relevant explanatory factors take place, we are 
 
20 But see Pagel 2012 for a view that comes very close to a collectivist, super-
organism view of human cultural groups and human evolution. 
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giving a holistic explanation. Some individuals interact with each 
other more than others within the collective. These connections or the 
networks they constitute may be the relevant explanatory factors in-
stead, in which case I call the explanation an interactionist explana-
tion. These individuals form an interaction group based on the spe-
cific forms of interaction that are relevant to the explanatory purposes. 
Interaction groups are constituted through specific, temporary inter-
actions, while collectives are the static collections of individuals who 
interact with each other in multiple ways. If an interactionist trait be-
comes collective-wide, it becomes a trait of the collective. There are 
significant differences between the two ideas of group. For example, 
there is competition between interactionist traits within the collective 
and the interaction groups overlap, but the competition between col-
lective traits is between collectives only and the collectives are distinct. 
I will discuss the different dimensions separately, but the first two 
(proximate and developmental) constitute conditional parts of an argu-
ment for group selection; given other factors, both proximate and de-
velopmental holism about a trait can be a reason for using a group 
selection model for its explanation. 
 
1.3.2. An Overview of the Dissertation 
 
Asking a question the right way and using the right kind of tools in 
answering it play a big part in giving an answer to a philosophical 
question. The structure of this dissertation reflects this. The first half 
or so will be preliminary work for the main topics, but this work sets 
the stage for them and articulates crucial background assumptions 
and premises, as well as develops some parts of the arguments al-
ready. I will begin the dissertation by explicating what I mean by the 
evolutionary explanation of behaviour. My perspective is the contras-
tive-counterfactual theory as the normative theory of explanation and mech-
anistic philosophy as a way to understand how things are connected in 
explanatorily relevant ways. My interpretation for what counts as a 
mechanism is relatively liberal. Mechanisms do not need to be spatially 
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connected and restricted structures, for example – the important thing 
is that there are causal interactions that form functional structures. I will 
build my arguments directly using these ideas. I will, therefore, de-
vote much of the first substantial chapter of the dissertation to expli-
cate how I understand these approaches, especially in connection with 
my main subject matter. I will not provide the view a systematic de-
fence, since this is only background theory and both views (contras-
tive-counterfactual theory and mechanistic thinking) are mainstream, 
even dominant views. But I will spell out some insights of these ap-
proaches that inform my further discussion and may be controversial. 
Under the contrastive view of explanation, the issue of individu-
alism and holism itself is about which levels of biological organization 
have explanatory relevance. This is not an ontological, but a methodo-
logical issue – how to break the causal processes or the mechanistic 
structures into explanatory parts in an adequate manner. There are 
pragmatic criteria for considering some subset of the causal factors 
relevant for explanation, in a relevant balance of accuracy and robust-
ness in description, and the main criterion is whether there is variation 
within the factor in the contexts relevant to the explanation, such that 
it is coupled with variation in the explained behaviour. The rest of the 
actual causes can be considered as fixed causal background or noise. 
This applies to all explanatory dimensions. The questions to be asked 
about individualism and holism are, therefore, about what is the rele-
vant level of description to pick causal factors for behaviour: individ-
ual or social. From the evolutionary point of view, the explanatory 
variation within social environment is interesting to the extent that it 
is relevant to evolutionary explanation. This has three components: 
what is evolving (that is, if the property being selected for is a property 
of an individual or of the group); what is the underlying replication 
process (that is, whether the processes transfer the property through 
an individual or social-level process), and what unit of biological or-
ganization we should attach the fitness consequences to.  
I will discuss evolutionary explanations of behaviour and the re-
lationship between evolutionary explanations and other biological 
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explanations in the third chapter. I will start by discussing the adap-
tationism debate and arguing that there are three different sensible 
interpretations of adaptationist explanations: historical adaptation ex-
planations, ahistorical adaptive function explanations and current use anal-
ysis. Explanations in the evolutionary human sciences can be any of 
them, and different ways of doing evolutionary social science use dif-
ferent explanations, as I will show in chapter 4. These are all forms of 
what I call evolutionary functionalism. The logic of explanation is the 
same in all of them, and most of the other issues I discuss apply to all 
of them. They face different constraints, however, and the contents of 
the explanatory questions and the explanations are distinct. I will also 
outline a model of evolutionary explanation of behaviour that I call 
the mechanistic view of evolutionary explanatory hierarchy. This will be 
the perspective from which I will connect the proximate, developmen-
tal, and evolutionary dimensions of individualism versus holism is-
sue. The interaction between these explanatory dimensions has con-
sequences for how holistic connections in proximate or developmen-
tal dimensions affect the question of levels of selection. I will then 
briefly discuss evolutionary social sciences (sociobiology, evolutionary 
psychology and evolutionary anthropology) in chapter 4 to provide back-
ground and to contextualize the main topics within the evolutionary 
human sciences as they are practiced. 
After this I will move to my main issues, starting with the proxi-
mate level. I will distinguish between behavioural and psychological 
traits as different explananda in chapter 5 and examine their relation-
ship. I will later argue that some behavioural traits should be under-
stood as interactive traits. I will spend much of the chapter 5 discuss-
ing folk psychology. I need a way to characterize behavioural traits in-
dependently of the psychological architecture underlying it, and for 
this I need an account that specifies what the behaviour is about with-
out an intentionalist baggage. Our folk-psychological practices ap-
proach behaviour as action that is guided by the individual’s goals 
and beliefs about means to achieve those goals. This builds a direct 
link between behaviour and psychology: the content of behaviour is 
35 
 
seen in the reasons for action. I will argue that this is an inadequate way 
to approach either psychology or behaviour for the current explana-
tory purposes and I propose an evolutionary functionalist analysis for 
the individuation instead. I will not present an eliminativist argument, 
however – I will argue that folk psychology conflates proper psycho-
logical and (what I call) agentive descriptions. The reference of folk-
psychological concepts is complex, not non-existent. 
I will discuss individualism and holism in the proximate dimen-
sion in chapter 6. However, I will mostly discuss various concepts of 
altruism in this chapter, both as a continuation of the previous chapter 
and to explicate the idea of interactive behavioural traits by taking recip-
rocal altruism as an example. I will distinguish between evolutionary, 
psychological, behavioural, and agentive notions of altruism, partly 
based on the discussion of the previous chapter. I suggest that the ver-
nacular notion of altruism in human context conflates psychological 
and agentive notions, but that agentive altruism is the central concept 
for practical purposes. Furthermore, agentive and behavioural con-
cepts may be confused in describing helping behaviour. I will also dis-
cuss the concept of evolutionary altruism and relate it to behavioural 
altruism in biological contexts. I will then analyse reciprocal altruism 
and argue that all four concepts of altruism are relevant in under-
standing this in the human context, and that there are two different 
traits to be explained. What is selected is not only the disposition to 
engage in certain forms of interaction, but the forms of interaction that 
get selected against other forms of interaction, firstly, and the disposi-
tion to engage in such interactions, secondly. Furthermore, the under-
lying psychology and the forms of behaviour are also different in the 
sense that the same psychology can instantiate different behavioural 
patterns depending on the social environment. If it is a form of inter-
action that brings the fitness benefits, this is what gets selected, and 
the psychological capacities to participate in such interactions are se-
lected based on this. 
I will then move to the developmental dimension. This is an im-
portant dimension for understanding evolution in general because 
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what gets selected is not the disposition for the behaviour, but the de-
velopmental process producing the disposition. Much of human psy-
chology and behaviour is learned, flexible, creatively improvised in 
the situation, and so on. Much of this cannot be an object of evolution-
ary explanation at all. There must be some processes of inheritance 
that 1) make the reproduction of the trait reliable enough to be an ob-
ject of selection, and 2) are difference-makers between the units of selec-
tion. I will discuss the relevance of development for evolution and the 
Extended Synthesis, as well as the developmental individualism and 
holism issue from this perspective in the chapter 7. I will also briefly 
discuss the role of culture in all this as a medium of inheritance that 
facilitates holism. However, most of my discussion on development 
will be about the concept of innateness, which I will discuss as the form 
of evolutionary individualism in the developmental dimension. I will 
reply to the critical discussion on the concept of innateness by defining 
and defending a contrastive invariance account of innateness. I will also 
argue that a charitable interpretation of nativistic evolutionary psy-
chology (or, alternatively, a normative recommendation for how to 
understand nativism) is to understand it as a methodological choice that 
constrains the applicability domain of such evolutionary psychological 
research. The aim of the dissertation is not to argue for holism across 
the border – I will argue for a neglected form of holism in the proxi-
mate dimension, but I want to retain individualism, too, as a sensible 
approach in the developmental dimension. 
However, evolutionary psychological explanations do not need 
to be developmentally individualistic either. Since the context of (at 
least some crucial steps of) the evolution of human mind was already 
social and cultural, some of the species-typical individual develop-
ment of mind may require certain socio-cultural elements in the de-
velopmental environment. If there is directed, functional plasticity that 
is guided by these elements, one could have an evolutionary psychologi-
cal explanation that is not nativist (developmentally individualist). An 
example of this might be the psychological capacity for language. 
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The last substantial chapter of the dissertation addresses evolu-
tionary holism in the purely evolutionary dimension – that is, group 
selection. I will also bring the other two dimensions into the discus-
sion. Talking about groups can be misleading in this context: it is not 
clear what counts as a proper group. There are also different ways in 
which group selection can be understood. I will define evolutionary 
holism as a selection process in which the fitnesses of the individuals 
are tied to each other. This can take place in many ways: through a 
connection in the evolutionary dimension only (that is, the individuals 
affect each other’s fitness because of the group structure, as in the case 
of evolutionary altruist groups outperforming evolutionary egoist 
groups), through a connection in the proximate dimension (the indi-
viduals participate in the social traits that have fitness consequences 
for the individuals, but only through participation), or through a con-
nection in the developmental dimension (the reproduction of the trait 
is social). I will first discuss the issue of multilevel selection as a 
standalone issue, and especially the debate on kin selection as a form 
of group selection. I will argue that the selection logic in kin selection 
is that of group selection, although there are important additional el-
ements to it. After this, I will show how holistic properties in the other 
dimensions promote group selection causally although they do not 
imply it. I will frame this discussion partly with the previous discus-
sion on the various aspects of the levels of selection debate by Elisa-




2. Explanation in Biology 
 
An explanation of something (e.g. an event, some aspect of it, or a 
property of an entity) articulates why this something is, or why it is 
the way it is. I will begin this chapter with a brief discussion on what 
it means for an explanation to do so in general, and a causal explana-
tion in particular. I do this partly to articulate the aims of the analysis, 
but the view adopted on this issue also has substantial consequences, 
as we will see when I take a brief detour to the debate on whether 
natural selection is a mechanism. I will later argue for a certain posi-
tion on adaptationism that depends directly on how we understand 
the nature of explanation. Furthermore, this issue is relevant to how 
we understand psychological explanation, which will be a topic of 
some later chapters. After a preliminary discussion on the aims of the-
ory of explanation, I will discuss the New Mechanistic Thinking in biol-
ogy, which is a part of my general framework. After this, I will artic-
ulate a view of natural selection explanations that will inform the next 
chapter’s argument for how to approach behaviour as an adaptation. 
 
 
2.1. Causal Explanation 
 
Philosophical theories of explanation aim to explicate what properly 
constitutes an explanation. At the same time, as an implication, they 
provide normative criteria for when something proposed as an expla-
nation succeeds at being one, as well as criteria for comparing differ-
ent explanations. The general idea is that explanation refers to a thing, 
the explanans (e.g. another event), which is in a proper relation to the 
explanandum (for example, there is a lawful connection between the 
types of things that explanandum and explanans are tokens of). Not all 
explanations are causal explanations, unless a causal theory of explana-
tion proves to be a universally true theory of explanation, but for the 
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purpose of this dissertation, I discuss only causal explanation.21 There 
are, however, two very different approaches to what the aims of a the-
ory of explanation should be. I will call them fundamentalist theories 
and pragmatic theories. In the context of causal explanation, they also 
imply two quite different approaches to causal relations that can be 
characterized, likewise, as fundamentalist and pragmatic theories of 
causation. I will make some remarks on this now, before articulating 
the main ideas of the contrastive-counterfactual theory of explanation 
and the accompanying manipulation theory of causality. 
 
2.1.1. The Aims of the Theory of Explanation 
 
What I call the fundamentalist theories are those that aim to explicate 
how the explanandum fits to the fundamental structure of the world. 
According to some such views, the nomological theories, explanation in-
volves general laws that describe or reflect the real regularities of the 
fundamental structure or processes in the world and from which the 
explanandum can be inferred (Hempel 1965; Salmon 1971; Friedman 
1974; Kitcher 1989). According to others – call them causalists – expla-
nations refer to ontologically fundamental causal powers and capaci-
ties, from which the explanans selects those that are relevant (Mackie 
1974; Harré & Madden 1975; Salmon 1984; Cartwright 1994). Accord-
ing to these fundamentalist views, an individual object of explanation 
is fully explained when we know exactly how it fits to the way the 
world works in general. Discovering the fundamental change-
 
21 A causal theory of explanation (e.g. Salmon 1971; Salmon 1984) makes the 
claim that a thing is explained when we know what caused it. This reduces all 
forms of explanation to causation, and by implication theories of this sort are 
theories of causation first and theories of explanation second. A theory of causal 
explanation (e.g. Ylikoski 2001; Woodward 2003), in contrast, is a theory that 
explicates a causal explanation without needing to be a theory of causation, 
to presuppose any specific ontology for causation, or making a generalization 
about all explanation being causal. 
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producing structure of the world (whether it includes only physical 
laws or also some emergent causal powers) is an important aim of sci-
ence – whether we can do so or not. It is also an interesting philosoph-
ical question to ask what fitting an individual event into a fundamen-
tal structure like this would consist of. This cannot be a general theory 
of explanation, however, for the following reasons.  
First, a theory that aims to explicate what takes place at the fun-
damental level of connectedness22 between the things in the world is 
mostly unusable. It cannot be used to describe and normatively eval-
uate most of the actual practices of scientific explanation when, for 
example, we are interested in finding the right kind of systematic de-
pendencies between two things of interest on a domain of research 
that is not at the level of these fundamental dependencies. In other 
 
22 There are multiple ways of understanding “levels”, as discussed in the Intro-
duction, and this applies here, too. One way to understand “more fundamental 
level” is to think about it in terms of ontological levels: some things function as 
the ontological constituent parts or “grounders” of the higher levels. There is a 
persistent intuition that more fundamental and more constitutive entities are also 
smaller: the entities of lower ontological levels are also the structural component 
parts of the systems of higher ontological levels. The idea of a mechanistic under-
standing of the ontology of levels (see Wimsatt 2007; Craver 2007; Levy 2013) 
sometimes rests on this intuition, but they are at least conceptually separate 
(Craver 2007 & 2015; Kuorikoski 2009). “Levels of explanation” can refer to either 
the hierarchical levels of constitution (like in the case of individuals and groups in 
the multilevel selection models) but also to the abstract levels of mechanism: the 
constituent parts of a mechanism need not be on the same ontological or hierar-
chical level with each other (Craver 2007). If this is adopted, what is “more funda-
mental” in mechanistic explanation is not the same as “more fundamental” in a 
structural or ontological analysis. Furthermore, levels may be levels of abstraction 
for analytical purposes even in explanation (like the functional and computational 
levels in cognitive science; see Marr 1982). The traditional way to think about fun-
damentality of levels in philosophy posits the fundamentality of “fundamental 
physics”, which is usually thought to be fundamental in all the relevant senses. 
For the current discussion, I grant the existence of such a fundamental level, what-
ever this means. If there is no such thing, fundamentalist theories automatically fail. 
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words, it is not a suitable approach to explanation in special sciences, 
including biology. We need a philosophical theory for characteriza-
tion and for criteria of evaluation here too. Second, things are con-
nected in complicated systems in complicated ways, and looking for 
the fundamental connectedness (such as physical causal processes; for 
example, Salomon 1984) is not necessary, may even be misleading (see 
Woodward 2003), and does not reflect the explanatory practices in 
special sciences. When we deal with “imperfect” or “elliptical” expla-
nations that do not give the whole picture, we need philosophical 
tools to compare different explanations, even if they are all true in 
their domain, to make sense of the whole picture and to relate the var-
ious explanations to each other. For example, we need tools to map 
the differences in what explanatory facts they point to and what the 
relation between these facts is. This calls for pragmatic theories of ex-
planation – either to replace or, at least, to complement the fundamen-
talist theories. 
The pragmatic approach to the theory of explanation takes the 
practice of explanation as its starting point for explication, clarification, 
and, subsequently, sophistication. It aims at a normative theory of a 
successful explanation without making a reference to a fundamental 
connectedness as a necessary criterion. This approach does not con-
tradict the principal idea of fundamentalist theories that the real de-
pendencies that the causal explanations trace are constituted by the 
fundamental structure of the world and how the change in it works – 
they are mostly neutral about this. It may be that some of the funda-
mental theories are compatible with some of the pragmatic theories, 
giving explications for different notions of explanation, instead of be-
ing rivals. One could, for example, consider pragmatic theories to be 
the theories of “partial” explanations, even if one thinks that a fundamen-
tal theory is needed to account for deeper questions of what ultimately 
makes things explanatory. The pragmatic approaches take the role of 
explanation, and therefore the role of the theory of explanation, to be 
more modest and practical than tracing fundamental structures exclu-
sively. The notion of explanation in this dissertation is a pragmatic 
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one. I will not argue against fundamental theories, but they are irrele-
vant to my discussion. 
The old school pragmatic theories were theories of the pragmatics 
of explanation (Gärdenfors 1980; van Fraassen 1980; Tuomela 1980; 
Achinstein 1983; Sintonen 1984). They aimed to explicate the explana-
tory questions and give criteria for practical evaluation of whether the 
given explanatory information was an answer to the explanatory 
question or not. Newer pragmatic theories, in contrast, aim at a nor-
mative theory of what counts as explanatory information and for what. 
The philosophical work in the newer theories is strongly based on the 
work done in the earlier theories, but the aims are different. Conse-
quently, the new pragmatic theories include criteria for what kind of 
things in the world are explanatory – even if they are not theories of 
what make things ultimately explanatory on the fundamental level. 
There are two approaches to this. One is the contrastive-counterfactual 
theory (Woodward 2000 & 2003a; Woodward & Hitchcock 2003; Yli-
koski 2001; Ylikoski & Kuorikoski 2010), which gives an account of 
how a partial explanation works, based on explanatory interest rela-
tive selection of real dependencies. The other is the mechanistic theory 
(Bechtel & Richardson 1993; Glennan 1996 & 2002b; Machamer, 
Darden & Craver 2000; Craver 2007), which aims to explicate the logic 
of explanation as a practice of revealing a type of dependency, a mech-
anistic connection that can be used in explanation.23  
The contrastive-counterfactual theory and the mechanistic theory 
are not exclusive alternatives to each other but approaches concentrating 
 
23 Including mechanistic theories in this category might seem a controversial 
move: one could take the stance that mechanistic theory is a causalist theory 
of explanation, if one takes it to be a theory of causation, too. I will discuss this 
matter shortly. But the main reason for including it here is that the proponents 
of this theory are interested in the structural connections of mechanistic inter-
actions in picking out the explanatory relations between things, instead of the 
causal powers of the entities that constitute these structures. Furthermore, the 
mechanistic ideas are used in this thesis as pragmatic, not ontological, ideas 
about explanation and causation. 
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on slightly different issues of causation and explanation, and they are 
often combined (for example, Craver 2007). This is a widely although 
not universally held position, and it is adopted in this dissertation. I 
take the contrastive theory to be the primary theory explicating the 
concept of explanation. The accompanying manipulation account of cau-
sation is the primary perspective on causal relations when it comes to 
the practices of causal explanation in science. The mechanistic theory 
is an important addition to account for relevant explanatory infor-
mation and to speak about the nature of causal relations in biology 
(see Ylikoski 2001; Woodward 2002 & 2011). These approaches are not 
only mainstream in the philosophy of science in general, they are all 
but dominating views within the philosophy of biology, so I will not 
advance a systematic defence for them. It is, however, worth articulat-
ing what these theories say about explanation and some of the reasons 
why these are the adequate approaches to assume at this point, since 
these ideas inform the substantial discussion of the main topics. 
 
2.1.2. The Contrastive-Counterfactual Theory of Explanation 
 
The starting point of the contrastive-counterfactual theory of causal 
explanation24 is that science traces real patterns of causal dependencies. 
The dependencies do not require a specific direct connection or pro-
ductive relation between the cause and the effect. This idea does not 
contradict the idea that causal relations are ultimately constituted by 
the fundamental structure of the world and whatever connects events 
or things to each other spatially. The regularities that are supposedly 
described by the strict laws of future fundamental physics may pro-
vide the description on this level. For any object of study within spe-
cial sciences, however, there is a multitude of causal connections in a 
complex network, and for any particular explanatory interest, only 
some subset of them is relevant. An explanation is an answer to an 
 
24 This brief review of the main points of the theory is based on Ylikoski 2001 
& 2007; Woodward 2003a & 2004; and Woodward & Hitchcock 2003. 
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explanatory question that focuses on some subset and implicitly con-
strains what kind of answers are relevant. For example, if we are in-
terested in knowing why a window got broken, we might sometimes 
be interested in the molecular structure of glass, sometimes in the in-
tentions of the child who threw the ball at it. A complete causal de-
scription would include both (under some description) and a lot of 
other things, but that is not what explanations usually aim at. On the 
contrary, much (or even most) of the causal information is not even 
explanatory within the chosen explanatory framework. Real explana-
tion is always aspectual. The contrastive-counterfactual theory anal-
yses the logic of such a partial explanation and gives criteria for explan-
atory relevance. According to it, the proper logical form of an explana-
tory question is not just “why x happened”, but “why x1 happened 
instead of x2…xn”, where x1…xn are mutually exclusive alternatives. 
x2…xn constitute the contrast class for the explanandum x1 – therefore the 
explanatory question is contrastive. The contrast class may be implicit 
in the explanatory question, but it is analysable in the context, if the 
question is unambiguous. 
For example, if we are interested in explaining a particular be-
haviour of an animal, say a cat attacking something small that moves, 
we are not interested in just anything that contributes causally to its 
behaviour, nor everything that is. We are interested in something that 
makes the animal behave in this particular way instead of some other 
particular ways. The contrasts are either real or theoretically possible 
alternatives (depending on the explanatory interest), and mutually ex-
clusive. Knowing all causal dependencies relevant to the behaviour 
and contrasting it with all logically possible alternatives would max-
imize our explanatory understanding of the behaviour, but in prac-
tice, the explanatory interests are always narrower. The adequate al-
ternatives could include things like the cat not paying any attention to 
the moving object at all or shying away from it. The explanatory factor 
we are after is the difference maker between these alternatives: it is the 
factor that leads into the explanandum instead of anything else in its 
contrast class. Different explanatory questions have different contrast 
45 
 
classes and call for different difference makers, even if they are all ex-
planations for the same thing, such as the same behaviour. This is es-
pecially important in evolutionary explanations that explain a trait as 
being an adaptation for something. First, an adaptation explanation 
does not, at least in its proper use, simply say that a trait is useful, it 
says that it has been (1) more useful (2) for some particular purpose (3) 
than a set of alternative traits that either existed in the earlier history 
of the species or could have plausibly emerged instead of the actual 
trait that is being explained. Whatever the trait’s use is, specified this 
way, it is a difference-maker. Secondly, an adaptation explanation 
needs not be a claim that this use was the only causally relevant factor 
in the trait’s evolution – to give an adaptation explanation is to choose 
one property of the trait (its fitness-increasing use) special interest. 
Whether this is appropriate or not depends on the research question. 
There is a sharp distinction between using adaptive value as the ex-
planatory focus (explanatory adaptationism) and assuming that the 
adaptive value is all we need to know to understand how the trait 
emerged (empirical adaptationism; see Godfrey-Smith 2001). I will re-
turn to this later. 
The explanans must be contrastive too. Even if the explanans only 
mentions the difference maker, it presupposes mutually exclusive al-
ternatives to it: the explanans is of a form “because y1 happened instead 
of y2…yn”. This is important for several reasons. First, for practical 
purposes, the description that picks the cause may be ambivalent re-
garding the details mentioned in the description. That is, the relevant 
causal factors of the explanans may not be specified by a mere reference 
to the explanans. Making the contrast class of the explanans explicit 
makes the relevant causal factors explicit as well. The property needs 
not be specified as such, only implied by the contrast class. However, 
there is a more substantial reason for doing this. In a complex system, 
several different changes in the causal history of the system could 
cause a similar change in the explanandum and different explanatory 
questions ask for difference-makers within different contrast classes. 
This must be made explicit when comparing explanations. Two 
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alternative causal explanations do not necessarily compete even if 
they point to two different factors that would make a difference in the 
same way. They may refer to different “locations” in the system that 
could be altered, and they may even all be necessary parts of the 
causal history of the system that brings about the explanandum, even 
with the same contrast class. This is important to note when compar-
ing different explanations and explanatory approaches to human be-
haviour, for example: many of them may be complementary and true 
at the same time, despite superficial discrepancies, while all of them 
are partial and cannot be treated as more than that. I will return to this 
in later chapters. Adopting the contrastive theory helps to conceive 
this, and explicating the contrast class of explanans makes it explicit. 
Take the explanation of the instinctive aggression of a cat for an 
example again. This behaviour as such is the complete target of our 
explanatory interests, and a full explanatory understanding of it 
would consist of knowing all the factors on which it depends, but any 
particular explanation points to a particular factor without which the 
behaviour would not take place. If we could intervene in the system 
such that the proposed explanatory factor is changed to one of its al-
ternatives (without changing anything else), the behaviour would 
change,25 but we are not interested in any such intervention. At least 
in principle, several different interventions in environmental factors, 
as well as in the animal’s psychological (or neural) states, could have 
the same effects (similar changes in the behaviour), but these factors 
are not competing explanations for the typical behaviour, since they 
are searching for difference-makers within different contrast classes. 
In other words, they are mutually inclusive explanations and may 
 
25 It does not matter for the semantic analysis of the logic of explanation 
whether we could actually make these interventions – we are using the notion 
of ideal intervention in order to articulate the logic. The actual feasibility of the 
interventions matters only for whether we can discover the causal dependen-
cies through actual experimental settings. The discussion for now is about the 
semantics of what is means to explain. I will return to the causality part of 
causal explanation shortly. 
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point to different factors in the network of causal connections that re-
sult in the behaviour. In addition to a direct intervention in the mech-
anisms triggering the behaviour, the cat’s “complete” behavioural dis-
position could be affected through intervention in its development, 
which would not only be an intervention in a different factor, but in a 
different kind of factor. I will return to the various kinds of biological 
explanations later in this chapter. Again, the relevant change to the 
psychological (or neural) disposition could take place both internally 
and externally: by there being different genes or epigenetic differences 
in developmental pathways, and by the cat growing up in a different 
environment. 26  Another different dimension of causal explanation 
(with a different difference maker and contrast class) is called for if we 
are interested in the environmental factors in the evolutionary past 
that contributed to selecting for the behavioural disposition.  
Many of the various difference-makers may make the relevant 
difference among the same alternative outcomes within the same con-
trast class of the explandum even if the explanations are wildly differ-
ent. All true explanations pick up some factors that contribute to the 
behaviour being what it is, but the explanation is aimed at picking up 
an explanatory relation with the right kind of contrast class at both 
ends of the relation, and this is presupposed in the explanatory ques-
tion even if it is not explicated. As pointed out above, no biological 
explanation asks for all causal factors at once (see Bechtel & Richard-
son 1993; Woodward 2010), and giving too much in an explanation 
makes it less informative and therefore a worse explanation for what 
is being asked. 27  Yet, at the same time, some explanations make 
 
26 The difference between contrast classes is determined by explanatory inter-
ests, which may depend on a practical reason for the explanation. For exam-
ple, if one is interested in explaining species-typical regularities in cat behav-
iour, internal developmental causes may be more central, but if one is inter-
ested in affecting a cat’s behaviour, external factors may be more interesting.  
27 One could argue, however, that the full understanding of any given event 
is constituted by all the causal factors that guide the event, i.e. an ideal explan-
atory text (Railton 1978 & 1981; see also Kitcher 1989). The Hempelian idea of 
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presuppositions that may contradict other explanations (Mitchell 1992 
& 2002; see also Pigliucci & Müller 2010). Comparing explanations re-
quires an analysis of a wider causal setting than an individual explan-
atory approach implies. This lies at the heart of the dissertation at 
hand – analysing the causal presuppositions of evolutionary explana-
tions of behaviour that are not a part of the explanations themselves, 
such as presuppositions about the proximate and developmental 
causal processes. 
 
2.1.3. Causes in Explanation 
 
The contrastive-counterfactual theory of causal explanation is not 
only a contrastive theory of explanation, but also a counterfactual theory 
of causal explanation. According to it, y causally explains x if and only 
if a) y was a part of the causal history of x (as a matter of fact), and b) x 
would not have taken place if y had not taken place (contrary to the fact; 
Ylikoski 2001: 35; see also Woodward 2003a & 2004; Schaffer 2005).28 
In other words, a cause is something that the effect depends on. In this 
framework, causation refers to a difference-making relation, not a process 
of production. Moreover, it is not an ontological theory of causation, like 
fundamentalist causal theories of explanation, and it does not need to 
 
giving all the relevant fundamental laws and conditions, or the mechanistic 
idea of describing the whole causal structure (this will be discussed shortly) 
may seem like natural ideas here, but they are both limited by only describing 
positive factors. Full understanding should also include knowledge about how 
things would have been different were some of the conditions different. The 
contrastive counterfactual theory of causal explanation can illuminate this 
idea, too (Ylikoski 2009).  
28 Notice that this is not a reductive counterfactual theory of causation aimed at 
defining causation with non-causal concepts (e.g. Lewis 1973; Vihvelin 1995): 
it presupposes the concept of causation as a primitive. The analysis is meant 
to be a tool for assessing causal relations more complex than a primitive 
cause–effect relation. (See Ylikoski 2001.)  
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make a commitment to any specific ontology of causation.29 Furthermore, 
it is not an attempt to give criteria for the cause of an event. It is an 
 
29 There is a de facto pluralism of causation concepts that probably confuses a lot 
of discussion on causal explanation (see Sober 1985; Hitchcock 2001; Cartwright 
2004; Hall 2004; Godfrey-Smith 2010). For the present purposes, it is not neces-
sary to participate in the debate on whether there is a “real” concept of cause 
and what it is if it exists. But it is important to clarify how the notion is used here 
– what the aim of causal explanation is taken to be. First of all, there are at least 
three conceptually different objects for a theory of causation: (1) the fundamental 
metaphysical issue of what connects events across time and is presupposed for 
the laws of physics to exist (but is not studied by physics); (2) the pragmatic no-
tion of causation that refers to things being connected in a certain way without 
this relation belonging to fundamental ontology (and perhaps not to physics 
either; see Price & Corry 2007 for causation in physics, von Wright 1971 and 
Woodward 2003a for the pragmatic notion of causation); and (3) the physics of 
causation that explains how the physical structure of the world is related to 
pragmatic-level causal relations (for example, Salmon 1984 and Dowe 2000). 
There can be different, contradictory views on how these issues are related and 
whether any of them are pseudo-issues (for example, (1) is a pseudo-question 
and the answer to (3) gives the most fundamental level of causation; (2) must be 
reduced to (3); or (2) is the only true sense of the concept). The notion of causa-
tion used here is the pragmatic notion. Secondly, the pragmatic notion can be 
taken as a difference-making relation or a productive relation (Hall 2004; Godfrey-
Smith 2010). These two notions imply two different criteria of validity for causal 
explanations. The difference-making relation is the prime focus here. It is the 
most “minimal” notion of causation and the one most broadly applicable to 
causal explanation in practice. The other notions include some extra criteria that 
tend to be metaphysical in nature. If the minimal notion of causality is not sat-
isfactory because it does not include any ontology of causation, we can simply 
consider the term “causation” to be shorthand for causally explanatory relations. 
This does not change the substance of the discussion. The same answer applies 
to causal pluralism in the other sense, one that is implied by the contrastive-
counterfactual account: we can give the same event several different causal ex-
planations that cannot be thought of as combinable partial causes. This is the 
case with natural selection as well as mental causation, both of which will be 
discussed later and in which the ontological attitude seems to lead into elimina-
tivism of an important explanatory factor (see also Shapiro & Sober 2007). 
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account that explicates a notion of cause that is applicable in different 
contexts in which we need to talk about causal dependencies, includ-
ing partial and negative causes as well as causes on different levels 
(Hitchcock 2003). Even if causation necessarily involves some contin-
uous physical processes directed by strict laws of physics (Salmon 
1984), complex causal systems may have nets of causal dependencies 
through somewhat constant structures (that we do not need to pay 
attention to under normal circumstances), or a causal field (Mackie 
1974) in which both the cause and the effect are changes. It may be 
enough for a causal explanation simply to know the existence of the 
connection, not the details of how the connection is constituted. Bio-
logical explanations typically take place in systems or parts of systems 
like this, and it almost never makes sense to go all the way down to 
basic physics in the explanation. 
All this has several consequences that are will be important later. 
First, as mentioned above, things can be causally dependent even if 
they are seemingly unconnected and would not be in a causal relation 
without the other factors within the system. Secondly, negative causes 
(omissions, preventions, and breaks in the system) can be treated as 
causally effective events when the system itself, functioning properly, 
is considered a background condition. Both positive and negative 
causes require a context; within a context, they can be treated symmet-
rically in explanations. Thirdly, it is sensible to refer to a continuous 
causal structure with descriptions that are on different “levels” of de-
scription (for example, macro and micro levels in social sciences) and 
yet identify causes and effects correctly. In the last case, a “higher-
level” description accurately refers to a type of conditions that are re-
alized one way or another on the “lower level.” But in some cases, the 
higher-level description, which might be functional and indirect, may 
even be a more precise way to extract the causally relevant factors. For 
example, if the description refers to a robust function within the sys-
tem that can be multiply realized, it may be more informative to use 
that function as an explanatory category and leave the detailed 
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description of the instantiation as a black box.30 What matters for the 
adequacy of an explanation is that it correctly identifies the difference-
maker. The fundamentality of the level of description (whatever that 
means) does not. The difference-maker may be a relational property 
or a cluster of properties on a lower level and captured as an abstract, 
higher-level property in the explanatory description. The contrastive-
counterfactual theory provides the logical form of an explanation that 
allows us to account for these aspects of a complex causal system by 
giving criteria for the constrained, unequivocal individuation of both 
the explanatory cause and the explained effect (see Ylikoski 2001; 
Woodward 2003a). What kinds of things are causally dependent in a 
relevant way is an empirical issue? 
The counterfactual theory can be further refined with a manipula-
tion or intervention account of causation: the idea that manipulation is 
central to the idea of causation (von Wright 1971; Menzies & Price 
1993; Pearl 2000; Woodward 2003a & 2003b). According to this view, 
having a causal connection between two events means that if we could 
intervene in the process by preventing or producing the cause, we 
would also prevent or produce the effect.31 A causing B means that if 
 
30 This is also roughly the idea behind the increasingly popular stance on men-
tal causation advocated by Menzies 2007, Shapiro & Sober 2007, Woodward 
2008, and Raatikainen 2010. According to them, causal claims under mental 
description are not competitive with or additional to causal claims about the 
same events under physical (that is, neural) descriptions. On the contrary, 
they are two different ways to refer to the same events (changes in the system), 
but a mental description may be a more accurate way to pick out the differ-
ence maker for some purposes. 
31 This intervention is ideal: we would not, in many real cases, be able to pre-
vent or produce just one event or aspect of a system. But it does not matter for 
the logic of the causal explanation. Even if the system includes factors with 
multiple causal functions, loops, and feedbacks, as many biological systems 
do, the causal roles that make up the system (or a mechanism) and the actual 
parts that instantiate these roles are analytically separate. The actual interven-
tions would be impossible since affecting one function necessarily affects 
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we prevented A we would also prevent B; and that if B had not been 
the case before the intervention, if we then produced A (under the 
same background conditions), we would also produce B. Our 
knowledge of causal relations is knowledge of what we could manip-
ulate in order to change the outcome. This explication is not a reduc-
tive explication of the concept of causation, for it uses causative no-
tions like “produce” and “prevent” that presuppose causation, but it 
explicates some important aspects of causal explanation as a scientific 
practice. First, it enables us to formalize causal relations in a complex 
system (such as any biological developmental system) that include 
overdetermination (for example, multiple alternative causal routes be-
tween a particular partial cause and effect in a canalized developmen-
tal processes) and “exotic” causal relations like preventions of preven-
tions (for example, a gene blocking another gene blocking a develop-
mental path, therefore enabling the developmental path) (see Pearl 
2000; Woodward 2003a). Second, the idea explicates the rationale of 
experimental practices of discovering causal relations (Woodward 2003b).  
Third, the interventionist idea explicates a pragmatic and more 
limited interest for having causal explanations: we are sometimes in-
terested in knowing which factors in the system contribute causally to 
the explanandum in a particular way, such that changing them would 
produce the right kind of effect from the perspective of our explana-
tory interests. Sometimes, however, this definitional relationship be-
tween causes and effects can become reversed because of the explan-
atory resources available. For example, if we are interested in the ef-
fects that hormonal changes have on some behaviour (such as sexual-
ity or aggression), the explanans (hormones) redefines the explanandum 
accordingly, which means that we are no longer explaining sexuality 
or aggression, but a certain effect within them that is explainable by 
the explanans of choice (see Longino 2013). 
 
some other functions in the system at the same time, but the logic of what it 
means to be a cause according to the interventionist account does not break. 
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Not all interventions are relevant to all our explanatory interests. 
Some causes are kept constant as the causal background for current 
explanatory purposes. This is not to say that they are not causally rel-
evant, but that we are interested only in some other changes. We may 
be interested only in the range of factors that we can actually intervene 
in (in contrast to ideal interventions), for example. In the case of his-
torical explanations (such as evolutionary explanations), we cannot 
perform actual interventions, but some alternative courses of events 
(that is, theoretical interventions in the evolutionary history) are more 
plausible than others and we might want to consider only those. Some 
other interventions, in turn, would have too large an effect on the 
whole system to be meaningfully treated as a cause for the specific 
effect that we are attempting to explain. For example, to return to the 
example of cat aggression, a genetic change that blinds or paralyzes 
the cat, or prevents the aggressive behaviour in general, would also 
prevent the aggressive response to a small moving object, but we 
would not consider pointing out those difference makers as explana-
tory, or those genes to be genes “for” that behaviour. Although the 
presence of those particular genetic resources is a necessary causal fac-
tor for the behaviour in interest to develop, it is not explanatorily ade-
quate. The contrast presupposed by the causal explanation is more pre-
cise. More generally, if a gene is understood as a DNA sequence, there 
is no gene that would be a gene for any phenotypic trait as such with-
out being a part of a complex net of causes. All talk about genes “for” 
a trait presumes a fixed set of certain background conditions that may 
include genetic, epigenetic, and environmental factors, and a change 
in the background may break the causal connection. 
In other words, causal factors are explanatorily informative de-
pending on both the real causal relations in the world and the explan-
atory interests we have. An explanation seeks a difference-maker be-
tween possible outcomes that are alternative to what actually hap-
pened and mutually exclusive within the contrast class that is presup-
posed by the explanatory question – it does not seek any or every 
causal factor that the explanandum is dependent on. For example, the 
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explanatory question about the cat exhibiting aggressive behaviour 
towards a small moving object asks for a difference maker between 
this behaviour and the alternatives, including the cat not being inter-
ested in the object or having another kind of response. However, the 
cat would still have to be able to perceive it and to act in the aggressive 
way in principle – it just would not be inclined to do so. If an alterna-
tive implied by the difference maker would remove the disposition to 
be aggressive, to perceive the movement, or the ability to act, what is 
being explained is something else than what we are interested in ex-
plaining. 
There are also other ways in which all causally contributing fac-
tors are not equal from the point of view of explanation. First, from a 
pragmatic point of view, differences in explanatory interests may ar-
range the causal factors in different orders of importance. For exam-
ple, whether we should consider genes more important explanatory 
factors in development than equally necessary environmental factors, 
or whether we should give adaptation a special role when other evo-
lutionary factors are in play as well does not depend solely on the facts 
of the matter. Secondly, depending on the nature of the causal net-
work we are dealing with, there may be further differences between 
causal relations. For example, there may be differences in the follow-
ing aspects (see Woodward 2003a & 2010 and especially Ylikoski & 
Kuorikoski 2010): 
 
1)  how stable or non-sensitive they are: how much change 
there can be in the background conditions for the explan-
atory relation to hold; 
2)  how precisely the description captures the relevant causal 
information: how much relevant detail the description con-
tains or how much irrelevant detail it omits – an important 
case of this is the graining problem and the choice of an ap-
propriate level of abstraction in description; and 
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3)  how specific the link between the cause and the effect we 
are interested in is: how exclusively is the cause related 
to the particular effect in contrast to having a lot of effects 
in the system.  
 
There may be trade-offs between these properties in choosing the ex-
planation. Furthermore, if we are interested in how the cause and ef-
fect are connected, for instance by explicating a mechanistic connec-
tion (I will return to this soon), a further property of an explanation is 
the accuracy of the details of the causal connection. This may be an-
other factor in the trade-offs. 
 
2.1.4. Invariance in Explanation 
 
Explanations require a link between the explanandum and explanans. 
The fundamental theories of explanation aim to explicate what consti-
tutes this relation in the world. The contrastive-counterfactual theory 
does not take a stance on the issue but only presupposes dependen-
cies. Discovering them is left to empirical sciences. In practice, sciences 
discover generalizable relations between types of events, properties, 
and so on. From the point of view of the contrastive-counterfactual 
theory, what matters for these generalizations to be explanatory is in-
variance (see Woodward 2000, 2001 & 2003a): the generalization about 
the relation between two types of, say, events, continues to hold under 
an intervention of a kind described above. However, it does not need 
to hold under any intervention to the background conditions that are 
presupposed by the generalization.  
For example, we may want to fix the environmental factors that 
are reliably present within the whole range of a species’ natural habi-
tats, as well as the shared genes, as the causal background in the de-
velopment of the members of the species for practical purposes and 
concentrate only on the factors that actually cause individual differ-
ences. Furthermore, even if we are interested in the developmental 
processes with fewer arbitrary background assumptions like this, 
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some factors (genetic or environmental) are necessary for the devel-
opment but do not make a difference in the outcome, while others do. 
We can use the contrastive theory to distinguish between instructive 
factors (the specific environmental or genetic factors that are responsi-
ble for individual differences in developmental outcomes) and permis-
sive factors (the environmental factors and genes that participate in the 
process but can be black-boxed for the purposes of explaining with 
these change-relating generalization; see Woodward 2010; Griffiths & 
Stotz 2013; Calcott 2017). This enables us to talk about a gene for a trait 
even when the development of a trait is dependent on various other 
causal factors to which we do not pay attention. If the environment or 
population’s genetic structure changes, however, the scope of relevant 
explanatory factors may change. Most generalizations have a limited 
range of changes over which the relation holds, and they break under 
extreme interventions. For example, if a generalization is about quan-
tities (for example, an increase in the exposure to some substance in-
creases the risk of getting a certain disease), there is usually a range of 
values under which it holds, while it breaks when the values exceed 
this range. Woodward (2000) calls this range of changes under which 
the generalization holds the invariance domain. Presumably, all non-
physical generalizations (and most physical generalizations, for that 
matter) have an invariance domain.  
For many pragmatic considerations, we do not need to know the 
extent of the invariance domain and its conditions exactly. It is suffi-
cient to know whether the range of variation that is important for us 
for practical reasons (the natural habitats, for example) falls within the 
invariance domain. From the perspective of the basic research, how-
ever, what interests us most is precisely the contribution of these “nor-
mal” conditions. The relevant range of variation in background con-
ditions may also vary from discipline to discipline. For example, a 
psychologist and a biologist may hold different environmental factors 
to be constant in development. Consequently, some key concepts may 
have broader reference in some approaches than in others. I will later 
argue that this is the case with the concept of innateness: it may have 
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a practical use (and a reference) from the psychological point of view 
in some contexts, while it is misleading at best from a biological point 
of view.32  
The limits of an invariance domain are a reason to be interested 
in the basis of the invariance, not just its existence (for practical pur-
poses): why and how the cause and the effect are related in an invari-
ant causal relation. We might also be interested in this for further sci-
entific understanding of the phenomenon, or for purposes of discov-
ery, for example. A strict natural law (of physics) would provide such 
a connection as a primitive fact of matter, a characteristic of reality. 
However, regardless of our stance on such fundamental laws, biolog-
ical systems are complex systems in which further invariances take 
place in functionally organized structures. Although they do not 
break any laws of physics, they exhibit regularities in behaviour that 
are not necessitated by the laws of physics alone but also by how the 
systems are structured and what are the functional relations between 
the parts. There are lawlike biological generalizations, too, but they 
are notoriously contingent, local, and fragile (Beatty 1995; Glennan 
1996 & 2002b; Mitchell 1997 & 2000; Raerinne 2011). Although these 
generalizations can be used in explanations and predictions under the 
contrastive-counterfactual model (see Woodward 2001; Raerinne 
2011) and in modelling the behaviour of a system, there is a call for 
further explanation of their very existence, too (see also Andersen 
2011). Moreover, the basis of a generalization enables us to make pre-
dictions about the range of applicability, or the invariance domain. 
The idea of biological mechanisms has been used to accomplish this, 
among other things (Bechtel & Richardson 1993; Bechtel & Abraham-
sen 2005; Darden 2006; Glennan 1996, 2002b & 2010; Machamer, 
Darden & Craver 2000; Craver 2007). 
 
32 There is also a vernacular notion of innateness that is a part of folk biology 
and folk psychology and refers to a completely invariant appearance of a trait, 
which is also the notion of innateness traditionally used in philosophical dis-
cussion of “innate ideas”. Nothing is innate in this sense. (See Sober 1998; Me-
din & Atran 1999; Griffiths 2002; Bering 2006; Bateson & Mameli 2007.) 
58 
 
2.2. Biological Mechanisms 
 
The idea of (non-physical) science as a search for mechanisms, not 
laws, or the New Mechanistic Philosophy, is a general idea of how to 
understand scientific discovery, explanation, prediction, and model-
ling. It has been used to account for things like causation, levels, func-
tion, reduction, and emergence in complex biological systems and be-
yond. (See Machamer, Darden & Craver 2000; Bechtel 2006; Darden 
2006; Craver 2007; Wimsatt 2007; Glennan 2010a; Levy 2013.) There 
are two basic ideas in particular that are relevant to what will follow. 
First, the idea that knowledge about mechanisms provides explana-
tory information on how and when a causal connection holds between 
two things of an interest. Opening the black box tells us when the 
black box can be kept closed for practical purposes, if the mechanistic 
basis is known to hold in all the practically relevant contexts. Sec-
ondly, mechanistic thinking may help to relate different kinds of 
causes (and therefore different kinds of causal explanations) that con-
stitute a mechanism from the perspective of the functioning of a big-
ger whole. I will use this line of thinking to articulate the relationship 
between proximate, developmental, evolutionary historical and evo-
lutionary functional explanations. Before this, I will discuss the mech-
anistic approach in biology in general and in understanding natural 
selection explanation in particular. 
 
2.2.1. Mechanisms in Explanation 
 
The idea of mechanistic connections being an important part of un-
derstanding biological phenomena goes back to the Early Modern era, 
although it was abandoned for a while (see Grene & Depew 2004). The 
idea of mechanistic explanation was introduced to more recent dis-
cussion by Peter Railton (1978) and Wesley Salmon (1984). They 
thought of mechanisms as interacting causal processes. Contemporary 
mechanists, building largely upon William Wimsatt’s pioneering 
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work (see Wimsatt 1974 & 2007), define mechanism as a system of in-
teracting parts. The seminal paper by Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden 
and Carl Craver, for example, defines mechanisms as “entities and ac-
tivities organized such that they are productive of regular changes 
from start or set-up to finish or termination conditions.” (Machamer, 
Darden & Craver 2000: 3.) The earlier characterizations concentrated 
on the basic idea of mechanism as interactions of partial causes that re-
sult in emergent causal connections in a complicated network of causal 
processes, whereas the contemporary discussion concentrates on the 
functional structures of such causal connections. The more novel ap-
proach, the New Mechanistic Philosophy, attempts to provide insight 
on the mechanistic connections in nature precisely through an analy-
sis of that structure. However, the difference between mechanism as 
process and mechanism as structure is crucial (Glennan 2010b), and it 
will have consequences for how to think about different kinds of 
mechanisms. The idea of mechanistic interaction of processes may 
have a broader scope than the structural approach.  
I will not go into the various definitions of mechanism and the 
disagreements in the literature, however. I will only describe the gen-
eral idea of mechanistic explanation briefly and point out that there 
are different ways in which the basic explanatory logic may be imple-
mented. Much of the discussion on biological mechanisms is about 
physical structures such as a cell (Bechtel 2006) or brain (2007), but 
social mechanisms, for example, work quite differently: the parts of 
the mechanism are types of interaction (see Kuorikoski 2009). There is 
no reason why some biological systems would not work in a similar 
way – for instance, social behavioural traits that are constituted by in-
teractions. I will use this idea precisely in that context. Furthermore, 
as we will see shortly, natural selection itself is a mechanism of the 
latter kind. But before getting to these issues, I will outline the general 
logic of mechanistic explanation that I assume to be generally ac-
cepted by the mechanists. 
The general idea of mechanistic explanation is the following (ab-
stracting from Glennan 1996, 2002b & 2010b; Machamer, Darden & 
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Craver 2000; Bechtel 2006 & 2011; Craver 2007 & 2103; my paraphras-
ing). The mechanistic structure is a system of entities and activities with 
a functional structure (such as the composition of a cell or a social 
structure that characterizes the relations between people). The parts 
of the system work in an orchestrated manner in a causally functional, 
invariant relation to each other. When the causal properties of the 
parts are combined with the structure of the interaction between the 
parts, a causal pathway emerges, making a causal connection, a mech-
anistic process between two entities or events not connected otherwise. 
This gives the entity or event thus created a mechanistic causal explana-
tion. The regularities in the mechanistic structure entail generalizable 
explanatory regularities. Furthermore, a mechanistic structure can 
give rise to a new phenomenon and properties that are of the mecha-
nistic whole and constituted by the parts and their activities. This is a 
mechanistic constitutive explanation. 33  These regularities, phenomena 
and properties would not exist because of the parts alone, but also 
need the structure of invariant relations to exist. The architecture of the 
mechanism has a constitutive role in mediating the causal powers or 
regular behaviours (whichever perspective is chosen for the analysis) 
of the parts, transforming it into the causal power or regular behav-
iour of the whole system. The causal powers or regular behaviours of 
the component parts are in turn constituted by lower-level mecha-
nisms that are guided by further lower-level mechanisms, and so on, 
until the fundamental regularities are reached.  
The “levels” in mechanistic explanations do not refer to ontologi-
cal relations34 or disciplinary relations. They refer to the hierarchies of 
part-whole interactions in which entities of the same type (for exam-
ple, molecules) may be parts of a mechanism on different levels of 
 
33 For the difference between causal and constitutive explanations by mecha-
nisms, see Salmon 1984; Bechtel 2006; Craver 2007; Kuorikoski 2012; and 
Krickel 2018. 
34 Until, perhaps, at the explanatory “bottom,” if physicalism is correct and 
causation can be given a physical definition, both of which are contested is-
sues, and neither of which matters in the context of this dissertation. 
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hierarchy (for example, constituting a neuron, which in turn is a part 
of a neural process, and participates directly in brain processes; 
Craver 2007). What is important is the causal functional structure and 
not, for example, physical hierarchical structure as such. Nevertheless, 
a key insight in the New Mechanistic Philosophy is that the physical 
structure and causal functional structure can be studied together in a 
dialectical manner. 
However, mechanistic systems function in an environment. The 
environment is not just a source of causal inputs and a target of out-
puts. A fixed system in a causal interaction with its environment may 
be structured so that certain parts of the environment, when present, 
are constitutive parts of a causal process, although they are not a part 
of the system in a narrower sense.35 These external factors may be con-
sidered part of the mechanism as a process bringing about a change 
in the states of the system, even if the explanatory mechanistic struc-
ture is conceived to be the fixed structure alone. Such interactive pro-
cessing is a crucial part of many biological systems that use resources 
reliably available in the environment – not only in their operation and 
maintenance of homeostasis, for example, but also in their develop-
ment (Wolpert et al 2010). 
The general idea of a causal mechanism as systemic interaction 
of causal parts could be used as a theory of causation, a theory of ex-
planation, or a theory of modelling strategies (see Levy 2013). I am not 
using it directly as any of the above. I use it as a supplement to the 
contrastive theory of causal explanation, as a framework to character-
ize the processes and structures in the world that constitute complex 
dependencies. Not all explaining is mechanism-seeking, not even 
when there are mechanisms involved. On the contrary, mechanism-
seeking explanations presuppose the idea that the mechanism is a 
 
35 One may be, of course, either internalist or externalist when it comes to char-
acterizing a mechanistic system such as a cell, but there may be both prag-
matic and theoretical explanatory reasons to draw a clear distinction between 
a physical structure such as a cell and its environment. 
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mechanism for something being the case instead of something else being 
the case (Craver 2013). Explaining with a mechanism, or rather, with a 
mechanistic connection, presupposes some idea of why we are inter-
ested in the mechanism for explanatory purposes in the first place, 
and the contrastive-counterfactual theory can be used to explicate this. 
This is important with complex systems in which the structures and 
processes may have multiple functions and can be partitioned in dif-
ferent ways so that different combinations of parts constitute different 
mechanisms. A mechanism discovered for a behavioural trait, for ex-
ample, is not likely to be the mechanism for this behaviour (see 
Longino 2013). All mechanistic explanations are answers to more pre-
cise explanatory questions than that. The individuation of a mecha-
nism involves deciding what effect we are trying to find a mechanism 
for. If we are not supplementing mechanistic approach with a contras-
tive-counterfactual or some other normative theory of explanation in 
this fashion, we would end up just describing structures of causal in-
teractions without criteria for individuation of explanans for any given 
explanandum. This would probably be simply fine, or even desirable, 
for a fundamentalist explanatory project seeking a complete set of fac-
tors. Given the practical needs for explanatory theories that are under 
consideration here, that would not do. This is important, for example, 
for understanding natural selection, as we will see. 
Discovering mechanistic detail may deepen the explanation in 
three ways. First, in providing an explanation for a singular explandum, 
adding mechanistic detail helps to make it more precise, more specific, 
or both. Second, in providing an explanation for a generic explanandum, 
knowing mechanistic detail tells us about the invariance domain and 
the stability. It provides explanatory information about the conditions 
under which a causal connection holds between two things of interest 
and when it breaks, as well as an insight into abnormal functioning 
and its causes. Third, our knowledge of mechanistic detail provides 
deeper understanding of the explanandum in the sense of increasing 
the explanatory counterfactual information: we are able to answer 
quantitatively more and qualitatively different kinds of what-if-
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things-were-different questions (Ylikoski & Kuorikoski 2010). Moreo-
ver, mechanistic understanding provides a way to evaluate the con-
nection between different (but correct) explanations by locating them 
in a wider scheme of mechanistic connections. This will be my general 
understanding of how the different kinds of explanation (including 
the three different explanatory dimensions) are related in the evolu-
tionary explanations of behaviour. 
Our knowledge of the existence of a connecting mechanism, even 
when it is left black-boxed, is evidence for either a generic or a singular 
causal claim between cause and effect, or both.36 Our knowledge of 
the details of the mechanism tells us what makes the connection and 
what the conditions for the causal relation to hold are: the structure of 
the mechanism and the causal functions the parts play in the whole 
system. Detailing a mechanism opens the explanatory black box. 
However, given that the mechanistic thinking itself presupposes both 
simpler causal relations (of the component parts) and needs an ac-
count for individuation, mechanistic thinking is not a stand-alone the-
ory of causation or causal explanation. Whether or not a mechanistic 
description is needed or helpful is a case-by-case issue that depends 
on purposes. (Ylikoski 2001; Woodward 2002 & 2011.) But if the es-
sence of mechanistic thinking in explanatory contexts is to articulate 
the connection involved in the causal relation between the explanan-
dum and explanans, and that the kind of details used for describing a 
mechanism has no relevance as such, we can be liberal as to what 
 
36 It is possible that there are unique mechanisms in the sense that the exact 
architecture is instantiated only once. A unique mechanism like this (for ex-
ample, a unique historical situation combining causally interactive factors in 
a novel way) could create a unique causal connection between events that 
holds only once. This means that there can be singular causal relations that 
are not instantiations of any causal generalization. (See Glennan 2002b.) How-
ever, this does not mean that there are no underlying generalizable causal 
processes or sub-mechanisms (as component parts), and from an epistemic 
point of view, we can know about the causal nature of these individual cases 
only through our knowledge of these underlying processes or mechanisms. 
64 
 
counts as a mechanism. In fact, we must allow a variety of different 
kinds of mechanisms if we want the mechanistic thinking to be useful 
in all the complex causal structures that it is intended to be useful for. 
An important link between manipulationist and mechanistic 
thinking about causation has to do with the causal links within the 
mechanism. A description of the causal connections between different 
parts is needed to characterize the internal workings of a mechanism. 
A manipulation account of causation can be used for this (see Menzies 
2012). There is, however, a complication when many causal parts of a 
complex system have several causal functions, there are looping ef-
fects, and so on. This has been used as an argument against the ma-
nipulation notion of causality in this context, and an alternative view 
has been provided, according to which the mechanistic explanation is 
simply about describing the structures and the activities of the parts 
of the mechanistic system (Machamer 2004; Bogen 2005). The core of 
the criticism is that one cannot make isolated causal interventions in 
the system, and the manipulationist notion, according to the critics, 
seems to require this. This criticism is, however, not valid. The idea of 
manipulationist analysis is to conceptualize the causal relations in a 
piece-meal fashion that distinguishes between the different causal roles 
a part plays in the system. The notion of an ideal intervention is used 
to articulate this idea in cases where no actual intervention would be 
conceivable without affecting the system otherwise. This disconnects 
the notion from the actual manipulation, but the aim is to describe the 
functional structure of the causal networks, not the physical structure 
that instantiates them. The causal functional decomposition needs not be 
identical to the structural decomposition of the system. The same parts 
of a concrete mechanistic structure can instantiate several different 
parts of the causal system that is instantiated by the structure. There-
fore, if one simply describes the structure, the activities of the parts, 
and the processes flowing through them, some causal information 
about the system is missing.  
Not all mechanisms are describable as processes and interactions 
between concrete parts of a fixed structure, yet the mechanistic 
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explanatory logic seems to apply. This is the case with social mecha-
nisms, and there is no reason to think that there could not be mecha-
nisms like this in biology, too. As I mentioned at the beginning of this 
section, I will argue that social behaviour should be understood 
within the alternative framework even from the biological point of 
view, and I will apply this idea to natural selection as well. In a social 
mechanism, the same concrete “parts” (individuals) may play differ-
ent causal roles in different contexts, and these functions, not the in-
dividuals, are relevant to the explanation. These social mechanisms 
can still be described as systematic interactions between causal pro-
cesses that give rise to constitutive and causal relations that would not 
exist without the structure of causal interactions (Kuorikoski 2009). 
Robert Skipper and Roberta Milstein (2005), in turn, have argued that 
the standard models of mechanisms fail to describe natural selection 
as a mechanism. This is because, according to them, natural selection 
is a probabilistic process and its component parts (its entities and ac-
tivities) cannot be individuals, traits, or the population itself. They are 
mostly right, but this criticism only states that natural selection cannot 
be a kind of mechanism that is characterized in this way.37 
Jaakko Kuorikoski (2009) has argued that there are two different 
concepts of mechanism that play the same explanatory role but are 
different in important ways: mechanism as a componential causal 
system (CCS) and mechanism as an abstract form of interaction 
(AFI). The CCS mechanism is the one that has been discussed by the 
New Mechanists, but there is no reason to consider only one of them 
“really” a mechanism. Both of these notions are referred to as “mech-
anisms” by scientists themselves and both are based on the idea that 
some causal connections are the results of nets of causal processes that 
have a structure that grounds the emerging explanatory connections. 
 
37 The part of their criticism that is not correct is the probabilistic part. For a 
reply to the problem of probabilistic processes in general, see Barros 2008; for 
a defence of the possibility of stochastic mechanisms, see DesAutels 2011. This 
problem does not arise the same way in the notion of mechanism I am moving 
into now, so it will not be discussed here. 
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The explanatory logic is similar enough, attributing the existence of 
causal generalizations to robust effects of networks of causal processes 
instantiated by the constituent parts.38 The nature of the parts and 
their interaction may be different with different kinds of mechanisms. 
An adequate articulation of mechanistic thinking should include all 
types of mechanistic explanatory strategies, if possible, and then pro-
ceed to the finer points of different mechanisms if needed. Therefore, 
as a starting point at least, both CCS and AFI are concepts of mecha-
nism at minimum, or, as I would rather say, they are sub-categories of 
the same explanatory idea and different, richer elaborations of a more 
minimalistic concept of mechanism.39 Both are important explanatory 
concepts for our current purposes.  
 
38 The New Mechanistic Philosophy starts with discussion about CCS mecha-
nisms and that has been the subsequent emphasis. However, it is a contingent 
fact that the philosophers of science started to analyse one category of mech-
anistic connections under the banner of mechanism. Surely, this is not an ad-
equate reason to restrict the notion to these cases only, especially when the 
term is used more extensively in actual scientific practices. 
39 Stuart Glennan (2015: 145) defines a minimal mechanism as follows: “A mech-
anism for a phenomenon consists of entities (or parts) whose activities and 
interactions are organized so as to be responsible for the phenomenon.” This 
is sufficient to characterize the logic of mechanistic explanation, but any given 
context of explanation requires some analysis of how the parts achieve this or 
evidence that they do. I consider the more sophisticated definitions to be ex-
plications of mechanistic logic under more specific conditions. The different 
definitions for a mechanism (for example, Bechtel & Richardson 1993; Bechtel 
& Abrahamsen 2005; Glennan 1996, 2002b & 2010; Machamer, Darden & 
Craver 2000; Craver 2007) do not need to be competing definitions for the 
same idea of mechanism but specify different conditions that have different 
consequences and apply in different contexts, granting contextual rather than 
universal insights about mechanisms. For example, such important issues as 
explaining the distinctive capacity of living things to maintain their homeo-
stasis as systems separate from their environment (which is a part of being 
alive; see Ganti 2003 and Bedau 2010 for more detailed analysis) require ad-
ditional properties of the mechanistic explanatory models (Bechtel 2011). 
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CCS mechanisms are Cartesian mechanisms, physical systems 
(such as a cell in Bechtel 2006 or a brain in Craver 2007) that are both 
functionally and structurally decomposable into concrete component 
parts. There are specific, direct causal connection between the parts, 
and these are the basis for the macro-properties of the system due to 
their causal powers and the composition of the system (see also 
Machamer 2004; Glennan 2010a). In AFI mechanisms, in contrast, the 
component parts of the mechanism are the kinds of behaviour that can 
be instantiated by various concrete parts that, in turn, can potentially 
instantiate multiple behaviours. For example, in studying social 
mechanisms, the concrete component parts (individuals and their be-
havioural dispositions) are interchangeable with each other in a social 
context, and the same individual exhibits different causal capacities in 
different contexts. The individuals are not only related to each other 
in a structure, but their relevant causal properties are relational: they 
depend on other individuals and the context. This context-dependent 
behaviour and its function in the structure of interactions on the pop-
ulation level is what matters, not particular individuals and their in-
dividual relation to each other, and these forms of interaction can be 
abstracted from the concrete interactions as the constitute parts of the 
mechanisms. The causal functional structure cannot be mapped to a 
spatiotemporal structure made of individuals, but to the patterns of 
interaction, that in turn are dependent on a repertoire of behavioural 
choices of individuals and how they manifest in the interactions.40 
 
40 There is a direct link from this to the individualism–holism issue. The agent-
based models may model either individualistic or holistic processes. This is 
because the agents in the models may represent fixed individuals or individ-
uals that play a causal role (which may or may not be a social role) that is 
specified by the context and affected by other factors in it. As Kuorikoski 
(2009: 35, n35) points out, the AFI approach identifies causal properties that 
are, as Wimsatt (2007: 217) puts it, “in between levels.” The account that I will 
give of some of the social behavioural traits as causally explanatory, fitness-
difference-making factors in the evolution of social behaviour, can be charac-
terized in this way. 
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Since the causal powers of the “parts” (the individuals) depend on 
other parts directly, the system is not a structural composite of com-
ponents with intrinsic causal powers. Instead, the dynamics of the sys-
tem must be understood by abstracting the forms of interaction within 
the system (such as interactions between individuals). However, if we 
adopt the interventionist conception of causality and the contrastive 
theory of explanation, we can operate with mechanistic causal func-
tional structures abstracted from a network of causal processes. 
Arnon Levy and William Bechtel (2013), in turn, discuss abstract 
mechanisms, by which they understand patterns of causal connectivity 
(such as network models and causal graphs) that are abstractions from 
the details of the mechanistic basis for those connections. In contrast 
to some other mechanists (for example, Machamer, Darden & Craver 
2000; Darden 2006; Craver 2007), they think that when it comes to 
modelling mechanisms, there should be room alongside the detailed 
models of decomposable parts and activities for the idea of abstract 
models of the behaviour of the system that have an explanatory role. 
The general point is that it is not always necessary to go into the details 
of concrete interactions of the parts of the mechanistic structure. It 
could even be misleading.  
I will discuss behavioural traits and psychological traits in social 
interaction as two different (yet connected) explananda for evolution-
ary explanation in a later chapter. It is important to distinguish indi-
vidual responses in a social setting and specific intentions or psycho-
logical tendencies – for instance, altruistic behavioural tendencies and 
altruistic motivation. The behavioural function in any given social set-
ting is multiply realizable by various psychological factors. Referring 
to psychological states instead of behavioural interactions would be 
more precise but not robust enough to have maximal explanatory in-
formation for some explanatory aims if the underlying psychology is 
heterogenous on the population level. Furthermore, if we abandon a 
priori individualism in our attempt to describe the components of so-
cial interaction, we may want to go deeper into the cognitive and mo-
tivational architectures of individuals instead of staying at the 
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intentional-level description. The sub-personal cognitive processes 
and motivational mechanisms that constitute individuals as agents, as 
well as their behavioural dispositions, may also directly constitute su-
pra-individual phenomena by being parts of social mechanisms in 
contextual settings (see Sperber 1997).  
 
2.2.2. Natural Selection as a Mechanism 
 
Biological evolution is a population-level change in the frequencies of 
individual properties, usually measured by genetic variation under-
lying the phenotypic variation. This is not conceptually necessary and 
there are good reasons to think that there are alternatives to genetic 
inheritance, but I will keep the idea simple for now. There are many 
sources for the change. Firstly, there could be a source of novelty, such 
as mutation. Secondly, given that all individuals do not produce ex-
actly the same number of further reproducing offspring, there will al-
ways be effects of chance and even disappearance of variation for 
purely statistical reasons – this is drift. In principle, these factors alone, 
combined with reproductive isolation keeping the mutations and drift 
apart, could even lead into speciation. However, there can be system-
atic biases caused by the properties of the evolving traits themselves 
in this chance process, such as their usefulness in the environment that 
the population is spread across. This requires a combination of causal 
factors that together form the mechanism of natural selection. Natural 
selection can be defined, following John Endler (1986), as a process in 
which 
 
C1)  there is variation in a given phenotypic trait on the popu-
lation level, 
C2)  there is a consistent relationship between the trait and fit-
ness, 
C3)  the trait is inherited, and because of this, 
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O)  there will be a change in the frequency of distribution of 
the variation in the trait between generations (see also 
Lewontin 1970; Futuyma 1998).  
 
This definition describes the logic of a causal mechanism: given the 
component parts (C1–C3) and their causal contribution to the system, 
an outcome (O) is produced. The causal processes go through the in-
dividuals and their interaction with the environment, and the repro-
ductive system, but the relevant causal components in the explanation 
are C1–C3. The generalizable phenotypic differences between the in-
dividuals (C1) are abstracted on the population level (that is, they are 
differences between phenotypes, not individuals), and although the 
differences are not causal in the productive sense, their existence is a 
necessary difference-maker in the mechanistic structure that produces 
the change. C2 refers to the systematic bias these phenotypic differ-
ences cause in the expected reproductive success (which is a relational 
property, in respect both to the other individuals of the population 
and to the environment).41 C3 expresses the presupposition of a mech-
anism that transfers the trait to the next generation in the population. 
These factors causally direct the process of evolution. The outcome is 
a population-level change in the variation to a certain direction. This 
process cannot be understood as a Cartesian mechanism, but the as-
pects of the real interactions that the individuals within the popula-
tion have with their environments, that are causally relevant to C1 and 
C2, can be abstracted as the causal components interacting with each 
other and C3, producing O.  
Although the concrete causal processes take place at the level of 
organisms and their interaction with their environments, some as-
pects of environment and individual characters have systematic 
 
41 Note that the reference to fitness is not a reference to a cause for evolution 
here, but a reference to an effect that the phenotypic differences have on re-
production. I will discuss the concept of fitness more extensively later, when 
I discuss the concept of evolutionary altruism. 
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effects that can be abstracted and generalized on the population level. 
These abstracted aspects can be considered components of causal re-
lations in the framework of the contrastive-counterfactual theory of 
causal explanation. Put together, these components constitute a func-
tional mechanistic structure. The component part C3 is a CCS mecha-
nism that is presupposed but often black-boxed in evolutionary expla-
nations – I come back to this later. The mechanistic nature of natural 
selection is both a model example and a test case for New Mechanistic 
Thought. It is a model example because the mechanistic nature of nat-
ural selection explains its productivity as well as the observable regu-
larities without laws, and the mechanistic nature makes its inefficien-
cies and fragility understandable. It is a test case because applying the 
most common definitions of a mechanism has proven to be problem-
atic. I submit that the process of evolution by natural selection and its 
causal factors cannot be adequately presented as a CCS mechanism, 
but the mechanistic logic on an AFI works just fine. Since the topic of 
this dissertation is evolutionary explanation and it is approached from 
the mechanistic perspective, I will briefly discuss this issue and the 
lessons from the debate. 
One key issue in the debate on natural selection as a mechanism 
has to do with the fact that its mechanistic components are abstrac-
tions (Skipper & Millstein 2005). Some have questioned whether it can 
be a causal factor at all. The advocates of a non-causalist, statisticalist 
alternative (Walsh 2000; Walsh, Lewens & Ariew 2002; Matthen & Ar-
iew 2002 & 2009) claim that natural selection is merely a statistical 
product of the causal interactions of individuals with their environ-
ments. Following from that, the real causal factors are the same that 
are at work in drift. According to them, the difference between natural 
selection and drift is just a difference in the statistical outcome of the 
causal processes of evolution and neither of them are causal factors 
themselves. This approach, however, focuses attention on all the 
wrong places. The critical issue seems to be that they approach causa-
tion and causal explanation from the fundamentalist point of view, 
tracing singular, concrete causal processes: for them, causal factors of 
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evolution are things such as predation, sunlight, and direct (in con-
trast to evolutionary) competition (Walsh, Lewens & Ariew 2002). 
This particular problem does not arise in the framework of the manip-
ulationist conception of causation and the contrastive-counterfactual 
theory of causal explanation (see also Reisman & Forber 2005; Shapiro 
& Sober 2007). Furthermore, if natural selection is an AFI mechanism, 
its explanatory mechanistic structure does not need coincide with the 
actual causal processes. The reasoning behind this follows. 
“Natural selection” as such refers to the abstract form of interac-
tion in which the component parts are whichever concrete factors 
have the relevant causal functions specified by the description of nat-
ural selection – all particular explanations “fill” these “forms” (or “rec-
ipes”, to follow Peter Godfrey-Smith’s 2009 terminology) with traits 
and environmental factors. It may be correct to say that natural selec-
tion, in abstract, is not a universal mechanism – but then again, it does 
not even exist as such. It is not a natural law, but a description of a 
certain functional structure of a causal system – any causal system. 
This functional structure can be instantiated by concrete systems of 
causal interaction in which the functioning of the concrete parts con-
stitutes local AFI mechanisms through the network of causal pro-
cesses. The same logical structure can be found in various non-biolog-
ical contexts, too, such as cultural evolution. It is also important to no-
tice that both the causes (abstracted inheritable differences measura-
ble in fitness) and the effects (changes in the frequencies on the popu-
lation level across the generations) occur at the population level. Even 
if the causal processes take place on individual level interactions, the 
causal explanation “slices” the entirety of the causal interactions on the 
population level with a description that captures those properties of 
the concrete interactions that instantiate the logic of natural selection. 
At the same time, if the theory of natural selection applies to a partic-
ular change in a particular population, then these properties are caus-
ally efficient in biasing the evolutionary process. 
There are various descriptions that may refer to the causal factors 
that make the difference in the outcome, but the population-level 
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description that uses the natural selection conceptualization is explan-
atorily more informative. This is because it adequately refers to those 
factors that make the difference to the direction of the change on the 
population level. Furthermore, this description refers to explanatory 
types of properties, thus being more generalizable and giving counter-
factual information. It does not matter that the more detailed and accu-
rate description of the causal processes of evolution is on a different 
level (the concrete interactions between organisms and their environ-
ments). It also does not matter that we cannot identify a difference 
between those processes that are in accordance with natural selection 
and those that are not on this more detailed level of description. The 
description that uses the language of natural selection refers only to a 
mechanistic structure, not causal processes, but it still refers to a set of 
properties and the outcomes of these processes. These processes (inter-
actions between the organisms and their environments, reproduction, 
and the evolutionary history constituted by these processes) are, how-
ever, presupposed for there to be a link between the selective pres-
sures and the outcome – they are mechanistic details, often black-
boxed. Both causal descriptions (detailed processes and generalizable 
structures) are correct, but there is a trade-off between being precise 
(regarding what factors are explanatory) and being accurate (in the de-
tails of the description of the process) in any concrete evolutionary ex-
planation. In this case, however, increasing accuracy decreases ade-
quacy as well: we are not interested in how the processes took place, 
but why they were likely to take the trajectories they took. 
Given the framework assumed here, it is sufficient for the logic 
of the explanation that the relevant causal aspects of the net of ongo-
ing processes are captured. We are not interested in all the causal in-
teractions taking place, but in the reliable net effects on the population 
level and the properties that have the right biasing effect. Abstracting 
away from detail enables us to focus on these properties, given that 
the connection is robust enough. A more detailed description of the 
causal processes actually loses explanatory information. Details of any 
particular interaction do not tell us anything about why the 
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population level effect occurs and what is important in those interac-
tions. For example, the advocates of the statistical approach conclude 
that there is no explanatory difference between natural selection and 
drift, but this conclusion should be taken as evidence against that ap-
proach. There is an obvious explanatory difference: natural selection 
specifies the conditions under which the probabilistic process of drift 
become biased.42 These conditions (abstracted in the form of natural 
selection explanation) cause the bias and explain the evolutionary out-
come. For example, if a trait was selected for its use in the environment 
(it is an adaptation), then if something in the environment changed 
(an intervention) so that the abstraction into conditions of natural se-
lection cannot be done in the new context (for example, the differences 
in traits are no longer reflected in the differences in fitness), the drift 
would not be constrained and the direction of evolution would not be 
biased – the trait would not be selected. This is an unequivocal case of 
causal explanation. The conditions C1–3 for natural selection are ab-
stractions that specify the causal structure of the interaction that, in-
stantiated in concrete interactions (and the differences between these 
interactions), constitute an AFI mechanism.43  
 
42 To be precise, the drift is not the theoretical null hypothesis of evolution: the 
Hardy-Weinberg Principle, which states that allele and genotype frequencies 
in a population remain constant from generation to generation in the absence 
of other evolutionary influences, is (Sober 1984; Stephens 2010). Evolutionary 
“forces,” including drift, are observed through their effects that are measura-
ble deviations from this equilibrium. In any finite population, however, there 
are random events that cause genetic drift, so this should probably be treated 
as the empirical null hypothesis. (Brandon 2006; see also Futuyma 1998.) But if 
this is the case, drift should not be considered a “force” or even a causal factor 
at all (Earnshaw 2015; Luque 2016). The point here is, however, simply that 
the change in population (that is, evolution) can be random (drift) or biased 
toward some traits evolving rather than other (natural selection), which is an 
additional factor in the process that still includes drift as an agent of change 
(see also Hitchcock & Velasco 2014). 
43 Lane DesAutels (2016) argues, against Skipper & Millstein (2005), that nat-
ural selection can be understood as Machamer–Craver–Darden mechanisms, 
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Furthermore, natural selection is an open mechanism: other 
causal factors affect the process of evolution too. The conditions that 
constitute the mechanistic structure of natural selection may be pre-
sent even if the actual causal process is not influenced by these condi-
tions enough for them to be the difference maker. Even in this case, 
natural selection would have what I will later call a minimal explana-
tory role, since it is a part of the conditions that need to be considered 
in counterfactual analyses.44 
I will not go deeper than this into the debate on natural selection 
as a causal mechanism, for two reasons. First, this is a foundational 
issue about the nature of evolution that would require much more 
thorough debate on the foundational questions about causation and 
causal explanation that I only referred to in the beginning of this sec-
tion and that I must leave in the background, and it is not the topic of 
the dissertation. It is sufficient, for now, to outline the mechanistic 
framework for analysing some of those mechanistic connections in 
greater detail later. I hope I have sketched an outline of an adequate 
argument for using this approach. Second, it is fair to say that, alt-
hough there is still some confusion over the mechanistic nature of 
 
if we distinguish between process vs. product regularity, mechanism-internal 
vs. mechanism-external sources of irregularity, and abstract vs. concrete reg-
ularity. I have characterized CCS mechanisms basically as MCD mechanisms, 
but these liberalizations of decomposability and isolation of the interactions 
between parts make DesAutel’s characterization, in my estimation, an AFI 
mechanism. The solution still works and is similar to the one presented here. 
44 Denis Walsh and Andre Ariew have pointed out that the current adaptive 
value of a trait explains (and predicts) the persistence of the trait in the future, 
even if it was not explanatory for the past evolution, for the same reason: it 
affects selection in the future (Walsh & Ariew 1996; Walsh 1996). We do not 
need to go into how this fits their statistical, non-causalist view of natural se-
lection, if it does at all. But under the interpretation advocated here, we can 
go even further and say that the mechanism of natural selection is currently 
in place, and this is why we can explain and predict the direction of evolution, 
within the limits of various constraints and other causal factors. 
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natural selection, the rivalling statistical view is a minority view,45 and 
the third theoretical alternative, natural selection as a law-like primi-
tive, is probably not endorsed by anyone. What is important for what 
is ahead is that the mechanism of natural selection is an AFI mecha-
nism with parts that are population-level abstractions of processes 
and differences that take place at the individual level. The population-
level descriptions emphasize what is explanatorily relevant in the 
population structure, whereas the individual-level descriptions of the 
same processes would not. 
  
 
45 For other responses and counterarguments to statisticalists, see Bouchard & 
Rosenberg 2004, Stephens 2004, Reisman & Forber 2005, Millstein 2006, 
Shapiro & Sober 2007, Millstein, Skipper & Dietrich 2009, Otsuka et al 2011, 
Ramsey 2013a, and Otsuka 2016. The defenders of causalism concentrate by 
and large on fitness as the causal factor that makes natural selection a form of 
causal explanation, whereas I have identified it as one of three causal parts of 




3. Evolutionary Explanations of Behaviour 
 
Let us zoom closer to the main topic of this dissertation now: from 
what evolutionary explanations are to what they explain about behav-
ioural traits more specifically, and how this is connected to other bio-
logical (including psychological) explanations of the same traits. Nat-
ural selection explanations have well known constraints both in ap-
plicability as a purely evolutionary explanation and as an instrument 
for knowledge production, especially on human behaviour. Con-
straints do not, however, imply non-existence, and the topic at hand 
is on the methodology of such explanations when they are adequate.46 
I will start by discussing adaptationism and the criticism of it, as well 
as the various concepts of function. The discussion on functions has 
been about how to identify a function of a trait, which also partly deals 
with adaptivity and natural selection’s role in understanding biologi-
cal characteristics. The two discussions are connected, although the 
direction of analysis is different.  
I will argue that there are two different issues involved in adap-
tation explanations. The first is the trait’s causal role function in the 
overall design of the organism in its ecological context from an evolu-
tionary point of view: what does the trait do for the organism’s overall 
fitness in its environment in its form of life, taking its other character-
istics into account? This involves an overall (pseudo-purposive) de-
sign perspective on the organism, which is justified and explained by 
the fact that the organism as a whole is a product of an adaptive evo-
lutionary process that has crafted and tinkered it into a somewhat 
functional whole. This question asks what the trait is for in the organ-
ism’s way of being. The other part is the actual evolutionary history of 
the specific trait. The latter is a historical explanation, often presented as 
a narrative that highlights the relevant (but not all) causal factors that 
 
46 “Evolutionary explanation” is a much wider category than “natural selection 
explanation”, although the first expression is often used when the latter is 
meant. This unfortunate convention is followed even in the title of this thesis. 
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directed and constrained the evolution of the trait, including natural 
selection and the population-level dynamics from selection pressures. 
This question is about how and for what the trait took its shape his-
torically, from a given explanatory point of view. If these two forms 
of evolutionary explanations (evolutionary functional analysis and causal 
history) fall into one (that is, the evolutionary history is causally di-
rected by the adaptive functionality that we perceive, and the adaptive 
causal history explains the trait’s existence), we have a true adaptationist 
explanation for the trait. This is sometimes assumed to be the case as a 
working hypothesis for evolutionary explanations of both kinds.  
There are good, much debated reasons to think that this presup-
position (which was the original target of Stephen Gould’s and Rich-
ard Lewontin’s (1979) attack on “adaptationism”) does not work as a 
universal explanatory strategy in evolutionary history. This in turn 
casts some doubt on the sensibility of the adaptive functionality anal-
ysis part of the question, since the one is justified by the other. If evo-
lutionary functional analysis is to be taken as a causal explanation, a 
correct form of evolutionary history is presupposed, even if no details 
of the actual causal history are. In fact, the debate over whether adap-
tationism is a usable approach anywhere seems to presuppose that 
these two issues are inseparable. In what follows shortly, I will sepa-
rate these two questions and discuss both forms of evolutionary ex-
planation, the causal history and the evolutionary functional analysis 
in the non-historical sense, as well as their relation to other forms of 
biological explanation (proximate and developmental), against the 
background of the criticism of adaptationism. 
However, when the object of evolutionary explanation is a be-
havioural trait, further complications emerge. Although the principles 
of evolutionary explanation apply to behavioural traits just as well as 
to physical characteristics, behavioural traits are in a more complex 
relation to the environment from proximate, developmental, and evo-
lutionary points of view. Furthermore, the relation of proximate, devel-
opmental, and evolutionary explanations to each other becomes more 
complex as well. Regarding human social behaviour, an important 
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factor for this complication is the influence of the social and cultural 
environment. This is true of each of these dimensions separately, but 
it is also possible that the interaction between proximate, develop-
mental, and evolutionary dimensions of biological explanation takes 
place on this level as well, not only through genetic inheritance of be-
havioural tendencies. To give adequate answers to the questions emerg-
ing from this complex, the questions themselves must be framed 
properly. To do this, I will explicate the relationship between the dif-
ferent kinds of biological causal explanations within the framework 
that I will articulate shortly. Before going there, I will distinguish between 
three kinds of explanations involving an adaptationistic approach (or 
evolutionary functionalism): evolutionary historical explanations, artifact-
model functionalism, and the analysis of the adaptivity of current use. 
 
 
3.1. Adaptationism and Its Criticism 
 
For Charles Darwin (1859), there were two major features in nature 
that needed an explanation that the evolutionary theory could pro-
vide: the family-like similarities between species (or unity of type), and 
the fact that biological beings seem to be designed for their environ-
ment. The first question is answered by common ancestry and the sta-
bility of certain developmental and structural features from genera-
tion to generation (phylogenetic inertia), and the second one by the 
mechanism of natural selection. (See Depew & Weber 1996; Gould 
2002.) Evolutionary explanations are historical explanations for why 
certain traits exist in the population and why they possess certain gen-
eral characteristics. Natural selection explanations are evolutionary 
explanations that refer to natural selection as the primary explanatory 
factor, in contrast to, for example, drift, or developmental constraints.47 
 
47 Developmental constraints are the factors in the individual development that 
limit evolutionary change either by limiting the range of phenotypic variants that 
are possible in the ontogeny (generative constraints) or by limiting the viability or 
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The developmental constraints both conserve the developmental 
forms from earlier evolutionary history (resulting in homological simi-
larities and partly explaining phylogenetic inertia) and bias the direc-
tion evolutionary change by constraining the production of variation 
for selection to work on (see Maynard Smith et al 1985; Amundson 
1994 & 2001; Richardson & Chipman 2003; Pearce 2011). There are also 
random factors that affect evolution, such as drift and mutation. Since 
they are not directed, their effect gets smaller over time, but they do 
have consequences, especially on small populations (Futuyma 1998). 
Moreover, adaptation takes time and is path dependent. Natural se-
lection explanations are not the only evolutionary explanations. In 
what follows, I will give a very brief review of some of the critical dis-
cussion on adaptationism. My intention is not to participate in this 
discussion as such. The clarification of various possible adaptationist 
stances and their criticism is a starting point for developing my own 
account of evolutionary functionalism in explanation and helps to 
clarify what I am proposing. 
 
3.1.1. Kinds of Adaptation Explanations 
 
In the previous chapter, I defined natural selection, following Endler 
(1986), as a process in which: 
 
C1)  there is variation in the given phenotypic trait on the popu-
lation level, 
C2)  there is a consistent relationship between the trait and fitness, and 
C3)  the trait is inherited, and because of this, 
O)  there will be a change in the frequency of distribution of the 
variation in the trait between generations. 
 
survivability of the organism during ontogeny (including through the consequences 
for other developing traits; selective constraints) (Richardson & Chipman 2003). 
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C1–C3 constitute an explanatory mechanism for O. Note, however, 
that the condition C2 only states that there is a consistent relationship 
between the trait and fitness, or, that the expected reproduction rate 
relative to others in the population. It does not specify why the rela-
tionship holds. To establish this, we need to specify a mechanism link-
ing the trait and fitness. A causal (non-arbitrary) connection could 
hold because the trait 
 
C2a)  is adapted to its environment (that is, it has benefits for the 
survival of the individual possessing it in that specific en-
vironment), 
C2b)  enhances the individual’s reproductive capacity (fertil-
ity, mating success, and so on), 
C2c)  has a supportive function for another trait that fulfils C2a 
or C2b directly, or 
C2d)  is otherwise associated with another such trait (for exam-
ple, because of a structural or developmental connection 
such as pleiotropy). 
 
C2a–c are cases of the trait itself causally contributing to the fitness 
and therefore its own existence. They are selected for instead of just 
being selected, as in C2d (see Sober 1984a). Being adapted (C2a) is a 
qualitative ecological notion that refers to the fit between the organ-
ism or its trait and its environment (Brandon 1978). An organism can 
be more or less adapted (and in many cases variation can be quanti-
fied, and one can make optimality models for measurement), but the 
notion is about the qualitative fit, having a function, in contrast to the 
quantitative notion of fitness. Fitness is a measure for reproduction 
capacity of an entity that reproduces: depending on what the theory 
in use allows, a gene, an individual, or a group. The fitness of an indi-
vidual (or a gene) supervenes on the individual’s traits (or the traits 
associated with the gene) depending on their overall adaptedness 
(C2s) as well as the factors in C2b and C2c. Fitness is not a causal 
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property itself: it is a measurement of relative differences between re-
productive units in the causally relevant properties that direct evolu-
tion by natural selection. (Futuyma 1998; Sober 1984a: 97–102). What 
is usually meant by “adaptation” is either the process in which a trait 
evolves because it gets selected for its adaptedness, or the trait pro-
duced by this process. The adaptation explanations rely not only on 
the mechanism of natural selection (which covers all C2s) but also pre-
suppose that the trait has something it has been selected for, its adap-
tive function. In the strictest interpretation only C2a qualifies as an ad-
aptation since it is the only one in which the adaptive value of the trait 
is causally related to its origins. In a more inclusive reading, explana-
tions referring to C2b or C2c can also be included in the adaptation 
explanation, although they may have originated for some other adap-
tive purpose or for none at all, and have only acquired a new role. 
Stephen Jay Gould and Elisabeth Vrba (1982), for example, distinguish 
true adaptations from such traits, which they call exaptations. I will ar-
gue later why a more inclusive reading is more sensible. Traits that 
are selected because of an association (C2d) but have no selective func-
tion are by-products.  
Not all evolutionary explanations are adaptation explanations: 
some are by-product explanations, some refer to drift or phylogenetic 
inertia, and some may refer to historical contingencies in the evolu-
tionary pathways. “Evolutionary explanation” is a larger category, 
“adaptation explanation” is a sub-category. Adaptations and natural 
selection have, however, a central place in evolutionary explanations. 
In what follows next, I will highlight the reasons why and under what 
limitations. I will also discuss the explanatory relevance of adaptive 
functionality extracted from a mere causal-historical explanation. 
Evolutionary adaptation explanations are interested in history, but a 
snapshot of the current adaptation process may be interesting in some 
cases, too. Moreover, as I mentioned in my discussion on mechanisms, 
an explanatory causal structure (such as the factors constituting a nat-
ural selection) may exist without a causal process going through it. 
More importantly, there is another reason besides the explanatory 
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relevance for why we think that C2a is special among the C2s: it is 
related to how the organism fits its environment. I will argue that this 
is in itself an important perspective for understanding living beings, 
not just because of its role in evolutionary-historical explanations. 
 
3.1.2. The Problems of Adaptationism 
 
The methodology of studying practically all biological traits as adap-
tations, or presupposing they are adaptations, was labelled “adapta-
tionism” by Stephen Jay Gould and Richard Lewontin (1979) who be-
gan to criticize it as a flawed practice (see also Gould & Vrba 1982; 
Gould 2002; Lewens 2009). Adaptationism is, however, several things 
wrapped into one package. I will now distinguish different concepts 
of adaptationism. This is not done to sort out different views – in fact, 
the “adaptationisms” discussed next are not different stances or views 
about adaptation, and they are not theoretically independent either. 
The aim is, instead, to sort out the overall baggage of adaptationism 
that is a net of connected ideas about the nature of biological evolu-
tion, explanatory choices, and methodological tools. The purpose of 
this is to find out how evolutionary explanations could and should be 
understood in the context of social behaviour and what the conse-
quences of this are for the issue of individualism vs holism in the hu-
man context. A starting point for distinguishing between various 
ideas related to it is Peter Godfrey-Smith’s (2001) distinction between 
empirical, explanatory, and methodological adaptationism, that can be 
further refined into several alternative interpretations of the subject 
matter; I will mostly follow Tim Lewens (2009) in this. Furthermore, a 
fourth important aspect of adaptationism (that was also discussed in 
Gould & Lewontin 1979) is the issue of atomism and holism48 about the 
characteristics of an individual: how isolated from the overall 
 
48 “Holism” as in the holistic nature of an individual organism, in contrast to 
an individual being a mosaic of traits that perform their evolutionary func-
tions in isolation from each other. 
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architecture of the organism and its behaviour can we presuppose the 
traits under explanation to be in their adaptive function? 
Some of these forms of adaptationism or distinct contents of ad-
aptation claims can be distinguished into further sub-categories. The 
forms of adaptationism that I will discuss are the following, with some 
preliminary characterizations: 
 
Empirical adaptationism - all traits are products of adaptation49 
Pan-selectionism - natural selection overrides other forces 
Good-designism - the overall design of organisms is a 
good fit to the environment 
Well-enough-designism - the overall design is functional in the 
environment 
Gradualism - the evolution of a trait is about a grad-
ual change 
 
Explanatory adaptationism - the replies to evolutionary questions in-
clude a reference to natural selection 
Strong historical expl. adaptationism - in evolutionary history, explanatory 
questions will have an adaptation an-
swer 
Weak historical expl. adaptationism - in evolutionary history, explanatory 
questions will have an answer that in-
cludes natural selection 
Ahistorical expl. adaptationism - adaptive functions are explanatory for 
the functioning of the organism 
 
 
49 This may be more or less inclusive in what counts as “adaptation”, as dis-
cussed above. The definition has implications for what adaptationism in this 
sense means, but we can disregard this for the current discussion. 
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Methodological adaptationism - all traits should be treated as if they 
were adaptations 
Historical meth. adaptationism - traits should be treated as if they were 
historically selected for what they do 
Ahistorical meth. adaptationism - instrumentalistic adaptationism in the 
functional description of the organism 
 
Atomism - traits are treated in isolation of each 
other regarding adaptivity 
 
Empirical adaptationism is a claim about nature and its history, about 
the causal factors guiding the evolutionary history. According to it, 
everything (or almost everything) in nature serves an adaptive pur-
pose and has been selected for that. In other words, it is an empirical 
claim about the relative powers of natural selection and other factors 
in evolution, and it is connected to actual historical processes. 
Whether or not this is so is a part of the research object of evolutionary 
biology proper, and from that perspective, this is the main question. 
Furthermore, it is the idea that most criticism of adaptationism has 
been targeted against.  
There are two sets of possible alternative factors for natural selec-
tion to be actual historical reasons for a trait to exist (see Gould & 
Lewontin 1979; Futuyma 1998). The first set consists of chance events. 
Since both populations and the time that they have to adapt to a par-
ticular environment are finite, the right mutations may or may not ap-
pear. Furthermore, there is a chance element in the order of mutations 
appearing, which may be consequential, and natural selection is path-
dependent in any case. Drift and migration may have consequences 
depending on the relative strengths of these factors and the selection. 
The other set of factors comes from the holistic nature of organisms 
and their development that constrains natural selection (see also 
Amundson 1994 & 2001; Gould 2002). There are structural dependen-
cies between functionally different parts of an organism, the 
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developmental processes may connect both functionally and structur-
ally separate traits, and some path-dependencies in the development 
make some changes in the organism’s design impossible. Empirical 
adaptationism is in its essence an empirical thesis about the strength 
of natural selection in relation to these factors. This in turn contains a 
whole set of presuppositions. Tim Lewens (2009), for example, further 
distinguishes three conceptually distinct presuppositions within em-
pirical adaptationism: pan-selectionism, good-designism, and gradualism. 
Pan-selectionism is the empirical adaptationist claim about the 
strength of natural selection in relation to the chance factors: natural 
selection is the strongest causal factor acting on the population level. 
The development does not matter, since this is a thesis about what 
happens to the variation that is available in the first place.50 A comple-
mentary empirically adaptationist claim would be precisely about the 
strength of natural selection over developmental factors. This claim 
would say that natural selection can break the links between function-
ally different traits and overcome all possible developmental con-
straints. This position is probably embraced by no one, since it is 
simply an absurd claim from a biological point of view. But there is a 
weaker version of it, which Lewens calls good-designism. According 
to this idea, organisms are overall well adapted to their environment, even 
if many of their characteristics are not produced by natural selection for 
the purpose to which they are being put. I will return to this idea later 
in more detail. Pan-selectionism and good-designism do not entail 
each other. The third form of empirical adaptationism that Lewens 
discusses is gradualism, a claim that all apparent design in the nature 
is produced by gradual evolution guided by natural selection for the 
particular purpose that they are designed for. This rules out things like 
 
50 Developmental constraints (see Amundson 1994 & 2001) are, of course, con-
straining possibilities for the evolutionary process, but natural selection does 
not produce variation but rather selects from it, so this should not be thought 
to constrain natural selection as such (Orzack & Sober 1994a, 1994b & 1996; 
Sober 1998b). Developmental constraints are constraints for evolution, but not 
for natural selection. 
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an evolved trait adopting a new function (or, to use a term proposed by 
Gould & Vrba 1982, becoming an “exaptation”). Gradualism is inde-
pendent of the other two forms of empirical adaptationism. 
The problem with all three claims of empirical adaptationism is 
that they are empirically false.51 There are other population-level fac-
tors than natural selection, organisms are not always optimal for their 
environments or in their design – biology is full of bad design rooted 
in structural and developmental constraints52 – and traits often adopt 
new functions (see Futuyma 1998). But it is important to keep these 
complications separate and distinct even in non-adaptationist meth-
odological considerations about the role of adaptation explanations 
and adaptive functionality, and I will return to them in the next sec-
tion. At the same time, even many of the most ardent critics of adap-
tationism think that natural selection is, in some sense, the most im-
portant factor in evolution (see Gould & Lewontin 1979; Gould & Vrba 
1982; Gould 2002). The point is not that adaptationist explanations are 
invalid or unimportant, or that true adaptations would be rare, or an-
ything like this. The point is that there are other factors that should be 
taken into account, the developmental factors being the most im-
portant. One of the main targets of criticisms in Gould and Lewontin’s 
original anti-adaptationist paper was that sometimes some 
 
51 See Futuyma 2010 for a review of empirical adaptation “failures” and some 
of the known and speculated reasons for this. 
52 For example, there are vestigial parts and structures that have lost their us-
age and have become burdensome. An often-used example of this, because of 
its striking dysfunctionality, is the anatomy of giraffe’s neck. First, there are 
developmental constraints that limit the number of neck vertebrae that seem 
to be specific for mammals but not, for example, for birds. Almost all mam-
mals (with the exception of sloths) have only seven cervical vertebrae, which 
makes their necks unnecessarily vulnerable from a purely design point of 
view. Second, their recurrent laryngeal nerve makes a long, unnecessary loop 
that is dysfunctional. (Badlangana, Adams & Manger 2009.) Traits like this 
call for an evolutionary explanation that describes the non-adaptive contin-
gencies of the actual evolutionary history. 
88 
 
evolutionary biologists simply presuppose the traits under study to 
be adaptations, and if a hypothesis fails, another adapatationist hy-
pothesis is made, while the correct explanation for the trait’s existence 
is not an adaptationist one in nearly all cases.53 This cannot be ac-
cepted, of course: even if a trait being an adaptation for something is 
a primary hypothesis in studying its evolution, the fact of it really be-
ing so should be a result of evaluating evidence, not a presupposition 
guiding the interpretation of empirical data. This is simply lazy and 
methodologically bad science.  
 
3.1.3. Adaptationism as an Explanatory Perspective 
 
Abandoning crude empirical adaptationism, there are still other pos-
sible justifications for granting adaptation and adaptive functionality 
a special role in research, from an explanatory or methodological point 
of view. Some proponents of adaptationistic approaches highlight the 
uniqueness of natural selection as an explanatory resource, because it 
is the only thing that can account for adaptive complexity (Dawkins 1983 
& 1986; Dennett 1995; Sober 1998). Traits could be adaptive by chance, 
and evolving systems tend to become more complex over time, but 
the only known factor that guides the evolving complexity systemati-
cally towards adaptive organization is natural selection. According to 
some, this gives adaptationist explanations a kind of priority: natural 
selection is not the only causally contributing factor, but it is the dif-
ference-maker for the questions in which we are interested most in 
evolutionary biology. This is the view Godfrey-Smith (2001) calls 
 
53 In practice, if there are several possible evolutionary hypotheses, only ad-
aptationist ones are generated or taken seriously, or adaptivity itself is con-
sidered evidence for the hypothesis. Elisabeth Lloyd (2006) provides a reveal-
ing case study on this practice. She points out that the existing evidence seems 
to back a by-product hypothesis on the evolution of human female orgasm, 
while the various adaptationist hypotheses are almost exclusively discussed 
in the literature. 
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explanatory adaptationism, and as he remarks, it is more charitable 
to consider many adaptationists explanatory rather than empirical ad-
aptationists (and this would probably include Richard Dawkins 1983 
& 1986 and Daniel Dennett 1995). I will later make a further distinction 
between historical and ahistorical explanatory adaptationism. 
As mentioned above, much of the criticism from Gould and his 
collaborators is aimed at the presupposition that, from a causal-his-
torical point of view, some adaptationist explanation is going to be cor-
rect. This strong version of historical explanatory adaptationism 
would be the thesis that all adaptedness to the environment is in fact 
selected for and it would presuppose (all forms of) empirical adapta-
tionism. A weaker version would be a view that acknowledges other 
factors but gives adaptation a special status: even though there are 
multiple causal factors in the evolutionary past, natural selection has 
an explanatory priority. As Godfrey-Smith (2001) and Lewens (2009) 
point out, the formulations that fall under this view (for example, 
Dawkins 1986) often sound like statements of what is interesting (ver-
sus boring) as an explanatory question, or what is the “proper” object 
of study within the discipline. This makes the question something of 
a matter of taste and an unnecessary normative constraint on research 
and discovery. In a more charitable reading (of, for example, Dob-
zhansky 1973 and Dennett 1995), this idea can also be taken as a phil-
osophical point about understanding how adaptive complexity or ap-
parent design is naturalistically possible in the first place (see also 
Dawkins 1983). This, in turn, is undeniably true, but not relevant to 
any specific historical explanations as such. Another interpretation is 
a substantial thesis about explanatory relevance. This reading is not trivially 
wrong in the light of the falsity of empirical adaptationism alone. This is 
also where the difference between chance factors in evolution and the 
holistic nature of organisms as arguments against adaptationism dis-
cussed above become relevant. For even a weak form of historical ex-
planatory adaptationism to be true, it has to overcome (even if not de-
bunk) the objections to the empirical adaptationism, and the two differ-
ent groups of objections discussed above call for different answers. 
90 
 
Pan-selectionism is not true, but it is not entirely false to say that 
much of what is in nature gets selected for a “purpose”. Even in the 
presence of strong selection, drift and other chance factors have some 
effect, but they do not have a uniform direction. Natural selection has 
a qualitatively different explanatory relevance in understanding long-
term trends in evolution: it gives evolution its direction. Although 
drift is sometimes the difference-maker between two possible evolu-
tionary paths, this is more likely when there are no strong selective 
pressures, and the population is small. Furthermore, natural selection 
plays some role in any complex adaptive system, and it is the factor 
behind the purposive-looking design – even if it is not the only factor 
and the apparent purposefulness was not the selected function. In ad-
dition, building an optimality model based on what a trait would be 
if completely adapted is the best way to find out about the existence 
of chance (and other) factors. Furthermore, we can understand the me-
chanics of adaptation process and build generalizable, testable models 
about them – it makes sense to start from there. (See Brandon 1978 & 
1990; Stephens & Krebbs 1986; Orzack & Sober 1994a, 1994b, 1996 & 
2001b; Sober 1998b.) For these reasons, it seems that the critiques of 
empirical pan-selectionism are not crucial challenges to granting ad-
aptationist explanations a special explanatory and theoretical role, as 
long as other factors are taken into account and the empirical reality 
is such that adaptation processes are commonplace. (They are.) One 
could view the evolutionary shaping of a trait as a dialectic between 
natural selection and chance, and from a theoretical point of view, nat-
ural selection plays a special role. This may be called weak historical 
adaptationisim in contrast to the stronger idea that natural selection 
is the only explanatorily relevant (or interesting) factor. 
There are many causal factors in any historical event, evolutionary 
or otherwise, that need to be described for a full understanding of what 
exactly happened. This is the case even if we are only interested in relevant 
information, not in complete description. Some of them, however, are 
more relevant than others, depending on the explanatory interests and 
the chosen framework (under the view on explanation assumed here). 
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The events and causal processes remain the same, but which ones are 
important to us (or explanatory of things that are important to us) will 
change. If we do not give the full story, different explanatory perspec-
tives may highlight different aspects of the ancestral environment to 
explain the same trait without being in competition. One should be 
just as pluralistic about evolutionary explanations as about any his-
torical explanation, and for similar reasons. 54 If we are interested in 
why birds have wings, we may very well be interested in several dif-
ferent causal factors in the evolution of bird wings, and different re-
search interests imply different factors to be important. We may con-
centrate only on evolutionary adaptive functions or on all causal factors, 
and even within the adaptationist framework, we might only be inter-
ested in those factors that are related to flying even if other selective pres-
sures were crucial in the beginning of wing evolution. There is nothing 
wrong as such in constraining the explanatory interest in this way. This 
becomes a problem if other factors are denied (the traditional accusation 
toward empirical adaptationism) or the chosen perspective requires ide-
alizations or other simplifications that affect the factuality of the case. 
 
54 This is a familiar issue regarding history proper. For example, if we are in-
terested in understanding the fall of some European countries under authori-
tarian rule in the 1930s, there are numerous historical facts that played causal 
roles, but only some seem to be more relevant to making sense of the difference 
between which countries fell under authoritarian rule and which remained (or 
developed into) democracies (see Mann 2004). We can isolate these factors as 
explanatory even if they give only fragments of the actual causal history. Fur-
thermore, in any such historical event, we are often interested in the differ-
ence-makers that explain those aspects of the event that are important to us 
from our contemporary perspective. For example, we may be interested in 
how the societies falling under authoritarian rule differed from our contem-
porary European societies (some of which seem to be surprisingly fragile de-
mocracies) instead of comparing them to the democracies of their time. This 
is the “teaching” function of history, and why every generation needs to write 
its own history, as it were. The events and causal processes remain the same, 
but which ones are important to us (or explanatory of things that are im-
portant to us) will change. This can also be extended to evolutionary histories.  
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A more crucial challenge that is lethal for even a weak historical 
explanatory adaptationism comes from the holistic nature of organ-
isms and their developmental constraints (see Amundson 1994 & 
2001; Gould 2002; Pearce 2011). This has consequences for how we 
should understand natural selection even if there were no competing 
causal factors affecting the change on the population level. Limita-
tions in the possible variations, linkages between different traits in de-
velopment, and the practical impossibility of some changes due to de-
pendencies between the traits or their development conserve “re-
ceived” forms in, for example, body plans. Changes like mammals 
getting an extra pair of limbs to function as wings, or whales evolving 
gills, are nearly theoretical impossibilities. This fact, which is some-
times called phylogenetic inertia (Harvey & Pagel 1991; Orzack & Sober 
2001b), performs much of the explanatory work in understanding liv-
ing beings. Even if adaptation were the central explanatory interest as 
a starting point, evolutionary biology has to account for when adap-
tationism does not work and when there are systematic “failures.” 
Evolutionary biology must be about these factors, too (see Futuyma 
1998). However, the inadequacy of adaptationism goes deeper than 
this. First, as mentioned above, evolutionary theory has two general 
explanatory interests in its task of explaining why biological beings 
are the way they are: not only their apparent design, but also the fam-
ily-like similarities between species. Phylogenetic inertia and devel-
opmental constraints are the explanatory basis for the latter. Mere 
common ancestry is not enough: it provides the starting point, but the 
developmental constraints are needed to explain the extent of con-
servatism in evolution. Second, phylogenetic inertia plays a substan-
tial role in the historical explanation of traits even if the focus is on 
adaptation. This is because in the study of adaptive evolution, the op-
timality models need to be combined with comparative methods, 
which include both analogical and homological comparisons (Orzack 
& Sober 2001b) – that is, both comparisons between independent but 
similar evolutionary paths on different lineages and comparisons be-
tween the “shared” traits of two closely related species to find 
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evidence for evolution. However, this topic as such is not important 
for the dissertation at hand.55 
A possible reply to this problem is to be flexible with the timeline 
and concentrate on the original adaptivity of the phylogenetically inert 
traits (Reeve & Sherman 1993 & 2001). Since even phylogenetically in-
ert traits (may) have been selected for some adaptive function in the 
evolutionary past, the reply goes, this is the relevant fact we need to 
know. If we want to understand why a trait exists, it is not enough 
simply to say that it has existed before and now it is stuck in the body 
plan; we need to understand its origins. This moves the adaptationist 
question back in evolutionary history and away from current use and 
gives the adaptationist perspective on an organism historical depth. 
This is also the adaptationist response that evolutionary psychologists 
gave to some adaptationist problems of human sociobiology. How-
ever, as a general solution, this fails. One could be interested in the 
origins of a given trait existing across a clade, for example, but if one’s 
historical adaptationist explanatory interests are in explaining traits of 
a particular population (for example, humans), given a historical start-
ing-point (for example, after the separation between our own line and 
the chimpanzee’s) and the selection pressures from the evolutionary 
environment, then the explanation is the trait’s pre-existence and fix-
ity in development, not the previous history.56 Furthermore, and most 
 
55 If two species share some characteristic because of their common ancestry, 
it is a homology. There has been debate on the nature, definitions, and rele-
vance of homologies in the philosophy of biology. Some even think that “ho-
mology thinking” (Ereshefsky 2007) is just as important as the design perspec-
tive (see Griffiths 2006; Ereshefsky 2012). I agree, but this issue is not of rele-
vant for the topic of this thesis. 
56 Whether or not this works with evolutionary psychology is a bit more com-
plicated. The point of much of evolutionary psychology is that there is an en-
vironment which is the proper environment of interest for evolutionary ques-
tions (the “environment of evolutionary adaptedness”), and all adaptation 
that is important for understanding human psychology took place there, not 
in contemporary environments. This does not confuse adaptation with 
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crucially, even if a trait’s mutability is constrained, selection may still 
have tinkered with it substantially, so that the end result is not per-
fectly adapted to anything in particular – not to the current environ-
ment, and not to the ancestral environment of the clade’s origin either. 
This sub-optimality (for everything) requires an explanation that re-
fers to developmental constraints. An evolutionary historical explana-
tion needs to integrate adaptation and phylogenetic inertia. 
Another line of argument is that we should consider the devel-
opmental environment of a trait an internal environment that the trait 
has to be adapted to (Reeve & Sherman 1993; 2001; see also Wimsatt 
& Shank 1988). In this way, explanations with developmental con-
straints would be just a type of adaptationist explanation. Neverthe-
less, this will not work either. As Lewens (2009) argues, this presup-
poses that alternatives that get selected against are developmentally 
possible, which is not always the case either (Amundson 1994 & 2001). 
And even if it were the case, this would already expand the perspec-
tive from mere external function of the trait to the developmental fac-
tors, which is exactly the point of the criticism of adaptationism in the 
first place. In other words, developmental factors are simply too cen-
tral to be dismissed.57 
 
3.1.4. Adaptationism as a Methodological Tool 
 
Explanatory adaptationism therefore does not seem to be a viable po-
sition either. This does not mean that adaptation explanations are not 
important in historical explanations – they are, but the adaptation pro-
cess is only one causal factor and should be treated as such. There is, 
however, a third way to see the primacy of adptationist explanations, 
as a methodological tool. Godfrey-Smith calls this methodological ad-
aptationism. Because natural selection is a central factor and tends to 
 
previous adaptation history as such, but is a similar general move in saving 
the adaptivity by moving back the context of adptivity, nevertheless. 
57 I will come back to importance of development in chapter 7. 
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figure in the explanations of apparent design in nature, some think 
that the search of explanation should begin from there, as I have al-
ready pointed out. Looking for an adaptationist explanation through 
optimality models and selection scenarios may be an important 
method to discover developmental constraints, too, through failures 
in the predictions (Brandon 1978 & 1990; Mayr 1983; Orzack & Sober 
1996 & 2010a). Elisabeth Lloyd (2015) has, however, argued convinc-
ingly that this methodology falls back to the other forms of adapta-
tionism: since the central question is still what the function of a given 
trait is, not whether it has a function, only adaptationist explanatory 
hypotheses are tested and the evidence becomes biased (see also 
Green 2014 for similar worries). 
I will argue in the next sub-chapter, nevertheless, that it is not 
necessary to interpret all adaptationist explanations as purely histori-
cal explanations of the original evolution of the traits. An alternative 
is to see the adaptivity of a trait as its function in the whole of the 
organism in relation to its environment in evolutionary terms: an ad-
aptation is a state of an organism, independent of historical origin, 
which might or might not be a historical adaptation as well (see for 
example Fisher 1985). The rationale for this is as follows. 
If organisms tend to be adaptively functional in their environment, 
it could be useful to approach their functional organization from this 
point of view, as if the organism were adapted into its environment, 
even though it was not adapted into it historically. The tendency itself 
may have many different historical explanations. Besides adaptation 
and exaptation, developmental plasticity, and environmental induc-
tion (West-Eberhard 2003), as well as evolution through non-genetic 
inheritance mechanisms (culture, behaviour, epigenetic inheritance; 
Jablonka & Lamb 2005), increase adaptivity. The causes for adaptivity 
are not in one direction, either: organisms can modify the environ-
ment they are adapting to (niche construction; Odling-Smee et al 2003) 
and organisms may select the environments in which they live instead 
of the environments selecting the characteristics of the organisms (hab-
itat selection; Morris 2011). All these processes can increase the 
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adaptedness of organisms to their environment in a dynamical rela-
tion with the environment, without being cases of strictly Darwinian 
selection processes.58 This idea, too, should fall under methodological 
adaptationism in Godfrey-Smith’s (2001) taxonomy. I also take some-
thing like this position to be the methodological stance advocated by 
Daniel C. Dennett (1995). For Dennett, the core of adaptationist heuris-
tics is that they are useful, and they provide justification for the “design 
stance” (Dennett 1987), an approach to living organisms as if they were 
designed, which is necessary for us to make sense of them.59  
As Lewens (2009) points out, the first point (the usefulness) is an 
empirical prediction that can be roughly equated with what he calls 
well-adaptedness. Lewens bypasses the second point (design perspec-
tive) as mere “heuristics”, but here I disagree. It may be viewed as a 
stronger point that is related to what I have already mentioned, calling 
it ahistorical explanatory adaptationism. The point is that the adaptive 
function of a trait has an explanatory role even if it is not the actual 
historical cause for it, as a form of functional explanation.60 There is, 
of course, the semantic issue of whether this should still be called 
 
58 The so-called “extended synthesis” (Pigliucci 2007) seeks to integrate devel-
opmental and ecological aspects into evolutionary theory and form a new par-
adigm for studying evolution (see also Pigliucci & Müller (eds.) 2010; Laland 
et al 2014; Laland et al 2015). Rather than being a challenge to adaptationism, 
this new paradigm could be interpreted as an extension of what explains the 
adaptation of organisms to their environment. I will discuss the extended syn-
thesis later in relation to evolution and development, but the ecology aspects 
are an equally important extension. 
59 This idea of design without a designer, or purposiveness without purpose, 
towards living nature as a necessary tool for understanding it, given how hu-
man mind works, goes back to Immanuel Kant (1790), interestingly enough. 
(See Depew & Weber 1996; Grene & Depew 2004.) 
60 Lewens (2004), Forber (2009) and Green (2014) have also pointed out that a 
weaker form of adaptive thinking, as a heuristic to discover the capacities of an 
organism and their functionality, does not require a connection to historical ad-
aptation and should be treated separately. I will argue in what follows that these 
are two quite different “evolutionary” approaches that should not be confused. 
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adaptationism, even if the view is defendable. This is not important, 
but to avoid confusion, I will call this combination of certain aspects 
of methodological and explanatory adaptationism evolutionary func-
tionalism. In what follows next, I will explicate this idea as a positive 
position on the role of adaptation explanations in non-evolutionary 
biology, including behavioural biology, and I will contrast it with 
other forms of adaptationism. In practical terms, I divorce evolution-
ary functionality and historical causes, which may come together (in 
true adaptationist explanations), but they may not. I will start by dis-
cussing the various concepts of biological function, many of which are 
to specify what the given trait is for, with or without the idea of the 
trait having been actually selected for that task, and I will discuss how 
adaptivity figures in this debate. After this, I will distinguish three dif-
ferent forms of evolutionary functionalism: current use, historical evo-
lutionary functionalism, and ahistorical evolutionary functionalism. 
 
 
3.2. Evolutionary Functionalism 
 
Much of biological explanation is functionalist. Traits and processes are 
understood by their purpose for and within the organism, and this pur-
pose is naturalized in one way or another. One such way is evolutionary 
functionality. This can also be a perspective on social behaviour, includ-
ing human behaviour. If this is the chosen perspective, questions arise. 
Functionality of what? For what? Functionality in what sense? Some of 
these questions will lead to the questions about the relation between in-
dividual and above-individual level descriptions and explanations. 
 
3.2.1. Adaptivity and the “Consensus without Unity” 
 
One way to characterize evolutionary functionality – or even to give a 
general explication for the biological notion of function – is to say that 
a trait can be explained as a component in a mechanism that produces 
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something that is useful for the organism. This participatory role in a 
mechanism is the trait’s function. There are different ways to under-
stand what exactly this means, and there is not even a clear view of 
what the analysis of function is supposed to achieve. Functions seem 
to be useful in distinguishing between purposeful and accidental (for 
example, the heart pumping blood versus making noise), they are 
supposed to be explanatory (why we have a heart), and they have a 
normative aspect, that is, distinguishing dysfunctional (not pumping 
properly) from functional, and malfunctioning (ventricular fibrilla-
tion) from functioning, and all these dimensions of functionality are 
contested (Garson 2016). Pluralism about function concepts is widely 
accepted (see Godfrey-Smith 1993; Amundson & Lauder 1994; 
Griffiths 2006; Bouchard 2013; Garson 2016). As Peter Godfrey-Smith 
(1993) put it, there is a “consensus without unity.” I will follow this 
consensus and, rather than defending a view of functions, I will pre-
sent the “basic concepts” of function and discuss them in connection 
with our current purposes. The three concepts I consider to be the 
basic concepts of function are the etiological function, the causal-role 
function, and the adaptive function.  
The etiological function of a trait (Wright 1973 & 1976; Millikan 
1984; Neander 1991) is whatever the trait does that explains its exist-
ence. Larry Wright (1973: 161) defines it thus:  
 
“The function of X is Z means: a) X is there because it does Z and 
b) Z is a consequence (or result) of X's being there.”  
 
The reason for including X doing Z as the cause for the existence of X 
is to naturalize the apparent purposefulness and explain it as well as 
to provide criteria for distinguishing the “real” function from every-
thing else that results from X. There is no theoretical necessity to re-
strict the use of the concept of etiological function to the evolutionary 
dimension of biological causes, but in practice, and especially within 
the evolutionary perspective, a biological trait has etiological function 
only if it is an adaptation. Ruth Millikan (1984) and Karen Neander 
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(1991), for example, defend the selected effect variant of etiological 
function. In this view, the function is whatever it does so that the or-
ganism becomes fitter, which in turn has caused the trait to be selected. 
Whatever else it does for the good of the organism is just a set of other 
consequences. This is also a way to understand the adaptationism de-
bate. Empirical adapationism is a claim that (most) traits have an etio-
logical function, and both explanatory and methodological adaptation-
ism give a trait’s etiology a special role in describing the trait. If this were 
the only way to understand functions, many biological traits, including 
some vital ones, would not have functions at all: useful by-products 
and exaptations could not be considered to have functions. 
The causal-role function (Cummins 1975 & 1983) is an articula-
tion for a function that is used to analyse the trait from the point of 
view of its causal role in the system that it is a part of, from the point 
of view of the functioning of the whole system. It is a more liberal ac-
count that does not require the function to contribute to its own exist-
ence. The proponents of this approach argue that there is a need for a 
concept of function like this, especially in physiology, neuroscience, 
ecology, and ethology (see Amundson & Lauder 1993; Bouchard 2013; 
Craver 2013).61 The causal role function of a trait cannot be whatever 
causal consequences it has as a part of a system. Etiological functions 
are too demanding for many purposes, but causal role functions re-
quire a perspective from which the functions of the parts are analysed 
to rule out accidents and unimportant effects. Therefore, the definition 
needs to include a perspective (see Cummins 1975 & 1983):  
 
An X has a function F in the system S in relation to an analytic 
perspective A that is adequate to the S’s capacity to G 
if and only if  
 
61 The different notions of function should not, however, be automatically taken 
to be differences that follow from the different fields of biology (Garson 2016). 
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X has a capacity to produce F (or have a role of F) in the system 
S as a part of a process resulting in G under the description within 
A that has a reference to an X capable of F.  
 
Unlike with etiological functions, there is no objective way to say how 
to choose A and G given any S and X. An obvious perspective is what-
ever explanatory interest we have (Rattcliffe 2000; Lewens 2000), 
which frames the contrastive-counterfactual questions we ask, and, 
therefore, which causal functions are constitutive parts of a mecha-
nism we use for explanations. Therefore, we can say that: 
 
An X has a function F if and only if  
1) there is an effect G that 
2) we are explaining from the perspective A  
3) with a mechanism M 
4) that has X 
5) with a capacity to F 
6) as a constituent part of M. 
 
Causal role functions refer to real causal relations, capacities and pro-
cesses, and are explanatory of the whole system and its capacities 
(they tell what the part does from the perspective of a wider system), 
but not all of the functions of a trait are equally interesting from the 
specific explanatory point of view. For this, we need some further cri-
teria. An important factor is that biological organisms are functional 
wholes that have architectures, as discussed above. Whatever per-
spective a researcher takes, this internally functional architecture and 
its mechanistic constitution and maintenance (that is, how the organ-
ism stays alive) are a natural part of that perspective. An important 
dimension in the meaning of “function” is that the trait contributes to 
this instead of being dysfunctional (for the whole) or malfunctioning 
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(that is, causing harm to the whole organism by not operating in an 
orchestrated manner).62 
The overall architecture, however, is not only a functional whole 
in itself. It must be functional in its environment, too – as a whole, 
even if not all its characteristics are functional. The organism might 
not be optimal, and it might not be “well-adapted”, but it has to have 
the means to operate and survive in its environment. Even if the or-
ganism’s design is widely sub-optimal, how it nevertheless survives 
in its environment is what is important in explaining the organism’s 
characteristics. For example, whales having lungs is not exactly an op-
timal solution, and the explanation for their existence is in the contin-
gencies of the evolutionary past, but understanding the characteristics 
of the whale lungs and the whole respiratory system must include ad-
aptationist thinking – albeit acknowledging that the functionality of 
the system centres around something that is highly dysfunctional it-
self. Much of the design of a given organism may be due to phyloge-
netic inertia and the path-dependent nature of evolution, but some of 
this is adapted and some parts have been utilized for new functions 
(as exaptations). These characteristics are not (historically) adapta-
tions for their use, but they are, nevertheless, a part of the organism’s 
functional design from the point of view of its overall functionality in 
its environment. The architecture needs to stay, in the course of evo-
lution, an orchestrated whole, and functional enough in the environ-
ment the organism lives in for it to be able to live in it, even if sub-
optimally. If the biologists are interested in describing the functional 
 
62 This is not always the case. If we want to understand the biology of a disease 
or impairment, it is not enough to know that something is malfunctioning 
from this point of view (although it is the starting point; see Wakefield 1992; 
Adriaens & Andreas De Block 2011), but we might be interested in how the 
disease, a cancer for example, functions from the point of view of what it is 
doing that is harmful for the organism. Given knowledge about some part of 
the “mechanism” of cancer (for example, its ability to form an internal blood 
circulatory system), we can try to prevent it growing based on this knowledge 
(see for example Tammela et al 2008). 
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architecture of an organism, it is only reasonable to include an ecolog-
ical perspective, which in turn is closely connected to evolutionary 
considerations. Furthermore, mechanisms used in biological explana-
tions require an idea of what the mechanism is for, and a functional 
analysis is needed for this (see Craver 2013; Garson 2013).  
Whatever role the trait plays in the overall adaptive functionality 
of the organism in the environment in which the organism lives is a 
natural starting point for understanding the organism. Even if the 
adaptive functionality from this point of view is not the result of an 
atomistic (historical) adaptation, an ahistorical adaptationist perspective 
may be a useful heuristic to decompose the organism’s functional ar-
chitecture in its ecological context. Exaptations and structural charac-
teristics that are phylogenetic relics can be treated as functional prop-
erties of the overall design – if one steers clear of making historical 
claims or optimality assumptions about them. This also seems to reflect 
real biological practices: biologists are interested in the adaptivity of 
an organism and its traits in its current environment as an essential 
part of understanding the organism without speculating about their 
evolutionary history (see Amundson & Lauder 1994; Walsh 1996; 
Wouters 2003; Cuthill 2005; Sherry 2005). Justin Garson (2016), how-
ever, voices a suspicion that this practice may implicitly rely on adap-
tationist thinking. This concern is warranted (see also Cuthill 2005), 
but regardless of what some biologists may presume of the connection 
of adaptive functionality and historical adaptation, there are other jus-
tified reasons to be interested in adaptive functionality alone. 
For starters, there are other reasons than a historical adaptation 
process that lead into ecological adaptivity, as I mentioned above. 
First, there is habitat selection: some organisms can choose an environ-
ment (recognizing environmental clues; this is habitat choice), or they 
may randomly end up living in an environment in which they are eco-
logically more functional, with increasing reproduction rates. Similar 
adaptive optimization takes place, only without any change in the or-
ganism, and an adaptationist perspective can be a useful ecological 
perspective even when we know that the organism has not evolved in 
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that specific environment. (Morris 2011.) Furthermore, if there are 
constraints on adaptation in some environment, another environment 
may be a better fit for the species: either it is directly better, or it is 
easier to adapt to within the given evolutionary constraints. A whole 
species may change its niche or migrate to another region – which is 
an adaptive process, too, producing adaptive functionality without 
organism-changing (Darwinian) evolution. This might happen when 
there is a change in environments (for example, a climate change) and 
a population changes its geographical location to keep its habitat. Or-
ganisms may also find new environments that fit them as well as or 
even better than the environment they evolved in.63 Furthermore, gen-
eralist organisms with behavioural plasticity may be able to utilize the 
features of the environment that are utilizable for them (for example, 
as food) beyond just those exact features that the capacities were se-
lected for. Developmental plasticity in turn may lead into direct adap-
tation to new environments (West-Eberhard 2003). Plasticity is espe-
cially important in humans. Yet another adaptive process to be taken 
into account is niche construction (Odling-Smee, Laland & Feldman 
2003): the organism not only chooses the habitat but may have 
adapted to actively change its environment in ways that make the or-
ganism a better fit to it, and further evolves into those environmental 
products, making the organisms and their environments co-evolving 
interactive wholes. 
All the above ways of becoming adaptive without an organism-
changing adaption process (or Darwinian selection) are further 
 
63 There are, for example, species that do better in urban than natural environ-
ments, the most extreme example being the rock dove (Columba livia) – the 
feral pigeon. They did not evolve for urban environments, but they have 
found an ecological fit in these environments that is better than what they find 
in natural environments, after which certain features in their behaviour have 
further adapted to urban environments (Rose, Nagel & Haag-Wackernagel 
2006). It is sensible to study the pigeon ecology as adaptively functional to 




reasons to abandon empirical and historically explanatory adpapta-
tionism – and they should be abandoned. At the same time, they ad-
dress further needs, beyond the Darwinian adaptation process, for 
adaptive functionality analyses of traits. First, a description that in-
cludes a functional account of the trait’s role in the overall form of life 
of the organism provides a deeper understanding of the organism, 
and the natural basis for such an account is from the point of view of 
what all organisms fundamentally do: stay alive, sustain themselves, 
and reproduce (see Wouters 1995; 2005; 2013). How an organism does 
this in its environment is simply a part of its biological description. 
Arno Wouters (1995) calls explanations referring to these features of 
the organism viability explanations: a trait is explained by how it satis-
fies an organism’s needs. This is not a causal explanation for the trait’s 
existence, but it is a functional explanation of how the trait contributes 
to the viability of the organism. Wouters even proposes that it is this 
idea of functionality that biologists use in their practices, never an eti-
ological function, unless they are doing evolutionary biology specifi-
cally (Wouters 2013).  
Note that “viability” only refers to the means to survive in the en-
vironment, and while the notion of “survival of the fittest”64 has become 
the misleading slogan for natural selection, one does not have to be the 
fittest to survive, and natural selection goes beyond mere survival. Alt-
hough optimality is only a theoretical endpoint of the adaptationist se-
lection models and cannot always be expected to be found (for the rea-
sons discussed above), natural selection can be expected to result in 
forms somewhere in between mere survival and optimality. And the 
other way around: natural selection is a partial explanation for viability 
and everything beyond. We do not need to restrict the considerations 
of adaptivity to optimality; adaptivity can be seen as a range of variation 
 
64 The phrase does not exist in the original Origins (Darwin 1859) – the origin 
of the term is Herbert Spencer (1864). Unfortunately, Darwin endorsed it and 
added it to later editions of the Origins – mostly because the expression “nat-
ural selection” has other misleading connotations, namely that of there being 
something that literally selects something. (See Gould 2002.) 
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from survival to optimality. Third, a functionalist description from an 
evolutionary perspective is still explanatory in a more minimal sense 
that I have called “ahistorical adaptation” above. Viability and adaptiv-
ity of a trait are more fundamental properties in the evolutionary expla-
nations than the selection process: selection is based on the comparison 
between viability and adaptivity of individuals (or other units). I will 
expand on some of these points next, and I will discuss the third “basic 
concept” of function, the adaptivity function. 
 
3.2.2. Adaptive Functionality and a Taxonomy of Functions 
 
One of the main problems of adaptationism in all its forms is the pre-
supposition of atomism (that is, each trait has a unique, isolated task 
it is selected for), when an organism is a holistic system (Gould & 
Lewontin 1979; Gould 2002). The organism’s parts simply cannot be 
functionally independent, atomistic adaptations. At the same time, the 
whole must have some degree of adaptedness. We can switch from 
atomism to a holistic approach and take the overall adaptedness of the 
organism to be the starting point of a functional analysis. We can also 
approach the environment as holistic surroundings with multiple 
simultaneous adaptive challenges with some qualitative variation. If 
we analyse individual traits from this perspective, we end up with a 
vastly different idea of what counts as functional in the first place. This 
overall adaptedness, in turn, can only come from some sort of adap-
tation process (be it Darwinian selection, habitat selection, or some-
thing else) that is at least partly guided by the logic of natural selec-
tion. This is the case even if the parts of the adaptive whole have not 
evolved for the adaptive function they have now, and even if the 
adaptedness is not optimal. Moreover, even if a trait has evolved be-
cause of some other evolutionary factors, natural selection may some-
times be a part of an explanation of why it remains.  
It seems therefore that ahistorical adaptation perspective has two 
explanatory functions. First, even if natural selection is historically only 
a partial explanation for the apparently purposeful design of the 
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whole organism, if one is interested in an organism’s way of life in its 
natural environment, then the point of view of adaptedness (or func-
tionality in environment) has an explanatory function. Second, ahis-
torical adaptation perspective has counterfactual power. If a change 
took place in the environment for which the organism is now fit, either 
there would be some change in the organism or its geographical loca-
tion, or it would be doing worse than in the current environment, pos-
sibly facing the threat of extinction. There might be ecological conse-
quences that loop back to the functionality of the organism in the 
changed environment. In this view, a particular trait needs not to have 
evolved for whatever its role is from the point of view of this adaptive 
whole; it is sufficient just to play a role. 
This approach is not only a heuristic approach to the organism’s 
design, but also minimally explanatory: it identifies a selection pres-
sure and a corresponding trait and has, therefore, explanatory power 
over a set of what-if-questions about possible alternative traits relative 
to which it would be selected for or against, as articulated above. The 
components of the natural selection mechanism with the trait’s adap-
tive value included are in place, even if they were not included in the 
evolutionary historical explanation of the trait. Even if natural selec-
tion did not guide an evolutionary process in the past, it is an effective 
cause in the on-going process of evolution, and it is predictive of the 
future. To make an even stronger claim, this is the case even if devel-
opmental constraints prevent the relevant alternatives, and these con-
straints, instead of selection, are the cause of the persistence of the 
trait. This is because the selection pressures exist even then, too. This 
supports the counterfactual that if the developmental constraints 
broke, selection would still maintain the trait, selecting against the de-
viations. Of course, the explanatory relevance is even smaller in this 
second case than in the first, where exaptation is combined with nat-
ural selection that actively selects against alternatives. Nevertheless, 
they are both cases of over-determination for the conservation of the 
trait. We are not just referring to actual historical difference-makers 
here. Furthermore, the ahistorical adaptationist explanation is more 
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general than historical: it explains a type of evolutionary process, not 
just a single token (Potchnick 2007), and the knowledge of these gen-
eralities is important for evolutionary biology as an explanatory, not 
just a descriptive, historical discipline. Either way, simply pointing to 
the adaptive function does not explain the historical evolution of the 
particular trait.65 
Philip Kitcher (1993b) has previously proposed an idea similar to 
what I have been sketching above. He has argued that causal role 
functions should be defined by their adaptive role from the perspec-
tive of the overall architecture or design. His aim is to unify the func-
tional discourse of biology as follows. If an organism adapts to a new 
situation through a small change in its architecture, or even without 
any change, by acquiring a new use for some of its old parts, this new 
use should be the (overall) etiological function. The causal role func-
tions of the parts that constitute this capacity are defined by their role 
in this (new) primary use (see also Buller 1998). 66  However, the 
Kitcher-style unification of function concepts fails as a way to under-
stand all biological talk about functions (and therefore mechanisms). 
A biologist might have other legitimate questions that define func-
tions (and mechanisms) (see Godfrey-Smith 1993). An obvious case 
would be understanding cancer (as discussed previously): we need to 
understand the parts of its development in a functionalist way with-
out any reference to adaptiveness. Moreover, this approach has limi-
tations even in functional biology, given that well-adaptedness is 
 
65 This issue is directly related to the issue of whether optimality models try 
to trace signs of adaptive histories and be “censored causal explanations” (Or-
zack and Sober 1994a & 1996; Potochnik 2007 & 2010) or if their use is about 
something completely different (Rice 2012). I will not go into this issue explic-
itly here, although I acknowledge that my subsequent discussion implicitly 
outlines an alternative account. 
66 For example, if long feathers in the front limbs of birds were an adaptation 
to capturing insects and a later exaptation for flying (Gould & Vrba 1982), they 
still have the causal role function of being a part of a device with an etiological 
function of flying. This is not a claim about their evolutionary history. 
108 
 
empirically false because of structural and developmental connections 
and constraints. Nevertheless, this perspective illustrates a way to un-
derstand the question about what a trait is for, and it outlines an ad-
aptationist answer that is explanatory without being a historical claim.  
There have also been attempts to define the function of a trait 
simply through its contribution to fitness without the trait needing to 
have evolved for this function, for similar reasons (for example, Ruse 
1971; Bigelow & Pargetter 1987; Walsh 1996; Wouters 1995; 2005; 2013; 
Garson 2016). Dennis Walsh, for example, defines what he calls rela-
tional function as follows:  
 
“The/a function of a token of type X with respect to selective re-
gime R is to m iff X’s doing m positively (and significantly) con-
tributes to the average fitness of individual possessing X with re-
spect to R.” (Walsh 1996: 563.) 
 
In other words, this is a function defined by what evolutionary signif-
icance the trait has for the organism (that increases its fitness in con-
trast to a range of alternative traits). I will call the family of function 
concepts similar to this the adaptive function.67 This notion adds the 
 
67 There are different formulations. For example, Arno Wouters refers to via-
bility instead of adaptivity, as mentioned above (Wouters 2005 & 2013). Justin 
Garson in turn defends a position he calls generalized selected effect theory (Gar-
son 2013 & 2016). In this theory, the function of a trait is the activity that led 
to its differential persistence or reproduction in that population, as in the other 
selected effect function theories (such as Millikan 1984 and Neander 1991) but 
allows this cause for persistence to be something that the trait does over the 
lifetime of an individual. In other words, it does not need to have had a selec-
tion history; it is enough for the trait to have the effect now. Garson considers 
this a version of a selected effect theory that gets rid of the general problem of 
these theories – that many seemingly functional traits do not have a real func-
tion. His theory solves the problem, but since the “persistence of trait” over 
the lifetime of an individual can only mean that the trait makes a positive con-
tribution to the fitness of an individual possessing it, this definition is a variant 
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idea of adaptivity to the concept of causal role function (or picks those 
causal roles that increase fitness) on the basis of current utility but 
does not require the trait’s historical origin to be caused by this func-
tion (being an adaptation, having an etiological function). Unlike 
Kitcher’s proposal, it is not meant to be a unificatory idea but an ad-
dition to plurality of function concepts. Its purpose is to explicate the 
concept of function such as the “function” in the practices of ethol-
ogists, which is understood as current utility (see Tinbergen 1963; 
Cuthill 2005; Sherry 2005). 
Let us sum up the above discussion into a systematic view about 
the relation between adaptationism and functional explanations in bi-
ology. A charitable way to see the adaptationist tendencies in biolog-
ical explanations would be this: it is a functionalist perspective on the 
overall design of the organism where the measure of functionality is 
the evolutionary adaptiveness. This functionality is descriptive but 
can also set the explanatory agenda. To clarify the different ways in 
which different adaptationist ideas are related to functionality, based 
on the above summaries of the discussions on adaptationism and the 
concept of function, we can build a hierarchical system of the concepts 
of function with a few additive dimensions.68 The base concept (F0) is 
a bare causal role defined by consequences. This is not a function yet. 
There are four dimensions that can be added to make it a function:  
 
F1 the causal role in a biological system, from the point of view 
of the purposive functioning of the whole organism, or 
maintaining the organism;  
 
of adaptive function, not the selected effect function as an etiological function, 
in my categorization. 
68  Wouters 2003 provides a somewhat similar taxonomy of functions that 
starts with mere activity (my F0) and moves through biological role (my F1) and 
biological advantage (my F3) to selected function (which is a combination of my 
F3 and F4). Wouters’s taxonomy is meant to be hierarchical, but these dimen-
sions need not coincide. 
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F2 the role in explanatory interest, which may be, for example, 
a function in a mechanism that constitutes a “higher 
level” property (Craver 2013) and thus overlaps with the 
first dimension, but it may be abnormal functioning (in 
the sense of normality defined in the terms of the first di-
mension), for example a mechanism causing cancer, 
which means that it does not need to imply F1; 
F3 adaptive value, which is not conceptually equivalent with 
F1, although, as I have been arguing for the past few 
pages, they tend to contribute to each other; 
F4 the function of the trait being (a part of) the explanation of the 
trait’s existence; this does not need to be an evolutionary 
loop, at least conceptually, but it is usually thought of as 
such.  
 
F1 and F2 are two different types of causal role function, F3 includes 
adaptive functions, and F4 is the etiological function. The relations be-
tween 1, 3 and 4 are an empirical issue and the criticism of adaptation-
ism is, basically, that they do not co-exist all the time. Furthermore, F3 
(adaptivity) is not the only criterion for F2 (explanatory interest). In a 
historical adaptation explanation, F3 and F4 (origins) are combined. 
Thus, atomistic historical adaptationist explanation (the main target of the 
criticism of adaptationism) combines F2, F3 and F4 as a presupposi-
tion. A non-atomistic alternative, holistic historical adaptationist explana-
tion, would likewise have all dimensions and would still need to pre-
suppose a strong form of empirical adaptationism to be true. A non-
evolutionary functional analysis combines F1 and F2. Ahistorical adap-
tation explanation combines F1, F2 and F3. Now, the next question is 
whether there is a need for an explanatory analysis that lies some-






3.2.3. A Case for Non-historical Explanatory Adaptationism 
 
Evolutionary functionalist analysis (identifying what the given trait is 
for) is practiced in biology without any explicit reference to evolution-
ary histories. Although biologists probably often think there is a direct 
link to adaptation histories, which would make the practice a target of 
some of the criticism discussed above, this is not the only way to un-
derstand or justify the practice. What I have been calling “ahistorical 
adaptationist explanation” is a form of explanatory functional analy-
sis in which the adaptive functionality (F3) is the chosen perspective 
(F2). This perspective is not a mere expression of personal or even dis-
ciplinary explanatory interest. As I have argued above, natural selec-
tion, and especially selection for being functional in the environment 
(either by Darwinian selection or by habitat selection) plays a special 
role in understanding the overall architecture and the functioning of the 
organism in its environment even if none of the specific traits can be pre-
supposed to have any particular kind of evolutionary history – or even 
if the current habitat is not the one in which the traits evolved. Taking 
an ahistorical adaptationist position is to explain organism’s parts as 
being part of the design that is fit to the environment and partly directed 
by natural selection (it being the only directional factor for fit). This in-
volves identifying what the challenges posed by the environment are 
and how the organism copes with them, and this is a relevant point of 
view for understanding the organism and its behaviour in its environ-
ment even without any interest in its actual evolutionary history. There-
fore, it is not contradictory for a trait to be a homology, for example, and 
the various species sharing the trait to possess different adaptive func-
tions for it, as a part of somewhat different overall design.  
Moreover, given that the natural selection is the only source of 
adaptively complex design, the overall relation between the organism 
and its environment needs to have some reference to adaptive func-
tionality as an explanatory component. This is the case even if the 
overall design is sub-optimal: if there is any adaptive fit between the 
organism and its environment, this fit is a part of the organism’s 
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overall functional description. But most importantly, if organisms re-
ally tend to be functional wholes with the capacity to interact with 
their environment in fitness-enhancing ways (and although this is an 
empirical hypothesis, I will boldly assume it  to be true), even if em-
pirical adaptationism is not true, a design stance with an adaptive per-
spective (Dennett 1995) will be a more productive source for testable 
and likely true hypotheses of the organism’s anatomy, physiology, 
and behavioural tendencies than any alternative method. This entails 
the heuristic use of methodological adaptationism to be a plausible 
position.69 This must be, however, a holistic approach that takes some 
of the suboptimal traits to be features rather than bugs, and infor-
mation about the design should be drawn from phylogeny as well (see 
also Calcott 2009 & 2014). So, for example, whales having lungs in-
stead of gills must be taken as a given design feature instead of a fail-
ure, after which the whale respiratory system can be reverse-engi-
neered from the point of view of fitness maximization in its environ-
ment. Furthermore, the design cannot be simply assumed to be func-
tional even in this narrower sense. 
In short, a functionalist explanation answers the question about 
what the trait under explanation does that is functional in relation to 
the overall architecture of the organism, the environment, and the or-
ganism’s form of life. It is a way to relate the organism to its environ-
ment. The explanation for where this design came from (or why there is 
sub-optimality) is a different, historical question. It is about evolution-
ary history. And this is where the explanations like developmental 
constraints and spandrels become alternative explanatory hypotheses 
for adaptationist hypotheses. The only presupposition that the ahis-
torical adaptationist functional analysis must make about historical 
 
69 I suggest this as a general principle, but like all such principles, there may 
be contexts in which it fails systematically. The criticism of adaptationism in 
the human evolutionary science controversy is not only about whether adap-
tation explanations are sensible, but also whether there is something in the 




adaptation is that it has played a significant role in one way or another 
for the overall architecture and its cohesion, and this is something that 
probably nobody would deny. But what I am proposing here, perhaps 
somewhat surprisingly, is that the importance of this perspective for 
understanding organisms is an argument for methodologically adap-
tationist research heuristics in non-evolutionary parts of biology, but 
not in evolutionary biology proper. 
Consider an example. The European honey buzzard (Pernis apiv-
orous) eats small mammals and birds, but it is also the only known 
predator of Asian giant hornets (Vespa mandarinia) (see Cocker & Ma-
bey 2005). It hunts them in the following way. When it kills an animal, 
it leaves a small piece of meat on a branch where it can see the meat. 
When a hornet arrives and takes a piece of it, and subsequently re-
turns to its nest, the buzzard follows it and eats the nest and the larvae. 
For some yet unknown reason, probably because of a chemical deter-
rent of some sort that the buzzard excretes, the hornets do not sting it. 
(The sting would be lethal for the buzzard.) This hunting behaviour is 
a complex pattern of behaviour that combines both general and spe-
cific characteristics of the buzzard’s cognitive and behavioural capac-
ities and physical characteristics. For example, its ability to follow the 
hornet, including perception and flying, are not specific to this behav-
iour, but the tendency to leave a piece of meat on a branch may be a 
specialized trait. This, too, might have had a function that was not 
specific to hornet hunting when it was evolving. Nevertheless, the 
hunting behaviour as a whole is an adaptation in the ahistorical, eco-
logical and qualitative sense that it is something that makes if fit for 
its habitat. The parts of the orchestrated behaviour, as well as the 
physical and psychological traits involved in the behaviour, can be 
analysed as having an adaptive function in relation to the entire be-
haviour of hornet hunting, when this particular behavioural trait is 
taken as the adaptive complex under analysis. A part of our under-
standing of these various component traits and their role in the buz-
zard’s form of life is in relation to this behaviour.  
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In other words, there is a form of behaviour that can be identified 
through it achieving something specific that has a positive fitness ef-
fect (eating the larvae) that binds the various participatory traits into 
one adaptive behavioural trait. The participatory traits constitute a 
mechanism that produces the overall behavioural trait, and their func-
tion, within this examination, is whatever causal role they play in the 
mechanism (that is, it is the Kitcher-style combined function). Some of 
the parts have other functions (most of them do), some do not (the 
hornet deterrent and setting the bait probably do not), but the task 
under scrutiny sets the analytical perspective for all the participatory 
traits and what their function is within this perspective. 
This functional analysis does not say anything about the evolu-
tionary origin of any of the specific component traits, or that this is the 
only or primary way to understand what any of the parts is for. They 
have many uses even from the perspective of adaptive functionality. 
Nevertheless, this is not just an analysis of causal roles in respect to 
the behaviour being analysed. Natural selection is likely to have 
played some role in building the hunting behaviour from whatever 
parts of it existed while this behaviour was evolving, tinkering with 
some parts, “exapting” others, and harmonizing the joint working of 
these parts in whichever ways possible. Complex behaviour like this 
could not be a pure accident, and probably nobody would deny natu-
ral selection to have played some role here. It is unlikely that complex 
multi-part traits would evolve otherwise, and if this is the case, the 
traits that take part in the overall behaviour do not only play a causal 
role, but their relation to the overall behaviour is such that they sup-
port whatever the trait does for fitness. If there is a complex behav-
ioural trait, it is more likely that component parts, given the way the 
play together, are such that the overall behaviour is better for fitness 
of the organism than an alternative variant of the same behaviour. 
This is a functionalist perspective on the overall design and simply 
points out that when we slice the buzzard’s doings in the forest into 
behavioural traits, it is reasonable to combine regular behaviour into 
larger wholes as adaptive tasks from the perspective of the fitness 
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effects of resulting behaviour. That is, it makes more sense to take “hor-
net hunting” as a functional design feature instead of merely categoriz-
ing the behaviour under structural descriptions (where external similar 
behaviour would the same behaviour regardless of the context). 
We could perform the partitioning into traits in other ways, too: 
for example, we could be interested in a given cognitive capacity (such 
as observing hornets) and its overall function in all behaviour it is in-
volved in, but this would be another explanatory question. Further-
more, we cannot understand the adaptive functions of cognitive traits 
without understanding what part they play in behaviour, since behav-
iour sets the fitness values for cognitive traits. Therefore, if we are in-
terested in evolutionary explanations in particular, we must analyse 
behavioural traits as adaptive complexes and their constituent parts 
as having derivative adaptivity functions regardless of what they 
were evolved for. Most cognitive capacities have several functions 
(participating in several behavioural traits). It is likely, however, that 
these behavioural tendencies and the mechanisms underlying them 
co-evolve into coherently functioning wholes that support a multitude 
of complex behavioural traits like this, they have been preserved for 
their roles in these complexes, and the buzzard’s behaviour and the 
ways in which it uses its environment (including the habitat of choice) 
have adapted to what it can do. However, this correlation is just the 
direction of causal influence from natural selection; it is not a guaran-
teed effect. 
Furthermore, there is a selection pressure against changes to-
wards dysfunctionality in all the traits involved in the hunting behav-
iour. When the behaviour has emerged, natural selection is a con-
servative as well as enhancing force.70 The adaptive functionality is, 
 
70 A note on the term “force”. Elliot Sober (1984) analyses evolutionary factors 
as forces analogical to Newtonian forces. This dynamical model has been chal-
lenged by the statisticalists that were discussed before (see especially Matthen 
and Ariew 2002), but also by some causalists, who consider it a misleading 
and potentially dangerous analogy (e.g. Lewens 2010). However, as Hitch-
cock and Velasco (2014) argue, much of the debate on this issue is based on an 
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therefore explanatory (in the minimal sense) for the existence of the 
hunting behaviour, even if the actual evolutionary history might 
mostly involve something else, which it undoubtedly does. Finally, 
the adaptationist perspective links various traits into an integrated 
whole, a complex trait. Explaining the complex behaviour involves 
identifying the component traits and their functions from the point of 
view of the complex trait and putting them into a mechanistic explan-
atory connection. This approach also predicts that many other, not yet 
studied traits (capacities, tendencies) to be such that they are more 
likely to advantage than to disadvantage the hunting behaviour. 
For the methodological purposes of non-evolutionary biology, the 
usefulness of evolutionary functionalism such as this comes from the 
guidance the approach gives for “reverse engineering” the organisms. 
One can give a structural description of the organism’s parts and capac-
ities and what it does in its environment, but there is also a use for the 
partitioning and integrating that places traits in a functional connection 
with each other and with the environment. This leads back to the issue 
of whether we should only describe mechanistic structures and their 
operations or also their causal-functional composition. I have already 
argued for the latter, and in the case of behaviour, it is the only way we 
can make sense of the overall behaviour, given the parts that we are 
putting together (such as laying a piece of meat on a branch and eating 
the larvae) and the causal relations between them do not form Cartesian 
mechanisms of direct structural connectedness. Their connection in 
 
inadequate understanding of Newtonian forces and the analogy as such is in-
nocent. The terms “factor” and “force” are used almost interchangeably to re-
fer to causal factors relevant for evolution, with the term “force” having a de-
sirable connotation of continuous effectivity. This is probably partly because 
philosophers of biology do not share a common foundational theory of cau-
sation. Most of the work on these issues attempts to stay neutral regarding 
more foundational issues (although it is very difficult to do so, as I showed in 
the previous chapter). However, the terms such as “factor” and “force” are 




meaningful ways can be a part of a discontinuous set of activities and 
separated by time.71 Given a high degree of tinkering, organizing and 
guiding of evolution by natural selection, and given that the survival of 
the organism is tightly connected to the fit between its characteristics 
and the environment (be those characteristics evolved for this environ-
ment or not), a reasonable perspective for the functional description of 
an organism and its behaviour is what adaptive challenges it faces and 
how its characteristics meet those challenges. This is not to say that the 
traits have evolved for these particular purposes or that the architecture 
is perfect for those purposes that we are projecting onto them. But alt-
hough this perspective is a projection, it is not mere projection. Hypoth-
eses about yet undiscovered characteristics based on the projected pur-
posiveness and already known architecture (including constraints) are 
more likely to be true than those that would go against purposiveness. 
The behaviour and design of an organism can be given various descrip-
tions, but it is more likely that one guided by considerations of what the 
adaptive purpose of the functioning of the whole is, is a better heuristic 
for the discovery of new properties than any random description of 
what the organism does. 
What cannot be presupposed, however, is that any particular part 
is functional let alone optimal, or if it is, that it has evolved for that pur-
pose specifically. Furthermore, developmental constraints, historical 
contingencies, and the fact that each component part needs to function 
in relation to every adaptive task it participates in, should be taken into 
 
71 It would be tempting to think that the reasons why we undertake actions 
are the connectives for behavioural traits in the human context. The individ-
ual behaviours get their meaning from and are connected by reasons and in-
tended goals for action. This is not available for all animals at least, and it is 
problematic in the human context, too, for explanatory purposes other than 
intentional action explanation. First, the identifications of reasons are not 
identifications of psychological mechanisms; second, the intentional action 
scheme applies to actions, not behavioural traits; and third, we may give evo-
lutionary explanations for psychological mechanisms and behavioural traits, 
but not for reasons for action. I will discuss this topic in detail later. 
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account. The form of evolutionary functionalism I am proposing as the 
rationale for adaptationist research in biology is not a form of empirical 
adaptationism, but a tool for making hypotheses about the functional 
structure. Although it assumes that natural selection has played a cen-
tral role in the evolution of the organism under study (for example, hu-
mans), it does not make strong assumptions about the strength of natu-
ral selection as a historical explanatory factor. It is analogical to making 
optimality models in evolutionary biology proper in order to discover 
not only selection but other guiding factors when the model fails in pre-
diction. But what I am also claiming is that these two weakly adapta-
tionist projects have different purposes. 
As I said at the beginning of this section, ahistorical explanatory 
adaptationism like this could simply be called evolutionary functional-
ism. It is linked directly to both kinds of methodological adaptation-
ism, evolutionary historical and ahistorical functionalism. Evolution-
ary functionalist analysis might be a way to discover the actual evolu-
tionary history (along with the empirical evidence from, for example, 
comparative studies or fossil evidence). The use of ahistorical meth-
odological adaptationism to discover the functional architecture of the 
organism, on the other hand, is an alternative to historical adaptation-
ism to interpret the reverse engineering that Dobzhansky (1973) and 
Dennett (1995), for example, think is required to make sense of, and 
integrate, the different parts, functions and behaviours of biological 
organisms, as if the organisms were designed, as well as to integrate 
different subfields of biology – and, in Dennett’s case, beyond. Both 
approaches use evolutionary functionality as a tool for discovering 
evolutionary histories or new traits in the architecture of, say, human 
cognition. But they are looking for answers to different explanatory 
questions and need to take different complications into account. Next, 
I will distinguish between three kinds of evolutionary functionalism 





3.2.4. The Kinds of Evolutionary Functionalism 
 
To sum the discussion so far: there are three possible and meaningful 
but different goals to assign an adaptive function. The first is the arte-
fact model of understanding biological systems (Lewens 2000 & 2004). 
In its strongest form it would slide into the form of empirical adapa-
tionism that Lewens (2009) calls “well-designism.” But it is possible to 
have a weaker interpretation (call it well-enough-designism) and make 
only assumptions about the overall adaptedness to a relatively high 
degree. Some degree of sub-optimality can and must be assumed, and 
even a few instances of dysfunctionality every now and then, to make 
the ahistorical explanatory adaptationism a sensible perspective for a 
holistic causal-role functional analysis from the evolutionary func-
tionality perspective (in the Kitcher style) – as long as there is enough 
overall adaptedness. As I have argued above, adaptive-functional 
analysis like this does not require an adaptationist evolutionary his-
tory. I propose this to be the charitable reading of the practice in biol-
ogy to approach organisms from the evolutionary point of view, as if 
they were adapted, without committing the analysis to any of the 
problematic presuppositions discussed above regarding the criticism 
of adaptationism. This charity could probably be extended to at least 
some forms of evolutionary anthropology and psychology as well. 
The weaker form of artefact model is enough to make the practice of 
reverse engineering both a sensible stance for functional analysis and 
a source of hypotheses in non-evolutionary biology. But it cannot be 
used as independent evidence since anything may be non-adaptive. 
It may be worth highlighting here that the artefact model, and the 
practice of studying biological entities from the design perspective (or 
from “design stance”; Dennett 1987 & 1995) in general, is always a 
cognitive tool, not a discovery of real design in the proper sense, even 
when the apparent design really is caused by an adaptation process. To start 
with a trivial point, there is no literal design in nature. The design per-
spective is an instrumentalist approach to make biological systems in-
telligible, although it is closely linked to the real patterns that 
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evolution seems to produce. There seems to be design in nature and 
we can analyse natural beings from this perspective. The existence of 
this design can be explained through real but non-purposive pro-
cesses of evolution. Evolution’s tendency to produce apparent design 
makes the practice of artefact model useful, but it is not a literally true 
description, just a cognitively salient way to understand the depend-
encies in nature. 
But secondly, maybe less trivially, even true adaptation (as a his-
torical process) is decoupled from the adaptationist design perspec-
tive as a guiding principle for describing organisms: the historical 
causes and the adaptive analysis in the current environment are two 
different things, even if the environment is exactly the same now as it was 
then. The logic of natural selection explanations goes the other way 
around. The adaptivity of the current use (in its environment) is ex-
plained by the comparative adaptive values and other factors in the 
past (in a similar environment). Otherwise, it would be a teleological 
explanation. Thus, the questions about adaptivity (or the functional 
analysis of the organism) and causal explanatory history are both con-
ceptually and substantially separate even here. There is design that 
we project onto the organism, and we use its environment as a point 
of reference for what it was “designed for”. And we acknowledge that 
this design is imperfect. The evolutionary history explains the struc-
ture of the organism that we perceive as functional. The history is par-
tially an adaptation process to environments different but somewhat 
similar to current environments, even when the simplified adaptation 
story is true. What is needed for the artefact model to work is a reason 
to think that there is coherent complexity that could be functional in 
some environments, and a reason to think that the organism is func-
tional in its current environment. The similarity between the environ-
ment of adaptive evolution and the current environment guarantees 
this, but it is not a necessary condition. Consequently, the adaptive-
functionalist thinking in analysing an organism is not about evolu-
tionary histories in any case. Natural selection having had a hand in 
the history is an explanation for why this thinking is somewhat 
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successful. The two (adaptive-functionalist thinking about a trait and 
giving the trait a causal-historical explanation) are conceptually dis-
tinct and they play different roles even in evolutionary historical ex-
planations: observed adaptive functionality in the current environment 
may be used to formulate a hypothesis about similar environmental 
conditions having been causal factors in adaptive evolution in the past. 
Therefore, it is sufficient empirical assumption for the artefact 
model to work that there has been some sort of selection-driven tink-
ering causing an apparent design in the architecture. This is enough 
to justify the practice. Every part of the design does not have to be 
evolved for precisely the purpose it is analysed to have. This happens 
at its fullest when the whole system under study is a true adaptation 
to a similar environment to the one in which it lives, but the causal 
explanation for the functionality of the design should not be confused 
with identifying design. This would be an intentionalist fallacy. It can-
not be meaningfully considered to be a criterion for what is “really” 
an adaptation. The further question for historical explanations is 
whether we can use the current use and its environment as a clue to 
what the trait was selected for. And sometimes the adaptive design to 
be explained cannot be explained by processes that assume the simi-
larity between environments past and present. 
The second type of functionalist explanatory adaptationism is 
functionalism in evolutionary history, or in how the trait actually 
came to be the way it is. This is a more complicated issue. Even if nat-
ural selection were the most important evolutionary factor, for exam-
ple in making sense of how apparent design is possible in the first 
place, it is still just one evolutionary factor among others that have a 
real significance. There seems to be a near consensus among philoso-
phers of biology that all three dimensions of adaptationism (empirical, 
explanatory, and methodological) are fallacies in any strong sense 
when it comes to evolutionary historical explanations. Furthermore, 
the causal effects of natural selection change over time when both the 
environment and the population change: it is not a simple relationship 
between an environment and the selected trait. No biological 
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characteristic is entirely an adaptation to any single environment, 
strictly speaking. The causal contribution of any environment to any 
trait comes in degrees. The contribution of natural selection to evolu-
tion, as such, as central as it is, is an abstraction from a multifactor 
causal history. There is, however, a much more modest historical use 
for evolutionary functionalism in historical evolutionary biology. Ad-
aptationist scenarios give how-possible explanations (Brandon 1990) 
that can be used to generate more specific follow-up questions. 72 
 
72 The issue of how-possible explanations is quite complicated, however. It 
means different things in different contexts. William Dray introduced the idea 
of how-possible explanations as historical explanations that do not tell us eve-
rything that we need to know in order to understand how something hap-
pened, but are fragments of information combined with plausible speculation 
that would explain what happened. The goal is not, however, to generate a 
plausible hypothesis. The goal is to give an account of the events that shows 
that at least one plausible explanation exists that makes the event intelligible. 
It is not mysterious that the event took place. (Dray 1957 & 1963; see also 
Persson 2012; Reydon 2012.) Robert Brandon, however, defends adaptationist 
explanations as schematic explanations that have holes in them. They are po-
tential explanations. (Brandon 1990; see also Resnik 1991.) These seem to be two 
different meanings of “how-possible explanation”, and they have two differ-
ent functions: Dray-type explanations are epistemic achievements in them-
selves that tell us why something was not unexpected, while formulating a 
potential explanation tells us what we still need to know in order to have an 
actual explanation (see Persson 2012; Kokkonen 2016). Furthermore, Peter 
Machamer, Carl Craver and Lindley Darden (2000) introduce the notion of 
plausible explanation, by which they mean an explanation in which the exist-
ence of a mechanism with certain causal powers is well established but the 
mechanism is a black box. This is a third form of how-possible explanation 
(Persson 2012; Kokkonen 2016). The confusion about different notions of how-
possible explanation has been sorted out by distinguishing between local and 
global how-possible explanations (Forbes 2010) and between possible causal sce-
narios and causal mechanism schemas (Ylikoski & Aydinonat 2014). I have de-
veloped a hierarchical taxonomy of how-possible explanations and their dif-
ferent possible epistemic achievements elsewhere (Kokkonen 2016). Further-
more, I argue that a Dray-type how-possible explanation is an epistemic 
123 
 
Models based on them can also be used to discover the existence of 
other factors (see Orzack & Sober 2001b). This is only a tool among 
others and should be used jointly with hypotheses on other evolution-
ary factors (Lloyd 2015), but it is a central part of evolutionary biology. 
This also means that understanding the adaptive dynamics of, say, al-
truistic behaviour, is a large part of the evolutionary historical expla-
nation of why altruistic behaviour exists wherever it does, even when 
other factors than those of the proposed dynamics (to be further dis-
cussed later) dominate the behavioural evolution. 
The third type of evolutionary functionalism is simply current 
utility, or adaptive function without further inferences into proximate 
mechanisms or evolutionary histories. Describing this function has 
what I have been calling minimal explanatory relevance. It is explanatory: 
it specifies a part of the natural selection mechanism that is an active 
and present causal factor even if it was not a part of how the trait 
emerged historically, even if other factors are over-determining or 
frustrating its effects, or even if there has not been enough time for the 
mechanism to bring about the effect. It is also relevant as an explana-
tory factor. First, regardless of the actual evolutionary history of a trait 
(or our knowledge of it), its adaptive function tells us that this is the 
direction selection would have pointed to (and maybe it did) and it 
gives a direction for further evolution (given that there are no con-
straints). Second, it tells us that the trait would outcompete variants 
that are worse off for this particular use. Third, and perhaps most im-
portantly, it also tells us about what kind of changes in the environment 
 
achievement in the evolutionary context too. For example, we cannot possibly 
know the actual explanation for the origins of morality, but a plausible ex-
planatory narrative makes morality understandable within the naturalistic 
framework. The further complications do not matter, however – the main 
point is that adaptationist scenarios have a heuristic function in evolutionary 
biology even without a strong commitment to adaptationism of any kind. The 
danger of sliding from innocent adapationist heuristics to full-blown empiri-




would create selection pressures for change and what kind of changes 
in the environment would be detrimental for the survival of the species 
(from the ecological perspective). It answers a set of what-if questions, 
and this increases our understanding of the organism in its environ-
ment. Nevertheless, the explanatory relevance is also minimal: it is nei-
ther necessary nor sufficient for explaining the trait’s existence, nor, in 
the case of behavioural traits, for providing a correct functional anal-
ysis of the underlying proximate mechanisms. However, it can serve 
as a starting point in, for example, ethology for either speculation on 
evolutionary history (see Cuthill 2005) or for a functional analysis of 
the proximate design (see Bolhuis 2005). If so, we switch the topic. In 
the evolutionary context proper, we switch into the previous kind of 
evolutionary functionalism and should only consider the function as 
the first approximation, a how possible explanation that enables alter-
native hypotheses and the gathering of evidence, without discriminat-
ing between non-adaptive alternatives. If we use it as a starting point 
for a functional analysis of the proximate design, we switch into the 
artefact model, which, once again, should only serve as a heuristic tool 
for discovering the causal-role functional organization of the organ-
ism’s physiology and behaviour, and how these interact with the en-
vironment. 
Just as there are three ways to understand adaptive functions, 
there are three ways to understand evolutionary explanations as func-
tionalist explanations. They are the following: 
 
Current use functionalism: the adaptive function is the context 
of analysis; minimally explanatory 
Historical explanatory functionalism: the adaptive function 
(current or past) also plays a role in the historical explanation of 
the trait’s origin 
Ahistorical explanatory functionalism: the adaptive function is 
the guiding principle for the functional analysis of the organism 
and its behaviour 
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There is a close connection between these three forms of evolutionary 
functionalism but, as such, they address different explanatory ques-
tions. Adaptive functionality in the sense of current utility simply re-
flects what aspects of the trait are doing something positive for the 
organism, measured by fitness. Historical explanatory functionalism 
traces the contribution of adaptivity to evolutionary change. Ahistor-
ical explanatory functionalism, or evolutionary functionalism in a 
non-evolutionary context, looks for functional explanations for what 
the organism is doing in its current environment. It is enough for the 
current utility function to refer only to the fitness effect, but both in 
the artefact model and in evolutionary histories adaptation is only one 
relevant perspective. There are other factors in the historical process 
of evolution and this matters for the artefact model as well. 
I have been making a case for an instrumentalist approach to 
ahistorical evolutionary functionalism, but it is only justified by the 
fact that actual historical adaptive processes have a lot to do with the 
overall design of the organism. But this is not as controversial as true 
adaptationism, if it is controversial at all. The artefact model can ac-
commodate adaptive features of the system that are not historical ad-
aptations, but the process of adaptation as a whole is what makes the 
organism and its behaviour, in its totality, a functional whole to what-
ever degree it is functional. But this still does not mean that we should 
be happy with a functional analysis alone. Incorporating knowledge 
about constraining factors such as phylogenetic inertia, structural lim-
itations, and path-dependencies makes even the artefact model more 
precise. For example, we should take whale’s lungs as a central design 
feature of the whales even in the artefact model. Brett Calcott (2014), 
for example, has argued for such an approach, which might be 
thought of here as a historically extended artefact perspective. 
Taking all these considerations into account, we may finally con-
clude that there are at least five different ways to interpret what an 
evolutionary explanation (not adaptation explanation only) of a given 




1)  a statement of the current utility (which is a minimally ex-
planatory description), 
2)  a causal-historical adaptation explanation (with an etiolog-
ical function), 
3)  an ahistorical functional explanation (with a causal role func-
tion, as a part of the artefact model description of an organism),  
4)  a causal-historical non-adaptive explanation (that is, a his-
torical narrative with multiple types of causal factors, in-
cluding but not limited to natural selection), or  
5)  an extended artefact model (which is not a historical state-
ment but takes non-adaptive historical knowledge into ac-
count in its view of the design). 
 
This distinction is important in interpreting the claims of “evolution-
ary social science” (the various schools of using evolutionary analysis 
tools on human social behaviour). Some of the evolutionary research 
programs seem to have different ideas about what an evolutionary ex-
planation is in the first place – and by extension, implicit ideas about 
what is being explained. I will return to this in the next chapter. But 
first, a short note on problems that remain. 
The three forms of evolutionary functionalism suffer from different 
adaptationist problems. The current utility analysis has no specific prob-
lems as such and is, in my estimation, a defensible adaptationist position, 
and ahistorically explanatory, but it is only minimally explanatory. It 
simply sets the trait in relation to environmental factors in a way that con-
stitutes a part of the natural selection mechanism and tells us what the 
trait’s use for the organism is, from the point of view of how it makes the 
organism fitter than (some of the) alternative forms of the trait would. 
This is not a fascinating achievement as such. The artefact model makes the 
additional assumption that the overall design of the organism is guided 
by this principle. In the weaker and more holistic formulation I have de-
scribed here (in contrast to a Swiss Army knife style piecemeal adaptive 
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architecture), this form of methodological adaptationism does not require 
any of the parts under study to be true (historical) adaptations. This 
should be enough to use adaptive functionality as the guiding principle 
in reverse engineering the functional organization of the organism. This 
form of evolutionary functionalism cannot, however, be more than a tool 
for first approximation and generating hypotheses, given that dysfunc-
tionalities are a real possibility, and the adaptationist ideas need to be 
amended. But this is also an instrumentalist approach to the design that 
gets judged by its practical usability. The use of adaptationist heuristics in 
evolutionary biology proper to outline the histories faces more serious prob-
lems, and I would conclude, as promised earlier, that adaptationism is 
not viable within evolutionary biology (for the reasons present in the lit-
erature and discussed above), even if it is a sensible ahistorical perspec-
tive on the design of organisms. Natural selection is only one and much 
constrained factor in the actual history, so even if it is the most important 
one, the use of evolutionary functionality as a guide to actual historical 
processes in evolutionary biology proper is misleading. Nevertheless, it 
may have a more limited use as a weaker how possible form of hypothesis 
formation, and adaptation explanations as such are central in evolution-
ary biology. It is important to understand how they work. This alone 
would make the clarification of adaptation explanation important. 
The three forms of evolutionary functionalism have different epis-
temic functions and different limitations. The core of the analysis is the 
same, however, so I will discuss “evolutionary functional analysis” and 
“evolutionary explanation” without making further qualifications about 
which of these projects is involved. I will, however, assume that human 
sociality, at the level of generality I will be discussing, is a product of evo-
lution, and natural selection has played a role in this evolution. The over-
all aim and motivation for the project at hand is so that we can give cer-
tain features of human sociality evolutionary historical explanations, and 
these explanations are part of what justifies the use of the artefact model in 
understanding human sociality. How far this methodology can lead us, in 
either project (the evolutionary origins of human sociality or understand-
ing it in contemporary humans through the artefact model), is up to the 
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success (or lack thereof) of these research programmes, as discussed in 
the introduction. I will not return to the problems of adaptationism later, 
but this is not because I do not consider them significant. I will discuss 
some other complications, however: how assumptions about proximate 
mechanisms and developmental mechanisms affect how the adaptation 
explanation works.  
I will move to the issue of how to relate the other explanatory di-
mensions to evolutionary dimension in the next sub-chapter. I will dis-
cuss adaptive function, evolutionary history, individual development, 
and proximate causes, using the famous four questions of Niko Tinber-
gen (1963). The main point will be this. Although there are different and, 
in principle, independent explanatory dimensions to any biological trait, 
how to answer them depends on what the answers to questions on some 
other dimensions are. One cannot apply evolutionary explanations or 
evolutionary functionalism directly to behaviour and leave the mechanis-
tic basis for the behaviour and the developmental factors that shape the 
replication or reproduction of the trait as black boxes. These points are 
well established in the literature, usually in the context of arguing against 
adaptationism or making the case for the Extended Synthesis (Pigliucci & 
Müller 2010). I will argue later that the relation between individuals and 
the groups they belong to becomes more complicated in all dimensions 
(mechanistic basis, development, and evolution) in ways that might 
sometimes call for a holistic approach in any or all dimensions. 
 
 
3.3. Tinbergen’s Questions with Mechanistic Answers 
 
Half a century or so ago, the ethologist Niko Tinbergen published an 
influential paper called “On aims and methods of Ethology” (1963), 
which, as the name suggests, discusses and distinguishes various as-
pects in the study of animal behaviour.73 It distinguishes four areas of 
 
73 This distinction has since become the orthodox way to sort the different 
tasks of behavioural biology; see Manning 2005. 
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causal explanation in the study of behaviour. This distinction has be-
come to be known as “Tinbergen’s Four Questions” or “Tinbergen’s 
Four Whys”, because it distinguishes between four different senses in 
which a question like “why is the male sparrow singing?” can be un-
derstood. These senses are, according to Tinbergen: 
 
1) Causation, which refers to the “behavioural machine” or 
mechanisms underlying the behaviour; for example: 
What proximate causes make the sparrow sing? 
2) Survival value (almost invariably called “function” in 
more recent literature; see Hogan & Bolhuis 2005 & 2009), 
which refers to whatever it is that the behaviour does for 
the animal that makes it better off (directly or through 
indirect consequences) in its natural environment: What 
is the singing for? 
3) Ontogeny (or development), which refers to how the be-
haviour and its underlying mechanisms appear in the 
course of the individual development of members of the 
species: How did the singing behaviour come about and 
change during the sparrow’s lifetime?  
4) Evolution, which refers to the actual history of the trait: 
How did the singing behaviour come to exist on the population 
level in the course of the history of the species and its ancestors? 
 
As such, these questions are not precise enough to be four different 
explanatory questions. Rather, they are four different perspectives from 
which to frame explanatory questions about animal (and human) be-
haviour, mapping different explanatory dimensions (as I have been call-
ing them), each of them collecting a set of explanatory questions about 
the same behavioural phenomena. Furthermore, each of them con-
tains a set of questions that differ in more than just what kind of (com-
plementary) explanatory information they seek. One could even go as 
far as to say that the different explanatory questions within a dimension 
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ask about different parts of the same causal network and the answers 
are either complementary or competing, whereas the different dimen-
sions simply ask different questions (Sherman 1988). However, the 
questions in different dimensions are connected through the subject 
matter: the answers to explanatory questions in any given dimension 
may sometimes depend on facts about explanations given in some 
other dimension (Mitchell 1992 & 2002; Pigliucci & Müller 2010). This 
also means that the formulation of an explanatory question in one di-
mension may derive its motivation from needs in another dimen-
sion.74 I will discuss the four explanatory dimensions (mostly) from 
the point of view of evolution of social behaviour now, taking the evo-
lutionary functionalist stance explicated above to relate other dimen-
sions to the evolutionary dimension. The evolutionary function is the 
perspective that sets the relevant explanatory questions in the other di-
mensions. The answers to these questions in turn affect the evolution-
ary explanation. This perspective is needed for evolutionary pur-
poses, and it may be relevant for other purposes (for the reasons dis-
cussed previously), but this is not meant to be a perspective-free sys-




Causation is a category that includes questions about both the external 
and internal immediate causal factors that trigger a certain behaviour, 
and about the mechanisms underlying these causal dispositions and 
participating in the causal processes that produce the external behav-
iour. Questions about external conditions only (what proximate 
 
74 In practice, questions that cross the boundaries between different research 
areas within biology are seldom in focus. When attention is paid to them, a 
whole new research program gets initiated sometimes. This has been the case, 
for example, in evolutionary developmental biology (Raff 1996; Hall 2003; 
Müller 2007). The boundaries within a discipline are not that different from 
ones between them sometimes. 
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environmental factors cause the behaviour?) leave the details of the “be-
havioural machine” black-boxed, concentrating on the interaction of 
the animal with its environment, to what stimuli it is responding in 
which ways. On the other hand, one could be interested in precisely 
this “machine”. This interest includes both comparative-psychologi-
cal (cognitive-ethological) level questions (animal cognition and mo-
tivational structures that are inferred from input-output relations in 
natural or artificial environments) and neurophysiological questions. 
These, again, differ in kind from each other, and both can be ap-
proached from both structural and functional perspectives. (See Ho-
gan 2005; Shettleworth 2010.) A central question for the (proximate) 
causal explanation of behaviour is how to define what to explain: is 
the explanandum a singular behavioural occurrence (usually not) or a 
behavioural trait? If a trait, there are different ways to define it: all 
structurally similar behaviour (regardless of context), all behaviour in 
a given context, all structurally similar behaviour in a given context, 
or all behaviour that is produced by a given set of proximate causal 
factors. There is no unambiguous way to slice behaviour into traits in 
biology (see Lidicker & Freund 2009). What behaviour goes together 
as a trait depends on the explanatory interests. This is also the case 
with human behaviour (Longino 2013). 
A further complication in explaining human behaviour is that we 
categorize both the behaviour and its causes as action guided by rea-
sons and intentions in our folk-psychological practices. This practice 
individuates behaviour individualistically and (if given a causal inter-
pretation) expresses its causes as well. However, if we approach be-
haviour from the evolutionary functionalist perspective (as we should 
for evolutionary purposes), we should instead approach behaviour 
along the lines that I discussed with the example of the honey buzzard. 
Various causes work in an orchestrated manner, forming a mechanism 
that produces a systematic behavioural pattern, and this pattern is iden-
tified through what adaptively significant effect it achieves. From this 
perspective, internal and external factors are connected: the evolution 
of internal dispositions (perceptual, cognitive, and motivational), 
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when guided by selection, is such that the combination of dispositions 
and external stimuli (in typical environments) jointly cause the behav-
iour that is functional in that environment. I will return to how to un-
derstand this in human behaviour and how this relates to our com-
mon way to understand human action in detail later. 
A special case of environmental stimuli is those caused by other 
individuals. Social behavioural dispositions that result in (evolution-
arily) beneficial outcomes without the individual processing the ends 
and means can be favoured over dispositions that involve individuals 
actively processing the ends and means. In human context, these dis-
positions would include things like emotional reactions to other indi-
viduals’ behaviour. They do not need to determine the behaviour to 
be selected dispositions; learning and reflection can shape both the 
perception triggering the emotion and the range of behavioural re-
sponses within the emotional state and the social context while the 
emotional response is still an evolved biasing factor for behaviour (see 
Mallon & Stich 2000). Non-reflective dispositions are likely to evolve 
if the social settings are robust enough to couple social triggers and a 
functional reaction reliably, since individual processing (contra se-
lected reactive dispositions) needs to go through proxies (that is, indi-
viduals need to want things that lead into fitness-increasing behav-
iour, and they need to recognize these things in a situation; see 
Sterelny 2003), processing consequences takes time and effort, and it 
is prone to errors that may be unnecessary. If there are persistent or 
frequent features in the social environment, selection favours reactive 
dispositions over individual cognition – although the two may be 
mixed. The selection for social environment does not need to be dif-
ferent from evolution guided by other features of the environment: 
behaviour is a selected response to the environment as it is, guided by 
the cognitive and motivational mechanisms that are selected to bring 
about this behaviour under the (social) environmental conditions, 
based on the clues that individuals are able to perceive within the en-
vironment and to process.  
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An individual does not need to aim at those consequences that 
are beneficial, but simply achieve those consequences because of what 
she or he is aiming to do: people may want to achieve something, but 
given the constraints, they achieve something else, which is what they 
actually “need” from the evolutionary point of view (see Sterelny 
2003). For example, people do not have an evolved urge for beneficial 
amount of energy intake, but for things like sugar, which lead into a 
healthy energy intake with availability constraints of the environment 
of adaptation, while urges without these constraints may lead into too 
much energy intake. This holds in social environments too. We may 
want to help others, for example, because unbeknownst to us this ben-
efits us (in an evolutionary sense) in the long run. An unavoidable 
difference from other conditions is that the selection of social behav-
ioural traits is dynamic: the fitness of a trait depends on other traits in 
the population, making the evolution sensitive to the repertoire and 
frequency of other traits in the population. But this is still a competi-
tion between traits. 
However, the fitness-relevant effects of the trait may depend on 
the response from others in a way that the behaviour makes sense only 
as a relational trait between two or more individuals: the consequences 
of the behaviour depend on the form of interaction, not just the indi-
vidual disposition to participate in the interaction in a particular way. 
This means that the explanandum for an evolutionary explanation of 
such behaviour is non-individualistic. This, of course, depends on both 
the facts about the proximate mechanisms guiding the behaviour and 
the adaptive functionality. I will make a case for this later. Neverthe-
less, the selection process itself may still be individualistic selection be-
tween individuals, with mutually beneficial consequences emerging. 
Game-theoretical models of behavioural strategies are usually inter-
preted in this way. I will argue that it may be inadequate to consider 
the object of evolutionary explanation (even if game theory is used in 
modelling the behaviour) to be only individual behaviour or psychol-
ogy, but sometimes the structures of social interaction may need to be 
taken as the object of explanation. The idea is roughly the following. 
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The behaviour has positive fitness effects for the individual because 
of indirect consequences that depend on the behaviour of other indi-
viduals. If you are comparing the fitness of individuals in the popula-
tion, it is not enough to know their individual behavioural disposi-
tions, but also what kinds of social interactions they are involved in. 
The object of the evolutionary explanation should be the collection of 
causal factors responsible for the link between the behaviour and its 
fitness consequences. If this collection is robust enough to evolve, and 
if it is a system of several individuals, the evolutionary explanation 
will be holistic in the proximate dimension. It is, however, another 
question whether the evolutionary explanation itself needs to be holis-
tic (that is, the selection takes place between groups of individuals) or 
if it can still be individualistic (that is, the selection takes place be-




Ontogeny, or development, also includes both internal and external fac-
tors. In this case, however, what counts as internal is not so clear. 
Sometimes, if the gene’s point of view is adopted, the distinction is 
made between genes and what counts as environment for their func-
tioning – including the hormonal environment within the organism. 
There are two possible justifications for this. First, the idea that genes 
are the source of intrinsic information that, in a linear causal sequence 
in the development, produces definite effects on phenotype, in inter-
action with the external factors. This image, however, has proven to 
be wrong: development involves, even on the molecular level, not 
only coding sequences of DNA (the molecular genes), but also regu-
latory sequences, the RNA and protein products of the DNA’s func-
tioning, and the environmental signals that influence the regulatory 
machinery in the cell, which in turn is a functioning living cell from 
the very beginning (see Wolpert et al 2010; Griffiths & Stotz 2013). An 
alternative way to divide between internal and external is to start with 
the fact that the development of an organism is a process, in which 
135 
 
some causal factors are external to the process, and some are internal 
to it. In this, internal factors include both the genome and the non-
genetic organismic properties in the developmental processes that 
build on the previous steps of the process. Even then, some of the ex-
ternal factors may be causally essential to development: some of the 
internal factors of development depend on some external factors such 
that they are not “fundamentally” internal. This, however, is a more 
realistic image of the process. (Oyama, Griffiths & Gray 2001; Griffiths 
& Stotz 2013.) 
The second argument for the first way to make the distinction would 
be an evolutionary-theoretical argument from the gene’s point of view a 
la Dawkins (1976): the genes are the developmental resources that repro-
duce and are there necessarily, in contrast to what depends ultimately 
on environment. This is an ad hoc distinction from a purely develop-
mental point of view, but if the question comes from the evolutionary 
point of view instead, the very interest to make distinctions is founded 
differently. The perspective could entail different criteria for what is 
explanatorily adequate. This solution, however, does not work since 
it makes unwarranted assumptions about reproduction even from the 
evolutionary point of view, including modularizing the evolutionary 
units of reproduction and assuming only one route for the reproduc-
tion of traits (see Oyama, Griffiths & Gray 2001; Jablonka & Lamb 
2005; Godfrey-Smith 2009; Pigliucci & Müller 2010). Furthermore, the 
concept of gene used here is an abstraction of inheritance patterns 
from the actual developmental processes, not something that could be 
identified with the molecular genes that are being copied and are the 
ones that matter for the developmental process (see Moss 2004; Grif-
fiths & Stotz 2013). I will return to this in more detail later. 
The external factors include the environmental factors external to 
the organism that participate in the developmental processes, both 
during embryonic development (the mother being the most relevant 
part of the environment) and after that. They may include specific 
properties of the environment that the development is sensitive to 
during the special periods of sensitivity for those particular factors, as 
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well as more generally affecting behaviour-changing properties. The 
factors of the developmental process can also be divided, for example, 
into more and less fundamental factors (for example, through the 
depth of generative entrenchment; Wimsatt 1986 & 1999), and into per-
missive and instructive factors (Woodward 2001; Griffiths & Stotz 2013; 
Calcott 2017). Both may include internal and external factors. Molec-
ular genetics is the study of one and only one component of this. I will 
return to the discussion on whether it is illuminating or not, or even 
seriously misleading, to differentiate between internal and external in 
development in the first place, especially in the development of be-
haviour. But even though molecular genetics can be said to study a 
component of individual development of behaviour, much of behav-
ioural genetics does not: it studies the association between genes and 
traits on the population level and should be classified as a different, 
although not independent, category. Evolutionary approaches work 
on the population level, and development used to be a black-boxed 
process between population genetics and population-level pheno-
typic variation, but this is an oversimplification. (See Wolpert et al 
2010; Oyama, Griffiths & Gray 2001; Carroll 2005; Griffiths & Stotz 
2013; Dediu 2015.) 
The role of the social (including cultural) environment that affects 
development is an important special case. As with proximate mecha-
nisms, the social environment can be just a part of the (developmental) 
environment from the evolutionary point of view, or it could play a 
more specific role. Individual development always takes place in the 
interaction between internal and external factors, but what are im-
portant in this from the evolutionary point of view are the individual 
differences that are transmitted to the next generation: the offspring 
resemble the parents in the ways that their parents are dissimilar from 
other individuals (Godfrey-Smith 2009). The features of the environ-
ment (and of the genome as well) that are not difference-makers for 
this, but are instead shared, indifferent regarding the outcome (even 
if they contribute to development), or random, do not matter. The fac-
tors that have the capacity to transmit traits, and differences in them, 
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to the next generation (or that participate in their reconstruction in the 
next generation; Griffiths & Gray 1994; Oyama, Griffiths & Gray 2001) 
can be targets of selection. This transmission may, at least in principle, 
take four different routes: genetic, epigenetic (that is, biological factors 
transmitted from mother to the offspring other than DNA that affect 
the developmental process), behaviour copying, and symbolic learn-
ing (Jablonka & Lamb 2006).  
From the evolutionary point of view, individualism and holism 
in the developmental dimension can be defined as follows. If the re-
production or reconstruction of the traits under selection relies only 
on internal factors (genetic or otherwise) regarding the systematic 
similarities between parents and offspring and the differences be-
tween individuals, these differences being preserved between family 
lines (that is, the transmission is only vertical), the evolutionary pro-
cess is individualistic in the developmental dimension. This leaves 
several options open for environmental factors in development: they 
may participate in the causal processes but the variation in these fac-
tors does not affect the outcome; there may be a range of variation that 
depends partly on the environmental factors in a non-discrete way; or 
there may be a limited number of discrete variants where specific en-
vironmental factors decide which of the possible variants gets devel-
oped. The object of evolutionary explanation may be a variant of a 
trait, but it may be the existence and frequency of the alternatives on 
the population level as well.  
A charitable reading of the so-called nativist evolutionary psychol-
ogy (more about this soon) is that it takes the object of the evolutionary 
psychological explanations to be those aspects of psychology that may 
have a range of variation but for which the range of variation is ex-
plainable as an adaptation. The alternatives may be explained by fac-
tors in individual development but the range of developmental dispo-
sitions by evolution alone. A charitable reading of what a trait being 
“innate” means would likewise work along these lines. I will go 
deeper into this issue later. I will defend a limited usability of the con-
cept of innateness, and I re-interpret nativism as a form of 
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methodological individualism. Nativist evolutionary psychology is 
narrowing its explanations to those aspect of psychology that develop 
because of internal factors only. I would, however, consider linear be-
haviour copying from parents to offspring and even difference-mak-
ing linear cultural transmission as forms of individualistic transfer of 
traits. The route of transmission does not make difference from the 
evolutionary point of view. 
The holistic approach is needed when the reproduction processes 
are not only external but take place in larger settings. Human devel-
opmental environment consists of cultural products and meanings, 
and social practices and roles that require multiple individuals, and 
these elements are shared by groups of people. If the transmission of 
behavioural traits relies on multiple individuals contributing to their 
development, the group stabilizes the forms of behaviour collectively, 
and this is partly horizontal (not within family lineages alone), the 
transmission is holistic, group-level process. The aspects of behaviour 
that are transmitted in this way bind the adaptedness of the individu-
als together, as well as enables group-level adaptation. The key here 
is that the difference makers are shared – the same logic applies to 
“shared genes” in the inclusive fitness and to culturally- or behaviour-
ally-transmitted shared similarities. 
 
3.1.3. Evolution and Survival Value 
 
Evolution concerns the change in the trait in the population over evo-
lutionary time. It includes two components: building a phylogenetic 
tree (which was Tinbergen’s main question about evolution) and tell-
ing the history of how the trait gradually changes in the course of evo-
lution. The phylogenetic tree can be built through comparative studies 
(especially using genetics) and a speculative history of the trait’s evo-
lution can be sketched using the phylogenetic tree and (partially) ad-
aptationist scenarios based on our knowledge of the evolutionary en-
vironments. In addition to this, population genetics is a perspective on 
evolution of its own that studies the process of evolution from the 
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genetic perspective. Furthermore, explanation using population dy-
namics differs in kind from a casual-historical explanation of how a 
trait has changed in the course of evolution. Brett Calcott (2009) has 
made this point and labelled the latter as lineage explanation.  
The category of survival value, or function, is inherently ambigu-
ous. It is meant to capture the ecological aspect of the behaviour: what 
is the role of that particular behaviour in the environment of the ani-
mal from the perspective of what positive feedback it has for the ani-
mal in its environment (see Krebs & Davies 1997; Cuthill 2005; Shet-
tleworth 2010). Tinbergen’s formulation equates function with sur-
vival value, making it what has been discussed as “adaptive function” 
above. As such, an ecological description of behaviour like this does 
not require it to be optimal in the environment or to be historically 
adapted for the environment, just to have a use. But there is no need 
for the trait to be adaptive at all: if the aim of behavioural ecology is 
to describe the animal’s behaviour in relation to its environment in 
general, there is no reason to exclude those behavioural traits that are 
even disadvantageous in relation to the environment, any more than 
there is a reason for a physiologist to exclude those physical traits that 
are disadvantageous from the description of the animal’s physiology. 
These traits cannot be said to have function, but there is no reason why 
ecology should be constrained to functional aspects alone. On the 
other hand, some ethologists seem to think that for it to be sensible to 
talk about function in the first place, it has to be a historical adaptation, 
while current use is only a guide to this (Cuthill 2005, for example, is 
explicit on this point). The function in behavioural biology can be un-
derstood, then, in all the senses discussed in the previous section: 
adaptive function, causal role function, or etiological function (that is, 
adaptation). 
What I would suggest, however, is that the best way to under-
stand the ecological analysis of behaviour through its survival value 
is the artefact model in the moderate sense I discussed in the previous 
section: an instrumentalist perspective on the overall design of an or-
ganism and its behaviour. If it is the animal’s ability to exist in the 
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given environment we are interested in, which is what ethology is 
mostly interested in, then constraining the primary research questions 
to these aspects makes sense. The adaptation perspective is needed to 
make sense of the overall life form of the organism in its environment. 
Its recurrent behavioural patterns are bundled and sliced into traits 
from this perspective, and they are given a functional description 
from the point of view of their adaptive function in this overall image. 
The evolutionary source of the organism’s behaviour is not an issue: 
it may be a combination of adaptation, exaptation, habitat selection, 
and plasticity of behaviour and its development (including individual 
and social learning, even culture in some species). These may all pro-
duce enough adaptive functionality to make adaptation to environment 
a sensible starting point for ecological analysis even without stronger 
(historical) adaptationist commitments. 
 
3.1.4. Interdimensional Connections 
 
The explanatory questions of different dimensions seek explanations 
for qualitatively different things. The answers to them cannot be com-
bined into a unified grand story: even if they all refer to the same over-
all network of biological processes, they partition this complex net in 
different ways, being interested in different types of causal questions. 
However, as Sandra Mitchell (1992 & 2002) has argued, the explana-
tions are still not, strictly speaking, separate: they may be relevant to 
each other by constraining each other’s presuppositions and they may 
therefore clash indirectly (see also Pigliucci & Müller 2010). The lack 
of unification does not entail independence. 
I have characterized the proximate and developmental dimen-
sions from the evolutionary perspective above, but only to articulate 
which explanatory questions are relevant in each dimension from the 
evolutionary perspective. What I will do in the reminder of this sub-
chapter is give an outline of how they are related. These connections 
are a reason for why individualism and holism (in the sense defined 
here) in the proximate and developmental dimension are relevant for 
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individualism and holism in the evolutionary dimension, and how 
they are relevant. The nature of the connections is mostly an empirical 
question but finding out the answer to this involves philosophical is-
sues, some of which I will discuss in the rest of this dissertation. What 
follows now, as a prelude, is a discussion on the basic logic of how 
these dimensions relate. This logic may be characterized as a mecha-
nistic model of evolutionary explanatory hierarchy. This hierarchy is not 
global: it is not about theoretical importance, causal primacy, funda-
mentality, or any such thing, nor a universal taxonomy of biological 
explanations. This is not an attempt at theoretical unification either, but 
a framework for how different explanatory dimensions are related, in 
accordance to the mechanistic analysis presented earlier, when evolu-
tion and evolutionary explanation is what we are interested in.75 
Even if the evolutionary functional analysis of behaviour were 
understood as an instrumentalist artefact model without a need to 
presuppose historical adaptation of the particular trait, there would still 
be a presupposition of an evolutionary process producing the fit be-
tween the behaviour and the environment, guided by natural selec-
tion to a considerable degree, as discussed above. Furthermore, the 
connection between the behaviour and its adaptive function presup-
poses two other kinds of mechanistic connections: psychological (or 
neurological) mechanisms connecting the stimuli of the environment 
to the behaviour, and the developmental mechanisms guiding the on-
togeny to produce the selected mechanisms for the selected behaviour 
in each generation. In this way, the evolutionary study of behaviour 
is a study of internally linked mechanisms (in the liberal sense of 
mechanism argued for in the previous chapter) in which mechanisms 
are components for other mechanisms – in other words, different 
mechanistic levels (in the sense of Craver 2007). In this case, the 
 
75 An account based on evolutionary functionality might be developed to un-
derstand how the different fields of biology are related to each other, as dis-
cussed in the introduction. The model I am about to give could be a first ap-
proximation for this. The aim here is much more modest, however. 
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mechanistic levels are not ontological levels or levels of biological or-
ganization, and the explanatory hierarchy here is not an ontological 
hierarchy in the part–whole sense or indeed any other ontological 
sense, but only in the explanatory sense.  
In short, the adaptivity of behaviour requires an evolutionary 
process (guided by the mechanism of natural selection) as a mecha-
nism to bring about the developmental mechanisms that produce the 
proximate mechanisms that in turn produce the behaviour. There are 
no “different kinds of causation” as such in this picture (such as “ulti-
mate” and “proximate” 76). There is a historical process with a causal 
 
76 The well-known distinction between ultimate and proximate causes, put forward 
by Ernst Mayr (1961; see also Ariew 2003), in which “ultimate” refers to evolution-
ary causes and “proximate” to everything else, is often mapped onto Tinbergen’s 
questions scheme simply as “ultimate” equalling “evolution” + “function” and 
“proximate” equalling “causation” + “ontogeny”. This equation is incorrect. First, 
“ultimate” cause is meant be an answer to the why-question, referring to evolution-
ary origins, and “proximate” cause is meant to answer the how-question through an 
answer describing the biological mechanisms on various levels, but development 
may be both proximate and ultimate in this sense (see West-Eberhard 2003; Laland 
et al 2011 & 2013; Calcott 2013). Secondly, if ultimate explanations are meant to give 
explanations through survival value from the point of view of population dynamics 
(i.e. “the trait had to evolve to that direction, and here is why”), there are further 
problems. If the functionalist analysis of behaviour is understood as an artefact 
model, it seems to fall into this category (for example, Gardner 2013 identifies “ulti-
mate” with “adaptive rationale”), but it is not evolution. On the other hand, evolu-
tionary histories without population dynamics would probably not qualify as ulti-
mate explanations (Calcott 2009 & 2013). Furthermore, if proximate causes are 
meant to be individual-level processes, where do behavioural genetics belong to? It 
also seems that the ultimate–proximate distinction is not precise and one-dimen-
sional in the first place: it seeks to capture the differences between evolutionary and 
non-evolutionary, population-level and individual-level, as well as adaptivity as a 
quasi-teleological equilibrium and directly causal processes. These do not bound to-
gether theoretically or empirically. Continuing to use this distinction hinders pro-
gress in understanding evolution rather than promoting it (see also Ylikoski & Kok-
konen 2009 and Laland et al 2013). The main point of the distinction is that there are 
two kinds of causal processes in biology, but clearly, there are many, and they are 
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mechanistic structure that can be broken down in different ways, such 
as the Tinbergen’s Questions scheme, resulting in qualitatively differ-
ent causal explanations or narratives. One narrative is the description 
of the evolutionary history of a given behavioural tendency as a pop-
ulation-level process with natural selection and other factors. The en-
vironmental challenges and the behavioural solutions are abstractions 
on the population level, and the totality of the evolutionary factors can 
be conceptualized as a mechanism that produces the behaviour (in the 
evolutionary sense). However, this process presupposes an actual 
evolutionary history, which is a process of interactions between indi-
viduals of the population and the environment, and reproduction. 
This process can be partitioned causally in different ways. Discover-
ing the details of the proximate mechanisms and their development 
can be approached as opening important black boxes in the mechanis-
tic explanation of the evolution of a particular behavioural trait, and 
the information about them may be important for the population-level 
evolutionary explanations. 
If things were simple (which they are not), the four explanatory 
dimensions would form a neat hierarchy of explanatory levels. I will 
now present this simplification to articulate the basic logic, which is 
the basis for adding complications. 
 
related in a way that is made more sense of by a richer taxonomy and a mechanistic 
model of their relation that is being presented here now. At the same time, the very 
terminology of “ultimate” and “proximate” lures us to think that causes might be 
“more or less” ultimate or proximate and to conflate ultimate with distal, which al-
most contingently is one of the differences between evolutionary- and individual-
level explanations. This might be congenial with the statistical view of evolution, in 
which all real causal processes are on the same level, but not with other views. I will 
be using the term “proximate” strictly in the sense of “proximate mechanism” in the 
category of causation in Tinbergen’s scheme, except in chapter 5 and 6, where I dis-
cuss these mechanisms specifically. There I will use the terms “proximate” and “ul-
timate” to refer to different dispositional properties within the motivational archi-
tecture. The difference between evolutionary “purpose” and causal-mechanistic 




1)  Adaptive function determines the course of evolution (that is, 
understanding how the pieces that form the mechanism of 
natural selection fall together in the given context is all the 
mechanistic understanding we need of the evolutionary pro-
cess), which  
2)  determines the developmental pathways (what gene-environ-
ment interactions there are), which  
3)  determines what kind of proximate mechanisms there are, which  
4)  determines the organism’s behavioural response to the environment. 
 
In this picture, the evolution of behaviour could be thought of as nat-
ural selection fine-tuning the intermediate mechanisms in a way that 
produces functional behaviour, and all transitional mechanisms be-
tween adaptive function and behaviour could be black-boxed. This 
would lead into an image of the study of social behaviour that is asso-
ciated with Wilsonian sociobiology (Wilson 1975), where behaviour is 
modelled as directly adapted to the environment and the adaptive 
function should be the primary focus of behavioural biology, every-
thing else being details.  
This image is a simplification, but not entirely wrong. It articu-
lates the rough lines of how the dimensions are related and why the 
idea of evolutionary functionality could be a viable way to integrate 
biological phenomena. However, every step in the scheme is more 
complicated. First, as already discussed, there are other factors in evo-
lution: historical adaptationism is a fallacy. Even if the artefact model 
is useful in the ecological analysis of behaviour, and even if it were a 
useful heuristics to make inferences between adaptive function and 
proximate mechanisms (see Bolhuis & Verhulst 2009 and Shettleworth 
2010), the evolutionary history including non-adaptationist factors is 
a more efficient guide for a heuristics in discovering the architecture 
of the proximate mechanisms. Even this has shortcomings and needs 
to be done in interaction with all directions: the integration of the 
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different dimension needs to be integrative, not reductive (see Bolhuis 
2005; Cuthill 2005; Ryan 2005). This does not make behavioural ecol-
ogy based on artefact model or adaptive functionality useless in ana-
lysing ecological relations, but it leaves the explanatory aspect of the 
analysis minimal (in the sense discussed in the previous section) and 
diminishes the heuristic value of adaptationist assumptions. 
Secondly, there is the issue of behavioural plasticity. The proximate 
(neural or psychological) mechanisms of an adult do not produce the 
same behaviour to the same environmental triggers in all cases. (That 
would be a reflex.) There can be much greater sensitivity to specific 
overall contexts, creativity, and learning from experience. The biggest 
issue, however, is the role of the development of these proximate 
mechanisms in the first place.77 Environmental factors contribute to it, 
which means that changing environments may affect the outcome (in 
many ways, including learning in a much deeper way than merely 
reacting to previous experiences). Sometimes this phenotypic plasticity, 
the capacity of a genotype to produce several different phenotypes, is 
a selected property of development.78 Furthermore, the development 
constraints the variation and possible evolutionary tracks for the trait, 
binds together parts and functions of an organism that would seem 
like separate traits from a structural or functional perspective, and so 
on. The theoretical integration of evolution and development that is 
under way right now may still change our understanding of evolution 
 
77 As a historical note, the other three of Tinbergen’s questions had previously 
been explicated by Julian Huxley, and the ontogeny dimension was added by 
Tinbergen partly because of the criticism of oversimplifying the developmen-
tal process. (Bolhuis & Giraldeau 2009.) 
78 By this I mean the phenotype on the level of proximate mechanisms. These 
mechanisms themselves can be sensitive to the environment in the sense that 
the same phenotype under proximate mechanisms description can produce 
different behaviour depending on the information available. Behaviour being 
a part of phenotype, this is also phenotypic plasticity, strictly speaking. But it 
may be useful to make the distinction between the plasticity of the develop-
ment of mental faculties and the plasticity of behaviour with these faculties. 
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substantially (see Oyama et al 2001; West-Eberhard 2003; Piggliucci et 
al 2006; Sansom & Brandon 2007; Laland et al 2014). Evolution re-
quires the transfer of traits to the next generation and the nature of 
this mechanism matters. Evolution is not the evolution of traits, but of the 
developmental processes that produce traits. The nature of these processes 
is relevant to the relation between evolution and the traits, in numer-
ous ways – but it is not a reason to dismiss the general logic of the 
relation between the explanatory dimensions implied by Tinbergen’s 
questions as such.  
It is also important to know how development is related to prox-
imate mechanisms and what is the role played by the developmental 
environment. The same environment can play different causal roles 
(Brandon 1990): it may be a part of the selective environment in the 
evolution, a set of causal factors in the development (in both ancestral 
and current population79), and a set of proximate triggers for behav-
iour. In all cases, it may participate in the mechanisms (proximate, de-
velopmental, or evolutionary) that produce the behaviour (in the 
proximate, developmental or evolutionary sense of “production”). 
These environmental factors may include the social behaviour of the 
other individuals and culture. The issue regarding individualism and 
holism arises in all dimensions, and holistic elements in one dimen-
sion can affect how the explanations work in another dimension. This 
depends on the adequate description of a relevant mechanism (in 
whichever dimension).  
 
79 Even if the ancient developmental environment (which is also the selective 
environment) is similar to the current developmental environment (in which 
we study the behaviour), they need not play the same role in the development. 
The role of an environmental factor may change in the development in the 
course of the evolution of the developmental mechanism of which it is a part. 
An extreme example of this would be the Baldwin effect, where the develop-
ment of the trait gradually becomes insensitive to the environmental factors 
that were originally essential to the development, even a source for individual 
learning processes (Baldwin 1896; Futuyma 1998). 
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This leads us back to the issue of what the trait under evolution-
ary explanation is in the first place. It is not certain that the same thing 
can be considered as a trait in all the dimensions. In the evolutionary 
functionalist framework, behavioural occurrences that serve the same 
purpose (or are related to the same ecological challenges) are bundled 
together as a behavioural trait, as discussed before with the example 
of the honey buzzard. We may also be interested in the cognitive ca-
pacities and motivational mechanisms as such. They may participate 
in the production of several such behavioural “bundles” or behav-
ioural traits, but from this perspective, these mechanisms are the 
traits, connecting all the resulting behavioural dispositions. This 
means that the evolutionary explanations of behaviour and of psy-
chology may be explanations for traits that do not structurally map 
onto each other. Yet they are intimately connected. A behavioural dis-
position is selected for its role in the overall behaviour. If the behav-
iour is selected, the underlying proximate mechanisms are selected, 
which in turn are selected for all their behavioural consequences. And 
conversely: behavioural traits are bound together by the underlying 
proximate mechanisms that are, in turn, bound together by the behav-
ioural traits that they participate in. I will return to this later. 
Development adds a further layer. Shared developmental re-
sources (be they genes or environmental factors) and processes may 
connect structurally and functionally unconnected proximate mecha-
nisms together. Since the development of traits is what is being se-
lected instead of proximate mechanical structures directly, this more 
holistic bundle of proximate- and behavioural-level traits is the unit 
of evolution and should perhaps considered to be the trait from an 
evolutionary point of view (see Gould & Lewontin 1979; Lewens 
2009). This is so especially if the perspective is evolutionary history 
and phylogeny, not adaptation. Common ancestry leads into similar 
developmental processes that lead into similar traits and these could 
also be units to individuate traits for some evolutionary purposes (see 
Griffiths 2006). However, even if developmentally defined traits, ra-
ther than phenotypically defined traits, are the objects of selection, the 
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adaptive value that determines the selection pressures is still due to 
the interaction between specific phenotypic characteristics and the en-
vironment (although the developmental aspect is also relevant to this 
interaction), and this is the focus here. The developmental issue of 
consequence for the main topic is the role that the environment plays 
in development and the possibility that those developmental factors 
are an alternative route for the replication of traits.  
To sum up, there are three important issues related to the explan-
atory hierarchy presented above. First, what is the logic of the rela-
tionship between the different kinds of biological explanation? I have 
sketched an outline for a general mechanistic framework, but I will 
expand the discussion on the specific points in the forthcoming chap-
ters. Second, within the context of the explanatory hierarchy, is there 
a one-to-one mapping between what counts as a trait on different lev-
els? I have raised the possibility of this not being so in the above dis-
cussion and I will return to this issue later. Third, are there explanato-
rily non-reductive, non-individualist elements on any of these levels 
in the case of human social behaviour? If so, what are the conse-
quences of this for its evolutionary explanation, taking the first two 
issues into account? I will discuss the various explanatory dimensions 
in turn. Before this, I will give a brief overview of the human evolu-
tionary sciences and show how frame these questions appear in the 





4. Evolutionary Human Social Sciences 
 
The human species is a product of evolution and has been studied as 
such in different ways. An obvious object of study is human evolu-
tionary history. Another way is to use evolutionary ideas in the study 
of contemporary humans. Humans have been studied as biological 
beings from both perspectives, but sometimes evolutionary models 
and ideas have been used as analogies, metaphors or expansions from 
the properly biological sphere to somewhere else (such as economics 
or cultural phenomena). The interest here lies in the nature of evolu-
tionary principles used in explaining sociality (for example, coopera-
tion) and culture. I will concentrate in the “natural” phenomena; I will 
not discuss evolution within created systems (such as economics or 
science). Sometimes the evolutionary approach is central to the very 
identity of a discipline, sometimes evolutionary considerations are 
just an additional source of hypotheses, but this distinction is irrele-
vant as such for the current discussion. I will use the labels of “socio-
biology”, “evolutionary anthropology”, and “evolutionary psychol-
ogy” in my discussion, but these titles are meant to be inclusive – that 
is, although some of the discussion in the section of “evolutionary psy-
chology” will be on the research program that is self-titled in this way, 
I include evolutionary approaches in “traditional” fields of psychol-
ogy in this category.  
These labels are not meant to capture different “schools” of evo-
lutionary human sciences either – to capture the whole variety of ap-
proaches, more fine-grained categorization would be needed. The var-
ious approaches are not necessarily in direct competition, either, but 
rather ask different questions with explanations that may sometimes 
be compatible and sometimes not (see Smith 2000: Ylikoski & Kokko-
nen 2009; Brown et al 2011; Laland & Brown 2011; Brown & Richerson 
2013). Furthermore, I will not evaluate any evolutionary approach as 
such here. The purpose of this chapter is to build the contextual back-
ground for the subsequent chapters: it matters, for the evolutionary 
social sciences, whether the explanations and the presuppositions 
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they make are individualistic or holistic, on all dimensions, and a fail-
ure to pay attention to holistic aspects of social behaviour when 
needed is a methodological failure. I will also introduce some key 
ideas and explanatory principles that will be discussed in more detail 
in the subsequent chapters. 
 
 
4.1. Sociobiology, Broad and Narrow 
 
There are two different senses in which the term “sociobiology” is un-
derstood. In the broad sense, it simply means all study of animal soci-
ality and social behaviour from an evolutionary functionalist perspec-
tive (see for example Alcock 2003). In this sense, the object of this dis-
sertation is sociobiology. In the narrow sense, it refers to a particular 
school of doing so (call this classical sociobiology if you will), which hap-
pened to be the school that started this line of research. Edward O. 
Wilson (1975) was behind the name “sociobiology”80 and was respon-
sible for the first systematic collection of its methodological tools and 
for building a unified theory, but the tools as such came mostly from 
theoretical biologists such as Robert Trivers and William Hamilton. 
The two central ideas of sociobiology were the gene’s eye perspective on 
adaptivity of behaviour and the use of game theory to analyse social 
situations, both of which have become fixed features of evolutionary 
approaches to social behaviour. Both approaches are usually consid-
ered to be individualistic approaches, although they can be argued to 
be neutral in this regard – Elliot Sober and David Sloan Wilson, for 
example, have argued that some cases in which these tools are applied 
are cases of group selection (Wilson & Sober 1994; Sober & Wilson 
1998; see also Okasha 2006 and Birch 2017). Furthermore, the sociobi-
ological tools make no assumptions about the proximate or develop-
mental mechanisms at all. I will now review some key aspects of 
 
80 The term itself was introduced as early as the 1940s, but it did not gain a fixed 
reference and did not see any particular use before Wilson (Plotkin 2004: 105). 
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classical sociobiology, and also some other tools of sociobiology in the 
broad sense. 
 
4.1.1. The New Synthesis 
 
The study of behaviour has always been a part of biology, but the pi-
oneers of modern animal behavioural biology, ethology, with evolu-
tionary component as one of its central parts, were Karl von Frisch 
(1886–1982), Konrad Lorenz (1903–1989), and Nikolaas Tinbergen 
(1907–1988), who shared the 1973 Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medi-
cine for this. 81  The approach became an established research area 
within zoology by the early 1950s. As we have seen, the ethologists 
thought from the very beginning that there are several biological ways 
to approach behaviour, including evolutionary approaches. The bio-
logical approach, generally speaking, was expanded to comprehend 
human behaviour by ethologists in the 1960s and 1970s (for example, 
by Konrad Lorenz (1966 [1963]) and his student Iranäus Eibl-Eibefeldt 
in a more academic context, and by Desmond Morris in a series of 
popular books; see Laland & Brown 2002; Plotkin 2004). This human 
ethology challenged the culture-centred view of many anthropologists 
of the time, replacing it with a zoologized view of humans. At the 
same time, they acknowledged the many peculiarities of human be-
haviour (such as culture) and their own methodological limitations in 
studying humans properly (Laland & Brown 2002, 59–64)). However, 
early ethological work influenced some anthropologists, including Li-
onel Tiger, Robin Fox (for example, Tiger & Fox 1971), and Donald 
Symons (1979).  
Human ethology was arguably based on evolutionary function-
alism, guided by the idea that animal behaviour can only be 
 
81 Their studies, of course, built on existing tradition, starting from Charles 
Darwin himself (Darwin 1872), with most important prior advances arguably 
made by Oskar Heinroth, Charles Otis Whitman, and Julian Huxley 
(Burkhardt 1981; 2005). 
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understood in natural environments – laboratory experiments are in-
adequate or at least insufficient – but it was not restricted to study of 
function. Ethologists were also interested in proximate causal mecha-
nisms and developmental processes without an evolutionary perspec-
tive, and much of their evolutionary attention was in building phylo-
genetic trees, not in discovering adaptive functions. (See Laland & 
Brown 2002; Plotkin 2004.) The tools of sociobiological analysis started 
to appear during the 1960s and 1970s (for example, Hamilton 1964a, 
1964b & 1970; Maynard-Smith 1964; Trivers 1971 & 1973; Maynard-
Smith & Price 1973). Edward O. Wilson collected the methods in a sys-
tematic theory in his field-coining book Sociobiology, subtitled The New 
Synthesis, referring to the expansion of the “old synthesis” of Darwin-
ian evolutionary theory and Mendelian genetics into the modern evo-
lutionary biology (Wilson 1975). Wilson’s Sociobiology and Richard 
Dawkins’s The Selfish Gene (1976), which is a more philosophical take 
on the guiding principles of the new approach and its gene-centred 
ontology, popularized the approach inside and outside academia. The 
approach pushed proximate and developmental questions and phy-
logenetic considerations into the background, concentrating on the 
function of behaviour. The first human applications of the approach 
appeared by the late 1970s, amid fierce controversy (see Segerstråle 
2000). In retrospect, leaving the proximate and developmental ques-
tions aside was an obvious step for the worse from the more tradi-
tional approach of ethology, and this was partly guided by mistaken 
ideas such as very strong adaptationism (Gould & Lewontin 1979; 
Kitcher 1985) and unwarranted behaviourism (which also reflected 
the differences in approaches between European and American psy-
chological as well as zoological traditions; see Segertråle 2000; Laland 
& Brown 2002), but an important motivation behind sociobiology was 
the emergence of new theoretical tools, such as kin selection and 
game-theoretical models, to understand social behaviour from the 
evolutionary point of view. A charitable reading of this new approach 
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is that its proponents got a bit overexcited about the new methods and 
approaches.82 
The most central theoretical idea of the approach was the gene’s 
eye view, or gene-selectionism, which switches attention from the fit-
ness of individuals to the fitness of genes. Although this shift of atten-
tion is away from individuals, it was built on direct criticism of group 
selection models. The early proponents of group selection (for exam-
ple, Wynne-Edwards 1962) thought that the adaptation of behaviour 
is sometimes for the good of the group. The individualists (for example, 
Maynard-Smith 1964 and Williams 1966) pointed out that even if in-
dividuals behaving for the good of the group make the whole group 
fitter, behaviour that makes the individual fitter than other individu-
als in the group (where all individuals get the benefits of being in the 
good group) will still be selected. This means that individual benefits 
trump group benefits every time they are in conflict. The logic in the 
gene-selectionism, however, is that it is the genes of the individuals 
that matter. The genes that are associated with behaviour that makes 
those very genes better, no matter in which individual, is selected. If a 
gene is associated with behaviour that promotes the fitness of the cop-
ies of the same gene in other individuals, it can be selected.83 One cru-
cial aspect of this move is to distinguish the different functions of the 
copying entity and the phenotypic entity in the logic of the selection pro-
cess, as explicated by Dawkins (1976; see also 1982) and elaborated by 
David Hull (1980, 1981 & 1988a). The copying entity (replicator) is the 
proper carrier of fitness, while the phenotypic entity (Dawkins’s vehi-
cle, Hull’s interactor) interacts causally with the environment in ways 
that determine the fitness of the replicators. I have already discussed 
some complications to this idea, raised by the complexity of develop-
mental processes that are left black boxes in this image. The whole 
 
82 Furthermore, as I explained in the previous chapter, black-boxing proxi-
mate, developmental and evolutionary-historical mechanisms makes some 
sense, although this was a mistake nevertheless. 
83 What exactly “gene” is referring to here is a more complicated question that 
will be returned to later. 
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approach has been since questioned (for example, Griffiths & Gray 
1994; Oyama, Griffiths & Gray 2000; Godfrey-Smith 2009). I will return 
to the problems and the remaining insights of this distinction later. 
 
4.1.2.  Kin Selection 
 
The key notion of gene-selectionism is the concept of inclusive fitness. 
It was introduced by William Hamilton (1964a & 1964b), based on pre-
vious work by Ronald Fisher (1930) and John Haldane (1932 & 1955). 
Inclusive fitness consists of two parts: direct fitness, which refers to the 
positive effects the trait has on the organism’s own reproductive ca-
pacity, and indirect fitness, which refers to the positive effects the trait 
has on the fitness of other organisms who share the same genetic basis 
for the trait. Both promote the selection of the underlying genetic basis 
that the trait is connected to. This is the basis for the effect that John 
Maynard Smith (1964) coined kin selection and Robert Trivers (1985) 
proclaimed to be the most important idea in theoretical evolutionary 
biology since natural selection itself: helping your kin to increase the 
fitness of your own genes. Formally put, when 
 
ai is the direct positive fitness effect the trait has on the individual i, 
bij is the positive fitness effect i has on the individual j,  
cij is the negative fitness effect on i for having the effect on j,84 
rij is the multiplier from the degree of relatedness between i and j, 
and 
wi is the inclusive fitness of i, 
the inclusive fitness can be calculated from the equation 
wi = ai – cij + Σ rij bij 
 
 
84 The behaviour may be costly, in which case there is a loss in absolute fitness. 
But even if there is no such loss, merely helping someone has a negative fit-
ness effect on relative fitness. I will return to this (and to this distinction) later. 
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where sigma refers to the sum of the fitness effects from all relevant 
individuals. The value of the relatedness multiplier is the same as the 
degree of the shared genes (when only those genes in relation to which 
there is variation in the population in the first place are considered) 
on average – in diploidic organisms, the multiplier between the par-
ents and offspring, as well as between siblings, is 0.5, between first 
cousins 0.25, and so on. These multipliers, however, presuppose that 
the parents are not related at all, and the population is infinite. Relax-
ing these unrealistic idealizations decreases the multiplier. In a popu-
lation consisting of only one family of two generations, the multiplier 
would always be zero. According to Hamilton’s rule, which is the cen-
tral equation of kin selection, altruistic behaviour of i towards j can get 
selected, if rb – c > 0, that is, if rb > c. (Futuyma 1998, 595–596.) 
I will return to kin selection later, but two observations should 
already be made here. Relatedness as such is not a causal factor. What 
is important is that the gene to be selected is associated with behaviour 
that benefits individuals who have that same gene, which includes the 
individual themselves and some others. The explanatory power of 
Hamilton’s rule does not come from relatedness, and even less from 
the overall shared genome, but from the likelihood of the gene in ques-
tion existing in the other individuals, which is higher the more closely 
related they are. There is a correlation between the amount of shared in-
heritance due to relatedness and the probability of sharing the gene. The 
first is not explanatory, which makes “kin selection” an unfortunate 
phrase.85 Another important point is that the two causal mechanisms 
in kin selection (the direct fitness benefits and the indirect fitness) are 
very dissimilar factors. Direct fitness has to do with the individual’s 
reproductive capacity compared to other individuals, whereas indi-
rect fitness makes sense only through the structure of the population 
and therefore requires a different mechanistic explanation even if the 
two factors could be modelled in the same equation. This has one 
 
85 This is not exactly so straightforward, but it is sufficient for now. I will dis-
cuss kin selection in greater detail in the final chapter. 
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particularly important consequence. Although sociobiology was in-
terpreted as an individualist account of social evolution by its propo-
nents and critics alike, this is not the only possible interpretation of 
these tools. Even if genes were the only replicators that matter (Daw-
kins 1989 [1976]), both individuals and groups might still be the real-
izers of the interactions that the genes are selected for – in other words, 
the vehicles or interactors (Wilson & Sober 1994). Hamilton himself, 
for one, thought kin selection was a form of group selection (Hamilton 
1970) after being convinced by George Price (1970) on this point. Elliot 
Sober and David Sloan Wilson (for example, Wilson & Sober 1994; So-
ber & Wilson 1998) have made a strong argument for this, too. I will 
return to this issue in more detail in the final chapter of the dissertation. 
 
4.1.3. The Evolutionary Game Theory 
 
The other central theoretical element in sociobiology is the use of evo-
lutionary game theory, developed especially by John Maynard Smith 
(Maynard Smith & Price 1973; Maynard Smith 1982). Social interaction 
can be modelled as a game where different options for behaviour have 
different fitness consequences depending on how the other(s) in the 
situation behave. The games are repeated and the number of rounds is 
unknown, since the focus is on the behavioural traits (or patterns of 
behaviour), not individual instances of social behaviour. The overall 
fitness of any behavioural disposition depends on the frequency of 
encounters with the various types of behaviour, and in an evolving 
population (with heritable behavioural dispositions) the dynamical 
selection process (that is, the very selective environment that evolves 
in the process), too, can be modelled as a series of games – this addi-
tion of the dynamic aspect is what differentiates evolutionary game 
theory from classical game theory. It is used specifically to understand 
conflicts and cooperation, but not only that. The central idea is that if 
the formal system has an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS; Maynard 
Smith 1983), that is, no other alternative strategy can replace it, the sys-
tem will ultimately reach it. The strategies are obviously idealizations, 
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not descriptions of actual behavioural traits, and they concentrate 
solely on the emerging fitness effects. Furthermore, the games are about 
consequences, not what the “players” are “aiming for” in the situations. 
This means that a social setting may have a certain game-theoretical 
structure measured in fitness without the concrete social interaction 
(defined with the individuals’ preferences, for example) having an iso-
morphic game-theoretical structure. The illustrations usually simplify 
this by concentrating on context where something concrete with a fit-
ness consequence (for example, resources or other direct conse-
quences of the behaviour) is “in play”. The structure of the evolution-
ary game may correlate with the structure of behavioural-level aims, 
but not always, and these structures cannot be collated. Still, they are 
useful tools for understanding the dynamics in interactions. 
There are different games to capture different social situations, 
but the classic of this approach (and the one that will be examined 
later) is the formalization of Robert Trivers’s (1971) theory of reciprocal 
altruism. The starting point for this is the intuitive idea that mutual 
help makes the individuals participating in the interaction fitter than 
individuals who do not participate. The possibility of free riding (tak-
ing help and not reciprocating) should, however, make such tenden-
cies unlikely to evolve. This situation is a classic case of prisoner’s di-
lemma. If we have only defecting and cooperative strategies, it is always 
better to defect, no matter what the other player chooses to play.86 
However, if reciprocity is an option, it may be the winning strategy. 
Reciprocation can be modelled as a Tit-for-Tat strategy (TFT), where 
the player cooperates first, and then reacts to however the partner 
played the previous round – keep cooperating if they did, otherwise 
 
86 For example, if cooperation costs one unit (of whatever has robust effects 
for fitness) but gives three units of benefit for the partner, defecting against 
another defector leaves you with zero units, whereas cooperating would only 
cost you a unit, and defecting against a co-operator pays three units, whereas 
cooperating would only grant two units. The only ESS in this setting is defect-




defect. This strategy does worse than defecting on the first round, but 
if there are enough reciprocal players and/or pure co-operators, it may 
do better overall. If it invades the population, it becomes ESS.87 (Fu-
tuyma 1998, 584–586; Hargreaves Heap & Varoufakis 1995, 197–198; 
Sober & Wilson 1998, 79–80.)  
Once again, the game-theoretical models have usually been in-
terpreted as individualist models, and understandably, so – they 
model individuals and their behavioural strategies in social situations. 
But, once again, there are alternative interpretations in which game-
theoretical models are sometimes interpreted as descriptions of 
group-level selection processes (see Sober & Wilson 1998). Further-
more, it is not so clear what the abstract strategies and games are mod-
elling in the real world. I will get back to these issues, too.  
 
4.1.4. Group Selection 
 
Not all early models of social evolution were individualistic. David 
Sloan Wilson had already presented his trait group model during the 
emergence of sociobiology (Wilson 1975), although much of the foun-
dational theoretical work and its popularization was done much later 
in the 1990s, notably as a collaboration between Wilson and Elliot So-
ber (Wilson & Sober 1994; Sober & Wilson 1994 & 1998; see also Sober 
1980a & 1984 and Wilson 1989). Other pioneers of both theoretical and 
empirical work include, for example, Charles Goodnight and Lori 
 
87 TFT does not automatically do better than defecting – it does not necessarily 
invade the population. But if it does, it is able to become fixed. There are also 
a lot of ways to make reciprocal strategy better in realistic ways, given some 
cognitive capacities. For example, in observer-TFT the player chooses the strat-
egy of the first round based on previous observations about the partner’s 
strategies (Pollock & Dugatkin 1992), and in a variation of this the player uses 
others’ attitudes as a clue for this (Castro et al 1998). In strong reciprocity (Gintis 
2000a) the defectors are punished – this is a problematic case, since even if this 
can make defecting unfavourable, punishing may be costly. (This may be a 
reason why, for example, lions tolerate free-rides.) 
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Stevens (Goodnight, Schwartz & Stevens 1992; Stevens, Goodnight & 
Kalisz 1995; Goodnight & Stevens 1997). Much of the later discussion 
on individualism and holism has been about what counts as group se-
lection – whether kin selection and the evolution of reciprocal altruism 
are really forms of group selection, for example, as mentioned above 
(see Sober & Wilson 1998; Okasha 2006; Goodnight 2012; Birch 2016). 
Wilson’s trait group model, however, is an unambiguous case of 
group selection in which the group level differences direct selection 
and override the invasion of selfish phenotypes from within. Even if 
a selfish (individual-benefitting) type is always fitter than the altruis-
tic (group-benefitting) type within every group, all individuals in a 
group with more altruists are fitter, which may make altruists fitter in 
the population overall. If there is a mechanism that keeps this struc-
ture constant, group selection takes place. However, the issue of indi-
vidualism and holism (as defined in the introduction) is partly about 
how we should interpret the sociobiological (in the broad sense) mod-
els as models of causal mechanisms in evolution. The fitness consequences 
that follow certain patterns (specified by the models) are a necessary 
condition for selection but modelling only the consequences does not 
say anything about the mechanisms that cause these patterns. This is 
a matter of relevant causal processes on all three levels discussed: 
proximate, developmental, and evolutionary. Group selection will be 
the topic of the final chapter. 
 
4.1.5. Biological Markets 
 
The Biological Markets Theory put forward by Ronald Noë and Peter 
Hammerstein (1994, 1995 & 2016) is a major new development in the 
evolutionary modelling of social behaviour. This theory approaches 
some forms of interaction within the species (such as collaboration, 
trading of goods, and mate selection) but also between species (such 
as cleaning mutualism or pollination) as “markets”. The idea is that 
there are goods (such as food or gametes) and services (such as clean-
ing or warning calls) that can be treated as commodities and the 
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individuals involved can be treated as traders. Traders choose their 
trading partners based on supply and demand, and on “bartering 
value”. Markets are formed only in situations where commodities are 
traded voluntarily, multiple potential partners are available, and there 
are differential bartering values. The theory also includes the idea of 
“advertising” services by signalling the services, which might include 
false information.  
Biological markets seem to work along two dimensions. The 
“currency” of trading in abstract is fitness, and the evolution of behav-
iour is explained as an evolutionary scale “bargaining process”. This 
does not need to involve any bargaining or partner choice in the prox-
imate dimension. For example, the evolution of symbiosis between 
flowers and pollinators can be formulated as a biological market, but 
the behaviour of pollinators is simply a result of this process. On the 
other hand, some animal behaviour looks a lot like actual bargaining; 
for example, primates exchanging grooming for other services seems 
to be a case of using grooming as a currency in actual trading. I sug-
gest that we distinguish these two aspects of biological markets: evo-
lutionary biological markets and proximate biological markets. At the 
same time, evolutionary biological markets explain the proximate bi-
ological markets and why the value of the currency of the latter can 
be measured in fitness. The idea of biological markets sounds like a 
metaphorical use of the term “market”, but if the market model ap-
plies to the evolutionary context and identifies a similar mechanism, 
the situation is analogical to the use of natural selection models out-
side biology: regardless of the disciplinary context of the discovery of 
a mechanistic structure, the structure itself may be more common. The 
ontological status of such repetitive structures is not important here. 
However, it is possible that real economic markets are an outgrowth 
of an activity that itself is a biological market in the proximate biolog-
ical sense, and that this is only one case of biological markets in hu-
mans. I will not go deeper into this here, but the approach has been 
applied to humans as well, outside economic activities (see Barclay 
2013 & 2016). 
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The Biological Markets Theory is about reciprocity, but it is not a 
variant or extension of the reciprocal altruism model – their explana-
tory mechanisms are different. They are not necessarily in competition 
either. However, they may be competing explanations for any partic-
ular case (see Carter & Wilkinson 2013, for example). Both can be used 
to explain reciprocity in behaviour (that is, altruism in turns over 
time), but whereas reciprocal altruism is about interaction between in-
dividuals, biological markets are about choosing the partner for inter-
action. The two mechanisms may contribute to the evolution of inter-
action at the same time. The distinction will be important later. 
 
4.1.6. The Shortcomings of Sociobiology 
 
There are different ways to interpret the evolutionary functionalist 
analysis of behaviour, as I have been arguing above. Classic sociobi-
ology (or sociobiology in the narrow sense) concentrated only on the 
function of behaviour, but its aim was not only an ecological analysis 
of current utility. It might be possible to reinterpret classic sociobiol-
ogy as a form of ahistorical explanatory functionalism, but it was pre-
sented as historical explanatory functionalism that was ahistorically 
explanatory as well, because of strong adaptationist assumptions that, 
as we have seen, provoked the classic criticism of strong adaptation-
ism. To be fair, however, the sociobiologists did not claim that the 
other dimensions (proximate and developmental) or other evolution-
ary factors and actual histories are causally irrelevant, only explanato-
rily irrelevant. The other factors could be black-boxed, since natural 
selection is the only directional factor in evolution (even if it is not the 
only one) and since only the genetic material that builds the behav-
ioural capacity is inherited and therefore persistent (Wilson 1975: 551; 
& 1978: 56 & 172; see also Laland & Brown 2002: 95–101; & Alcock 
2003). Furthermore, Edward O. Wilson (1975: 551) believed that spe-
cies-level traits evolve rapidly under new conditions, while only traits 
general to higher taxonomical levels are robust enough to resist rapid 
change. All this became subject to criticism of genetic determinism (for 
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example, Rose, Lewontin & Kamin 1984; Kitcher 1985) and adapta-
tionist story-telling (e.g. Gould & Lewontin 1979; Kitcher 1984),88 and 
these assumptions became especially problematic when sociobiologi-
cal methods were applied to human behaviour.  
One way to express the shortcut that classic sociobiology makes 
between behaviour and its evolutionary function is that it presumes 
the hierarchical mechanistic scheme that I presented in the previous 
chapter. The logic is as follows. The actual evolutionary processes 
have a causal function in the mechanistic process of natural selection, 
but their details do not matter. Other factors in evolution are not im-
portant in the long run. Evolutionary processes, in turn, involve the 
transfer of traits from one generation to the next. Developmental pro-
cesses are the mechanisms that produce the behavioural capacities 
and tendencies in a complex interaction between various factors, but 
only genetic components, being the only inherited parts of this, are 
relevant to the evolutionary functionality, and they, too, can be simply 
assumed. Behaviour, of course, involves capacities and tendencies, 
that is, proximate mechanisms, that cause the organism to behave in 
the selected ways, but the details can be left black boxes as well. Much 
of the justification for all these black boxes, in a charitable reading, 
comes from the population-level perspective: only certain aspects of the 
processes are robust enough to have a population-level effect. 
 
88 To be fair, the sociobiologists were not genetic determinists in any direct 
sense (see Wilson 1978; Segerstråle 2000), and even Kitcher (1985) only criti-
cizes them for being indirect genetic determinists, since the sociobiological 
thesis was never that genes determine behaviour, but that other developmen-
tal factors do not matter to the evolution of behaviour, since they are largely 
irrelevant to heritable differences between individuals. For this to work, pat-
terns of heredity should be seen in the diversity of human behaviour. The 
roots of behavioural genetics lie in eugenics, and it was Jerry Hirsch who 
brought the population genetics to ethology decades earlier (Greenspan 2008), 
but the need to prove heritability of human behaviour made a link between 
classic sociobiology and human behavioural genetics. But population-level ge-
netics leaves the development inside the black box. 
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Therefore, the adaptive function determines (to an explanatorily rele-
vant extent) the evolution, which determines which evolutionarily rel-
evant developmental factors (genes) exist, which then determine the 
proximate dispositions, which determine the behavioural outcome – 
and so the adaptive function is all we need to know to understand the 
behaviour. 
None of the black-boxing is warranted, and all the mechanistic 
details matter. Contemporary evolutionary human scientists agree 
with this. They incorporate the sociobiological methods with more sub-
stantial ideas about the mechanisms that connect the behaviour to its 
evolutionary function. Some of them concentrate on mind (evolution-
ary psychology), whereas some are still attempting to analyse the be-
haviour and its context, including culture (evolutionary anthropology). 
 
 
4.2. Evolutionary Psychology 
 
Like “sociobiology”, the expression “evolutionary psychology” can be 
understood in several ways. Broadly speaking, it can refer to any ap-
proach to psychology that is informed by evolutionary considerations, 
be they historical or functionalist. There are, broadly speaking, three 
types of approaches (that are not mutually exclusive): evolutionary 
histories of mind, evolutionary functionalist methodology within psy-
chological research, and evolutionary psychology proper. Evolution-
ary histories of mind try to trace the natural historical development of 
human mind and its capacities, although usually with the aim of in-
forming non-historical psychological research as well. Examples in-
clude relatively broad phenomena like the theory of mind and other 
social and communicative capacities (Byrne & Whiten 1988; Corballis 
& Lea 1999; Brüne & Brüne-Cohrs 2005; Tomasello 2009 & 2014), mo-
rality (Bekoff & Pierce 2009; Boehm 2012; de Waal et al 2014), religion 
(Boyer 2001; Atran 2002; Bering 2006; Schloss & Murray 2009), or lan-
guage (Carruthers 2002; Mithen 2005), and these approaches usually 
combine evolutionary functional considerations with comparative 
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empirical data from humans and other primates (or even larger 
clades), and are usually more interested in the temporal sequence of 
the emergence of new capacities (and the related phylogenetic issues) 
than functionality (see also Gangestad & Simpson 2007). Both this 
kind of evolutionary speculation and evolutionary functional analysis 
of psychological capacities and tendencies are sometimes used in the-
orizing or as heuristics in psychological research that does not attempt 
to reveal evolution as such, but to learn about how the human mind 
works (for example, Baron-Cohen 1995; Narvaez et al 2012). These two 
types of evolutionary inquiries into mind (evolution of mind and evo-
lutionary methods in psychology) are separated by their aims, but 
they are connected in much of the substance. The third type I men-
tioned above, “evolutionary psychology proper”, includes ap-
proaches that take the evolutionary perspective (historical or func-
tional, or both) as the basis for understanding the workings of mind 
(and sometimes human phenomena beyond just mind), and they prac-
tically combine the aims of the two other types directly (for example, 
Barkow at al 1992; Buss 2005 & 2014), usually in an (historically) ad-
aptationist manner. 
The classification of these approaches does not matter as such, 
and I do not evaluate any specific approach in this dissertation.89 But 
 
89 For the criticism of the boldest evolutionary approaches, see Buller 2005; Rich-
ardson 2007; Ylikoski & Kokkonen 2009; and Smith 2020. Two aspects have to 
be distinguished in the problems commonly associated with the field of evolu-
tionary psychology: the deeper problems having to do with theoretical and 
methodological assumptions and more superficial problems having to do with 
quality of research. Much of the epistemically bad reputation of the field may 
be related to the latter, and even in this case, the issue is not so much the quality 
of the research performed as it is the structural constraints under which it is 
done. First, evolutionary psychology shares the general problems of psycholog-
ical research. The notorious replication crisis is probably symptomatic of several 
methodological problems (such as lack of actual replication of the experiments 
and a high level of theory-ladenness), but probably includes the overestimation 
of the uniformity of human psychology (see Henrich, Heine & Norenzayan 
165 
 
it is worthwhile to note that “evolutionary psychology” is not one 
thing. Furthermore, the main idea for the study at hand is what evo-
lutionary psychological approaches say about human sociality. Even 
here the focus is only on what difference the assumptions about indi-
vidualism and holism make – and that these assumptions exist. To ar-
ticulate this, I will briefly describe the methodological starting points 
of the evolutionary psychology movement that claimed the name of 
“evolutionary psychology” first, and is also known as the Santa Bar-
bara School, nativist evolutionary psychology, or “Evolutionary Psy-
chology” (with capital letters) (see Laland & Brown 2002; Buller 2005; 
Sterelny 2007), to highlight some clearly individualist tendencies. Af-
ter this I will review some criticism and alternative takes that may 




2010). Evolutionary biology, on the other hand, always suffers from a high de-
gree of speculation and uncertainty. Evolutionary psychology accumulates the 
problems of these fields. Furthermore, whereas evolutionary approaches to an-
imals can assume that the current habitat of the animal is approximately the 
same as the environment of evolutionary adaptedness, in the case of humans, 
this environment (including its social aspects) is speculative. To make things 
worse, the idea that the mind that evolved in this environment and that the 
minds of contemporary societies are the same, or highly similar, is an assump-
tion that falls outside empirical evidence. All this makes evolutionary psychol-
ogy highly speculative and vulnerable to assumptions that originate in precon-
ceived ideas about “human nature” and the social interactions experienced by 
the researchers, as well as their value basis. This is all familiar criticism that has 
already been directed at sociobiology (Kitcher 1984; Segerstråle 2000). My point 
is, however, that even if the epistemically bad reputation of evolutionary psy-
chology is deserved, this does not mean that evolutionary approaches to mind 
suffer from these problems necessarily, or that the deeper problems are actual 




4.2.1. Nativist Evolutionary Psychology 
 
Nativist evolutionary psychology (or nativism) is a branch of evolutionary 
human science that was born partly out of the criticism of classical 
sociobiology and was critical towards it too. Its main founders were 
Donald Symons, Leda Cosmides and John Tooby, in the late 1980s 
(Cosmides & Tooby 1987; Tooby and DeVore 1987; Symons 1989; 
Tooby & Cosmides 1989), and other prominent pioneers include Je-
rome Barkow, David Buss, Martin Daly, and Margo Wilson (for exam-
ple, Barkow et al 1992; Buss 1995; Daly & Wilson 1999; see also Laland 
& Brown 2002, 153–157). According to Cosmides and Tooby (1987, 
278–279), the failure of (classical) sociobiology was to try and explain 
behaviour directly (as genetic adaptation to present conditions), when 
it should be obvious that what has been evolving is the psychological 
basis for the behaviour, and this has evolved in quite different environ-
mental conditions to the environment of evolutionary adaptedeness, or 
EEA. 90  Instead, they propose an alternative research programme.91 
The basic theses of the nativists are the following (Cosmides & Tooby 
 
90 Both the term and idea come from the British psychiatrist John Bowdy 
(1969), who explained some features of child development as being functional 
in the environment in which humans evolved (Laland & Brown 2002: 161.) 
Leda Cosmides and John Tooby (1987) adopted this notion and started to 
identify it roughly with the Pleistocene, during the last epoch in the history of 
our species in which the species was more or less one population and living 
in more or less similar conditions for long enough for evolutionary adaptation 
to have time to take place. The idea is contested: there are good reasons to 
think that the environment was not homogenous during this period (see Boyd 
& Silk 2003; Levin & Foley 2004), and human evolution did not happen exclu-
sively during that period – the evolution of human psychology is in continu-
ation with pre-human psychology, and there have been evolutionary changes 
after that period, too, even if the EEA was the most relevant period. 
91 This branch of evolutionary psychology can be argued to meet the criteria 
of a research programme in sensu Lakatos (1970) and should maybe evaluated 
as a research programme instead of as a series of empirical claims in its critical 
evaluation – but this is not important here. 
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1997, 2000, 2005a; Tooby & Cosmides 1989, 1990a, 1990b, 1992; Daly & 
Wilson 1999; Buss 1995 & 2014), my paraphrasing: 
 
A) The mind has a structure that consists of functional sub-parts 
(modules) that perform specific tasks in cognition and motiva-
tion. 
B) External behaviour varies for several reasons, including be-
cause of the different cultural surroundings people grow up 
in, but all the variation is dependent on the species-typical 
overall structure that is innate.92 
C) The tasks that the mind is designed to perform are domain-
specific, and they have been selectively evolved to perform 
these tasks in these domains to fulfil specific needs. In other 
words, they are specific adaptations to specific environmental chal-
lenges. 
 
92 The criticism of evolutionary psychology, in this narrow and a broader 
sense alike, that points out to variation across cultures, is somewhat mis-
guided. Explaining cultural variation and underlying psychological struc-
tures are two separate projects that are not directly competitive (Mallon & 
Stich 2000). However, the range of actual variation and the degree to which 
the psychology is species-typical are empirical questions that matter to how 
relevant evolutionary psychological explanations are and how much under-
standing they can provide. The programmatic claim that evolutionary psy-
chology reveals the universal human nature that should be the basis for all 
human science (for example, Tooby & Cosmides 1990b & 1992) is not very 
credible, for example (see Buller 2005; Richardson 2007; Ylikoski & Kokkonen 
2009; and Smith 2020). If the universal features that evolutionary psychology 
reveals of human psychology were on the same level of abstraction as, say, 
the universality of language in the Chomskyan linguistics (in any of its forms; 
see Chomsky 1980, 1986, 1993 & 2000), this would be an interesting fact to 
learn about this capacity, but it would not help us to understand human be-
haviour any more than Chomskyan Universal Grammar would help us to un-
derstand any particular natural language. 
168 
 
D) The adaptation of the entire psychological architecture takes 
time. This is why the characteristics of mind that can be ac-
counted for from the evolutionary perspective are rather spe-
cies-typical than local, and also why the Environment of Evolu-
tionary Adaptiveness (EEA) cannot be the current or a recent 
environment, but something that remained similar enough 
for a long enough time. 
 
A few notes on these theses. The idea of modularity (A) and domain-
specific adaptation (C) usually go hand in hand. A starting point for 
this is the standard approach of cognitive science that, following Da-
vid Marr (1982), identifies three levels of analysis: the computational 
level (what task is accomplished), the representational level (how the 
system operates on the level of representational and motivational – 
that is, psychological – description), and the implementation level (how 
the brain operates). The evolutionary approach is a perspective on the 
computational level: what are the functions of mental capacities, cog-
nitive mechanisms, emotions, and so on? Prima facie, this makes 
sense: if the operations of the brain and the resulting behaviour have 
evolutionary functions, they must be about what tasks are to be ac-
complished. This also provides an answer to what kind of functional 
design the psychologists and cognitive scientists should be looking for 
(if adaptive evolution is what explains this design), and how to justify 
the presupposition (or explain the fact) that cognitive processes have 
such designs in the first place. There are, however, four well known 
problems in this approach: 1) How modular is the mind, if at all93? 2) 
 
93 The concept of modularity in psychology comes from Jerry Fodor (1983). 
His list of criteria for modularity include domain specificity, automaticity, in-
formational encapsulation, fastness of the processes, superficiality, specializa-
tion, and universal individual development. This is not an exhaustive list, but 
a list of some typical characteristics that distinguish some cognitive processes 
from creative, rational “central processing”. Contemporary cognitive science 
distinguishes between two kinds of systems or domains of processes in a sim-
ilar way without making references to modularity of the non-conscious 
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What is the right grain size – both for the tasks in the selective envi-
ronments and the mental functions, they being bound together94? 3) 
The assumption of innateness and species-typicality of the mind’s 
structure.95 4) The problems of adaptationism, which has been dis-
cussed already. Evolutionary psychology is explicitly making histori-
cal adaptation explanations, but this is not necessary. An extended ar-
tefact model version of evolutionary functionalism (including 
knowledge of actual evolutionary history) as discussed above, would 
probably be adequate to justify the research – although this interpre-
tation also makes its claims to unificatory power (Tooby & Cosmides 
1989 & 1992) much weaker. The first two problems, in turn, are em-
pirical matters that affect how to do evolutionary psychology. 
If the mind (or brain) did not possess evolved functional struc-
tures at all, this would be crucial for the existence of evolutionary psy-
chology. If the mind is massively modular with precise tasks, study-
ing its structure, both empirically and through evolutionary theoriz-
ing, would be much easier than if the structure is non-precise and the 
tasks are relatively general, and several behaviourally distinct traits 
 
processes – I will return to this in the next chapter. In biology, there are other 
concepts of modularity, such as developmental modularity (Raff 1996), which 
may or may not be relevant to evolutionary psychology (see Wagner & Wag-
ner 2003) but are not important to the discussion in this thesis. 
94 Anderson 2007 presents an idea of massive micro-modularity as a more re-
alistic view of how mind works: the processes of mind (whether modular or 
not) use a set of sub-processes that, in turn, use sub-processes, until the “bot-
tom level” of modular processes is reached. Non-modular processes can be 
constituted by modular processes. If this were the case, it would make more 
sense to think that the mental units that get selected are the constituent parts, 
on the basis of the multitude of tasks in which they participate, not task-level 
modules. This would make the search for modules as solutions to evolution-
ary challenges extremely complicated and difficult. 
95 I will discuss innateness later. The assumption of species-typicality is a more 
general problem for psychology: much of the experimental work has been 
done with a specific population and many of the results seem not to be cross-
culturally generalizable (Henrich, Heine & Norenzayan 2010). 
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utilize the same structures.96 So, for example, if there is a “cheater de-
tection module” (Cosmides & Tooby 1992 & 2005b) that explains why 
the rule of material implication is automatically applied in the context 
of social norms but difficult to apply in some other contexts of infer-
ence (Wason 1966), the evolutionary explanation may be quite 
straightforward. If the explanation of this discrepancy in thinking 
comes from a more general point about relevance (Sperber et al 1995), 
the evolutionary connection between the environmental challenges 
and the way mind works becomes vaguer and more complicated – 
this holds even if the social norms constituted the actual selective con-
text for the ability to use material implication in thinking. However, 
this does not mean that evolutionary psychology must be built on the 
idea of modularity, specific tasks, and specific challenges – just that it 
would be an easier discipline to practice if this were the case. A char-
itable interpretation of the nativist evolutionary psychology would be 
that it is the first step towards human evolutionary psychology97 and 
just tries the easy way first. Bolhuis et al 2011, for example, calls for 
integration of criticism (about EEA, species-typicality, and massive 
modularity) into evolutionary psychological practices instead of con-
sidering them as a theoretical challenge to the discipline as such. Fur-
thermore, the modularity approach may work for some but not all 
characteristics of cognition and motivation (see Atran 2005). This is an 
empirical issue not to be taken stance on here. It should be noted, how-
ever, that modularity is not necessarily connected to innateness: 
 
96 For arguments for massive modularity, see Sperber 1994 & 2001; for criti-
cism, see Karmiloff-Smith 1996; Buller & Hardcastle 2000; Buller 2005; and 
Samules 2005. 
97 Evolutionary approaches can, naturally, be applied to animal cognition too. 
Interestingly, Steven Mithen (1995 & 1996) has argued that even relatively 
close ancestors of humans must have had modular minds, but the last stages 
of human evolution have been about an increase in the fluidity and sociality 
of mind. Even if this is the case, it is very unlikely that this would have wiped 
out all of the modular structure: evolution builds on existing structures rather 
than replacing them, here as well. 
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Annette Karmiloff-Smith (1996), for example, has argued that even 
modular structures of the adult mind are products of flexible individ-
ual development, not innate (see also Buller & Hardcastle 2000). 
However, the grain size problem (and the identification of the 
evolving trait in general) has consequences for the issue of individu-
alism and holism. Theoretically at least, the trait may be individual or 
interactional from the evolutionary functional perspective in two 
ways. First, there is the issue of how to define the phenotypic trait that 
is responsible for the fitness consequences. That is, which set of capaci-
ties and resulting behaviour constitute the unit for the functionalist analysis. 
Second, there is the issue of what the mechanisms of inheritance for 
this trait are. This is connected to thesis (B) above: the assumption of 
species-typicality and innateness, which usually go hand in hand.98 
The psychological disposition that is selected and inherited is, of 
course, a characteristic of an individual. The function it has (that is, 
the focus of the evolutionary analysis and explanation) is the role that 
this behaviour plays in the individual’s life that affects the individ-
ual’s fitness systematically. This may depend on the social surround-
ings in two different ways. Social evolution is a dynamic process 
where the interactions between the individuals and the behavioural 
dispositions (or the frequency of different dispositions across the pop-
ulation) depend on the makeup of the rest of the population and/or 
the group structure. In an individualistic approach, the rest of the pop-
ulation functions as a selective environment for the individual psy-
chological traits. In an alternative interpretation, some behavioural ex-
plananda are interactions. The interactive phenotypes are functionally 
 
98 The target of evolutionary psychology is something that is thought to be 
species-typical (and therefore an object of species-wide evolutionary explana-
tion), and the basis for species-typicality is the fixedness – that is, innateness 
– of the trait across the species. The contrast here is with individual or cultural 
traits that are acquired (not innate) and (therefore) not an object of species-
wide explanations. However, the link between innateness and species-typi-
cality does not need to be this strong. Furthermore, both concepts in this equa-
tion are vague and problematic. I will return to this later. 
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explainable as being more advantageous for the individuals who are 
participating in them, in contrast to the other alternative interactions, 
and this is not reducible to individual-level traits alone – this means 
that in the cases of this kind a holistic approach is needed.  
 
4.2.2. Individualism and Holism in Evolutionary Psychology 
 
Evolutionary psychology tends to be methodologically individualist 
in identifying the objects of research. Furthermore, evolutionary psy-
chology tends to concentrate on traits that are innate rather than ac-
quired. Even the nativist evolutionary psychologists do not dispute 
the role of culture and individual learning in psychology, but they 
claim that the proper target of evolutionary explanation is the psycho-
logical structure that is species-typical and innate and does neverthe-
less manifest even in behaviour affected by cultural and other ac-
quired tendencies. The meaning (as well as the very meaningfulness) 
of “innateness” in these contexts is disputed. I will later articulate a 
concept of innateness that should both escape the standard criticism 
and capture the function the concept has in psychology. Under this 
interpretation, nativism would be about the identification of what is 
being explained, not a thesis about mind. If there is a psychological 
developmental process in which both environmental and genetic de-
velopmental factors contribute, both sets of factors constrain the pos-
sible outcomes. “Innate” in this context can be charitably understood 
as those aspects of psychology that are not affected by normal varia-
tion in environmental factors – that is, even if the environmental fac-
tors contribute to the developmental process, the result will be 
roughly the same under any combinations of causal factors present 
(within a reasonable degree of variation in these factors). If there is 
significant variation in the results of the developmental process that 
depends on the environmental factors, only those aspects of the trait 
that are not affected can be explained by evolution. This means that 
the phenotypic plasticity of a given psychological trait may have an evo-
lutionary explanation, but not the details of the psychological 
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variants, nor the partly culturally transmitted behavioural traits that 
this evolved psychology underlies.  
Once more, the individualistic approach is not the only possibil-
ity. The group/culture-dependent variation in psychological charac-
teristics can also be an evolutionarily functional set of responses to 
changing environmental conditions in which the properties of the sur-
rounding group in childhood serve as triggers or contributing factors 
for the development of the variant that is functional in the given con-
text. This could be a case of adapted plasticity in the sense that envi-
ronmental triggers choose between developmental pathways, di-
rected learning, selected culture-dependency, or a combination of 
these things. Kim Sterelny (2003, 2007, 2012 & 2013), for example, has 
developed an alternative framework in which the changing social sur-
roundings and active teaching play a role in evolutionary explanation. 
Karola Stotz (2014) has suggested a theoretical integration of the ex-
tended evolutionary synthesis (including non-genetic inheritance, 
plasticity, and other developmental aspects). The so-called “4e” 
model of cognition (embodied, enactive, embedded and extended; see 
Menary 2010) offers an alternative, extended approach to evolution-
ary psychology, challenging individualism on both cognition and its 
development.99 Darcia Narvaez (2014; Narvaez et al 2012; Narvaez et 
al 2014) has applied evolutionary considerations to psychological de-
velopment instead of the results of that development, tracing environ-
mental (including social) difference-makers in development using 
evolutionary considerations. Christina Moya and Joseph Henrich 
(2016) have proposed a gene-culture co-evolutionary model as a per-
spective on psychology and the cultural variation in it, to replace na-
tivist evolutionary psychology with culture–gene coevolutionary psy-
chology. (See also Schaller et al 2010 for integrating evolutionary and 
 
99 The evolutionary psychologist Louise Barrett (2011) has also attempted to 
synthesize embodied cognition and cognitive ecology with traditional evolu-
tionary psychology, although her approach is still individualistic. 
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traditional cultural psychology.) Evolutionary psychology does not 
need to be nativist nor individualist. 
If plastic psychological traits are approached holistically in the 
developmental dimension, variation (and the range of traits), rather 
than merely species-typical universals, could be an object of evolu-
tionary explanation. Variation can also be explained from an individ-
ualistic perspective: as mentioned, plasticity as such is easy enough to 
explain as an individual response to changing environments, and a 
certain range of variation or variant types, for example, can be ex-
plained through frequency-dependent selection of individual traits. 
But if there is functional variation between groups, in which the dif-
ferences between groups are causal factors in individual develop-
ment, an approach sensitive to group differences is needed, and indi-
vidualist evolutionary psychology cannot explain the variation. Mov-
ing into explanation of culture-specific variants is moving from evo-
lutionary psychology into evolutionary anthropology, but even some 
of the species-typical characteristics of the human mind may be prod-
ucts of this kind of evolution rather than individualist evolution, and 
need to be accounted for as such – biological evolution of the mind’s 
capacities and culture’s shaping of the mind should probably not be 
seen as temporarily consecutive stages but in interaction (see To-
masello 1999; Baumeister 2005; Schaller et al 2010; Sterelny 2012). Once 
again, it is a matter of where the empirical research leads, whether a 
holistic approach is ever needed, but there are methodological alter-
natives even within evolutionary psychology. 
The final element in the list of the theses of evolutionary psychol-
ogy is the assumption of the evolution of relevant traits taking time. 
This assumption fixes the objects of explanation as being innate and 
species-typical, and it is a distinguishing factor between evolutionary 
psychology and sociobiology (see Cosmides & Tooby 1987; Tooby & 
Cosmides 1989) as well as between evolutionary psychology and evo-
lutionary anthropology (see Smith 2000; Laland & Brown 2002; Brown 
& Richerson 2013). This assumption may be considered part of the 
definition of what kind of evolutionary explanations, and therefore 
175 
 
what kind of explanatory targets, the different branches of evolution-
ary social sciences are interested in, more than a general ontological, 
empirical, or methodological assumption about evolution, natural se-
lection, evolutionary explanation, or human psychology. However, 
this also means that the proper scope of evolutionary psychology, for 
example, may be significantly smaller than what evolutionary psy-
chologists hope for.  
In this section I have outlined some reasons to be interested in the 
difference between individualistic and holistic explanations within 
evolutionary psychology when it comes to the connections between 
evolutionary explanations and the proximate and developmental as-
sumptions made by these explanations. In the previous section I pro-
vided some preliminary considerations for distinguishing between in-
dividualistic and holistic approaches in the evolutionary explanations 
proper, and these considerations hold for evolutionary psychology, 
too. Next, I will move on to evolutionary anthropology, in which the 
target of explanation is behaviour, not its psychological basis. Culture-
dependent behavioural differences are a part of the explanatory agenda, 
and cultural inheritance, complex social traits, and the explicit use of 
group selection models make all these three issues more important. 
 
 
4.3. Evolutionary Anthropology 
 
Evolutionary anthropology, too, can be defined in more or less limited 
ways. Narrowly understood, it is the branch of biological anthropol-
ogy that concentrates on the evolutionary history of human lineage, 
which includes paleoanthropology and comparative primatology. 
More broadly understood, it includes all evolutionary approaches to 
humans, including evolutionary functional considerations of human 
anatomy and physiology, as well as psychology, in which case it 
would include evolutionary psychology as well. In fact, biological an-
thropologists often include evolutionary approaches to mind in their 
toolkit (see, for example, Deacon 1997 and Fisher 2016). But since the 
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interest here lies in explaining behaviour, I will concentrate on the an-
thropologists’ unique ways of explaining human behaviour with evo-
lution directly, which includes research programmes such as behav-
ioural ecology, theories of cultural evolution, dual inheritance theo-
ries, and the niche construction theory of culture. But since our inter-
est lies in evolutionary explanation of human behaviour as a biologi-
cal phenomenon, broadly speaking, I will not include evolutionary 
change within specific institutional settings.100, 101 
Historically, evolutionary thinking was a part of anthropology in 
its “progressivist” interpretation – that is, evolution was understood 
 
100 “Special institutional settings” here would be things like a specific eco-
nomic system such as free market capitalism (and the use of evolutionary 
game theory in understanding its dynamics; see Hargreaves Heap & Va-
roufakis 1995) or science as an institution (for evolutionary perspective to sci-
ence, see Hull 1988b). Fundamental issues regarding these models are, how-
ever, presumably similar to what will be said about theories of cultural evo-
lution in general. 
101 Another way to distinguish between evolutionary psychology and evolu-
tionary anthropology would be via reference to the encompassing institutional 
discipline – that is, whether it is psychology or anthropology. There are, how-
ever, reasons to not to use this as a demarcation. First, there is a difference be-
tween doing epistemology-driven philosophy of science and institution-driven 
sociology of science, implying different criteria for distinctions. Second, the rel-
evance of institutional divisions to the analytic understanding of epistemic is-
sues related to disciplines as epistemic projects is questionable. Sometimes the 
epistemic connections between two subfields of different disciplines may be 
stronger than the connections between subfields within the same institutional 
discipline. From an epistemic point of view both psychology and anthropology 
are divided into differentiated epistemic projects that are more like different 
disciplines than organized sub-disciplinary parts of the same discipline. Third, 
the institutional location of various evolutionary approaches is not unambigu-
ous, as can be discovered by a quick look at the variation in the academic back-
grounds and the institutional settings of the research performed by the practi-
tioners of these various branches of evolutionary human sciences. But mostly, 
the focus here is on the methodology, not institutions, and the classification 
adopted reflects this, not institutional structures. 
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as a progressive change towards more and more perfected forms, and 
different “cultures” (culturally different groups, typically identified 
with ethnic groups) were seen as more or less progressive in this 
sense. The various parts of anthropology studied different aspects of 
cultures that were seen as being at different stages of progress, and 
there were measures, for example, of different stages of linguistic evo-
lution, the Western European languages being, naturally, on the top 
of the evolutionary scale. (Ingold 1995b.) When these ideas of progres-
sion were abandoned (rightly so, from the evolutionary point of view 
as well), most of anthropology resigned from evolutionary considera-
tions altogether. Biological (or physical) anthropology remained the 
sphere for evolutionary considerations, and cultural anthropology 
concentrated on the differences between cultures that were explaina-
ble, basically, by their being of different cultures (Kuper 1999). Since 
the 1980s, however, evolutionary theory has made a comeback in the 
study of culture in three different ways: in behavioural ecology, in the 
dualistic gene-culture co-evolution, and what I will call the evolution of 
cultural representations, which includes several theories (e.g. memetics 
and epidemiology of representations). 
 
4.3.1. Human Behavioural Ecology 
 
Human behavioural ecology (for example, Chagnon & Irons 1979; Smith 
& Winterhalder 1992; Krebs et al 1997; Cronk et al 2000; Borgerhoff 
Mulder & Schact 2012) is a branch of anthropology that approaches 
human social behaviour (such as mating and marriage, parenting, and 
moral practices) as an adaptive reaction to local ecological conditions. 
It uses methods, concepts, and theories from evolutionary biology and 
sociobiology to do so, and it was partially an anthropological out-
growth of these (see Laland & Brown 2002; Brown & Richerson 2013). 
Unlike evolutionary psychology, it sees human behaviour as flexibly 
adaptable to different conditions, but unlike classical sociobiology, it 
does not bind this to genetic adaptation. One of the central theses of 
human behavioural ecology is the so-called phenotypic gambit (Grafen 
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1984): the phenotype (behaviour) is approached as adaptive to its cur-
rent ecological setting, but the means by which it adapts is left black-
boxed. It is assumed that this adaptation is a combination of evolved 
psychology (including evolved environment-sensitive decision rules 
both on proximate and developmental dimension), cultural adapta-
tion, and individual intelligence (and the use of other general cogni-
tive capacities) to make the best of the environment. The emphasis is 
on the environment (hence “ecology”). The measure of the success is, 
however, the fitness effects of the behaviour, not just fulfilling the psy-
chological needs of the individual or the group, making this a form of 
evolutionary functionalism. Human behavioural ecology uses the 
form of evolutionary functionalism I labelled as current utility analysis, 
in contrast to the artefact model of which some of the evolutionary psy-
chology is an example, and the historical evolutionary functionalism that 
characterizes some of the evolutionary psychology and that classical 
sociobiology got stuck with. The anthropologist and behavioural ecol-
ogist Monique Borgerhoff Mulder, for one, is quite straightforward on 
this point in constraining behavioural ecology to Tinbergen’s question 
about functionality and leaving the other questions to other fields of 
study, including social sciences (Borgerhoff Mulder 1991: 69). How-
ever, anthropologists who use ecological tools do not restrict them-
selves to this, and it is not unusual for them to study the proximate 
mechanisms too (see Brown et al 2011). Much of what human behav-
ioural ecologists do in practice is regular anthropological fieldwork. 
Human behavioural ecology is just an additional perspective that has 
become a school of its own. 
 
4.3.2. Cultural Evolution 
 
Social learning and culture are exceptionally important in human ad-
aptation (Boyd, Richerson & Henrich 2011; Mathew & Perreault 2015). 
Behavioural ecologists grant culture a significant role in human adapt-
ability, but they do not study the mechanisms of or the basis for cul-
tural evolution. The concept of culture is itself a contested concept. 
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There is no unified view in cultural anthropology, for example, on 
how to define culture and what it is supposed to include: symbols, 
values, and representations only, or material products, technologies, 
and social structures as well? Is it something in the mind or in the ex-
ternal (but socially transmitted) behaviour? Is it a characteristic of an 
individual or a group? Are there holistic “cultures” or more atomistic 
“cultural features”? (Silverman 2002; see also Kuper 1999; Fox & King 
2002b; Ramsey 2013b; Koskinen 2014.) Whatever it is, it is a non-ge-
netic difference maker between different groups. For now, we can dis-
tinguish between two concepts of culture that refer to this: culture as 
a medium and culture as content on this medium. Culture as a medium 
is the biological phenomenon of humans having cultures. It includes 
whatever capacities are needed for this (social learning and language, 
for example) and the fact that humans transfer “cultural things” using 
this medium. Culture as content includes whatever “things” that are 
transferred. The biological question of whether a species of animal has 
a culture and if so, what is the nature of this culture (for example, 
Hunt & Gray 2003; Laland & Galef 2009; St Clair & Rutz 2013; Ramsey 
2013b). The controversies about culture in cultural anthropology are 
about the nature of the contents of this medium. 
Biological anthropologists and primatologists are often more in-
terested in the medium of culture and how it functions and constitutes 
a non-genetic route for traits to spread in the population (for example, 
de Waal 2001; see also Ramsey 2013b), although sometimes the capac-
ity to generate behavioural differences between groups is mentioned 
(McGrew 1998: 305). There is also a further issue about the accumula-
tion of the modification (Boyd & Richerson 1985; McGrew 1998; To-
masello 1999; Carruthers 2013a) that may be required for genuine cul-
tural evolution. The bioanthropological notion of a medium for socio-
cultural transmission is what is meant by culture in this dissertation 
(with some further distinctions later on), and as for what kind of things 
belong to it, there is no harm in being an inclusive pluralist here. The 
important thing for the main issue is that how individuals behave in 
social situations is affected by what they have learned from other 
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individuals, one way or another (for example, by copying behaviour, 
learning norms and attitudes, or developing meanings and beliefs that 
affect how the context is interpreted etc.). There are, however, theories 
about cultural change and cultural differences specifically. 
One type of things that belong to culture are representations that 
are acquired from others and build our beliefs and affect our motives. 
There are several theories that try to capture the evolution of cultural 
representations. Edward O. Wilson presented an idea of “culture 
genes” as an elaboration of sociobiology (Lumdsen & Wilson 1981), 
and Richard Dawkins (1982) presented the similar idea of memes, later 
developed into memetics by Susan Blackmore (1999). The general idea 
in these theories is that there is something analogical to genes that 
copy themselves from one mind to another, and there could be an evo-
lutionary theory of cultural change. It is, however, difficult to capture 
the nature of the entity that is supposed to be the self-replicating unit 
that forms lineages (see Boyd & Richerson 2000; Sperber 2000; Sterelny 
2006a; Lewens 2015). The lack of mechanistic detail in the theory 
leaves memetics explanatorily empty and merely an alternative narra-
tive for cultural change (see Lewens 2015). A more sophisticated ver-
sion of the same idea is Dan Sperber’s (1996) theory of the epidemiology 
of representations, which pays attention to culture-related cognition. Its 
main idea is that ideas, norms, et cetera are copied from human mind 
to human mind through communication, in which both the process of 
communication and interpretation bias what is transmitted, as do the 
characteristics of human cognitive architecture, such as what con-
cepts, narratives et cetera are easy for us to understand and remember. 
Human mind is the environment to which ideas must adapt, and the 
features of the human mind can explain, for example, what religious 
ideas are likely to emerge (Boyer 2001; Atran 2002). The epidemiology 
of representations is partly based on the evolutionary psychological 
understanding of mind, although what matters for it is only the un-
derstanding of how mind works, not its evolution, and the researchers 
of the field are usually more interested in cross-cultural comparative 
psychology (or cognitive anthropology) than evolutionary psychologists 
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proper who are more content with monocultural laboratory studies. 
None of the evolutionary theories of cultural representations specify 
the connection between genetic and cultural evolution; they are theo-
ries of cultural evolution only. Consequently, the relevance of these 
fields for the issue at hand is limited. 
 
4.3.3. Genes and Culture in Interaction 
 
Culture, as the medium, is a more significant issue. Culture in this 
sense is a product of evolution itself. In some cases, selection favours 
automatic reactions and fixedness of the behaviour, while in other 
cases, it favours developmental plasticity (West-Eberhard 2003). The 
forms of plasticity range from the triggering of a fixed and adapted, 
alternative developmental pathway by environmental conditions, to 
learning something new through individual creativity and intelli-
gence. As a rule, learning is biased, directed, and constrained to some 
degree. The advantage of learning is the potential for novel behav-
ioural responses during an individual’s lifetime, while genetic evolu-
tion takes generations. Genetic evolution, however, selects behav-
ioural responses according to their actual fitness benefits without the 
need for an individual considering, which has a higher risk for error, 
which makes genetic adaptation better than learning in most cases, if 
there is time to adapt. Individual learning and intelligence are fa-
voured in conditions where constant and rapid adaptation to new cir-
cumstances is needed. (Sterelny 2003.) Culture and social learning 
make behavioural change faster than genetic evolution and slower 
than individual learning; it allows cumulative learning that surpasses 
everything that an individual could accomplish, but it is also vulner-
able to similar errors as individual learning – there is more time to 
correct, but the possibility of multigenerational accumulation of er-
rors, too (Boyd et al 2011). Social learning and cumulative culture are 
evolutionarily useful only under quite specific context (for example, 
when a species is spread over a vast range of ecological conditions that 
change over time but stay the same for several generations, and there 
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is gene flow between the groups). This is why social learning is rare 
in nature.102 (Boyd & Richerson 1985 & 2005; Boyd & Silk 2003.) 
The specific contents of cultural representations also influence 
behaviour in ways that have fitness consequences. If the capacity for 
culture is evolved, it is to be expected that humans rely on social learn-
ing and individual thinking to different degrees in different contexts, 
and what and how is learned is constrained in ways that make evolu-
tionary sense. Culturally invented and acquired capacities and habits 
may also become increasingly independent on external information in 
their development, if there is a selection pressure to acquire them ef-
fectively, through the Baldwin effect.103 All this means that the role cul-
ture has played in human evolution should inform evolutionary ap-
proaches of psychology, not only the other way around. But even on 
a shorter time scale, culturally acquired behaviour may have fitness 
consequences.  
The theory of gene-culture co-evolution (or dual inheritance) 
(Boyd & Richerson 1985 & 2005; see also Durham 1995) explains hu-
man behaviour as a product of interconnected genetic and cultural 
evolution. For the purposes of the theory, “culture” is defined as “in-
formation capable of affecting individuals’ behaviour that they ac-
quire from members of their species through teaching, imitation, and 
 
102 New Caledonian crows seem to be the sole example of cumulative culture 
outside the human species (Hunt & Gray 2003; St. Clair & Rutz 2013). The lack 
of social learning is likely to be a matter of willingness to do so rather than the 
lack of the necessary cognitive capacities – this seems to be the case of the 
famous kea parrots, at least, who are able to learn by observing others but 
seem not to do so in nature (Gajdon et al 2004) – and there may be an evolu-
tionary reason for this preference. 
103 If a characteristic that is acquired is useful, more and more powerful ways 
to acquire it get selected, and genes that guide the development of the char-
acteristic may be selected, too, if they emerge (Baldwin 1896; Futuyma 1998). 
The same applies in the other direction as well: if a developmental resource is 
reliably available in the environment, genetic guidance of the developmental 
process may disappear. 
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other forms of social transmission”, where information means “any 
kind of mental state, conscious or not” (Richerson & Boyd 2005: 5). 
Social learning involving information transference is biased by both 
general and individual capacities and biases in learning, memory, and 
heuristics about who to copy from, but its assumptions about human 
psychology involve domain-general rather than domain-specific ca-
pacities, in contrast to nativist evolutionary psychology (Sterelny 
2012; Brown & Richerson 2013; Carruthers 2013a). The heuristics are 
biased in, for example, which individuals are more likely to be copied, 
based on their social status, perceived success, et cetera. These biases 
and other contextual differences in when to copy others are products 
of biological evolution: we have the tendency for social learning (and 
teaching) in the contexts where it has been evolutionarily more bene-
ficial to rely on other than rely on one’s own thinking or (adapted) 
inclinations. This means that there is an evolutionary loop between 
cultural and genetic evolution: local cultures are evolving based on 
the biological success they bring, and the biological evolution of psy-
chology is adapting to changing cultural conditions and the needs to 
rely on culture and social learning. Both cultural and genetic evolution 
are on-going processes, although cultural evolution is faster, as well 
as more directed, since new variation (produced by individual inno-
vation) is directed, and transmission is biased (according to the behav-
ioural trait’s content and context). However, if the dual inheritance 
theory has an approximately correct image of human evolution, it is 
important to understand that whatever species-typicality there is in 
human psychology, it is partly adapted to a socio-cultural environ-
ment like this, and to an on-going cultural evolution and its needs. 
The dual inheritance theory has three key features that make it a 
holistic approach. First, the cultural transmission is horizontal, har-
monizing the behaviour on the group level, and relies on collective 
properties of the group (for example, the biases in who to copy from 
depend on the relative success and social status relative to other indi-
viduals). Second, there is an idea of cumulative culture: behaviour, tech-
nology, et cetera become more adapted, more sophisticated, and more 
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complex from generation to generation, surpassing individual limita-
tions. This may lead into behavioural traits that are increasingly de-
pendent on the group level structures and interactions with others 
that make them holistic in the sense that I will discuss in the next two 
chapters in more detail. Third, the key idea in connecting culture and 
genes is cultural group selection. Despite the name, this involves not 
only selection between cultural groups (as cultural quasi-organisms), 
but it is also a form of biological (gene-based) group selection between 
groups that have different behavioural traits based on cultural differ-
ences through the co-evolutionary loops described above.  
 
4.3.4. Schools in Comparison 
 
I will not discuss any of the “schools” of evolutionary human social 
sciences any further, nor will I try to evaluate them or discuss their 
compatibility. Any of them may be an adequate explanatory perspec-
tive on some human behaviour104, and much of human behaviour is 
probably such that the evolutionary perspective has nothing, or only 
trivial things, to say about it – but all this is a matter of empirical study 
and trial of various explanatory strategies. But there are some meth-
odological issues that have come up and will be the topics of the fol-
lowing chapters. First, the role played by evolutionary functionalist 
thinking is different in different schools, not just what they say about 
behaviour or its evolution. Classical sociobiology was a historical ad-
aptationist project, and so is co-evolution theory. Some forms of evo-
lutionary psychology also fall in this category, but some of it can be 
thought of as an artefact model instead, while behavioural ecology 
analyses behaviour from the current use perspective. Secondly, the 
very targets of the various evolutionary approaches seem to be differ-
ent. Evolutionary anthropology is interested in the behaviour while 
 
104 Smith et al 2000, for example, identify contradictions between evolutionary 




evolutionary psychology is interested in the psychology that produces 
it (although some anthropologists are interested in both). As I pointed 
out earlier, it is not necessary for these to map onto each other: a psy-
chological mechanism implies a set of behavioural dispositions, but 
the functionally adequate partitioning of behaviour into behavioural 
traits may be different, for both ecological and co-evolutionary ex-
planatory purposes. 
Different uses of evolutionary functionalist thinking or different 
explananda do not, however, make these approaches different accounts 
of what evolutionary human behavioural science should be all about 
– they have different explananda. They are not in direct competition, 
but neither are they unconnected projects. The assumptions they 
make may be mutually incompatible, such as about how mind works 
and what the role of culture in the individual development is. I will 
analyse the relationship of the different explananda in general in the 
following chapter, and with the example of cooperative and altruistic 
behaviour in chapter after that. Cooperation and altruism have been 
central to all approaches (see Brown & Richerson 2013) as well as be-
ing key topics of discussion in the philosophy of biology. I will argue 
that sometimes the explanandum of evolutionary anthropology is a 
type of interaction that cannot be understood from an individualist 
perspective, but only as an interactive trait. But I will even go a step 
further: since the evolutionary perspective of the evolutionary psy-
chology has to do with what task the psychological characteristics are 
selected for, and in the case of social behaviour, this is participation in 
the selected interaction, evolutionary psychology cannot be individu-
alistic in all these cases either.  
Another issue has to do with development. Evolutionary psy-
chologists tend to be interested in innate traits, whereas anthropolo-
gists are also interested in the behaviour that is influenced by culture. 
Regarding this, I will discuss the concept of innateness and defend a 
way to understand psychological innateness that makes sense in the 
context of evolutionary psychology. I will also discuss culture as a ho-
listic route of inheritance for reproducing behavioural traits in the 
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next generation and what difference it makes. The third and final is-
sue, and the main issue of the dissertation, is group selection. Co-evo-
lutionary theorists fully embrace this as an explanatory tool, in con-
trast to evolutionary psychologists who tend to be individualists in 
this dimension as well. Behavioural ecologists are a more difficult 
case: they approach issues individualistically while acknowledging 
culture as a factor. My main contribution to the philosophical discus-
sion on group selection will be to show how the previous two issues 
are related to the group selection controversy in the human context, 
and how this helps us understand the contested issue of what counts 




5. On Human Behaviour and Its Causes 
 
Dividing behaviour into explainable biological traits is more difficult 
than doing so in physiology, or even in psychology. There is no un-
ambiguous way to slice behaviour into behavioural traits in biology 
in general (see Levitis, Lidicker & Freund 2009), and it is even more 
difficult to do with human behaviour (see Longino 2013). In general, 
behaviour can be defined as the activity of a system, such as the bodily 
movements of an animal or a human being (Dretske 1988). In philo-
sophical psychology and action theory, behaviour as a mere bodily 
movement is usually a vague notion merely to be contrasted with ac-
tion as something intentional that the agent does. This contrast in-
volves attributing the agent reasons that identify the action. From this 
perspective, behaviour as bodily movement is understood as a com-
ponent of action, and there is no need to scrutinize behaviour inde-
pendently of this. There is no need for an analysis of what counts as a 
behavioural trait; giving reasons (or rationalizing the action) provides 
all the structure we need to slice behaviour into the units we need, for 
the purposes of understanding human action in this way.  
However, if we want to talk about behavioural traits as an object 
of explanation, for example, we need criteria for what goes together 
whether we use rational action explanations in understanding specific 
instances of behaviour or not. Furthermore, what counts as a trait de-
pends on our purposes for partitioning behaviour into traits, includ-
ing our current explanatory interests (see Longino 2013). Taking ra-
tionalization as a basis may serve this purpose in some cases, but it 
may be inadequate or even dangerously misleading in others. The lat-
ter is the case with evolutionary explanations: evolutionary psychol-
ogy, for example, does not explain our reasons for action. I will com-
ment on this in greater detail later. Furthermore, rationalization of ac-
tion is intimately connected to individual psychology: what we un-
derstand the behaviour to be about is conceptually connected to the 
aims and beliefs of an agent and to what the behaviour means for 
them. Folk psychology does not make the clear distinction between 
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thinking and behaving in action that we need to make to separate be-
haviour and its underlying psychology as explananda. Yet, at the same 
time, folk psychology is a constitutive part of the human social prac-
tices, and folk-psychological attributions of intentional agency cannot 
be disregarded in the description of the explananda, even if folk psy-
chology does not provide an adequate framework for conceptualizing 
the explananda on psychological or behavioural level, or for explana-
tions. This is why I will use some space to comment on what folk psy-
chology is from the evolutionary perspective, and how it is related to 
cognition, motivation, and behaviour as objects of scientific research, 
instead of just bypassing the whole topic, which is usually done in 
discussing evolutionary explanations of behaviour. Instead, I will 
make a distinction between psychological and agentive levels of de-
scription, which, I will argue, is not explicit within the folk-psycho-
logical attributions, and I will use this distinction in the next chapter 
in discussing social interaction. 
The main topic of this chapter is to develop an evolutionary func-
tionalist account for defining human behavioural traits and shows 
how they differ from psychological traits (as well as from agentive de-
scription) and how they are related. This is done in part by contrasting 
it to the folk psychological understanding of how psychology and be-
haviour are related and showing how folk psychology is inadequate. 
This prepares for the following chapter, in which I argue that behav-
ioural traits, understood this way, can be supra-individual traits. I will 
also briefly discuss the role folk psychology and rationality assump-
tions play in the evolution of human social behaviour. I will start by 
setting the question, then discussing the nature of folk psychology and 
action explanations, and finally returning to the question of how to 






5.1. Preliminary Issues 
 
The standard way to approach social interaction from the evolution-
ary perspective is to understand behaviour as the interaction of indi-
vidually implemented strategies, where the social surroundings are 
the selective environment only. The evolution of strategies is dynamic, 
with a possibility of large-scale emergent consequences, but the selec-
tion in this picture is between traits of individuals. The sociality of be-
haviour simply means that the behaviour has fitness implications for 
both the individual who performs the behaviour and some other indi-
vidual(s) with whom the performing individual interacts. In other 
words, the approach is individualistic (when it comes to the proxi-
mate dimension). In addition, the behavioural dispositions are treated 
as isolated traits and the distinction between a behavioural trait and 
the mechanism producing it, which is left black-boxed, is not assumed 
to be significant. However, as we have seen in the previous chapters, 
since the same psychological faculties may participate in a range of 
different behaviours, the fitness of the faculties depends on the conse-
quences of the resulting behaviour, and the resulting behaviour de-
pends on the context as well, we need to keep psychology and behav-
iour separate even within the individualist context. This opens the 
door to considering alternative, non-individualist ways to identify be-
havioural traits. I suggested two alternative versions of holism in the 
introduction: collectivist holism and interactionist holism. In collectivist 
holism, behavioural traits are traits of a collective. In a human context, 
this would involve distinguishable groups that act as collective agents 
with respect to the behavioural trait in question. Superorganisms such 
as social insect colonies are groups that behave only in this manner, as 
if an individual (see Haber 2013). Some social institutions with inten-
tional planning of their structure may qualify as examples (see List & 
Pettit 2011, for a candidate), but it is doubtful that natural human 
groups have evolved to possess such uniformity (although see Pagel 
2012 as an example of a biological superorganism view of human 
groups). Shared cultural meanings and social norms can bring such 
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uniformity to groups regarding some behaviour, which makes this 
form of holism still relevant to consider with some individual behav-
ioural traits. In the interactionist holism, the traits are forms of inter-
action between two or more individuals. The traits are not attributed 
to a collective of individuals or an individual but to sets of individuals 
whose behaviour in a context constitutes a trait that binds the individ-
uals together in an interactive trait. 
Superorganisms are quasi-individuals and automatically foci for 
fitness considerations as such.105 I will discuss the issue of whether in-
teractionist holism involves fitness considerations above the individ-
ual level as well (through trait group selection; Wilson & Sober 1994; 
Sober & Wilson 1998) in the last part of the dissertation. Individualism 
and holism regarding the behaviour and its mechanistic basis is a fun-
damental methodological issue in the evolutionary explanation of so-
cial behaviour in either case (see Moore et al 1997; Formica et al 2017). 
I will later argue that even in some cases where the evolution is mod-
elled as individual action (for example, with game theory), where the 
models correctly show the selection of individual phenotypes, the 
traits that are selected for are the emerging interactions. Individual be-
havioural dispositions are selected by virtue of participation in these 
interactions. Before this can be argued, we must establish that such 
traits are possible in the human context. 
 
5.1.1. Evolutionary Requirements for Interactive Traits 
 
A central issue in what can count as a trait from the evolutionary per-
spective is evolvability (Wagner 2005; Pigliucci 2008). Evolvability re-
quires heritability and a high enough degree of modularity for differ-
ent traits to have separate evolutionary trajectories. For behavioural 
 
105 This is partly a definitional issue about what counts as an individual (see 
Bouchard & Huneman 2013). Charles Goodnight (2013), for example, defines 
an individual as the lowest level of biological organization that is relevant for 
(multilevel) selection models. 
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traits, this requires repeatability (see Formica et al 2017). These re-
quirements are not a problem for interactive phenotypes if they are 
not a problem for individualistic behavioural phenotypes either. So-
cial behavioural patterns are dependent on individual behavioural 
dispositions, whether we understand them as consequences of indi-
vidual behavioural dispositions in social contexts or as higher-level 
relational traits. If there are evolvable individual behavioural traits, 
there can be interactionist traits constituted by such traits in repeata-
ble interactions. Evolvability of behavioural traits as such does not 
seem to be a problem with repetitive behaviour (see Katz 2011) and 
repeatability may be very robust in higher-level social behavioural 
traits too (Formica et al 2017). Behavioural plasticity limits the level of 
detail in which traits can be evolvable, but cultural inheritance and 
social norms increase the robustness of social traits in more detail 
again. I will later effectively argue for the evolvability of interactionist 
and social-environment sensitive traits in humans, but I will not dis-
cuss evolvability itself directly. I will assume that some social behav-
ioural traits are evolvable. The constraints posed by what is evolvable 
and what is not limit the scope of evolutionary explanations of social 
behaviour and therefore the scope of the subject matter of the discus-
sion. None of this has any effect on the issue of individualism and ho-
lism within the scope of evolutionary explanations as such. 
A further prima facie challenge to the idea of interactive traits is 
that they are both evolving traits and the environment for their own 
evolution at the same time. This is a bit odd. The evolution of social 
behaviour (social selection) is always a dynamic interplay between in-
dividual traits, but the individualistic models separate the evolving 
trait and its environment as a snapshot of the evolution of the entire 
population. The individual traits that constitute the interaction are co-
evolving, interacting phenotypes that are each other’s selective envi-
ronment. However, the co-evolution of interacting phenotypes like 
this can be modelled using indirect fitness effects like those in kin se-
lection models as seemingly individual selection (Moore et al 1997). 
The trait group approach (Wilson & Sober 1994; Sober & Wilson 1998) 
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is an evolutionarily holistic alternative to model some of the same in-
teractions, although this model presents the traits themselves just as 
individualistically. But both approaches explain the form of interac-
tion (interactive traits) while at the same time these interactions play 
a causal role in the explanation of why individuals with certain be-
havioural dispositions (individual traits) have higher fitness than 
some other individual phenotypes. This means that there are two phe-
notypes in the explanandum. To understand the causal structure of the 
selection process (and not just model it), we should distinguish be-
tween two different but intertwined explananda, rather than conflating 
them: the form of behaviour and the proximate psychological mechanisms 
underlying the behaviour. The proposition that behaviour and its 
proximate mechanisms are different objects of explanation may sound 
trivial but also non-consequential because of the intimate connection 
between the two. This may be the case with most behaviour, where 
the form of behaviour is simply a result of the underlying psychology 
and the context that triggers the behaviour. However, the very idea of 
interactive phenotypes is that the form of behaviour is interactive. 
This gives the difference explanatory significance. The forms of social 
interaction compete with each other while the individual behavioural 
dispositions that are the constituents of interactive phenotypes com-
pete with other individual dispositions in being able to participate in 
these interactions. We need to understand both parts and this implies 
evolving traits on two different levels: individual and group.  
 
5.1.2. Human Behavioural Traits and the Problems with Folk 
Psychology 
 
The problem with distinguishing a form of behaviour and the psycho-
logical mechanism producing it is that we need criteria for what is a 
behavioural trait. What counts as “doing the same”? This is also im-
portant for repeatability and therefore for evolvability as well. One 
option is to describe the external physical behaviour as robust, 
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repeated structural patterns and simply lump all the behaviour with 
the same pattern into the same trait. The problem is that the same pat-
tern of behaviour may have completely different triggering causes 
and consequences in two different contexts, and two different sets of 
bodily movements may have the same function in achieving some-
thing. For instance, swinging a hand in the air may constitute a greet-
ing, but it may be an act of stopping a taxi or scaring a wasp away, 
and greeting can take place in other ways. Mere bodily movement out 
of context is not what we are usually interested in when explaining 
behaviour or how we understand behaviour in the first place.106 We 
are not interested in explaining hand waving behaviour, but we might 
be interested in explaining greeting behaviour or reactions to intrusive 
wasps. The identity of the behaviour depends on the context too – it 
is both a reaction to something and directed to achieve something. 
How we characterize behavioural traits should reflect this, both in bi-
ology and psychology, whether or not we use folk psychology. (See 
Enc 1995.) Having a behavioural trait as an explanandum requires gen-
eralizability of the kind of reaction to a kind of context with an idea of 
what the behaviour achieves (or attempts to achieve) in the context – in 
other words, what it is about.  
With simple stimulus-response systems, this would be a straight-
forward pairing of a behavioural pattern with an environment, but as 
the behavioural responses become more flexible, and the relevant con-
text of behaviour becomes more and more inclusive of factors not con-
cretely present, the identification of behaviour with environment be-
comes more complicated as well. Most human behaviour is related to 
goals and representations of things and states of affairs that are not 
visible in the external behaviour and its immediate environment 
alone. This alone does not mean that there are no behavioural traits or 
that they are not separable from each other. This only means that a 
trait as a pattern of movements and a trait as a functional reaction are 
 
106 Of course, it could be, if we are interested in neuromotor control of a bodily 
movement itself, for example, but this is not what we are usually after. 
194 
 
separate, and a heterogenous cluster of possible patterns of behaviour 
can constitute the latter. This makes it more adequate to give behav-
iour semantically loaded descriptions that refer to the goals and rep-
resentations involved in the behaviour. Both everyday practices and 
many scientific theories understand human behaviour as goal-di-
rected intentional action like this. This makes sense on the first ap-
proximation and makes a good candidate for what instances of behav-
iour should be categorized as “doing the same”: the instances of be-
haviour that are executed with the same intention of achievement. 
Fred Dretske (1988), for example, suggests that reasons (or rationali-
zations) structure the behaviour in an adequate way by stating what 
it is for, which enables the identification of behaviour. Reasons are 
constituted by propositional attitudes such as beliefs and desires. Both 
evolutionary psychologists and anthropologists characterize human 
behaviour using folk-psychological conceptualizations like this. How-
ever, this can be misleading, for two reasons.  
First, folk psychology is ambiguous as to whether (or rather: 
when) its concepts refer to personal and sub-personal levels. Consider 
the following example. A person, let us call him Amos, is drowning. 
Another person, let us call her Beatrice, sees this. Beatrice jumps into 
the water and rescues Amos. Let us suppose Beatrice has no other ex-
ternal goals for the action than to save Amos – she is not motivated by 
appearing heroic, getting gratitude, promoting romantic feelings, sig-
nalling her virtues, or any other purpose that she might use the rescue 
as an instrument for. We would say that the reason for Beatrice’s action 
is her desire to help him and her belief that she can do so by jumping 
into the water and pulling him to shore. Furthermore, even if there are 
other reasons for her to jump into the water, or further reasons to save 
Amos, if this is the primary reason107, we would say that this was her 
intention to act. Now, let us suppose that an egoistic motivation theory 
 
107 Primary reason is the “actual” reason, the one that made the person do 
what they did (see Davidson 1963; O’Brien 2019). I will return to the role of 
reasons and primary reasons in explanation later. 
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of helping behaviour is true (see Batson 2011). For example, the inter-
nal motivation structure is such that the causal process of perceiving 
Amos’s distress and jumping to help him goes through the distress 
that Beatrice feels when she sees Amos in danger. This contrasts with 
an altruistic theory of motivation (or empathetic concern theory), accord-
ing to which seeing Amos’s distress is the motivating (or triggering) 
factor for Beatrice, and her own distress is not needed (Batson 1991 & 
2011). In this case, the “ultimate desire” in the succession of desires 
giving rise to each other is an egoistic one (see Sober 1992c; Sober & 
Wilson 1998).  
Both descriptions (that Beatrice’s action is guided by her non-in-
strumental desire to help Amos, and that Beatrice’s action is guided 
by her need to get rid of her own distress) seem to be right. Are folk-
psychological attributions about the agent’s overall goals or about the 
underlying psychological states? The debate over psychological ego-
ism and altruism revolves around the issue of what the ultimate de-
sires guiding the action are (see Kitcher 1997; Sober & Wilson 1998; 
Stich 2007; Batson 2011), but it is somewhat unclear whether these de-
sires are meant to be attributes of the whole person (making Beatrice 
an altruist) or sub-personal psychological factors (making her an ego-
ist). What does it mean to say that Beatrice is ultimately acting upon 
selfish motives, for example? The debate seems to assume that the de-
sires of a person are attributes of the whole person and effective psy-
chological states at the same time. I will analyse this in greater detail 
later. My suggestion is that there are two levels of description, psy-
chological and agentive, and folk psychology does not make this dis-
tinction. 108  This in turn is important for how we think about the 
 
108 In social psychology, the object of study includes cognitive, affective, and be-
havioural aspects of sociality-related psychology. The “psychological” under 
my definition includes both cognitive and affective parts of psychology, but 
not behaviour. “Psychology” is all those processes that produce behaviour. In 
philosophy and behavioural sciences, it has become commonplace to concen-
trate on the relationship between cognition and behaviour. In some cases, 
“cognitive” would be practically synonymous with “psychological” and this 
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identification of behaviour and what its causes are, which in turn is 
important to knowing what it is that we are explaining in the evolu-
tionary explanations of behaviour. 
The distinction between propositional attitudes ascribable to a 
person as a whole and representational states participating in cogni-
tive processes is not new, but much of the philosophical discussion on 
the matter has been about what is the right level of description. There 
are several theories of propositional attitudes and the nature of folk 
psychology, and for current purposes I will group them into cognitiv-
ists, who think that propositional attitudes are causally effective psy-
chological states, and ascriptionists, who think that propositional atti-
tudes are the states that we attribute to agents. Cognitivists are usually 
representationalists, who think that propositional attitudes are psycho-
logical entities, representations, which participate in cognitive pro-
cesses (for example, Fodor 1975, 1981, 1990; Millikan 1984; Dretske 
1988; Cummins 1996; Shea 2018), and that folk-psychological practices 
trace them. I will include eliminativists (P.M. Churchland 1981 & 1989; 
Stich 1983; P.S. Churchland 1986; Churchland & Churchland 1998) in 
this camp too, since what they are eliminativists about is propositional 
attitudes as participating in cognitive processes rather than agentive 
ascriptions. The ascriptionists include interpretationists (for example, 
 
is the case in some discussions that I refer to. However, since a large part of 
the discussion will be about motivational mechanisms such as psychological 
egoism or empathetic concern, which are affective rather than cognitive fac-
tors, I will use the term “psychological” as the general term to capture all that 
is necessary. Furthermore, although I make the distinction between psycho-
logical and agentive that both are sometimes called “psychological” or “men-
tal”, and I will use finer distinctions between levels of abstraction in referring 
to psychological processes and mechanisms, such as Marr’s levels (Marr 
1982), these finer distinctions are all within what I call psychological. These 
terminological discrepancies reflect different conceptualizations of the same 
processes, sometimes with different levels of abstractions as their explanatory 
perspectives – but the proposition I am about to argue for is that psychological 
and agentive are different categories altogether. 
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Davidson 1963; Anscombe 1967; Dennett 1971 & 1987) and disposition-
alists (for example, Ryle 1949; Marcus 1990), who think that proposi-
tional attitudes get their semantics from patterns of action and reac-
tion and that propositional attitudes are attributed to agents based on 
their dispositions to behave according to these patterns. Additionally, 
functionalists think that the best way to characterize propositional at-
titudes (or mental states in general) is through the role a state plays in 
relation to something else (other such states, perceptual input, behav-
iour etc.), regardless of which camp the person belongs to otherwise 
(for example, Fodor 1968; Lewis 1972; Putnam 1975; Dennett 1978; 
Millikan 1984; Shea 2018).  
What I suggest instead is that folk psychology as a natural practice 
(and the basis for the conflicting philosophical intuitions regarding 
mental states) does not make this distinction in the first place. Its con-
cepts may refer to holistic states of an agent (hence agentive level) or 
entities within the cognition and internal factors in action motivation 
(psychological level), depending on the situation, and the practice itself 
does not always recognize a difference between the two cases. Propo-
sitional attitudes understood as agentive states are intentional states 
attributed to an agent. Psychological states are causal factors within 
the functioning of mind, having to do with representations and moti-
vational forces (or drives) that participate in cognitive and behaviour-
guiding processes. The debate on the right level of description to think 
about the reference of folk-psychological concepts is also a debate on 
how to understand intentionality. This is one reason why I use the 
term “agentive” instead of “intentional.” There may actually be good 
reasons for not distinguishing between the two levels in everyday 
practice, but this is still problematic in philosophy and in science. Our 
intuitions about mind and behaviour are based on our use of folk-psy-
chological capacities, and its conceptualizations inform our under-
standing of human behaviour outside what is observed or explicitly 
hypothesized in any given theory. In other words, folk psychology 
brings in “meta-theory-ladenness” to both empirical and 
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philosophical research.109 I will spend a big part of this chapter on this 
issue, for although folk psychology is not a part of the main topic of 
the dissertation, and I might be able to simply stipulate the distinction 
for what is required for the overall argument, folk psychology con-
fuses intuitions about the subject matter (including in science), and 
folk psychology as a practice is a part of the explanandum of the evo-
lutionary explanations under discussion (which is also the reason why 
our intuitions, as participators in this practice, are influenced by it). I 
will discuss some aspects of folk psychology both to convince that an-
other approach is needed and to clarify what I am proposing. I will 
try to be as brief as possible, which inevitably leads to some superfici-
ality considering the significance of the issue and the amount of liter-
ature on each detail, but my aim is only to show that the distinction I 
propose is needed and that it does not require whimsical revisionism. 
I will discuss both philosophical debates and the empirical research 
on folk psychology to argue for the plausibility of the suggestion. 
The central issue is that the ambiguity of the reference of folk-
psychological attributions fixes the focus on the individual by con-
necting the form of behaviour and the individual psychological dis-
positions directly. Intentional action descriptions identify both what 
the action is about (which we need in order to talk about behavioural 
traits) and what kind of psychological states are causing it. We cate-
gorize human behaviour according to what it is intended to be about, 
 
109 Consequently, if this position is correct, both empirical psychology (and 
philosophy of psychology as well as those parts of philosophy of mind that 
are concerned with the workings of mind) and action theory (and philosoph-
ical psychology insofar as it analyses personal-level states) must be revision-
ist, although in different “directions.” The nature of these revisions is not a 
matter for this thesis, but I would argue that some of these revisions, or their 
essential features, have in fact been made on these fields already, even if they 
have been left unarticulated and some conceptual confusions remain. This in 
turn is the source of some apparent discrepancies between psychology and 
action theory. I will return to this to some extent later. 
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and this is inherently connected to intentional psychology.110 Folk psy-
chology seems to presuppose individualism and conflates the two 
senses of trait that need to be distinguished for the analysis of the evo-
lutionary explanandum in social behaviour. This confusion can mani-
fest in two connected ways: first, if we use a folk-psychological frame-
work in describing psychological and behavioural traits (that is, we 
have folk-psychological assumptions within the substance of the re-
search), and second, if folk-psychological presuppositions bias re-
searchers’ observations and categorization of behaviour itself (that is, 
researches apply folk psychology in making observations). For exam-
ple, evolutionary psychologists explicitly explain human wants. 111 
Thinking about behaviour in a folk-psychological framework may 
smuggle folk-psychological elements into both scientific observation 
and philosophical intuitions without epistemic justification, and this 
includes individualistic thinking about behaviour. 
Another problem in understanding behaviour through folk-psy-
chological conceptualizations is that folk psychology is primarily a 
framework to make sense of a particular individual action and is not 
sufficient to describe generalizable traits in the first place. Traits are 
behavioural tendencies rather than actions that are rationalizable in 
context. The object of an evolutionary explanation may be a psycho-
logical disposition or a behavioural pattern, but never an individual 
action. We can come up with a reason or a cluster of reasons that unify 
a series of actions, but this is different from a tendency – it is giving a 
reason for (or rationalizing) a tendency. We may do so and call this a 
 
110 The Logical Connection argument (von Wright 1971) states that since we at-
tribute intentional states to agents based on our interpretation of their behaviour 
as intentional action, the intentional states cannot be psychological factors that 
cause the behaviour. What I am saying here is a weaker point about the connec-
tion: folk-psychological attributions identify action by intentions regardless of 
whether they are ascriptions or causal states, and this attribution fixes an iso-
morphic relation between agentive and psychological level structure. 
111 I will return to this “Freudo-Darwinian Fallacy” (Ylikoski & Kokkonen 
2009; see also Buller 1999) later. 
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habit, for example, but a psychological explanation would rather refer 
to the tendency to have certain kinds of inclinations and reactions (or, 
in a rationalizing language, to come up with certain kinds of reasons 
instead of other possible reasons). Evolutionary explanations are 
about these features of the psychological makeup, not about reasons. 
This also means that if we distinguish between behavioural traits and 
psychological traits (as I will), agentive-level descriptions are different 
from both sub-personal psychological descriptions and behavioural 
descriptions. I will discuss this in greater detail later. In any case, be-
havioural traits should be objects of generic explanation (in whichever 
explanatory dimension) instead of a contextual particular explanation 
(which is the real focus of folk-psychological descriptions even if we 
use the same reason to explain multiple actions). This means that 
whether we use a folk-psychological framework or not, we still need 
further criteria for what behaviour goes together as a trait.  
 
5.1.3. Non-folksy Alternatives 
 
An alternative solution to the problem of defining a behavioural trait 
(without using folk psychology) would be to organize behaviour ac-
cording to the psychological mechanisms that produce it. This might 
seem to be a sensible solution, especially in evolutionary explanations, 
given that psychological mechanisms are the traits that are inherited. 
This is the intuition that guides evolutionary psychology, as we have 
seen. There are problems with this alternative, too. For one, it is not 
clear what these mechanisms are supposed to be. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, this would probably work with the isolated innate 
modules approach of nativist evolutionary psychology, but this ap-
proach is probably wrong. If cognitive processes and mechanisms 
have a more complicated architecture, identification of psychological 
mechanisms turns out to be identification of capacities that are identi-
fied by their functions, and the functions are identified by tasks and 
other performance-related categories. Psychological characteristics 
are patterns discovered in research and the mechanisms that are 
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postulated to explain them. Furthermore, behaviour takes place in a 
complex network of causal factors (including various psychological 
processes and environmental factors) and the explanatory interests 
determine how to break down this network. Psychology is not the 
only sensible explanatory interest. For example, if we are interested in 
the role of behaviour in a social context, we might want to organize 
behaviour into traits in a different way. Furthermore, since the evolu-
tionary benefits of psychological characteristics depend on the behav-
iour they contribute to in a variety of environments, we need to sort 
the behaviour into types of interaction anyway, even if we were inter-
ested only in the adaptivity of a psychological characteristic.  
We could also slice the behaviour according to what factors trig-
ger it. For any behaviour, we can distinguish between triggering and 
structuring causes (Dretske 1988): the structuring causes are the back-
ground conditions and mechanistic details that are presupposed, and 
the triggering cause is what the behaviour under scrutiny is a reaction 
to, internal or external to the system itself. In this image, triggers 
would identify the behaviour, whereas some of the structuring causes 
constitute a psychological mechanism, which is the psychological trait 
that explains the behaviour, other factors being background condi-
tions. Again, how we categorize any particular factor (including what 
is included in the trait) depends on our explanatory interests. This 
causes the different approaches of different behavioural sciences, for 
example, with different explanatory resources, to have, strictly speak-
ing, somewhat different explananda, even if we start with the same in-
stance of behaviour.  
As Helen Longino (2013) has pointed out, different human be-
havioural sciences define a behavioural trait using incommensurable 
categories: sometimes as a repeated pattern of behaviour, sometimes as 
a kind of effect in behaviour, and sometimes as the consequences of a 
specific mechanism that seems to make a difference in behaviour (for 
example, hormonal changes), depending on the explanatory interests. 
These do not map onto each other one-on-one, either. Consequently, 
as Longino argues, the different kinds of research, with different 
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explanatory interests, tools, and ways to understand the concept of 
behaviour itself will end up with incommensurable explananda – not 
only with different technical definitions, but also with actually differ-
ent objects of research. This is not a problem in isolation, but it be-
comes problematic when we are interested in the connection between 
the subject matters (see Mitchel 1992), which is the case here. 
Lacking generalizable criteria for a behavioural trait, we need to 
choose one that best fits the purposes at hand. I proposed evolution-
ary functionalism as an alternative way to approach behaviour in the 
previous chapter. This is not only a criterion for partitioning behav-
iour into traits for evolutionary purposes but also a perspective on 
how to integrate different explanatory dimensions and causal factors. 
It does so by connecting behavioural tendencies and environment 
(with an adaptive function), providing one sense in which to under-
stand what the aboutness of behaviour is. There is a task that connects 
the parts of behaviour through their joint contribution to a positive 
fitness effect in which the parts are dependent on each other in making 
this contribution (as in the example of the honey buzzard’s hunting 
behaviour). This does not require one-to-one mapping between a be-
havioural trait and a single mechanism or a module, or an identifica-
tion of the trait with a particular set of bodily activities. This approach 
depends on a specific explanatory interest and is not a universally 
workable solution even in biology – and I am not suggesting that it is 
applicable to all human behaviour. It is, however, a sensible perspec-
tive from which to understand animal behaviour (for the reasons 
given in the previous chapters) and an adequate perspective on hu-
man behaviour when it is the evolutionary understanding of human 
behaviour that we are specifically interested in. There are limits to the 
applicability of evolutionary functionalism, as discussed before, and 
these are the limits of evolutionary human science. The object of my 
discussion is whatever remains within those limits. 
The choice of perspective alone does not solve the problem of 
ambiguity. As we have seen before, the evolutionary perspective de-
pends on assumptions about other explanatory dimensions. The 
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direct link between the function and behaviour made by the classical 
sociobiology does not work. The perspectives from different dimen-
sions do not necessarily slice the behavioural patterns into traits in an 
isomorphic way, but different explanations may be relevant to each 
other or each other’s presuppositions even if they ask different ques-
tions (see Mitchell 1992; Longino 2013). Moreover, whatever defini-
tional perspective we use, the proximate causal basis of behaviour 
probably involves several cognitive and motivational mechanisms 
that are not restricted to this behaviour only (as we saw with the 
honey buzzard). Behavioural dispositions and capacities are psycho-
logical characteristics that are selected for the net effect they have on 
fitness through all the behaviour they participate in. This means that 
behavioural traits are connected to other behavioural traits through 
psychology, unless they are modular to a high enough degree to be 
completely distinct. Additionally, this means that the psychological ad-
aptations are adaptations only through their participation in evolutionarily 
functional behavioural traits. The adaptivity of psychological traits de-
pends on how they contribute to manifest behaviour. But the evolu-
tionarily functional behavioural traits (the main explananda of evolu-
tionary anthropology) and evolutionarily functional psychological 
traits (the main explananda of evolutionary psychology) cannot be 
mapped onto one-to-one relations. Rather, there is a co-evolution of 
adaptive behaviour and adaptive psychology.112 This is a further rea-
son to keep psychological and behavioural traits separate for evolu-
tionary purposes: there may even be selective tension between them. 
Psychological development adds another connective factor between 
psychological and behavioural traits – but this complication is a topic 
for later.  
 
112 There are many reasons for why all psychology and/or behaviour cannot 
be completely adaptive, but the non-isomorphism of psychological and be-
havioural traits would probably be enough to make both psychology and be-
haviour sub-optimal. This is a further argument against adaptationism of 
most kinds, but not the holistic evolutionary functionalism proposed in the 
previous chapter since it is an instrumentalist idealization in the first place. 
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5.2. The Intolerable Ambiguity of Folk Psychology 
 
There is no generally accepted definition for folk psychology. This is 
understandable since the definition depends partly on substantial 
views about what it is. For example, some consider it mostly a folk 
theory with applications while others think there is hardly anything 
theory-like in it. But as a starting point, I use the concept in an all-
inclusive way, including cognitive capacities, interpretative practices, 
conceptual frameworks, quasi-theoretical ideas and other theory-like 
elements that exist in everyday conceptualizations, explanations and 
predictions of human behaviour, and in communicating and thinking 
about action and thinking. The folk theory part alone will be called 
theory of mind and the cognitive capacity to attribute mental states will 
be mindreading. None of these concepts has a fixed meaning in the de-
bates and some of them are often used synonymously. Furthermore, 
it is not clear whether mindreading is supposed to attribute internal 
psychological states (it usually is supposed to) or whether attribution 
of mere agentive states qualifies as well, or what the attempted refer-
ence of the concepts in the theory of mind is, personal or sub-personal 
level states. Whatever folk psychology is, it is the starting point for 
both philosophical and scientific psychology, as well as theory of ac-
tion and decision theory. In folk psychology, the agent, the subject of 
the action, is the causal locus of behaviour, and this makes it individ-
ualistic in its very presuppositions of the nature of agency.113 
The debate over how folk psychology works as an interpretative 
device (is it a theory of mind that guides our perceptions and attribu-
tions or does it work in some other way?) includes both philosophical 
and empirical elements. There is another related debate over what the 
reference of its conceptual categorization is – the workings of our 
 
113 That is, this is the tendency in most of the discussion about folk psychology, 
both in philosophy and psychology. Whether folk psychology includes collec-
tivist elements such as “we-intentions” as well (Tuomela & Miller 1988) is a 
further issue (see Tomasello 2009). 
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mind (which is at least partly experienced subjectively) or the modal 
states of the agent (epistemic and directive). Yet another question is 
the relationship between folk psychology and scientific conceptuali-
zations of mind. These perspectives are central in the philosophy of 
mind and in the philosophy of psychology, but action theory and phil-
osophical psychology are mostly interested in the logic of folk psy-
chology from within the practice. There are two components in this 
philosophical enterprise: the explication and analysis of the essential 
conceptual elements of the theory of mind and the development of a 
more sophisticated theory based on them for further philosophical 
purposes, such as the analysis of moral responsibility. The latter in-
cludes normative issues in conceptualizing human action, such as ra-
tionality.114 I will discuss some of these topics to argue for the distinc-
tion between agentive and psychological as a substantial distinction 
between two relevant ways to understand human action and its un-
derlying psychology, not as two competing theories of intentionality. 
Moreover, I will endorse the Pluralistic Folk Psychology of Kristin An-
drews (2012, 2015a & 2015b), the view that folk psychology is inher-
ently pluralistic as a theory and as a practice, whether in the psycho-
logical processes involved in the practices, what its function in social 
life is, or what the references of its core concepts are. I will argue that 
the different levels of abstraction are not kept apart in everyday prac-
tices, and consequently some of the philosophical debate over the na-
ture of human thinking and action may be confused in this respect 
too.115 
 
114 “Normativity” can refer to a wide range of issues involving “ought” rather 
than “is.” The normativity of rationality is normative in a somewhat minimal 
sense: the rationality of an action tells us whether an action is adequate for the 
goals of the agent (see for example O’Brien 2019). I will return this later. 
115 Having elements of different kinds does not mean that there is no system-
atic connection between them. Georg Henrik von Wright (2001), for example, 
argued that “mind” refers to a complex interaction between (to paraphrase a 
bit) brain, folk-psychological conceptualizations of behaviour, and the con-
scious subjective mind. “Mind” cannot be reduced to any one component. 
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5.2.1. The Foundational Tension in the Philosophy of Folk Psychology 
 
The strikingly different intuitions that have emerged in philosophy 
about the nature of folk psychology may be symptomatic of its plural-
istic nature. Having strikingly different intuitions is not exactly un-
heard of in philosophy. Yet the disagreement of intuitions is not about 
which philosophical theory of folk psychology is correct but about 
what this philosophical theory should be about in the first place. We 
all have access to folk psychology from within. Starting from Wilfrid 
Sellars (1956), many philosophers have thought that folk psychology 
is essentially a theory – a folk theory that explains (or is used in the 
explanations of) human behaviour. This involves attributing mental 
states or entities, such as propositional attitudes, that explain behav-
iour and constitute the mind. Intuitively, this seems to hold: we not 
only theoretically explain but also predict others’ behaviour based on 
mental attributions, and more importantly, we manipulate others’ 
 
Folk psychology fixes the semantics of the mental categories, brain is the 
source of causal powers, and reflection provides a privileged epistemic access 
to the complex that allows us to know intuitively what we are doing (i.e. what 
is the action we intend to take). Even without going this far, one could argue 
that folk psychological practices nevertheless play a constitutive role in what 
the human mind is – either conceptually (as in von Wright’s image) or caus-
ally (through mindshaping (Mameli 2001)), or both. I do not have a stance on 
what the reference of “mind” is, nor do I think it matters for any of the issues 
at hand as long as the local references are clear. Instead, I try to avoid using 
the terms “mind” and “mental” except as assumptions within the theory of 
mind as an object of discussion. I will use “psychology” and “psychological” 
as a narrow category of sub-personal processing. These processes may de-
pend on interaction with the environment, and I am sympathetic to attempts 
to expand the perspective outside strictly internal processes, but I will use the 
“psychology” of internal cognitive processes as a contrast to both the subjec-
tive conscious mind only and folk-psychological ascriptions of agency with 
mental states. I use “psychological” rather than “cognitive” because psycho-




future behaviour by manipulating their mental states through persua-
sion, arguments, threats, et cetera, for example. In other words, mental 
states, whatever they are, seem to work as if they are causal factors, 
according to the Woodwardian understanding of causality. This 
means that they cannot be mere descriptive abstractions, but they have 
to refer to something that causes the behaviour or, at least, to causal 
processes that ground these abstractions. At the same time, however, 
the propositional attitudes are intentional (directed to something, be-
ing about something; Anscombe 1967; Dennett 1971) and rational (that 
is, they are connected through the entailment relations based on their 
propositional content). It seems that this is foundational for the se-
mantics of folk psychology, whilst the underlying causal processes 
produce the behaviour itself (Davidson 1963 & 1970; von Wright 1971 
& 2001; Kim 1993 & 2005). Much of the philosophy of mind for the 
past half a century or so has been about various solutions to this ap-
parent dual nature of mentality. I will not go into any of these debates 
more deeply than necessary.116 But I do have to discuss some issues to 
 
116 I am only interested in individuating mental states as explanatory factors. 
To do so, I have to say something about mental causation, rationality in ex-
planations, folk psychology, and mindreading, even if I am not going to go 
deep into any of these issues or try to make arguments within these debates. 
But I will not discuss mental content. There is a whole subfield of philosophy 
of mind devoted to whether the right way to understand the contents of be-
liefs and other mental states is to restrict oneself to the internal properties of 
individual such as representation (narrow content; for example, Fodor 1987 & 
1990) or whether the content extends to facts about the world (broad content; 
for example, Putnam 1975 & Burge 1979 & 2003). This is related to the issue at 
hand through an overall view about what mentality is about. The idea of nar-
row content is connected to the idea that mental attributions are about attrib-
uting psychological states that have a narrow content. The view that mental 
attributions are ascriptions of relational states between an individual and ex-
ternal facts is related to broad content theories. Some of the more recent views 
about mentality, such as enactivism (for example, Hutto & Myin 2013 & 2017), 
attempt a radical reinterpretation of mentality on both accounts. There is no 
necessary conceptual connection between the two, however. There is a 
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articulate properly the adequate explananda of the evolutionary expla-
nations and what the assumptions behind this are. 
The representational theory of mind is the dominant paradigm and 
I assume that something like it is true when it comes to the cognitive-
level scientific descriptions. Whether the representations postulated 
by this theory are mere instrumental abstractions of the functional prop-
erties of the cognitive architecture in modelling the performative ca-
pacities of the human brain (and are, therefore, emergent systemic 
properties) or entities with inherent causal powers that are imple-
mented by the brain processes (and are therefore parts of the system) 
is irrelevant here. The core of the theory is that the mental entities are 
intentional yet causal at the same time. This usually involves reducing 
the agent-level intentionality to psychological-level representations 
that participate in the causally effective cognitive processes (for exam-
ple, Fodor 1975, 1981 & 1990; Shea 2018).117  
 
difference between how to understand a mental state as a container of a men-
tal content (the person as a whole or a specific psychological state) and 
whether to understand the content in terms of the individual’s states or in-
clude external factors. For example, whether the meaning of “water” includes 
facts about the chemical structure of water does not depend on whether we 
think beliefs about water are representational states in our cognition or dispo-
sitional states of an individual. It depends even less on how folk psychology 
works as a conceptual framework for presenting explanations. There are over-
all philosophies of mind that draw borders regarding several issues and the 
themes are connected, but not through direct entailment. Furthermore, if my 
distinction between psychological and agentive is accepted, the only direct 
consequence for the debate over mental content is that it makes a hybrid po-
sition available: cognitive (representational) contents and individual (doxas-
tic) contents are kept conceptually separate and their substantive relationship 
is left open. 
117 The representations have content, but their relation to belief-like states and 
to propositional contents is an open question. The core property of representa-
tions is that they stand for something in cognition without being in direct causal 
connection to the object; they are decoupled from the immediate presence (see 
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The eliminativists think folk psychology is a false theory, and the 
mental entities that it attributes (and the mind) do not even exist (Stich 
1983; Churchland & Churchland 1998). Patricia S. and Paul M. 
Churchland (P.M. Churchland 1981 & 1989; P.S. Churchland 1986; 
Churchland & Churchland 1998) conclude from this that the adequate 
level of scientific explanation is neuroscience, and that scientific psy-
chology is based on the same false theory as well. Stephen Stich ar-
gued in his 1983 book, in contrast, that the level of descriptions of cog-
nitive science is fine – but without the intentionalist baggage from folk 
psychology (see also Cummins 1983 & 1996). 118  But not everyone 
agrees that folk psychology even attempts to describe the psycholog-
ical reality of cognition. The non-causalists (for example, Anscombe 
1967; von Wright 1971) concluded early on that folk psychology is not 
a theory that postulates entities at all, and it does not give causal ex-
planations for behaviour – it is about rationalizing the action of an in-
dividual agent, a person, by attributing reasons for action that expli-
cate what the individual’s behaviour is about. Some causalists (Da-
vidson 1963 & 1970; Dennett 1971 & 1987; Lewis 1972) had similar in-
sights, proposing that the rationalizations of action are ascriptions to 
human agents as “systems” that have real causal properties, but the 
causal properties are captured under different descriptions than ra-
tionalization.  
This early disagreement on the very function of folk psychology 
(that is, whether it refers to causally effective internal entities or as-
cribes mental states to human agents as holistic systems) may be 
symptomatic of the vagueness of reference (see also Stich 1996). These 
approaches do not need to be rival views of the same thing. They may 
be attempts to capture different aspects of human agency and psycho-
logical phenomena related to it that are unified in folk psychology – 
 
Sterelny 2003). Hence, they function as having mental content even if they are a 
part of a causal system (see Shea 2018). I will return to some of this later. 
118 Later, of course, Stich took an agnostic position about the reference of folk-
psychological terms (Stich 1996). 
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and they may be unified at the level of detail that is necessary and 
sufficient for folk-psychological practices, but not for further sophisti-
cation. This is in large part an empirical claim, in two ways: how the 
mind works and how interpreting it works (or, what interpreting 
minds is about). These are separate but closely connected questions. If 
our use of folk psychology includes assumptions about mind, these 
assumptions are a part of our interpretation of the object of folk psy-
chological interpretations when we reflect on our intuitions about the 
reference of folk psychology. If we want to discover the possible biases 
in our intuitions caused by folk psychology, including about folk psy-
chology itself, we need to understand the psychology of mindreading 
(the attribution of mental states; see Baron-Cohen et al 2000; Nichols 
& Stich 2003; Apperly 2010): how, based on what and to which pur-
poses we make these attributions. The philosophical analysis should 
be amended by empirical knowledge about this. 
 
5.2.2. Psychology of Folk Psychology 
 
Psychologists and primatologists generally use the term “theory of 
mind” when talking about the capacity to attribute mental states to 
others (for example, Gopnik & Meltzoff 1997; Wellman & Liu 2004; 
Call & Tomasello 2008; Lurtz 2009; Henry et al 2013), but it is not clear 
how strong their assumptions of theory-likeness are. Generally, they 
seem to merely refer to the ability to attribute mental states to other 
beings (that is, mindreading). Some psychologists have argued for 
much stronger theory-likeness, based on the observation that children 
seem to use natural language as a theory-like guide to human behav-
iour (for example Gopnik & Meltzoff 1997; Wellman & Liu 2004). The 
psychological vocabulary seems to refer what is “behind” behav-
iour.119 Others think that folk psychology, or its core at least, is innate 
 
119 Bogdan (1997) and Hutto (2008), on the other hand, discuss the role of lan-
guage at later stages of acquiring full-scale folk-psychological capacities 
through learning narratives. Narratives structure children’s thinking about 
211 
 
rather than acquired with language, but it functions as a theory of 
other minds (for example, Baron-Cohen 1995; Carruthers 2013b). 
Some psychologists also make a distinction between affective theory of 
mind (the ability to understand feelings and emotions) and cognitive 
theory of mind (the ability to attribute beliefs, goals, and intentions) 
(Shamay-Tsoory et al 2010; Duval et al 2011). This is an important dis-
tinction as the two capacities might function very differently. An al-
ternative to the theory theory of folk psychology is the simulation theory 
(Gordon 1986; Goldman 1989 & 2006). The directions of inference are 
opposite in these theories: in simulation theory, mindreading involves 
generalization from internal observations. The simulationists think 
that interpretation has more to do with mental simulation of other 
people’s context and trying to get “into their heads” with introspec-
tive knowledge about mental states that would emerge in the given 
situation.120 This does not involve theoretical postulates but cognition 
involving introspection. Lately, hybrid theories have become more 
popular (see Nichols & Stich 2003; Perner & Kühberger 2005).  All 
these views are intellectualist views of the mindreading process, and 
there are those who argue that much of folk psychology is something 
else (for example, Bogdan 1997; Hutto 2007 & 2008; Hutto et al 2011; 
Zawidzki 2013; Andrews 2012; 2015a & 2015b).  
The psychology of mindreading is concerned with how the at-
tribution of mental states works as a part of human cognition. This is 
connected to two philosophical issues: the epistemic justification of 
making claims about other minds, and whether folk psychology in-
volves representing mental entities (that may or may not exist) that 
are psychologically explanatory for action. With respect to the epis-
temic issue, the simulation theory is an account of the logic of min-
dreading that bypasses the problem of how to test the hypothesis of 
 
action as an event that is a part of a chain of events involving beliefs acquired 
earlier and goals in the future. 
120 The simulation theorists do not have a unified view of what counts as sim-
ulation (see Gallagher 2007), but this is not relevant to the current discussion. 
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other minds (since this attribution is not hypothetical). However, it is 
not sufficient to account for how we perceive our own mental states 
without some sort of representation of mind (Carruthers 2009 & 2011). 
This means that even if the simulation theory is correct about how we 
attribute mental states to others (in contrast to the theoretical hypoth-
esizing of theory theory), it does not rid us of a theory of mind as a 
conceptual framework that structures the internal observations (see 
also Dennett 1991a). The philosophical issue about their reference 
(psychological or agentive, and real or fictional) remains, even if the 
epistemological problem of other minds is fundamentally trans-
formed. Furthermore, simulation would not make the attributions by 
mindreading necessarily correct (see Stich 1996), and how we perceive 
our own minds (which is the basis of knowing other minds in simula-
tion) may also be fundamentally misleading in the first place.  
Observing our own minds involves the same folk-psychological 
framework we use in interpreting others in mindreading, regardless 
of which one is the psychologically primary context for it. But intro-
spection involves internal access to some of the psychological pro-
cesses involving how we represent the world, what our needs (or 
drives) and objects of inclinations are, and what our current action is 
about, producing conscious metarepresentations. Both philosophers 
(James 1884; Ryle 1949; Boghossian 1989; Carruthers 2009 & 2011; Do-
ris 2015) and psychologists (Nisbett & Wilson 1977; Nisbett & Ross 
1980; Hurlburt & Schwitzgebel 2007) have seriously challenged the 
epistemic certainty of knowing one’s own mental states. At the same 
time, it would seem absurd to deny that we know what we are doing 
most of the time. For example, it may be a matter of interpretation for 
others to know whether my hand-waving is about greeting someone, 
stopping a cab, or getting rid of a wasp, but I can hardly be mistaken 
about this myself under normal conditions. But we need to make a 
distinction between knowing one’s own intentions and knowing the 
psychological processes underlying it. We may not have access to all 
the decision processes, for example. Nevertheless, we may grant 
enough reliability and directedness to introspective observations to 
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give it a privileged (although fallible) epistemic status (see Nichols & 
Stich 2003; Goldman 2006; and Carruthers 2011 for such accounts) and 
yet recognize that the conceptualization of these observations is the-
ory-laden. We cannot simply assume that the folk-psychological in-
terpretations of our own minds are raw observations, but observa-
tions with a conceptual structure. Regardless of the primary reference 
of these concepts (inner psychological states, agentive dispositions, or 
a heterogenous category), the framework (also) serves the purpose of 
positioning the agents (including the subject of the interpretation her-
self) in a network of relations to the world. Beliefs and desires, 
whether they have psychological references or not, have a proposi-
tional content that describes these relations, epistemic or directive. 
Even if beliefs and desires have psychological realizers (representa-
tions), the semantics of folk psychology depends on these holistic re-
lations.121 On the other hand, since we have access to our own minds, 
it would be curious if we did not also take advantage of this in infer-
ring about other minds. This may be an effective cognitive tool, but 
also a basis for confusion if it makes the reference of the concepts a 
heterogenous category. 
Concentrating on the most sophisticated levels of the mindread-
ing process can, however, be misleading. Our mindreading cognition 
probably uses more direct and minimal ways of attributing perceptual 
states and behavioural dispositions to others than a full theory of 
mind in much of our social practices. The capacities for this task in-
clude joint attention, mimicry, and affective empathy, for example, re-
gardless of which theory turns out to be the correct theory of more 
sophisticated attribution. (See Sterelny 1995, 1998, 1999 & 2003; Bog-
dan 1997; Tomasello et al 2003; Hutto 2007; Gallagher 2008 & 2012; To-
masello 2008; Zahavi 2008; de Waal 2009; Hutto et al 2011; Andrews 
2012, 2015a & 2015b; Zawidzki 2013; and Hutto & Myin 2017 for a 
 
121 There are also philosophers who have suggested that the semantics of folk 
psychology is even more intimately connected to behaviour (Ryle 1948; Witt-
genstein 1953; von Wright 1971 & 2001). 
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discussion of the lower-level cognition involved). Kristin Andrews 
(2012, 2015a & 2015b), for example, has proposed a theory that she 
calls Pluralistic Folk Psychology, highlighting both the variety of psy-
chological mechanisms involved in folk psychology (mindreading be-
ing just one) and the functions performed by folk psychology. It is not 
just about attributing propositional attitudes. Action explanations and 
predictions may rely on other factors, such as personality types, social 
roles, context, and so on, and the functions of folk psychology include 
interactive practices like coordination and justification. Moreover, ex-
planation (the focus of much of the theoretical discussion) and predic-
tion (the focus of most of the empirical research) may involve different 
capacities. She argues that prediction relies mostly on the normative 
aspects of folk psychology that regulate social interaction, and only 
the violation of these norms evokes the need to explain what hap-
pened. This explanation may involve attributing cognitive states, 
emotions, or personality traits, for example, which loops back into fur-
ther predictions.122 Some of the attributed traits may be on the per-
sonal and some on the sub-personal level. 
Furthermore, even if the pure theory theory were the correct way 
to think about the logic of sophisticated mindreading (as postulating 
explanatory entities, events or processes for external behaviour and 
its directedness, without internal observations of these entities), the 
full theory of mind would still be preceded by a more minimal theory 
of mind, both developmentally and evolutionarily speaking. We 
should probably talk about interpretive capacities with quasi-theoret-
ical presuppositions rather than a theory of mind in these early stages, 
even if we espouse theory of mind. Given how psychological architec-
tures are usually constructed, more sophisticated mindreading tools 
 
122 This is well in line with empirical studies that suggest that people rely on 
behavioural expectations rather than theory of mind in natural contexts and 
that the inferences using theory of mind are cognitively taxing, deliberate, 
and, as a result, adult humans make often mistakes that they are equipped to 
avoid. See Malle & Pearce 2001; Keysara et al 2003; Apperly et al 2006, 2008 & 
2010; Bryant et al 2013. 
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are more likely to be additions to than replacements of the earlier 
stages. The central empirical question of philosophical consequences 
is what the function of these capacities may be. To address this ques-
tion, we may need to expand the discussion to evolutionary origins. 
The selected use of the capacities during the main stages of their evo-
lution tells us the success conditions of their use – that is, what is the 
object that they should most accurately trace in interpretation. Given 
the usual constraints of adaptationism, we should not expect them to 
be completely successful in this or that the answer should be clear, but 
we can get some idea of the reference of the concepts in our practice. 
 
5.2.3. The Evolution of Folk Psychology 
 
The evolutionary background and function of this set of diverse ca-
pacities and practices is important for the following reason. If we ap-
proach the core concepts of folk psychology as quasi-theoretical terms, 
we must ask what entities they are “trying” to refer to, what their 
function in the evolved practice is. In other words, the practices are 
attempting to trace something in other individuals, and the central 
concepts used in the practice get their reference as a part of this pro-
cess.123 If the evolutionary function of folk psychology were to cor-
rectly refer to the psychological structure of mind, its accuracy in this 
would be selected. But if folk psychology is a set of capacities and 
practices in social interaction and its evolved function is more prag-
matic, its quasi-theoretical components do not necessarily serve the 
 
123 This may be understood in the terms of teleosemantics in that the function 
of the representations in the cognitive processes involved is to trace certain 
features, and they refer to what those features are (Millikan 1982 & 2004; 
Papineau 1984; Dretske 1988). However, the point here is independent of any 
theory of reference. Any causal-historical theory of reference needs a story of 
the “baptism”, which will need a description of what the foundational prac-
tices were, and any descriptive theory needs to describe the function of the 
concepts in the folk theory of mind. They all will lead into the same question. 
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purpose of describing the structure and functioning of mind (as something 
internal). Instead, they conceptualize the states of the agents in relation 
to the world in a way that makes prediction of their behaviour possible 
and facilitates social interaction.124  
The evolutionary origin of folk psychology and its various ele-
ments is commonly thought to lie in enabling and boosting our wide 
variety of social practices. We use it to predict others’ behaviour and 
signal our own intentions in contexts of collaboration, competition, 
manipulation, moral evaluation, and so on. (See Vygotsky 1978; de 
Waal 1982; Byrne & Whiten 1988; Byrne 1997; Bogdan 1997; Corbalis 
& Lea 1999; Richerson & Boyd 2005; Tomasello et al 2005; Knobe 2007; 
McGeer 2007; Moll & Tomasello 2007; Tomasello 2009; Emery 2012; 
Devaine et al 2014; Andrews 2015b.) To be successful in this, the details 
of the cognition do not necessarily matter. For most tasks related to 
sociality, robust representations of the relations between the inter-
preted individual and their environment are sufficient. But it is also 
likely that growing sociality and new cognitive needs create selection 
for different capacities, not just more powerful or more accurate ones.  
Radu J. Bogdan (1997) has built a whole theory of different cog-
nitive stages in mindreading (both evolutionary and developmental), 
and what cognitive tasks the various stages accomplish, evolutionar-
ily speaking. The stages range from “natural teleology” (understand-
ing the directedness of behaviour and different perspectives) through 
a “psychobehavioural” stage (attributing non-visible goals and con-
text-independent epistemic states to the agent) to a “psychosocial” 
stage (with higher abilities that are needed in two-directional social 
interaction). Bogdan’s theory is highly speculative at times, especially 
when it comes to the evolutionary dimension, but the details of the 
 
124 “Evolutionary debunking arguments” are sometimes presented for scepti-
cism on various issues related to the products of human cognition on the basis 
that nature selects for usefulness, not truth. But the usefulness is often de-
pendent on correctness of these products, depending on the case. (See Wilkins 
& Griffiths 2012.) The point here is not about debunking, but about the locus 
of what needs to be got right. 
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evolution (or development) of mindreading are not important here. 
The important idea is that the rudimentary mindreading practices do 
not need a theory of mind in the sense that it postulates internal psy-
chological states. The social cognitive capacities of small children and 
apes could be achieved without such. (See also Hutto et al 2001; Hutto 
& Ratcliffe 2007; Andrews 2012).125 The more recent elements of social 
cognition, in turn, may involve both attributions of psychological 
states and locating the targets of interpretation in narrative structures 
involving the rationalization of past events and future goals (see Bog-
dan 1997; Hutto 2008), which are expansions of two different kinds, 
cognitive and agentive (cf. Goldie 2007). 
Whether or not non-human apes have a true theory of mind is 
contested within primatology. Chimpanzees seem to understand the 
difference in others’ perspectives and goals, to some degree, and use 
this information in social contexts, and this is usually interpreted as 
their postulating an inner life to each other (see Call & Tomasello 
2008), but primatologists Daniel Povinelli and Jennifer Vonk (2003) 
have questioned this (see also Penn & Povinelli 2007; Andrews 2012). 
Instead, they suggest, chimpanzees might merely use behavioural ab-
stractions. This is in line with Bogdan’s interpretations. In addition, 
they accuse the more generous interpretations of using the theory of 
mind in interpreting the “interpreting” in chimpanzees, instead of dis-
covering it in them. That is, the researchers are using their own min-
dreading capacities in reading mind on the chimpanzee being ob-
served by another chimpanzee, and then again when they interpret 
what the observing chimpanzee “must” be observing. This is a nice 
example of the folk-theory-ladenness of observation that might bias 
 
125 Whether small children are already using a more sophisticated theory of 
mind is a different question to whether they need it to accomplish the tasks 
they perform. Peter Carruthers (2013b) argues that they do use more sophis-
ticated cognitive tools early on. But this may be telling of the need for a so-
phisticated theory of mind in adult age, which necessitates the development 
of one. The developmental and evolutionary stages are often correlated, but 
do not completely mirror each other. 
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observations of human behaviour as well. But the important thing 
here is not whether chimpanzees really attribute psychological states 
(see Tomasello & Call 2006; Sober 2009; Butterfield & Apperly 2013; 
and Clatterbuck 2015 for a defence of a stronger interpretation). The 
important idea is, once again, the distinction between attributing be-
havioural abstractions and attributing psychological states, and the 
difficulty of knowing which of these is the case, based on chimpan-
zees’ performative competence and behaviour alone. In the first case, 
the chimpanzee under interpretation is the locus of the dispositions, 
as an agent, and this would be enough for chimpanzee social cogni-
tion. A folk psychology as an expansion of this would be a more so-
phisticated conceptual framework to locate the individual in the envi-
ronment with behavioural dispositions, transcending temporal and 
spatial limitations.  
If this were the case of ape cognition, it would probably also be 
partly true of human folk psychology. We clearly make assumptions 
about internal states, too, but there is no reason to think that human 
mindreading that uses psychological attribution has replaced all the 
earlier elements in cognition after emerging. This is not how evolution 
works – quite the contrary.126 Furthermore, children have some folk-
 
126 It is not likely that the evolution of mindreading capacities begins with at-
tribution of inner states, or that our more sophisticated cognitive capacities 
have completely replaced the more rudimentary ones. A nice example of lay-
ered cognition like this is Frans de Waal’s (2007) famous “Russian doll model” 
of empathy, a model of how perception, cognition and motivation regarding 
others works in a system where cognitively more sophisticated capacities are 
new “layers” built on the older ones. The core mechanism is a direct emotional 
connection between the other's behavioural state and the subject's states (au-
tomatic motor mimicry and emotional contagion). This provides the basis for 
a higher layer in which the other is perceived to be the source of felt emotions 
(and the object of care), which in turn is a basis for the fully developed em-
pathic layer of attribution and perspective taking. Each earlier layer plays a 
role in the higher layers. The general lesson from the evolution of mind is that 
we should expect it to be layered like this in its capacities, including in the 
capacity to interpret other minds. 
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psychological understanding before they have any concept of belief 
(Wellman, Cross & Watson 2001), and mindreading and applying it in 
inferences develop in stages of cognitive competence (Wellman 1990; 
Apperly & Robinson 2003; Moshman 2004; Henry et al 2013). In fact, 
there is evidence that even adults attribute beliefs and make belief-
related inferences deliberately, not automatically, and much of folk-
psychological practices work without it (Malle & Pearce 2001; Keysara 
et al 2003; Apperly et al 2006, 2008 & 2010; Back & Apperly 2010; Bryant 
et al 2013). 
However, Stephen Butterfield and Ian Apperly (2013) have intro-
duced another alternative to interpreting rudimentary interpretation 
capacities as having a minimal theory of mind.127 Under this interpreta-
tion, chimpanzees and young children do not attribute mere behav-
ioural dispositions but refer to the underlying psychological states 
(something that is in between the observed environment and the be-
haviour) in their interpretations in some robust way (see also Whiten 
1996). But they do not use a full theory of mind, either, since they lack 
metarepresentational categories in their cognition. They do not have 
beliefs about others’ beliefs, but their cognitive processes represent the 
cognitive processes of others. This is definitely a theoretical possibility 
when it comes to accounting for things like automatic attributions of 
visual perceptions and immediate goals of behaviour to others. How-
ever, the minimal theory of mind is precisely not about attributing 
propositional attitudes. If the richer theory of mind is an expansion of 
a minimal theory of mind like this, it requires additional attributing of 
world-directed states that are the person’s attitudes, with propositional 
contents that are linked to the person’s other propositional attitudes 
through the contents. The success criterion for this is still whether the 
attributions relate the individual to her or his environment in ways 
that serve social purposes – that is, prediction, coordination, et cetera.  
 
127 Butterfield and Apperly do not argue that this is what actually happens in 
chimpanzee interpretation but introduce the notion of minimal theory of 
mind as an alternative way to think about this and various other cases. 
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If the evolution of cognition is tied to the evolution of social prac-
tices, there will be selection for isomorphic relation between the cog-
nitive processes and their interpretation by others, either directly, by 
mindshaping (Mameli 2001; Zawidzki 2013; I will return this shortly), 
or both. But this selection is not directed to make the enriched inter-
pretation of the internal processes more correct, but to have a robust 
connection between the two. Let us bring back Beatrice saving Amos 
from the earlier example. A minimal theory of mind would attribute 
her a state of perceiving Amos in distress and a teleological state of 
mind to help Amos. But how does this change if we attribute her a 
belief that Amos is drowning or the pro-attitude to save him? These 
still seem to be attributions of the overall states of Beatrice to her. If 
the theory of mind is based on a minimal theory of mind, it is still an 
open question whether attributions of propositional attitudes can be 
understood in terms of psychological-level representations. They 
may. However, if Pluralistic Folk Psychology is true (and it seems to 
be compatible with the empirical psychology of folk psychology and 
evolutionary considerations) it would make sense to think that folk 
psychological practices generally rely on more robust attributions of 
intentional states to a person under interpretation but go “deeper” 
into the thinking processes of the individual when it is needed. For 
the practical purposes of folk psychology, it does not make sense to 
distinguish between overall assessment of what is intended and why, 
and going into more detail, even though this might involve a transfer 
between levels – and constitute a category mistake, strictly speaking. 
Even if the function of mindreading is the agentive level dispositions, 
it can still involve attribution of internal states as a part of this process. 
Since we humans have access to our own minds (even if sometimes 
fallible), it only makes sense that we use our self-observations as a clue 
to what is happening with other agents, too.  
All this is somewhat speculative, and it could not be otherwise – 
the debate on the empirical issues has not been concluded yet. How-
ever, my argument is only that the two levels are both conceptually 
and substantially separate, that it makes sense to talk about both, and 
221 
 
folk psychology is about both but without maintaining the distinction. 
Both options for explaining the primitive interpretation (behavioural 
abstraction and minimal theory of mind) implicitly make the distinc-
tion between psychological and agentive, although they propose dif-
ferent levels as the object of rudimentary interpretation. 
If there is no need to distinguish between different levels (agen-
tive and psychological) in folk-psychological practices, however, the 
levels conflate with no practical consequences. If there is no selection 
for accuracy, mixing the levels may even be cognitively less demand-
ing and thereby more functional. We also think about our own future 
actions and plan for them, which involves reflection and reasoning, 
which in turn involves conscious rational thinking and direct 
knowledge of what we are planning to do. But even here the function 
of folk psychology does not lie in accuracy in representing our inner 
processes. The function of folk psychology is not so much a theory of 
mind as a theory of agency that makes presuppositions about mind 
and utilizes introspection in this. There is no reason to think that folk 
psychology’s principal function is to describe the inner workings of 
mind. At the same time this alone does not entail that the attributions 
(such as beliefs and desires) are not also attempts to capture internal 
psychological states. The emergence of the theory of mind does not 
need to create another layer in our mindreading practices. Using the 
theory of mind in interpretation may instead be “thinking harder” 
about the beliefs and goals of the agent, rather than attributing further 
explanatory entities behind the agentive states. This would be more 
parsimonious on the level of robustness needed for folk-psychological 
practices. As for philosophical and scientific endeavours, whatever 
entities, processes, and structures constitute human psychology, we 
can think about them as the realizers of agent-level beliefs and desires, 
or their constituent parts. But this is a further question. Folk psychol-
ogy’s success criterion is pragmatic: it must be useful, and for this it is 
222 
 
enough that it describes the robust dispositions of an individual agent, 
not accurate details of its underlying psychology.128  
To sum up our discussion of the empirical side of the issue, folk 
psychology seems to involve a variety of quasi-theoretical and cogni-
tive tools that we use to understand others’ behaviour in a certain con-
text (see also Davis & Stone 1995; Bogdan 1997; Baron-Cohen et al 
2000; Nichols & Stich 2003; Hutto & Ratcliffe 2007; Hutto 2008 & 2009; 
Andrews 2012, 2015a & 2015b). It involves things such as perspective 
taking in a context; attributing belief-like states that describe the 
agent’s cognitive relation with the world; attributing immediate and 
non-immediate goals to behaviour; simulation and empathetic pro-
duction of similar mental states; conceptualizing the behaviour of the 
observed agent as action with agentive states such as beliefs, desires, 
goals, intentions, et cetera; attributing broader “mental backgrounds” 
such as belief systems, long-term goals, emotions, moods, personality 
traits, et cetera to the agent; and ideas about the behavioural tendencies 
that humans generally have. The more sophisticated stages of folk 
psychology may involve symbolic learning, such as language and ex-
planatory narratives (situating the target of interpretation into a series 
 
128 This view about folk psychology also has deep roots in philosophy. It has 
been popular lately among those who approach the issue from an evolution-
ary point of view, and these are the theorists referred to here. But the idea that 
mind-related concepts obtain their semantics from understanding action, es-
pecially other people’s actions, instead of referring to mental entities in some 
more concrete way, goes back to Ludwig Wittgenstein (1952) and philoso-
phers under his influence (see Ryle 1949; Anscombe 1967; von Wright 1971 & 
2001). There is also a close connection between interpretation of action and 
mental states for the likes of Donald Davidson (1963 & 1970). Wilfrid Sellars 
(1956), who originated the idea of theory of mind, also considered the actions 
of others to be the starting point for attributing mental states (that he was re-
alist about as internal states, though). Later, philosophy about these issues 
branched into philosophy of action and philosophy of mind, one of which is 
about understanding action and the other about human psychology. They 
both keep using the same folk-psychological framework, but the objects of 
analysis may have diverged. 
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of events, actions, and goals; see Bogdan 1997; Gopnik & Meltzoff 
1997; Hutto 2008). Its basic elements, as well as the tendency to learn 
its acquired elements from others, are deeply entrenched in the devel-
opment of human psychology and have evolutionary roots. Other an-
imals share some of these capacities, but not all. (See Bogdan 1997; 
Tomasello et al 2003; de Waal 2009; Andrews 2012; Tomasello 2014.) 
What matters for the main topic under discussion here is how folk 
psychology functions as an explanatory practice and what its relation-
ship to proper psychological explanations is. 
 
5.2.4. In Search for Clarity (by Making Things More Complex) 
 
The most plausible interpretation of both the empirical research and 
the existence of differing reasonable intuitions within philosophy is 
that the reference of folk psychology is pluralistic and simplifying. 
Kirstin Andrews (2012, 2015a & 2015b) has argued for a similar posi-
tion, as discussed above. Pluralism also implies pluralism in the ex-
planatory status of folk-psychological attributions. Peter Goldie (2007) 
has also argued that folk psychology mixes different elements: ration-
alizations and narrative-historical explanations, both of which belong 
to agentive explanations in my distinction, but also explanatory refer-
ences to non-rational (even irrational) motives, emotions, moods, per-
sonal characteristics, et cetera that I will consider psychological causal 
explanations. He argues that philosophers should not think of folk 
psychology in terms of rationalizations alone, and that the project of 
building philosophical psychology based on this is fallacious. I agree 
with the first point about how to think about folk psychology, but I 
think that agentive descriptions are a specific way to understand ac-
tion (within and without folk psychology) and there is a role for phil-
osophical psychology based on rationalizations for as long as it is un-
derstood to be a conceptually different project from scientific 
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psychology.129 However, the issues about the psychological makeup 
of humans and the theory of mind (as a conceptual part of social prac-
tices) should be analytically divorced. Among other things, this would 
make the eliminativist arguments philosophically irrelevant to the 
folk-psychological theory of mind.130 Moreover, it raises a question 
about the role of the theory of mind in explaining action, among some 
familiar lines that I will discuss in the next section. Furthermore, these 
levels connect more intimately than “mental” and “physical” levels, 
as it were. 
Moving from folk psychology to “mind” itself, it would be tempt-
ing to follow those who distinguish between three conceptually dif-
ferent ways (or “levels” of abstraction) to talk about human behaviour 
and its causes.131 First, the neurophysiological level, referring to physical 
 
129 I disagree with Donald Davidson’s (1974) stance that empirical psychology, 
decision theory and philosophical action theory lie on the same continuum. I 
generally agree with his point about scientific and philosophical issues lying 
on a continuum and being relevant to each other in a symmetric relation, but 
in this particular case, this is the wrong way to relate them. 
130 Eliminativism, under this view, is mistaken about the function of folk psy-
chology, the reference of its concepts, and how successful it is. This was 
pointed out early in the discussion on eliminativism (e.g. Horgan & Wood-
ward 1985; Bennett 1991; Dennett 1991b; Bogdan 1991b & 1993). Patricia 
Churchland (personal communication), has agreed that it is possible (even 
probable) that our social practices necessarily require a theory of mind and its 
categorizations, given how our cognition works. Her issue is explicitly with 
the scientific understanding and its postulates. Steven Stich, on the other 
hand, soon turned to a sort of agnosticism about the whole issue (Stich 1996) 
and has more lately focused on the issue of folk psychology as a psychological 
capacity (i.e. Nichols & Stich 2003). 
131 These ways are applications of three different conceptual frameworks that 
aim at different ends. There is no need for any metaphysical implications in 
making this distinction. 
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processes only.132 Second, the psychological level proper, which gives a 
functional, computational, or algorithmic description of these pro-
cesses (Putnam 1975; Fodor 1975, 1981 & 1990; Marr 1982; Cummins 
1983; Shea 2018). This would be the level of the representational states 
that cognitive science studies and that give rise to the psychological 
phenomena (such as abilities and inclinations) that the psychological 
science describes. The descriptions on this level refer to causal pro-
cesses and dynamics between representations, drives, emotions et 
cetera. This is also the proper level of evolutionary psychological ex-
planations. Third, the agentive level, which is the level of attributions 
such as beliefs, desires and intentions, understood as states of the 
whole agent. In other words, “mental states” would be divided into 
psychological (in a narrower sense) and agentive, and the debate over 
the nature of intentional states would turn out to be partly a confusion 
between different levels instead of a substantial debate only. I will fol-
low this temptation after discussing some complications.  
Distinguishing between cognitive architecture and agent-level 
descriptions while regarding them both as valid perspectives is an old 
idea when it comes to the actual analysis of how the mind works. The 
view outlined here is similar to Daniel Dennett’s idea of intentional, 
design, and physical stances (Dennett 1987), for example, and one 
standard solution to understanding intentional states is precisely that 
they are useful ascriptions to the whole person, as mentioned before: 
they are states of the agent, not references to separate internal states 
(Davidson 1974; Dennett 1987). Distinguishing the levels, ascription-
ism becomes compatible with a causal interpretation of psychology 
proper. The ascribed states are just properties of the system, rather 
than parts of the system, and thinking of them as parts with causal 
role would be a category mistake. To quote Dennett’s (1991b) 
 
132 A proper “physical” level would be yet another level, however. Neuro-
physiological processes are functionally organized and not theoretically re-
ducible to physical processes only, but this is irrelevant here. 
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metaphor, beliefs and desires are more like the centres of gravity than 
the concrete states of mechanisms.  
There have also been attempts to build a theory of cognitive rep-
resentations explicitly without any connection to the teleological no-
tions of folk psychology (for example, Stich 1983; Cummins 1983 & 
1996). These theories are usually considered to be alternatives to the 
representational theory of mind (Fodor 1975, 1981 & 1990; Shea 2018) 
that attempt to explain intentionality in terms of cognitive-level enti-
ties and propose that intentional states of the agents are representa-
tions within the system. What I suggest, however, is that both agentive 
and psychological level are sensible levels of analysis, even if we also 
understand intentionality and representations at the psychological 
level. The latter is a separate question asking what explains, on the cog-
nitive/psychological level, agentive-level intentionality – if anything 
does. Furthermore, neither is the (only) valid level of folk-psycholog-
ical references. Philosophical theories of mind are not explications of 
folk psychology but revisionist theories. 
Some of the recent naturalistic attempts to make sense of inten-
tional representational mind approach the processes of mind as brain 
processes with robust outcome functions that have been stabilized by 
evolution and learning (for example, Godfrey-Smith 2006; Sterelny 
2015; Shea 2018). These processes are controlled by sub-personal sub-
systems, and their functional operations have representational con-
tent. Personal-level attributions of beliefs and desires, however, are 
robust states of the individual (or the whole “system”) that describe 
their cognitive relations with the world, descriptive and directive, and 
these relations are constituted by the parts of the representational sys-
tem. This is plausible and I will not challenge it as such. However, it 
would still be a category mistake to reduce the states of the system to 
the parts of the system. Beliefs and desires are dependent on the sys-
tem of representations, not parts of it. If the robust outcome function 
approach is correct, it explains the constitution of systemic states, but 
this is a different matter and does not build a conceptual link between 
the levels. There are also interesting alternatives to the representational 
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theory of mind within the naturalistic context that are still compatible 
with describing humans as agents. The most extreme is radical enactiv-
ism (Hutto & Myin 2013 & 2017), which takes the biology outside the 
central processing system more seriously as part of cognition. It pro-
poses that much of cognition lacks any representational content at all 
and has more to do with how the sensory-motor system functions as 
a whole. The so-called “4e movement” (enactive, extended, embodied 
and embedded; see Newen, De Bruin & Gallagher 2018; see also Clark 
& Chalmers 1998) approaches to mind and cognition in general chal-
lenge the classical representational theory of mind, without neces-
sarily denying that representation is a part of the picture.133 But even 
if they are right, it would not directly make intentional action descrip-
tions inadequate on the agent level. The debate between representa-
tionalists and their critics is not about attributing mental states to 
agents but about how the mind works. The latter includes the issue of 
what explains the applicability of folk-psychological attributions to hu-
man agents. There are several ways to do this, including representa-
tionalist intentional realism (reducing agent-level intentionality to 
cognitive processes) and instrumentalism (intentional stance, and as-
criptionism in general). This part of the question is mostly irrelevant 
to the issue at hand and will be left aside. 
Furthermore, a precise relation between psychological and agen-
tive levels is more difficult to understand with directive mental states 
than with descriptive ones. Psychological-level descriptive represen-
tations and agentive level beliefs can be thought of as being in a com-
plex constitutive relation, for example. 134  But how the drives and 
 
133 Some proponents of the representational theory of mind (most notably 
Fodor 1975, 1981 & 1990) are quite explicit in reducing individual-level prop-
ositional attitudes to mental representations (being intentional realists), but this 
is a further claim that a proponent of the theory does not need to make. 
134 Even here there are complications. It seems that people sometimes act as if 
they believe something, even if those beliefs are not a part of their deliberated 
or conscious belief-system and might even be doubted by the agent if they 
become aware of them. There are various attempts to differentiate between 
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motivational salience relate to agentive-level desires and other pro-
attitudes is trickier. Motivational salience is a crucial explanatory com-
ponent in the emergence of pro-attitudes, but it is difficult to see how 
it alone could have the right kind of propositional content. It is simply 
a causal factor, incentivising or aversive, that instigates behaviour. 
Motivational salience explains preferences but is not itself a prefer-
ence with content. Furthermore, pro-attitudes are about particular 
goals, not behavioural tendencies towards or away from a behaviour, 
which motivational salience entails. The goals implied by a pro-atti-
tude may be quite general and abstract, of course (like “world peace”, 
being famous, or whatever goals moral values entail even prior to 
knowing these entailments), and folk psychology accommodates 
moods and personalities as more general and robust dispositional states. 
But these are not the same as a tendency to be motivated by certain 
things in certain contexts. This is evident in how folk psychology is 
inadequate in capturing mental episodes such as depression. 
 
stronger and weaker notions of belief, such as distinguishing between beliefs 
as involuntary dispositions to feel that something must be the case and delib-
erative acceptances (Cohen 1992), or between true beliefs and aliefs, which are 
enactive states of habits and automatic reactions in which some elements of 
belief are implemented along with some elements of directive states (Gendler 
2008). Both distinctions aim to discriminate on the level of agentive analysis, 
however. Representations as they are conceived in cognitive science (e.g. Shea 
2018) refer to a more primitive unit in cognition. Aliefs, beliefs, and ac-
ceptances may be considered qualitatively different constitutive products of 
representative mind. But if there is some truth to the enactivist story in some 
cases, where the behaviour implements belief-like states without cognitive 
representations, alief also covers these cases. The taxonomy of doxastic states 
is not important here. The important point is that the agent may have belief-
like states attributable to her as beliefs in an agentive-level attribution without 
their being directly reducible to cognitive representations. This depends on 
how cognition works – what explains the belief-like states of an agent in the 
control system of behaviour. The answer to this is not important here, but the 




Depression has effects on individuals that make it difficult to ration-
alize their behaviour. The origin histories of depression cannot be 
fully understood in terms of folk psychology, either – that is, we can-
not always give a rationalizing reason for being depressed, and it may 
be dangerously misleading when we try. Depression simply is not a 
reason-like state nor a collection of reasons or desires, and neither ex-
plaining depression nor explaining with depression is a rationalizing 
explanation (cf. Goldie 2007).135 But the difficulties surface even in spe-
cific actions in a more careful analysis. 
Recall Amos and Beatrice again. Amos is drowning. Beatrice sees 
this, jumps into water, and rescues Amos. Beatrice has no other exter-
nal goals for the action than to save Amos, such as appearing heroic, 
receiving gratitude, promoting romantic feelings, or signalling virtue. 
The reason for Beatrice’s action is the combination of her desire to help 
him and her belief that she could do so by pulling him to shore. Fur-
thermore, this is what Beatrice intended to do. Let us still suppose that 
an egoistic motivation theory of helping behaviour is true and the in-
ternal motivation structure is such that the causal process of perceiv-
ing Amos’s distress and jumping to help him goes through the distress 
that Beatrice feels when she sees Amos in danger. This is in contrast 
 
135 This is not to say that our folk-psychological practices do not influence de-
pression episodes. A person’s beliefs about his or her own states may, for ex-
ample, cause loops in which negative self-evaluations and self-blame deepen 
the depression or even cause it to become chronic (Bentall 2003; Beck 2008). 
But this is also a case of folk-psychological misattribution of causes on behalf 
of the person themself. In fact, conceptualizing depression episodes in terms 
of reasons may be highly misleading for both understanding and curing de-
pression. People commonly make remarks such as “what reason has he to be 
depressed?” or believe that people could think themselves out of depression 
– which sounds like they are guided by folk psychology in their evaluation 
and solutions. More generally, psychiatric explanations such as childhood 
traumas should not be understood as reasons to act in certain ways, but as 
causes of psychological tendencies and pathologies. (See Murphy 2006 for ex-
planation and classification in psychiatry; see also Glennan 2015.) 
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with the empathetic concern theory, according to which seeing Amos’s 
distress is the motivating (triggering) factor for Beatrice, and her own 
distress is not needed. (See Batson 1991 & 2011). Even if the selfish 
theory were right as a scientific psychological theory, it would not 
make sense to say that the reason for Beatrice’s action lies in her want-
ing to get rid of her own distress, as caused by Amos’s plight. This 
would only mean that the psychological mechanism involved in al-
truistic actions has a hedonistic motivational structure on a much 
more primitive level than the level on which we specify goals of ac-
tion. Let us suppose that Amos is a small child and Beatrice is her 
mother, and her psychological disposition to save him is both ex-
tremely robust and strong enough to even become self-sacrificing. It 
would be absurd to say, within the folk-psychological framework, 
that this is a selfish act, even if the psychological process goes through 
an extreme distress triggered by the situation.136 In fact, the extreme 
distress could be interpreted as a source for a strong agentive-level 
disposition to act altruistically. 
At the same time, this cannot be turned into an argument for psy-
chological altruism proper. Regardless of the agentive-level descrip-
tion, there is an empirical difference between altruistic and egoistic 
motivation theories. Different aspects of the internal functioning of 
the motivation mechanisms could be manipulated to prevent the mo-
tivation to help from arising if different theories are true. Joseph Butler 
(1726) famously argued against psychological hedonism by showing 
that internal hedonistic states are not the proper goals of actions. As 
Elliot Sober (1992c; Sober & Wilson 1998) has pointed out, this argu-
ment confuses the different kinds of motivational factors in action. To 
 
136 A mother’s care for her offspring is probably the original context for the 
evolution of empathetic core mechanism (in de Waal’s “Russian doll” model 
of the layered structure of empathy mechnisms; see Churchland 2011), which 
has then become a more general mechanism. The distress in the situation is 
more likely to be caused by an empathetic concern than the other way around. 
But for the sake of argument, to distinguish two levels of description, we will 
concern ourselves with a hedonistic mechanism for now. 
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slightly paraphrase Sober, the distinction between internal mecha-
nisms and external goals is not maintained.137 Stephen Stich (2007) in 
turn has argued that Sober’s argument for the existence of genuine 
psychological altruism (Sober & Wilson 1998) fails to make suffi-
ciently sophisticated distinctions in the psychological architecture. I 
would – and will – argue that whether this argument goes through, it 
is a further reason to make the distinctions between different concepts 
of altruism and different levels of action explanation. I will return to 
the issue of altruism in detail in the next chapter. The point for now is 
not, however, simply that we might need at least two concepts of al-
truism to sort out the motivation behind helping. The agentive-level 
action explanations (she wanted to save him) and psychological-level 
causal explanations (the observation triggered distress that caused the 
action), as well as neurophysiological explanation (whatever pro-
cesses are taking place on this level), are different. The agentive de-
scription is about the goals of action, not the inner psychological 
workings that guide it. The confusion over how to conceptualize situ-
ations like this is caused by conflating different levels. 
Moreover, when we refer to behavioural traits, such as the ten-
dency of parents to help their children in danger, we are not talking 
about a goal of an action in the first place, or action-guiding desires. 
We may say that parents have a preference to help their children in 
danger, but the concept of preference is an abstraction of whatever 
choices an agent is disposed to make. The causes and constitutive pro-
cesses of having a preference may be anything – including social situ-
ations and structures. It is too abstract and vague a concept to under-
stand the goal-directedness of action on the psychological level. Hav-
ing a behavioural tendency to help one’s children in danger is having 
a tendency to form the right kind of pro-attitudes in situations with 
children in danger – it is not having a pro-attitude to help children in 
 




danger as an abstract goal, nor is there a second-order desire of this 
kind.138 
Another argument to divorce the psychological and agentive 
comes from looking at animal cognition, situated agency, and the evo-
lution of representational mind, as already discussed to some extent. 
Simple organisms behave purposefully in their environment without 
a representation manipulation system. The decoupling of representa-
tions from their immediate triggers comes from the need to represent 
the robust features of a complex world, and the metarepresentational 
states, such as desire-like metarepresentations of one’s own needs, are 
probably even later than that, for planning purposes (and possibly 
preceded by attributing similar states to others). It is reasonable to 
think that human cognition is a mix of the “primitive” features and 
more complex cognitive processes, whether its operations are best un-
derstood as representation manipulation or something else. (See God-
frey-Smith 1996 & 2006; Bogdan 1997; Sterelny 1998, 1999, 2001b, 2003 
& 2015; Hutto & Myin 2017.) It also makes sense to study animal psy-
chologies (with drives and representations) even when we do not con-
sider them intentional agents, and the human mind is in a continuum 
with them and similar to them in parts. Humans become intentional 
agents when they can be attributed with propositional attitudes, and 
this involves the emergence of the capacity for rational thinking. But 
this does not mean that the functioning of mind switches completely 
from non-intentional operating to exclusively rational processing. 
The functioning of the mind and the mechanics of thinking are 
not important for this dissertation as such. How to explain behaviour 
is. But they are connected. In the next sub-chapter, I will discuss the 
relations between rationalizing action with agentive states, causally ex-
plaining the external behaviour through physical (neurophysiological) 
states and thinking. I start with the basic functionalist idea that the 
states of mind that psychologists refer to are on an intermediate layer 
 
138 Parents may, of course, also have second-order desires about the desirabil-
ity of helping one’s children in danger, but this is a different thing. 
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between the two – a level that describes causally effective brain activ-
ity, but as functional, computational, or algorithmic descriptions of 
what the brain processes do (see Putnam 1975; Fodor 1975, 1981 & 
1990; Marr 1982; Shea 2018). This is conceptually different from the 
agentive descriptions at minimum, and the stronger argument can be 
made that rationalizations do not refer to this level – directly at least. 
This is also the level of explananda for evolutionary psychology. This 
discussion is a detour from the main argument, but there are compli-
cations that make a simple distinction between levels proposed here 
an insufficient characterization of action explanation (for example, the 
apparent causal relevance of some rationalizations and the role that 
folk psychology as a practice plays in social behaviour), so I will dis-
cuss them shortly to block some possible objections. I will not discuss 
the ontological or theoretical relations between the various levels of 
description further – the only assumption I will make is that the agen-
tive descriptions and psychological descriptions are conceptually sepa-
rate and do not actually go hand in hand always.  
 
 
5.3. On Action Explanations 
 
Many philosophers have argued that folk-psychological ascriptions of 
intentional states to agents should be analysed as functional states of 
a person that make action intelligible instead of referring to the causal 
structure of mind, even when they disagree on whether the states also 
capture something causal (see Davidson 1963 & 1970; von Wright 1971 
& 2001; Lewis 1972; Dennett 1987; Bennett 1991; Bogdan 1993 & 1997; 
Nichols & Stich 2003; Godfrey-Smith 2005 & 2008; Sehon 2005; Hutto 
2008; O’Brien 2019). The foundational level of causality is usually con-
sidered to be the physical/neurobiological level, and causalists con-
nect this level to intentional states either by analysing the relationship 
between mental states as person-state ascriptions and physical level 
directly, or by treating an intermediate psychological level as being 
constituted by physical processes but realizing intentional states. As 
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stated above, these are rivalling theories of what intentionality is, but 
I suggest that there are two different levels of description, agentive 
and psychological, the former being the level of person-level attribu-
tions and the latter being the level of sub-personal causal processes. I 
have also suggested that folk psychology itself, as a natural practice, 
does not make the distinction: there is no difference between a belief 
as a mental representation (that takes part in cognitive processes) and 
a belief as a state of an agent (as its relation to the world), or desire as 
an agentive state and as a psychological directive state. Nor is there 
any reason why folk psychology as a practice should make such dis-
tinctions. For practical purposes, the distinction between states that 
articulate behavioural dispositions of a person and states that are 
causally effective psychological factors which entail such dispositions 
is not that important if there is a high enough covariance between 
them.  
For scientific and philosophical purposes, different frameworks 
should be distinguished conceptually, whatever their relation turns 
out to be. Without this revision, it looks like rationalizations of behav-
iour causally explain it, which seems to be both true (we do explain 
people’s behaviour using reasons as if they were causes) and false 
(agentive descriptions do not refer to causal processes). This is the 
classical problem of mental causation here, which I will not attempt to 
solve here. I will only argue that the (rationalizing) agentive and 
(causally explanatory) psychological levels of description are distinct 
but connected in various ways (for example, there is causally efficient 
rational deliberation that uses folk-psychological categories in reflec-
tion, and individual rationalizations have causal presuppositions), 
and folk psychology as a practice does not make the distinction. Con-
sequently, folk-psychological explanations cannot be used directly in 
more sophisticated action explanation – philosophical, psychological, 






5.3.1. Rationality and Rationalization 
 
An essential source for difficulties and connectedness between psy-
chological and agentive levels is rationality. The agentive description 
attribute reasons to agents, and the relationship between reasons to 
each other and the action is rational. The rationality of action like this 
seems to presuppose some sort of rationality in the causal processes 
that produce behaviour if agentive descriptions are given a causal ex-
planatory role – not rationality itself to be a causal factor, but the 
causal processes to have systematicity in their functioning that exhib-
its behaviour that we perceive as rational. Furthermore, rational de-
liberation about the goals and means to achieve them is a part of hu-
man psychology, not just a property of action attributions. 
There are, however, different concepts of rationality that may be 
applied to action and should not be conflated, especially if we are in-
terested in their connection to causal explanation of behaviour. Agen-
tive rationality is the notion of rationality used in the philosophical 
theory of action: the idea that there is a reason for action. The action is 
rational when it is in accordance with the goals and beliefs of the agent 
in a way that can be expressed as giving the action a reason. There are 
both descriptive and normative elements in this: the action can be de-
scribed as intentional by giving it a rationalizing conceptualization, 
but rationality is also evaluative in the sense that we consider action 
itself appropriate or not, given the reasons it was taken (see McGeer 
2007; O’Brien 2019). Agents may be more or less rational in the sense 
that the action may be more or less appropriate, but it is a qualitative 
property of an action that it can be given a reason. It is about the intelligi-
bility of behaviour as the action of an agent. The proposition that hu-
mans are rational agents is a categorical proposition about rationali-
zation, both in its descriptive and normative dimensions. If humans 
are rational in this sense, rationalization is an adequate way to con-
ceptualize humans and human behaviour. The normativity of ration-
ality in this sense is what makes human action rational or irrational, 
while most animals, for example, are not rational or irrational but 
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arational (see Hurley & Nudds 2006). Cognitive rationality, which is 
the notion used in cognitive science, is a quantitative measure of cog-
nitive capacity – but it is, likewise, also a normative notion. Rationality 
is measured against the chosen optimality model, which specifies what 
counts as rational, either in the epistemic (belief-formation) or instru-
mental (decisions about which course of action to take given the con-
text) sense, and the degree of rationality and irrationality in human ac-
tion and thinking is evaluated by comparing the performance to the 
model (see Stanovich 2011 & 2012). 
The two senses of rationality, and the notions of normativity ac-
companying them, are different. The philosophical analysis of folk 
psychology uses the agentive notion. It is supposed to capture some-
thing that is constitutive of agency. Its normativity is about the ade-
quacy of action given its reasons, and the failure to be rational is a 
failure to be an agent and for the behaviour to be intelligible as human 
action (see O’Brien 2019). Cognitive rationality and its normativity are 
instrumental: there are models that we choose to represent optimal de-
cision in a context, given the aims of the agent, and we compare the be-
haviour to this. Moreover, these models (and the concept of rational-
ity) could be applied to non-intentional systems, too, such as those 
animals that we consider not to be intentional, and to Artificial Intel-
ligence systems. Agentive rationality does not imply any particular 
model of cognitive rationality. Moreover, it cannot be assumed that 
agentive rationality implies any particular degree of cognitive ration-
ality that would enable agentive rationality itself to be an explanatory 
factor for behaviour, for example (see also Henderson 1993; Ylikoski 
& Kuorikoski 2016).  
The two notions of rationality are also related. The models of cog-
nitive rationality are meant to be about what a rational agent would 
ultimately choose, given their goals. This implies a third notion of ra-
tionality, normative rationality: how one should reason and choose ac-
tion, given the goals. This is a stronger notion of rationality than the 
one used in rationalization of action – the assumption (rational) 
agency is not an assumption complete rationality. However, although 
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this is a more demanding normative notion of rationality than the 
other two concepts in their normative component, the normativity of 
normative rationality is instrumental: it depends on chosen goals and 
acknowledged constraints on achieving these goals. This is the notion 
of rationality for fields such as Decision Theory and does not concern 
us here. However, the ability to be a rational agent in the agentive sense 
requires some cognitive capacities that explain it. Cognitive rationality 
is a measurement of how well some of the cognitive capacities function 
in certain tasks, and having these capacities is a partial explanation for 
why humans are agentively rational. These capacities are what we 
should be interested in when causally explaining human behaviour 
and how it fits with the causal understanding of human behaviour 
that humans are also (agentively) rational. I will refer to the agentive 
notion as “rationality” from now on, unless otherwise specified. 
An essential feature of folk-psychological explanations is that 
they rationalize the behaviour into actions that have reasons behind 
them and goals to look forward to. Reasons (and their constituents, 
beliefs, and desires, the “two directions of fit,” as Elizabeth Anscombe 
(1967) put it, descriptive and directive) are connected to each other 
and to the action in rational relations: the propositional contents entail 
other propositional contents and are attributed to agents as holistic 
sets. At the same time, the attributions identify what action the behav-
iour is, and the identification of the behaviour as doing x is a part of 
the interpretation of which beliefs and pro-attitudes of the agent con-
stitute their reason for action in the situation. That is, the action de-
scriptions are a part of the same holistic net of semantic connections 
as the mental states that make behaviour intelligible. For some this 
means that rationalizations cannot be causal explanations, since se-
mantic entailments are not causal relations (Anscombe 1967; Taylor 
1966; von Wright 1971; Sehon 1997 & 2005; see also Mele 2000), 
whereas others think that this merely makes the ontology of action 
somewhat anomalous (Davidson 1970). It seems that folk-psycholog-
ical practices require the attributions to have at least some causal 
counterfactual power: the point of persuasion and reasoning with a 
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person, for example, is to change their underlying structure of desires 
and beliefs to affect their future behaviour. This is a causal interven-
tion, not a matter of interpretation after the fact. Mental attributions 
should not be causal attributions, under some conceptual and meta-
physical considerations, but they seem to function as if they were. 
Hence the attempts to reduce the rationalizing elements into some-
thing that also has psychological reality. (See Heil & Mele 1993; Hen-
derson 1993; Crane 1995; Mele 2000; Kokkonen 2011 & 2012.)  
Furthermore, folk-psychological practices seem to presuppose 
that of all the reasons we can attribute to the agent, there is a primary 
reason that is why the agent actually did what they did. It determines 
what the action was about – it is not just an alternative description for 
the behaviour. How should we understand this? For a causalist like 
Davidson, the primary reason is the one that caused the action. Under 
the ascription view, this is a problem known as Davidson’s Challenge: a 
mere ascription is only about pattern fitting, it does not explain action 
(see Davidson 1963; Mele 2000; O’Brien 2019). For the causalists the 
problem is how the reasons can be causes. This problem can be broken 
into two parts. First, how can mental states (that is, agentive states un-
der the description of folk-psychological conceptualization) be causes 
of physical behaviour? I call this the core problem of mental causation.139 
Second, how could rationalization of action reliably capture states that 
are causally efficient for behaviour? In other words, how can reasons, 
identified by their modal and logical properties, be causal? I consider 
this the hard problem of action explanation.140 
 
139 In the traditional formulations of the problem of the mental causation, the 
distinction between psychological and agentive is not made – it is just about 
“mental” and “physical” (e.g. Davidson 1963 & 1970; Kim 1992 & 2005). In the 
three-level analysis, the problem of mental causation gets broken up as prob-
lems between the three levels of agentive, psychological, and physical. The 
“physical”, too, consist of two levels, physical proper and neurophysiological, 
but the relationship between the two is a problem of a different kind. 
140 The problem of mental causation has several dimensions. In addition to 
what I call the “core problem” of mental causation, which has to do with 
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5.3.2. The Hard Problem of Action Explanation 
 
The recently popular solution to the core problem of mental causation 
has been to use the contrastive-counterfactual theory of causal expla-
nation and the manipulationist theory of causation as a framework to 
identify causal factors (Menzies 2007; Shapiro and Sober 2007; Wood-
ward 2008 & 2014; Raatikainen 2010). Folk-psychological descriptions 
make robust but imprecise claims about causal processes and behav-
ioural dispositions of the agents on which the behaviour depends, 
with relevant counterfactual contrasts. These robust states are the 
states of the agents. There may be psychological states that implement 
these more or less directly and have causal relations with other psy-
chological states and the behaviour, and similarly with neural states – 
but these are further issues. What matters is that the mental descrip-
tions identify states that have intelligible contrast classes, and the dif-
ference between the explanatory state and its contrast class is a differ-
ence-maker between the explained behaviour and its contrast class. 
The explananda and explanantia need not be described on the same 
 
causation between different levels or kinds of descriptions, and the “hard 
problem” of action explanation, there is also the ontological problem of how 
subjective, reflective states of mind can have causal power. This is similar to 
the rationalization problem in that in both cases a non-physical, mental attrib-
ute is supposed to have a causal relation with something physical, and the 
concern is that either the mental remains epiphenomenal or the physical real-
ity is not causally closed (a violation of the exclusion principle; Kim 1993). In 
both cases, the solution to the core problem of how to understand causation 
gives the direction for the solution but is not enough. I will not go into the full 
problem of mental causation here. I will restrain from discussing the parts that 
have to do with explanation. Furthermore, not all mental states are conscious, 
including not all causally relevant mental states, unless one defines mental 
states as having conscious content – in which case psychological processes 
would be a mixture of mental and non-mental factors. It would also make 
some explanatory reasons non-mental. This is a possible way to conceptualize 
mentality, but it is a matter of semantics that probably adds to the confusion 
more than it clarifies any issues. 
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level, for as long as the framework identifies the correct dependence 
relation. In other words, reasons can be causes when having a reason 
is the adequate identification of a causal disposition.  
Furthermore, the contrast classes of explanation may be different 
when referring to the causal process on different levels. In fact, given 
that we attempt to explain behaviour that is specified with a goal, a 
folk-psychological description (including reasons and intentions) may 
be a more adequate way of identifying the contrast class than an alter-
native explanation on a different level (see Raatikainen 2010). This 
seems to solve the causal explanatory part of the problem regardless 
of what the relationship between agentive states and the underlying 
causal processes may be.141 Moreover, it grants autonomy to causal ex-
planations on different levels and fits the general pluralistic approach 
of this dissertation. Some other issues remain untouched with this so-
lution, however. These include problems such as the ontological rela-
tion between the objects of the different descriptions, 142  but more 
 
141 Tuomas Pernu (2013) has argued that this solution only makes the different 
levels of causal notions equally legitimate but does not provide grounds for 
postulating inter-level causal interactions. It is true that this solution does not 
give a satisfactory account of downward causation (mental causing physical), 
which many consider to be the standard for genuine mental causation, since 
the mental remains epiphenomenal otherwise (e.g. Kim 1989, 1992 & 2005). 
This throws us back to the issue of what causation is in the first place, and the 
ontology of causation, which was discussed in the previous part. Even if 
Pernu’s argument is valid, there is no problem in causal explanation of physical 
behaviour with mental states, if a causal dependency of the right kind can be 
established. I agree that this is not enough to solve the entire problem of men-
tal causation, but it solves the part of the problem that it addresses. 
142 That is, the issue of reduction and emergence, and the role of subjectivity. 
The psychological level of explanation, be it connected to folk psychology or 
not, is usually thought to be functional explanation and both distinct from and 
autonomous of the neurophysiological explanations (e.g. Fodor 1981; Cum-
mins 1983; Stich 1983; Dennett 1987; Shea 2018). Gualtiero Piccinini and Carl 
Craver (2011) have proposed that the functions should be understood as 
mechanism sketches and therefore the psychological explanation is 
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importantly, this solution does not touch the issue about the role of 
rationality and rationalization itself (the hard problem): how can we 
discover causes of behaviour by rationalizing action (or rather: can 
we, and how can we justify this practice)?  
The problem has two components. First, how is it possible that 
humans are natural beings whose behaviour is a part of the causal 
structure of the world but follow the dictates of rationality at the same 
time? (The role of rationality in naturalism.) Second, is rationalization a 
form of (causal) explanation? There are only two possible solutions to 
the first part: some sort of anomalous monism (Davidson 1970), or that 
humans are not actually as rational as rationalization practices pre-
suppose. There are good empirical reasons to think that humans are 
not fully rational when it comes to cognitive rationality (see Kahne-
man, Slovic & Tversky 1982; Kahneman 2003 & 2011; Stanovich 2011 
& 2012). As discussed above, the agentive notion of rationality is a dif-
ferent notion, but there is a substantial connection between the two no-
tions in explaining rationality. If rationality itself does not have causal 
powers (and it follows from the naturalistic premises that it does not) 
there must be something in the psychology that explains this. Rational 
deliberation is a part of how mind works, and it has causal consequences, 
but the empirical research seems to imply that it plays a limited role in 
 
mechanistic. The mechanistic approach generally sees the reduction and 
emergence as properties that come in various degrees in moving between the 
levels of analysis in complex systems (see Wimsatt 2007; Craver 2007), but the 
details matter. For example, different levels of analysis may identify the sys-
tem itself in different ways (that is, what are the important causal factors, 
which differences between entities or processes make a difference under 
which description, which entities or processes form kinds together, what 
counts and what the analysed phenomenon itself is, etc.). Later I will distin-
guish between four different levels of analysis that are relevant, and a reduc-
tion all the way to physics introduces a fifth, the level of physical processes. 
The ontological relation between “mental” and “physical” goes through these 
levels and the moves between them are likely to be different in kind. But this 
issue as such is not important here. 
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cognition. This also implies limitations on the extent of agentive ra-
tionality in humans. (See also Henderson 1993; Ylikoski & Kuorikoski 
2016.) Partial rationality (whether it is because of deliberation or 
something else) may be enough to justify the interpretative practices, 
however, and it is not an unsolvable problem for a naturalistic view 
of humans. Humans have complex cognitive systems adapted to sur-
vive flexibly in complex, changing environments. A part of this pro-
cess has been the decoupling of representations from what is immedi-
ate, and this has also created a need to represent states of affairs as 
related to each other and make inferences between them (Godfrey-
Smith 1996; Sterelny 1999 & 2003). In other words, humans have 
evolved psychological processes that are causal (and implemented by 
neural processes) but deal with representational states in a way that is 
partially rational, since the psychological mechanisms have been se-
lected for having rational outcomes. But this rationality is relative to 
selected tasks and their proper contexts. There is no selection for uni-
versal rationality. And even if there was, an organ such as the brain 
could not produce universal rationality through causal operations. 
Then again, we are not universally rational. This solution also makes 
the rationality of human behaviour and psychology (to the extent that 
it is rational) an explanandum itself – rationality (the entailments between 
propositional attitudes) does not explain rationality of behaviour. Ra-
tionality is a part of descriptions of the behaviour to be explained.143 
Folk psychology is, however, also a crucial part of our social prac-
tices and the cognitive skills related to them, and it evolved to be func-
tional to the many different needs of our many kinds of social interac-
tion (Byrne & Whiten 1988; Whiten & Byrne 1997; Bogdan 1997; Cor-
balis & Lea 1999; Tomasello 2009; Emery 2012; Devaine et al 2014). This 
 
143 A part of the solution will probably be a deliberate, conscious rational 
thinking as a part of overall cognitive processing, but it is not doing the think-
ing alone and it is not responsible for the rationality of behaviour alone. More 
about this later. Deliberation is not, however, a single capacity either, but its 
workings need a constitutive explanation by a causal system that cannot be 
perfectly rational in its functioning, for metaphysical reasons. 
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evolution does not need to have been a passive selection of our min-
dreading capacities to human behaviour, either – there are equal se-
lection pressures in the other direction. The need for effective min-
dreading for various social activities to be possible, entails selection 
pressures on our behavioural tendencies, as well as the “control struc-
tures” in our cognition, to be more in accordance with the kind of ra-
tionality that we use as a guide in folk psychology (Sterelny 2015). 
Furthermore, the folk-psychological practices, the language related to 
them (see Gopnik & Meltzoff 1997; Zawidzki 2013), and the agent-
based narrative structure we learn in childhood (see Hutto 2008) affect 
our thinking. They do have not only mindreading but also mindshap-
ing functions – they are an extra-genetic form of inheritance to shape 
our behaviour and its underlying psychology to be in line with folk-
psychological assumptions, as suggested by Matteo Mameli (2001) 
(see also Zawidzki 2013; Sterelny 2015). Moreover, folk psychology 
has regulative and justificatory functions in social interaction (An-
drews 2015a & 2015b; see also McGeer 2007; Zawidzki 2013). All this 
makes rationality understandable from a naturalistic point of view as 
far as it is limited, but rationality as such does not play an explanatory 
role in why we think and act rationally. The (evolutionary) function 
of folk psychology is to enable us to track, predict and guide patterns 
of behavioural tendencies, not to describe the cognitive architecture 
behind it. The feedback loop from the expectations of and selection for 
rationality that pushes us to be rational is caused by the expectations 
and selection, not by rationality itself. This also means that rationali-
zation is not a mere projection of agentive states – it is a part of the 
causal story. But it is a part of the causal story because it is used in 
social practices, not because it captures something that would exist 
without these practices. 
This still leaves us with the second problem, rationalization as ex-
planation. So far, I have been arguing that rationality of human action 
is an explanandum, not an explanans. How could rationalizing with a 
reason itself be an explanation? One possible solution would be to re-
vise the non-causalist stance on attribution of mental states by 
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proposing that psychological states (in the narrow sense) are refer-
ences to causal states, but rationalizations are about agentive states. I 
have already alluded to something like this as the first approximation. 
But making this distinction alone would cut the connection between 
rationalizations and causal explanations, and rationalizing attribu-
tions seem to work as attributions of causal factors. We could go even 
further: we rationalize action only because it captures something 
causal. Furthermore, it would leave us with Davidson’s Challenge: the 
notion of primary reasons, the intended reasons for action, require 
some further explanation if intention is not causally effective (see Mele 
2000; O’Brien 2019). 
 
5.3.3. A Causal Presuppositionalist Account of Rational Action 
Explanation 
 
Consider the following option. It is not the reasons the agent has that 
are manipulated in an interaction, but something that having the rea-
sons depends on (that is, something causal that can be described on the 
psychological and/or neurophysiological level). If the connection be-
tween the reasons and their underlying conditions is sufficiently ro-
bust, reasons identify causal relations, albeit under an imprecise de-
scription. Reasons are attributed by rationalization, and they depend 
on psychological processes. This would be a form of anomalous mon-
ism that is not anomalous, given there are explanations available for 
why the two are correlated. However, this is not a sufficient solution. 
Describing intentional action involves ascribing an intention to the 
agent, not just rationalizing reasons for action that can be interpreted 
for the agent: some reasons express what the agent intends to do, and 
these intention references are clearly meant to capture something 
causal (Davidson 1978; Bratman 1987; Mele 1992 & 2009). And as Eliz-
abeth Anscombe (1967) (albeit a non-causalist herself) pointed out al-
ready, we also seem to have direct knowledge of our own intentions. 
Our knowledge of all the factors that play roles in why we do what 
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we do may be fallible, but the experience of intending to do something 
in particular is direct, not a process of interpretation. Within the causal 
interpretation, we identify some of our reasons as causes. Further-
more, we do not just act and interpret the action; we reason about our 
goals and the means to achieve them, and this reasoning seems to 
make some causal contribution to producing behaviour. Hence, the 
connection between agentive rationalizations and causal psychologi-
cal processes seems to hold. 
It is, however, one thing to say that we have more intuitive un-
derstanding of ourselves as agents than a mere interpretation and an-
other thing to say that this understanding involves direct observations 
of the causal processes that guide our behaviour. I have already men-
tioned philosophical and psychological doubts for the latter. More im-
portantly, we are only conscious of a part of our cognitive processes 
and motivations for action. Cognitive and social psychologists distin-
guish two kinds of processes in mind144 (the so-called dual process and 
dual system theories of cognition): Type I (or System 1) and Type II (or 
System 2). Type I processes are automatic; they are fast, reactive, non-
conscious, associative, heuristic, and effortless. Type II processes are 
analytic; they are slow and effortful but controlled and deliberative. 
(See Kahneman, Slovic & Tversky 1982; Epstein 1994; Evans and Over 
1996; Bargh & Chartland 1999; Stanovich 1999 & 2011; Stanovich & 
West 2000; Kahneman 2003 & 2011; Frankish 2004; Lieberman 2007; 
 
144 The division into two kinds only is problematic, and the different theorists 
highlight different differences between the different kinds of processes (see 
Stanovich 2011), which may imply a much messier image of cognition. Emo-
tions, for one, participate in much of our choices of action and they are some-
thing that we are very conscious of, but they remain mostly outside rational 
processing (Griffiths 1997; Haidt 2001; Prinz 2004) and their cognitive contents 
are probably partly non-conscious (see Winkielman & Berridge 2004; 
Gawronski et al 2006). But the important point here is only that there are both 
conscious deliberative processes that may involve rational reasoning, and 
non-conscious processes that are more associative and nevertheless partici-
pate in reasoning processes. 
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Carruthers 2008; Frankish & Evans 2009; Evans & Stanovich 2013.) 
These processes (or systems) are jointly activated, and they give a rise 
to more complex cognitive operations, but only some processes are 
conscious, and we are (indirectly) aware of only some of the non-con-
scious processes. We have no access to all the processes that influence 
our thinking, even our conscious thinking. When people are asked 
about the reasons for their actions, they do not identify an effective mo-
tivation behind them, but describe a state with a goal, and this may be 
just as much a rationalization after the fact as if they were explaining 
another person’s action, even in highly deliberative contexts such as 
making a moral judgment (Haidt 2001; see also Nisbett & Wilson 1977; 
Nisbett & Ross 1980; Bargh & Chartrand 1999).  
As mentioned earlier, the notion of rationality used in cognitive 
science is different from the one used in the analysis of folk-psycho-
logical conceptualizations, although there are substantial connec-
tions.145 There are two properties of the two-level cognitive system 
that are consequential for the issue at hand. First, the analytic pro-
cesses that we are conscious of and constitute our deliberation are the 
ones we identify as our thinking and decision-making in our cognitive 
phenomenology. We experience other states too, such as emotions, 
and we are usually aware that we have other psychological motivat-
ing factors, but reasoning is what we consider to be our thinking and 
responsible for decision-making. We can disregard the normative, 
 
145 Furthermore, there are two schools regarding how cognitive rationality 
should be understood, regarding the two levels of processes: the heuristics and 
biases school and the cognitive ecology. The representatives of the heuristics and 
biases school think that there is a great deal of irrationality in human thinking, 
with the analytic processes being the rationalizing part (Kahneman, Slovic & 
Tversky 1982; Kahneman 2003 & 2011; Stanovich 2011 & 2012). The cognitive 
ecology school thinks that the simple automatic processes guide human be-
haviour to be more rational in an adequate context even if the processes pro-
ducing this outcome do not work in rationalizing ways (for example, Ander-
son 1990; Cosmides & Tooby 1996; Gigerenzer 2007; Marewski, Gaissmaier & 
Gigerenzer 2010). Whoever is right about this does not matter here. 
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gradual notions of cognitive rationality for a while and concentrate on 
some of the qualitative aspects of the analytic processes. First, they 
process propositional contents: this part of cognition is closest to what 
folk-psychological rationalization presumes human thinking to be 
like. Second, our thinking and decision-making involves the non-con-
scious processes as well, even while we deliberate, and they have in-
puts into the deliberation. When we deliberate, we become aware of 
the products of non-conscious processes as our own thoughts (even if 
we do not have access to the processes producing them), and they be-
come a part of further deliberation. Third, the agentive rationalizing 
attributions to agents (as whole persons) do not distinguish between 
these two kinds of processes.  
If folk psychology is pluralistic both in its mechanisms but also 
in its reference, this extends to self-reflection. When we reflect our mo-
tives and decisions, we attribute the rationalization of intentional 
states (desires, beliefs, reasons) to ourselves according to folk psychol-
ogy. The source for these states includes both the deliberative process 
and the other processes that participate in guiding our thinking and 
behaviour. If this is the case, the object of reflection on our own mental 
states is a combination of deliberative conscious states, products of 
non-conscious processes that we are aware of and interpret in folk-
psychological categories, and quasi-theoretical assumptions about 
ourselves that are folk-psychological postulates. Our self-understand-
ing is fallible regarding these differences. Even if our self-attributions 
of mental states are correct in terms of folk psychology in the moment 
of action, and even if they are based on epistemically reliable self-ob-
servations, our justificatory self-rationalization does not necessarily 
identify the causal processes of how we came to the decision correctly. 
Furthermore, we are not necessarily correct in our self-attributions ei-
ther, and our self-observations are not always reliable.  
However, reflection is not mere rationalization. Sometimes we 
explain our own behaviour with non-rational causes, such as anger, 
sorrow, or intoxication. But the point here is that sometimes we also 
misidentify having non-rationalizable psychological processes as 
248 
 
having reasons. Conscious reasoning (as a part of cognition) and in-
terpretation using the theory of mind (on the agentive level) are con-
fused in the simplified image of rational agency, and they should be 
distinguished. Moreover, although we experience intending and iden-
tify it correctly as the motivational state that triggers action, the con-
tent (the reason, or a plan) we accompany it with may sometimes still 
be an interpretation within a folk-psychological conceptual frame-
work, not an experience of a deliberated state. There are also problems 
with prediction of one’s own behaviour: people are notoriously bad at 
predicting their future actions based on their current self-perceived 
states of minds – although it is not clear whether this is because of 
misinterpretation of one’s own motives or underestimating the situa-
tional factors that are not present in the context of prediction (Poon, 
Koehler & Buehler 2014).  
Having an intention (in the sense of intending) does, however, 
presuppose that there is at least one causal factor that is identified in 
experiencing intending. Psychologically speaking, we experience mo-
tivational forces, aversive and incentivising saliences that guide our 
behaviour. A successful agentive explanation does not need to specify 
these processes precisely to be a form of causal explanation. But a suc-
cessful agentive description must include a reference to the existence 
of such factors. The identification of an intention in the context of action 
involves attributing a reason that adequately describes the agent’s rela-
tion to the world in a robust way in the context, given both her epis-
temic states and active motivational forces. For example, in the case of 
Beatrice saving Amos, there is an identification of an intention to help 
with a propositional attitude that (correctly) describes Beatrice’s pro-
attitude to save Amos (as an agentive state), which is adequately paired 
with a motivational force pushing in this direction. It is a further ques-
tion whether this motivational force is Beatrice’s own distress or empa-
thetic concern – which, on the other hand, is a real difference between 
two causal routes to motivation. In other words, a successful agentive 
description correctly refers to the agent’s effective states within the 
conceptual framework of folk psychology, but this is not the same as 
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identifying the agentive states with the psychological states. Moreo-
ver, even if we think the agent herself knows what she is doing (or what 
her intention is), this does not require her to know all the psychological 
processes involved. On the other hand, when Beatrice reflects on her own 
motives, or an observer of the situation wonders whether Beatrice is, 
indeed, altruistic or has some other goals in mind, the observation or 
speculation (depending on who is doing it) targets the psychological 
states, but this may still use the same goal-directive semantics. 
Rational deliberation is a part of our cognitive capacities. It is a 
part of the causal makeup of mind, not just a passive reflection of cog-
nition. But reason, in this sense, is not a determinative factor. At the 
same time, the object of rationalization is the action, not a partial factor 
of it: we use folk psychology to represent our own holistic agentive 
states, such as beliefs and desires, in metacognition (whether in con-
scious deliberation or in automatized processing, which also has met-
acognitive functions). We do not represent just the reasoning part of 
our cognition, although this is the part we mostly identify our think-
ing with, and we tend to conflate the two – the contents of reasoning 
and the holistic states. Folk-psychological categorizations affect how 
we deliberately plan our actions, but once again, this is causal influ-
ence of folk psychology on our cognition – it does not make agentive 
and psychological states the same. The same applies the other way 
around; not all behaviour needs to be produced by deliberation alone 
in order to be rationalizable in the sense of agentive rationality. Much 
of the unconscious, automatized processing has a positive function in 
reaching the chosen goal of action (see Bargh & Chartrand 1999; 
Gigerenzer 2007; Marewski, Gaissmaier & Gigerenzer 2010).  
For example, if I want to get some coffee from the department’s 
break room while thinking hard about how to formulate an example 
of automatized processing for my dissertation, and I have made this 
same trip literally hundreds of times, the only conscious choice I make 
might be the decision to get coffee, while all the guidance of the rest 
of the action might be automatized, including opening doors and 
pouring coffee. This involves automatized observations, inferences 
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and behavioural decisions guided by a learned script and almost no 
conscious thinking at all. Similarly, automatized processes may guide 
behavioural choices and decision-making even in much more compli-
cated situations. Developing routines is a part of the skillset of any 
profession and much of our evolved psychological capacities work 
like this rather than in a conscious way. If the agent has chosen a goal 
and starts acting towards it, if the automatized processes work to-
wards this goal, and if the agent identifies with the behaviour they are 
participating in the production of, this is sufficient for it to be an ex-
ample of agentive rationality.146 
We can summarize the discussion above in the following propo-
sitions about rationality and action: (1) Reasoning (as rational deliber-
ation), is a cognitive process that participates in the causal production 
of behaviour. (2) People are conscious of this part of their own cogni-
tive processes, while the other processes manifest only in the products 
of these processes. (3) The non-conscious parts of cognition are often 
instrumental to the chosen goals, and therefore they participate in pro-
ducing the action that we rationalize without being a part of the rational 
guidance of the action on the cognitive level. (4) People rationalize both 
their own and others’ actions within the folk-psychological 
 
146 As inferences become automatized with practice, the agent might lose the sense 
in how they do what they do and may give completely false interpretations of 
themselves, as discussed here. A rather striking example of this phenomenon, alt-
hough anecdotal, is when a magician or a charlatan fortune-teller doing “cold 
readings” starts believing themselves to have supernatural powers. “Cold read-
ing” is the art of gathering information from a person and feeding it back to them, 
making guesses and testing them, and giving an impression to the person that the 
source of this information is supernatural. A cold reader may become so good at 
this that they lose the sense of how they do it and start to experience their own 
skills as something supernatural. According to Orson Welles, who was a magi-
cian, among other things, and learned cold reading from old-time charlatan for-
tune-tellers in the 1920s, this was a well-known “occupational disease” among the 
charlatans who themselves called this phenomenon “becoming a shut eye” (an 
interview on The David Frost Show, May 12, 1970). 
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framework and this rationalization has more to do with justification 
and evaluation than causal explanation, but it functions both ways. (5) 
People conflate the rationalization they apply to their action and the 
experienced intention that triggers this action whether it is the outcome of 
rational deliberation or some other process. It can be either. To the degree 
that non-rational processes are instrumental to chosen goals, this does 
not make a difference in understanding the action as guided by rea-
sons. But giving only reasons in the causal explanation misidentifies 
the causes. (6) People are aware of non-rationalizable causes such as 
emotions and use them in the folk-psychological explanations as well, 
and these explanations are not rationalizations. Emotions, personality 
characteristics, reasons and other factors are not separated as being on 
different levels; but there is only one folk-psychological “level”. (7) 
Sometimes, people have no idea what motivated them, and their ra-
tionalization of their own action is simply incorrect. 
If these conclusions are accepted, agentive, rationalizing descrip-
tions do not refer directly to psychological processes with causal pow-
ers, but they presuppose that there are causal processes that are respon-
sible for the action in order for the folk-psychological practices to 
work.147 In these practices, agentive attributions of reasons and attrib-
utions of psychological states proper that underlie the agentive states 
are mixed into a heterogeneous category, and the distinction between 
them would not make a difference. The connection between agentive 
ascriptions and the underlying psychology is strong enough to allow 
rational arguments, persuasion and other folk psychology-based prac-
tices to enter the cognitive system and influence behaviour. In philo-
sophical and scientific scrutiny, however, different levels of descrip-
tion need to be acknowledged. Slices of the causal process that result 
in behaviour can be described on any level, although they do not make 
 
147 Lilian O’Brien (2019) has argued for a similar presuppositionalist account 
within action-theoretical framework. She argues that rationalizing action ex-
planations presuppose underlying causal factors, but causality does not play 
an explanatory role in rationalization. 
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the same causal explanatory claims (since they have different contrast 
classes) and sometimes there is no rationalizing action explanation at 
all – that is, when the behaviour under scrutiny is irrational. For psy-
chological and philosophical purposes, however, the two levels 
should be kept apart. 
This also means that the action-theoretical framework in philos-
ophy is revisionist and not psychologically realistic. To clarify, this is 
not an argument against philosophical action theory. Since folk psy-
chology is a part of the practical view of human agency, fields like 
decision theory and moral philosophy148 require a conceptual scheme 
built upon its core framework. Philosophical psychology and action 
theory are conceptual clarification and revision of folk psychology for 
analytical purposes. These are normative projects. For example, the 
issues of free will and moral responsibility are important substantial 
issues that require an adequate, precise philosophical theory, even (or 
rather especially) if the aim is to analyse what scientific research does 
and does not say about these matters (see Mele 2009). Philosophical 
psychology cannot be completely divorced from assumptions on the 
human mind, but it idealizes human thought and action in terms of 
rationality on the agentive level, for the purposes mentioned above.149 
 
148 It may be that moral judgments shape our folk-psychological interpretations 
rather than simply use them (Knobe 2007), and if so, philosophical psychology (as 
an elaboration of folk psychology) is not only a part of metaethics (as philosophi-
cal moral psychology), but an integral part of normative moral philosophy. 
149 A similar point can be made about the philosophical literature on collective 
action from the point of view of action theory and philosophical psychology (for 
example, Tuomela & Miller 1988; Tuomela 1995 & 2007; Gilbert 1996; Bratman 
1999; Miller 2001; List & Pettit 2011; Ludwig 2016 & 2017). Social action could 
be defined as action that takes place in a social context (taking other agents into 
account in one way or another), whereas collective action is a special type of 
social action where a group of people have a common goal and work as one. 
According to the philosophical work, conceptualizing this within the frame-
work of philosophical psychology requires collective intentionality of some sort: 
joint attention, shared beliefs, collective acceptance, we-mode intentions, or 
something along those lines. One issue in the discussion is whether this 
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It may also be that scientific psychology cannot be divorced from folk 
psychological categories, if the description of the phenomena and un-
derstanding the results requires it to be applied in real-world situa-
tions guided by folk psychology. This is especially true in practical 
branches of the scientific study of mind, such as psychiatry (see Mur-
phy 2006), but these complications also emerge when we try to under-
stand social behaviour – the agentive descriptions are part of how peo-
ple perceive each other in these contexts. The scientific understanding 
of behaviour is, however, another matter. 
I will concentrate on causal explanation of behaviour from now 
on. The main point of the discussion in the past two sub-chapters has 
been to show that folk-psychology and folk-psychological intuitions 
are not a good guide to understand human behaviour from scientific 
point of view. Instead, causally relevant psychology and agentive-
level ascriptions should be distinguished, even if folk psychology is 
not good in doing so, and the two are influencing each other in com-
plex ways. Identifying behavioural traits should not rely on agentive 
ascriptions, either. This does not make agentive level irrelevant, but 
the aims of philosophical action theory, for instance, which clarifies 
 
collective intentionality can be reduced to individual intentionality or not. This 
is closely related to collective responsibility and the responsibility of individuals 
who take part in collective action (see Miller & Mäkelä 2005; Miller 2006), a topic 
that is important to get right from the moral and political point of view. In con-
trast, scientific attempts to make sense of joint action (see Tomasello 2009 and 
Suchak et al 2016 for biological models; see also Sterelny et al 2013) attempt to 
discover what capacities animals or humans need to have to collaborate, how 
these capacities are used, and what their evolutionary origins and the dynamics 
of their evolution might be. The interpretation of action by analysing it with 
intentional states involved and the psychological capacities have different aims 
here. However, the disconnect is not quite as straightforward as this. Social be-
haviour involves the participants using folk psychology – it is a part of the phe-
nomenon, if not of explanation. The characterization of the capacities in terms 
of theory of mind may require concepts that refer to collective intentionality (see 
Tomasello 2009; Hakli, Miller & Tuomela 2010; Gallotti & Frith 2013). Neverthe-
less, this is not a central issue for the work at hand. 
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the ways we should understand the agentive level ascriptions, are dif-
ferent from the scientific aims – which is nothing controversial in the 
context of action theory, either. But it is important to keep the analysis 
of psychology, agency, and behaviour separate and not mix intuitions. 
This will be especially important in the next chapter, which discusses 
social interaction, different concepts of altruism, and reciprocal altru-
ism as an example of an interactive trait. Psychological, behavioural, 
and agentive levels all play an important role, but they need to be kept 
apart in the analysis. 
 
 
5.4. Explaining Behavioural Traits 
 
It is now time to return to the main question of the chapter: how to 
identify behavioural traits as the object of explanation – this time with-
out the folk-psychological framing. I will differentiate behaviour and 
psychological traits, now disconnected by disregarding the folk-psy-
chological connective, as different explananda. Thereafter I will discuss 
what this means for the evolutionary explanation of such traits. 
 
5.4.1. Behavioural Traits Revisited 
 
Earlier I suggested that a sensible way to identify behavioural traits is 
to relativize them to current explanatory interests. In the most general 
terms, this means that a behavioural trait consists of those external 
behaviours that go together either functionally (being instrumental to 
a goal that has a specific adaptive significance in the organism’s life 
form), by shared proximate mechanisms, by shared development, or 
by shared evolutionary history. Going into greater detail, there are 
different kinds of explanatory questions to be asked within each di-
mension, as discussed in the previous part of the dissertation. The var-
ious human behavioural sciences attend to various causes of behav-
iour in ways that are not directly combinable (Longino 2013). At the 
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same time, different approaches make presuppositions that may turn 
out to be contradictory even if the explanatory questions are separate, 
and comparisons can only be made case by case (Mitchell 1992 & 
2002). This implies that pluralism about behavioural explananda must 
be acknowledged. 
From a theoretical point of view, we may think of behavioural 
phenomena as intersecting causal processes that we can slice into ex-
plainable parts with precise explanatory questions, on different levels 
and in different dimensions, with different partial explanatory factors 
in mind. I discussed evolutionary functionalism as one possible (and 
partial) perspective on how various factors are connected, and this is 
the perspective discussed in this dissertation. But the hierarchical sim-
plification of how the dimensions are related that I described in the 
previous chapter is a metatheoretical tool of thought, not for a genuine 
theoretical unification, and it works only as a starting point. There is 
no general theoretical way to integrate the approaches of different di-
mensions. But perhaps we can understand their interaction and inter-
sections in particular cases and have a pragmatically integrated view 
of the phenomena (cf. Mitchell 2002), and my suggestion is that evo-
lutionary functionalism is an instrument to achieve this in some cases. 
In the human context, however, this is problematic. Behaviour is di-
rected at goals that may be abstract, and we tend to conceptualize this 
in folk-psychological ways that conflate behaviour and its proximate 
psychological mechanisms into action. All explanation of human be-
haviour inevitably starts with using folk-psychological concepts in 
categorizing the explandum itself (see Longino 2013).  
I defined behaviour earlier, following Fred Dretske (1988), as the 
activity of a system, such as the bodily movements of an animal or a 
human being. I defined behavioural traits as categories that capture 
all the behaviour that attempts to achieve the same thing in some 
sense, in reaction to the same types of situations. Categorizing behav-
iour as a behavioural trait requires generalizability of the reaction in a 
context with an idea of what the behaviour achieves in the context. 
This means that a behavioural trait includes more than just the 
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individual behaviour. The identification becomes more problematic 
with flexible and complex responses. Rationalizations are one way to 
structure complex behaviour into units that can be used as a basis for 
categorizing behaviour into traits. However, Dretske does not think 
that reasons are causes of behaviour. He suggests that reasons struc-
ture the behaviour adequately by stating what it is for. The same ac-
tivity (say, going to kitchen to get something to drink when thirsty) 
can be composed of different movements and neural patterns in dif-
ferent times and we need criteria for what counts as an instance of a 
particular kind of behaviour. We can identity this using folk psychol-
ogy. As argued above, however, this is not a satisfactory solution for 
all purposes at least.  
Brent Enc (1995), in contrast, defines behaviour in relation to the 
environment in which it takes place – the same bodily movements 
constitute different behaviour in different contexts, and different bod-
ily movements may still be an instance of the same behaviour in the 
same context. Without going more deeply into this suggestion, both 
Dretske and Enc argue for the need to relate the causal processes (bod-
ily movements, internal mechanisms, and the triggering causes) to 
something external that tells us what the behaviour is about (see also 
Longino 2013). Some account of what the behaviour is about is needed 
in understanding animal behaviour too, if we want to talk about be-
havioural traits instead of mere reactions. We can call this quasi-inten-
tionality of behaviour. I will return to this in the next chapter. Helen 
Longino (2013), in turn, argues that since our understanding of behav-
iour seems to presuppose some sort of teleology like this, including in 
the context of human behavioural sciences, the study of a particular 
kind of causal factor may be highly misleading. No explanation is ex-
planation of the behaviour. The explanandum is always a specific causal 
process and its effects on behaviour, but this cannot be identified with 
the teleologically understood behaviour. We cannot explain behav-
iour; we can only rationalize it and explain effects of various kinds on 
it. (See also Mitchell 1992.)  
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But perhaps we could have an alternative way to understand 
what the behaviour is about, relating it to something external, that 
would also help to relate the various explanatory factors? I suggested 
earlier that animal behaviour could be structured into traits with 
adaptive functions, and this might also be a starting point to relate 
other explanatory dimensions in some cases. This is true at least when 
the evolutionary approach is the chosen perspective. I also argued for 
evolutionary functionalism in general, which is why the evolutionary 
approach might be a useful approach to human social behaviour. In 
the context of human social behaviour, however, folk psychology 
complicates this in two ways: not only is folk psychology an alterna-
tive way to understand behaviour, which misleads intuitions, it is also 
a part of the social psychological makeup of humans and their social 
practices. This makes the folk-psychological categorizations them-
selves a constitutive part of the behaviour we seek to understand. Fur-
thermore, reasoning is a part of human behavioural guidance sys-
tem.150 This means that folk-psychological interpretations move from 
the side of the explanans to the side of the explandum, but we still need 
an account of how they work. In other words, we need psychological, 
agentive, and behavioural perspectives. Furthermore, folk psychol-
ogy may be relevant to understanding behavioural traits because its 




150 This also holds in evolutionary anthropology, including in understanding 
the cultural heritability of behavioural traits: they are partly transferred by 
symbolic representations and behaviour-copying that utilize folk psychology. 
But this latter part is about the acquisition mechanisms and the mechanisms 
that guide the behaviour as a part of the explananda. It does not make folk 




5.4.2. Evolutionary Psychology Done Properly 
 
If we make the distinction between agentive, psychological, and neuro-
physiological levels of explanation, and combine it with Marr’s (1982) 
levels of analysis distinction of implementational (physical), algorithmic 
(representational), and computational (functional) levels, we get four 
levels of description to explain psychological phenomena. (1) At the 
“bottom,” we have the neurophysiological level. Explanations on this 
level are “purely” biological and causal. (2) The next level is the de-
scription of how the cognitive system works: the level of representa-
tions, drives (salience), and processes involving them, of how the sys-
tem accomplishes the cognitive tasks. It is an abstraction of what takes 
place on the neurophysiological level (and may include processes out-
side the brain151), but it is still supposed to capture the same causal 
processes. (3) The functional level describes the tasks executed by the 
system: the cognitive and behavioural tasks, or what the cognitive sys-
tem is doing. This is the perspective on how to slice the psychological 
processes into traits, similarly to what I have said about slicing behav-
iour into traits. This is the level that requires a perspective on the func-
tioning of the cognitive system and what it does in its environment.152 
(4) Finally, there is the agentive level. If we individuate the function of 
 
151 In Marr’s distinction, this level is a description of what the brain does, but 
the implementation may involve much more than the brain – there are causal 
feedback loops between the brain and the body, as well as the surroundings. 
The 4e-approach to cognition mentioned before (the e’s standing for “embod-
ied”, “embedded”, “enactive” and “extended”; see Newen, De Bruin & Gal-
lagher 2018; see also Clark & Chalmers 1998; Bechtel 2008b; and Hutto & Myin 
2017) may be a more accurate way to approach both the cognitive processes 
and their implementation, but this does not change the topic at hand.  
152 The traditional cognitive science perspective that Marr takes is methodo-
logically solipsistic in Fodor’s (1980) sense: the internal states of the system 
are individuated in relation to other internal states only. Even if this were the 




the system through the agentive understanding of what the agent is do-
ing, this creates a link between folk psychology and psychology proper 
(the “algorithmic” level), but it is one of individuation and not identity, 
and it remains problematic for the reasons I have given above. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, evolutionary psychology is 
a functional-level approach to the cognitive architecture and, as such, 
can be either a heuristic and minimally explanatory approach to the 
structure and processes of human mind (at the “algorithmic” level), 
or a historical explanatory project of how these capacities evolved. The 
latter is trivially a different explanatory dimension from any of the 
others discussed above. But how about the first? Let us assume that 
evolutionary functionalism (as defined in the previous chapter) is an 
exceptionally successful heuristic to discover the human cognitive ar-
chitecture. This would mean that we could understand mind in a 
framework that makes the known cognitive processes and mecha-
nisms sensible and understandable as solving tasks in particular cog-
nitive ecologies, and new discoveries would be predictable. We could 
organize our knowledge of cognitive processes and motivational 
mechanisms in evolutionary terms. This is precisely the aim of much 
of evolutionary psychology, as discussed in the previous chapter. If 
evolutionary psychology is understood in this way, as I think it 
should, it means that these functionalist descriptions do not capture 
additional psychological factors (on the algorithmic level) and the 
functions it uses are not only instrumental but on a different (explana-
tory) dimension from the folk-psychology-driven functional analysis 
of psychology. Furthermore, evolutionary psychology does not pro-
vide another layer of proximate mechanistic explanation for why we 
do what we do, or what causes us to do what we do.153 
 
153 Confusing psychology proper, evolutionary-psychological functions, and 
folk-psychological functions is quite usual in the popularizations and public 
understanding of evolutionary-psychological research, by proponents and 
critics alike, and probably by some of its practitioners too. This might be a case 
of folk-psychological meta-theory-ladenness. 
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Evolutionary psychology is (or should be) a way to think about 
the cognitive processes and motivational forces in order to learn about 
them – and perhaps about their origin. In contrast, agentive-level de-
scriptions refer to the behavioural dispositions of the whole individ-
ual, and the functional perspective on cognitive processes derived 
from this traces what explains these dispositions of the whole system. 
The evolutionary approach only traces the fitness consequences and 
adaptive fit to an environment of the cognitive processes. It is another 
dimension of explanation, not another level of description. The evolu-
tionary “reasons” (the adaptive functions) are not reasons for action. 
This is almost trivial, but sometimes “evolutionary reasons” are 
treated like folk-psychological reasons, as if they were agentive states, 
the “ultimate reasons” for action – also mixing the two senses of “ul-
timate”154. This is a category mistake that confuses proximate and evo-
lutionary dimensions (not levels). Folk-psychological reasons are func-
tional descriptions of the agent’s goal-directedness, whereas evolu-
tionary reasons are either a part of the causal past of the capacities (as 
historical, population-level explanations), or they are evolutionarily 
functional descriptions of the capacities in relation to a set of types of 
tasks. An individual agent may or may not ever choose to accomplish 
the task tokens of these types, and the “evolutionary aims” of the 
drives may or may not ever also play a motivational role in the agent’s 
intentional action in which these drives participate. They play no role 
in rationalization, either – they are not hidden reasons comparable to 
folk-psychological reasons. This would be a Freudo-Darwinian fallacy 
(Ylikoski & Kokkonen 2009; see also Buller 1999 & 2005), which is nev-
ertheless a common occurrence in popular evolutionary psychology.155 
 
154 That is, ultimate desire (causing the consequent proximate desires) and “ul-
timate” simply as a reference to evolutionary reasons in Mayr’s distinction 
between ultimate and proximate. I explained in a previous chapter why I do 
not use this distinction. 
155 Elliot Sober (1998c) has raised another, related concern with using agentive 
and deliberative analogies as a misleading “heuristic of personification” in the 
context of social evolution. This way of verbalizing social evolution confuses 
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If evolutionary psychology in any of its versions (see the previous 
chapter) works, the functional level of description is nevertheless its 
target. Folk psychology (or to be more precise: the agentive stance) 
and evolutionary psychology are, then, alternative (but not compet-
ing) ways to slice both the behaviour and psychological capacities and 
motivational mechanisms into traits. Folk psychology probably plays 
both evolutionary and developmental roles in shaping the mind, and 
its developmental role may have an evolutionary reason (Mameli 
2001; Zawidzki 2013; Sterelny 2015), but this is different – in this case, 
the folk-psychological description is a part of the phenomenon, within 
the evolved practice. Consequently, people have motivational states 
that can be understood from an evolutionary point of view, but these 
should not be confused with motivational states that are understood 
in folk-psychological terms. Moreover, evolutionary approaches are 
about types of motivation mechanisms and their effects on the popula-
tion level and/or during the lifetime of the individual, whereas the folk-
psychological approach is about the intentions of the agent in action. 
 
5.4.3. Evolutionary Explanations on Other Levels 
 
Evolutionary explanations can also take place on other levels. The pri-
mary locus in the evolution of mind and behaviour is, of course, the 
brain (and its interaction with the body and the environment). For ex-
ample, Stephanie Preston and Frans de Waal (2002; see also Preston 
2007; de Waal 2009) discuss neural mechanisms and how they become 
layered (almost literally) in the evolution of brain while discussing 
their perception-action model for empathy and the evolution of empa-
thy, and how this is connected to the evolution of altruistic behaviour. 
The level of implementation places constraints on what can be imple-
mented, and although the functioning of mind in abstract also sets con-
straints on further evolutionary steps (through interconnectedness, for 
 
the deliberation of possibilities and the selection of actual fitness conse-
quences as what directs the evolution of social behaviour. 
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example), the brain itself is an important factor in this. Furthermore, 
identification of the brain areas involved in psychological mechanisms 
can help to characterize the operations, even if this does not directly re-
veal them (Bechtel 2008a; see Brüne & Brüne-Cohrs 2005 and Chakroff 
& Young 2014 as examples of the practice), giving an opposite direction 
to the task-functionality to decompose the cognitive processes into mech-
anisms and traits. Furthermore, the behaviour itself can similarly be 
sliced into traits using evolutionary functionalistic approaches. This is 
done in evolutionary anthropology. Moreover, given the environmen-
tal, symbolic and behaviour-copying routes of the inheritance of behav-
iour, the historical evolution of behaviour is not entirely dependent on 
the genetic evolution of mind, as discussed in the previous chapter. 
 The proximate (psychological) dimension of explanation has 
levels of description (neurophysiological, algorithmic, computational, 
and agentive), and there are other dimensions: evolutionary and de-
velopmental. The behaviour can be integrated into traits using an 
agentive description, an evolutionary functionalist description (of the 
behaviour or of the cognitive function), or by identifying a psycholog-
ical mechanism (a type of processing) that underlies the behaviour. 
However, if the identification of a psychological mechanism requires 
functionalist criteria, this loops back to either agentive, evolutionary 
functional, or some other quasi-teleological characterization. This 
does not make the identification of the psychological mechanism iden-
tical with this characterization. Regarding agentive characterization, 
this would be the case only if the reasons for action that cause the to-
kens of behaviour to be tokens of the same activity were psychological 
mechanisms themselves. Regarding evolutionary functionalism, this 
would be the case if the psychological mechanisms were modular to 
the degree that no two functionally different behavioural traits would 
ever use the same underlying processes. Neither is the case (see Buller 
2005). Instead, focusing on the evolutionary functionalist characteri-
zation, the function of the psychological mechanism is what it does 
that is (or was) positive for fitness in its effects in all the contexts where 
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the same mechanism is used.156 We can slice the behaviour into behav-
ioural traits based on their joint achievements, in accordance with evo-
lutionary functionalism, as in the example of the hunting behaviour 
of the honey buzzard. The psychological processes bundle into traits 
in accordance with the type of the cognitive task achieved by the trait: 
for example, the more general capacities that the honey buzzard uti-
lizes in the hunting behaviour but not only there. Even if evolutionary 
functionalism is the perspective on functionality in both cases, the 
functional decomposition is different. This means that there is no iso-
morphic mapping between psychological and behavioural traits from 
the evolutionary point of view either. 
Development, as the third dimension, brings further complica-
tions. First, the object of selection is not just the trait but also the devel-
opment of the trait. The dependencies in the developmental process 
bind psychological structures together, providing an alternative way to 
define either psychological or behavioural traits. This may be unintui-
tive (but see Bjorklund & Pellegrini 2001) and I am not going to use it as 
a criterion. However, the connectedness itself is important for evolu-
tionary explanations. Furthermore, many human behavioural sciences 
approach behaviour from a developmental perspective (for example, 
studying hormonal effects, or the various genetic approaches) and alt-
hough the starting point is the general (folk-psychological) understand-
ing of a trait, these approaches may end up identifying the behavioural 
 
156  As discussed before, identifying a mechanism always requires an idea 
about what the mechanism is for, which makes the functionalist criterion nec-
essary. But this is not the only criterion – since a mechanism is constituted of 
parts (e.g. cognitive processes), we can identify the same psychological struc-
ture as a mechanism that takes part in several activities. It is a mechanism for 
several things. We could also choose to say that the same processes implement 
more than one mechanism instead, but if we are interested in the structure and 
functioning of psychology on the algorithmic level, it makes more sense to 
identify this structure as one mechanistic part of the psychological architec-
ture – even if we differentiate between the two functions on the computational 
level. However, this is mostly a semantic issue. 
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traits that they study somewhat differently from other approaches (see 
Longino 2013). Moreover, behavioural genetics works on the popula-
tion level and molecular genetics studies individual developmental 
processes, which means that they have different objects. Secondly, 
when we acknowledge the role of development, and both the plasticity 
of the development of the psychological capacities and the plasticity of 
behaviour with identical psychological capacities, and include cultural 
and other social factors that affect development, folk psychology enters 
the picture once again – but as a mechanism that participates in the ac-
quisition of behavioural dispositions. 
 
5.4.4. The Scope and Specificity of Behavioural Traits 
 
Different scientific approaches may identify a trait differently, given 
their specific explanatory interests and methods. But the differences 
are not only about different levels and dimensions – their targets may 
be different in their scope and specificity. The behavioural trait we are 
interested in may be more specific or more general: we may be inter-
ested in explaining a specific type of helping behaviour in a specific 
context, a wider range of helping behaviour types, or altruism in gen-
eral. In addition, even after we fix the class of behaviour and its spec-
ificity, the explanation may have different scopes. First, one may be 
interested in explaining an occurrence of a behaviour – for example, a 
particular occurrence of helping behaviour. Folk psychology is usu-
ally concerned with this and refers to the reasons of the agent for the 
specific actions in specific contexts, such as an intention to help a per-
son for no other reason than helping them. The individual tendency to 
behave in a certain way may also be a target of a folk-psychological 
explanation. This might involve a reference to personal characteristics 
(such as an altruistic personality). These explanations presuppose an 
underlying psychology, and a psychological explanation would refer 
to the existence of these cognitive capacities and motivational dispo-
sitions as the basis for such a reaction. For example, the psychological 
explanation for an altruistic tendency could include either an 
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empathetic concern or a tendency to become distressed when others 
are in need of help – both of which can result in the same contextual 
behavioural disposition. This reference may be to a species-typical 
psychological mechanism or to the individual dispositions of the 
agent. Either way, the explanation on the psychological level like this 
is not about the occurrence, but about the capacity for the behaviour, 
regardless of how it manifests. An anthropological explanation, in 
contrast to both, would refer to the context and the function of the 
behaviour, which is about constant habits instead of occurrences or 
capacities. An anthropological explanation can be used in an explana-
tion of the occurrence, but the proper explanandum is the tendency of a 
member of the cultural group to behave in this way.  
Another class of explanations is those for the existence of the behav-
ioural trait or the psychological basis for it. The explanations for existence 
come in two dimensions: evolutionary and developmental. The object of 
a developmental explanation may be the neural system, the psychologi-
cal capacities, or the external behaviour, and the explanations may con-
centrate on (molecular) genetic factors, the external factors, or the inter-
action in various ways.157 The explanation of existence may also have dif-
ferent scopes: the existence of the trait at all, its dominance, or its fre-
quency. All these have both evolutionary and developmental dimen-
sions. This (and only this) question also brings in behavioural genetics in 
its peculiar way to abstract a subset of factors from individual develop-
mental processes to explain variation on a population level.158  
 
157 Therefore, there are different fields that study the development of psychol-
ogy and behaviour, such as behavioural genetics, developmental neurobiology, 
developmental neuropsychology, and developmental psychology, as well as re-
search projects such as Developmental Systems Theory (which will be discussed 
more closely later) that aims at rethinking the process of development and inte-
grating various factors. Longino (2013) provides an excellent but partial review 
of different approaches and how they trace different causal processes. 
158 This abstraction of a subset of factors, genes, also involves an abstract con-
cept of gene that is not reducible to the molecular gene (see Portin 1993; Moss 
2004; Griffiths & Stotz 2013).  
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Different explanations may have different specific objects and 
different scopes, which causes the explanations to be about a different 
trait, not just different aspects of the same trait. Moreover, the scope 
can be chosen first: there may be a phenomenon that we find puzzling 
(for example, altruistic behaviour from the evolutionary perspective) 
and this fixes the explanatory interest. As the research proceeds, the 
discovery of explanatory factors in a given dimension from a given 
perspective may end up making further distinctions or lumping the 
behaviour together with something that was not a part of the same 
trait in the first approximation. A dialectic like this is unavoidable, but 
if different approaches start with the same understanding of the ex-
planandum but move in different directions, the plurality of ap-
proaches may be lost. 
We may be able to integrate the multitude of approaches case by 
case by showing how the various levels, dimensions and scopes are 
related in a particular object of research (Mitchell 2003), or we may not 
(Longino 2013). Even in the latter case, the approaches provide partial 
knowledge. As Longino (2013: 150) says: “Partial knowledge is no less 
knowledge of being partial.” When our ability to explain different as-
pects increases, our understanding expandsas well, even without in-
tegration. However, integration deepens our understanding. Our 
knowledge of how things fit together increases our understanding of 
the dependencies between processes and mechanisms. It may be that 
all attempts to integrate different partial explanations are just as much 
perspective-dependent and local as the explanations being integrated, 
but even partial integration is integration. If we wish to understand 
how the details of proximate and developmental mechanisms affect 
evolutionary explanations of behaviour, we need to have an integra-





6. Altruism and Other Forms of Social Behaviour 
 
In this chapter, I will discuss social behaviour and interactive behavioural 
traits. Interactive traits are traits that emerge in the interaction between 
individuals. I suggested that this kind of trait may be the object of se-
lection in the introduction; now I will give an argument why this is so, 
making the object of an evolutionary explanation a supra-individual 
trait and the resulting adaptation holistic rather than individual. In-
teractive traits can include behaviours such as dominance and mating, 
but the main interest will be in altruism, division of labour, and mu-
tualistic cooperation. I will discuss them in general but focus on altru-
ism, despite the recent shift of interest in the evolutionary analysis from 
altruism to cooperation (see Sterelny 2012; Tomasello et al 2012; Sterelny 
et al 2013; Forber & Smead 2015). This is for several reasons.  
My main example of an interactive trait is reciprocal altruism – it 
is simple enough to make it an illustrative example, and very much 
discussed. I will discuss the various concepts of altruism in detail to 
build the ground for using reciprocal altruism as a locus for argument, 
but it will serve two other purposes as well. First, my discussion illus-
trates the points I argued in abstract in the previous chapter and 
shows why they are crucial for understanding social behaviour from 
the evolutionary point of view. The distinction between the form of 
behaviour and a psychological trait is very sharp here, as well as their 
differences with an agentive description, making it a suitable case for 
illustrative purposes. Second, altruistic behaviour has been the central 
phenomenon for much of the debate over individualism and holism 
in evolutionary explanation. It has been the main theoretical challenge 
for understanding the evolution of social behaviour and the main rea-
son to introduce group selection models. I will later argue that even if 
we leave aside the problem of evolutionary altruism, which might 
make a holistic approach necessary on the evolutionary dimension, even 
individualistic evolutionary approaches may require us to under-




The various forms of mutualistic collective behaviour (direct co-
operation and indirect cooperation through the division of labour) are 
easier to conceptualize as a group of individuals combining their ef-
forts for joint goals and interests, which makes the interaction instru-
mental for everyone separately; the behaviour of others is just a con-
textual precondition for such action. But with altruistic behaviour, in 
contrast, the very aims of action are the needs or goals of others. I will 
also argue that explanatory models of altruism based on benefits from 
reciprocity over time require us to understand individual behavioural 
contexts as parts of interactions between multiple agents that extend 
over time – that is, the traits are interactionist.  
I will begin by clarifying the notion of altruism. The term “altru-
ism” refers to the tendency to be prosocial.159 It refers to helping be-
haviour, as well as things like sharing and consolation, in both hu-
mans and animals, as well as the psychological tendency to behave 
this way. There is a well-known distinction between psychological and 
evolutionary altruism (Sober 1988a & 1989; Rosenberg 1992; Wilson 
1992; Sober & Wilson 1998), in which psychological altruism is defined 
in terms of what motivates the action, and evolutionary altruism in 
terms of fitness consequences. Reasons to distinguish at least a third 
notion of altruism, that of behavioural altruism, which refers to the type 
of behaviour defined by its consequences that are not measured in fit-
ness, have been presented in literature (Voorzanger 1994; Wilson 2002; 
Kokkonen 2003; Clavien & Chapuisat 2013). I will introduce the fourth 
notion of agentive altruism as the primary folk-psychological notion of 
altruism which should not be conflated with either psychological or 
behavioural altruism.160 
 
159 Some authors recommend separating altruism from prosocial behaviour be-
cause of the danger of conceptual confusions (for example, Hawley 2014 and 
Eisenberg & Spinrad 2014), but since it has been common to use “altruism” very 
broadly and it has been philosophers’ practice to make distinctions between 
various notions of altruism instead, I will follow the “many altruisms” route. 
160 Christine Clavien and Michel Chapuisat (2013) distinguish between psycho-
logical, reproductive, behavioural, and preference altruism. Their definitions 
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6.1. Reasons and Causes to Help 
 
Let us return to the example of Beatrice rescuing Amos from drown-
ing once again. We can give this event several explanatory descrip-
tions (only some of which are relevant here). First, we can give it an 
agentive description. If Beatrice saved Amos intentionally, instead of, 
say, falling into the water and dragging Amos with her accidently, we 
can identify the action as saving Amos. This is intentional helping, so 
we can identify this behaviour as helping as a type of behaviour. I will 
call a form of behaviour behavioural altruism if it is such that its re-
sults help another individual and this helping is not accidental. I will 
provide behavioural altruism with a more sophisticated definition 
later, but it is sufficient that the behaviour is an intentional act and the 
intention is to help. Beatrice’s reason to save Amos may be instrumen-
tal only, even if the action is intentional helping – it could also be that 
she expects a reward of some sort or has some other ultimate goal that 
motivates this action, such as appearing heroic for the social benefits 
this brings. We would perhaps not want to call this a genuine act of 
altruism. I will stipulate that for the act to be genuinely altruistic in 
the agentive sense, or to be genuine agentive altruism, its ultimate goal 
(as perceived in a folk-psychological or action-theoretical framework), 
has to be the help that is provided (saving Amos, for instance). That 
is, the agent’s ultimate desire in the situation is to help.161 I will call 
 
are different from mine, but why they distinguish behavioural and preference 
altruism from psychological and evolutionary (which they call reproductive) 
altruism is similar to my reasons for distinguish between behavioural and agen-
tive altruism. The most important difference is that their preference altruism, 
which they define as an “action [that] results from preferences for improving 
others’ interests and welfare at some cost to oneself” (Clavien & Chapuisat 2013: 
131) is ambiguous with respect to what “preferences” refers to. 
161 Robert Richards (1987) uses the term “action altruism”, which is applicable 
to both humans and animals and includes an idea of psychological motives. 
It is not the same as agentive altruism here and probably closest to what I will 
later call quasi-intentional biological altruism. 
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agentive pseudo-altruism an act that is intentional helping but only 
instrumental for something else that is self-serving (and intended as 
such), such as enhancing reputation, or in which the ultimate desire is 
something that is otherwise not directed to the receiver of help, such 
as a desire to hold on to a principle.162  
Agentive altruism is conceptually separate from psychological 
altruism, which is defined by a motivational mechanism that causally 
guides the action, if we make the distinction between agentive and 
psychological as I have suggested. The altruism debate in social psy-
chology has been about how to explain helping behaviour psycholog-
ically. In this context, “altruism” often refers to helping behaviour it-
self, regardless of how it is explained (in which case it is altruism in 
the behavioural sense), but sometimes it refers to an altruistic motiva-
tion in contrast to a selfish motivation to help. Some egoist theories 
explain helping behaviour (or at least much of it) with something that 
the agent achieves by helping (status, credit, social capital, gratitude, 
avoidance of direct or indirect sanctions etc.). Some others refer to in-
ternal self-serving states instead, such as pleasure from helping, 
avoidance of distress from seeing another person in need of help, or 
avoidance of guilt and shame from not helping. (See Batson 1991 & 
2011 for a general review.) The first group of explanations make help-
ing behaviour agentive pseudo-altruism (the ultimate desire to help 
 
162 There is a further issue regarding how to conceptualize common goals. The 
issue of joint action was briefly discussed at the end of the previous chapter, 
but it should be mentioned here that in all the types of altruism discussed here 
(agentive, psychological, and behavioural) it is possible to distinguish be-
tween selfish, altruistic and joint goals – Margaret Gilbert (1994), for example, 
makes the three-part distinction about psychological motives. The variety of 
possible psychological motivation mechanisms is, however, much wider than 
this, as we shall see. We could also make a distinction between being moti-
vated by the good of the group including oneself, and good of the group ex-
cluding oneself. In evolutionary contexts, this distinction does not work: joint 
action can be mutualistic or reciprocal, and it is an open issue in both cases 
whether the behaviour of a participatory individual is selfish or altruistic.  
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lies in something that the agent gains). The second group of selfish 
motives may still be a basis for genuine agentive altruism: even if we 
classify the internal mechanisms as selfish, the action itself, under an 
agentive description, might have no other goal than to help. For ex-
ample, it is a mother’s distress that mediates the helping of her child, 
and if there are no other desires than to help the child (under an agen-
tive description), there is no reason to call this a selfish act. Nothing 
else is intended. For it to be psychological altruism, something else is 
still needed. 
 
6.1.1. Psychological Altruism 
 
In contrast to the egoistic motivation theory, the empathy-altruism hy-
pothesis, defended most importantly by C. Daniel Batson (1991 & 
2011), states that there are genuinely altruistic motives and the moti-
vation to help shows empathetic concern directly. Batson (2011: 11) de-
fines empathetic concern as “other-oriented emotion elicited by and 
congruent with the perceived welfare of someone in need”. It could 
also be called compassion.163 For Batson, genuine altruism is motivation 
guided by empathy. He defines it as (Batson 2011: 20–21): 
 
163 Batson (2011) also distinguishes empathetic concern from other meanings of 
“empathy”, which includes the following: (1) “Feeling” other people’s emotions 
or thoughts (as in mindreading by simulation). (2) Matching the other person’s 
posture or response (also known as “motor mimicry” or “physiological sympa-
thy”). This plays a role in the Preston & de Waal (2002) model of empathy that 
I will describe later. (3) Coming to feel as the other. (4) Taking the other person’s 
perspective in the situation. (5) Imagining how the other feels or thinks. (6) Im-
agining what oneself would feel in another person’s situation. 7) Being dis-
tressed when seeing another person in distress. Elisa Aaltola (2014 & 2018), in 
turn, distinguishes between five kinds of empathy: projective/simulative (put-
ting oneself in the other’s position), cognitive (representing the other’s states of 
mind), affective (reverberation of the other’s emotions and other phenomenal 
contents), embodied (intersubjective sharing of bodily expression), and reflec-
tive. All these “empathies” may be relevant to altruism in one way or another. 
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1) a motivational state 
2) with the ultimate goal 
3) of increasing another’s welfare. 
 
The motivational state has a goal – it is not simply a drive, and Batson 
uses the concept of desire here. At the same time, it is a “force” – it is 
a causal factor that pushes the agent and disappears when the goal is 
reached. The goal being ultimate means that the motivational force 
does not cease through an alternative route. This is the difference from 
a selfish mechanism for helping such as distress, for which the agent 
does not feel the need to help if there is an alternative way to get rid 
of the distress (cf. Sober & Wilson 1998). The third criterion distin-
guishes between egoism and altruism. 
A couple of clarifications will be helpful. First, Batson uses agen-
tive concept of goal-directed desire here, although he refersto a causal 
psychological state. This is to be expected, as it is in psychology gen-
erally: the ambiguity of folk psychology shows its influence. But the 
conceptualization of the state as agentive desire does not do any work 
here. The psychological state of being motivated can be connected to 
an external target or goal without introducing a reason. What is re-
quired is that there are triggering conditions for both starting and 
stopping the motivational state (incentive salience), and this motiva-
tional state must relate to cognitive processing about the other person 
in need of help, which decides the need for help, how to do it, and 
when it is not needed anymore. This cognition can be a complicated 
representational system without the drives becoming any more com-
plicated states. Even if folk-psychological conceptualizations are used 
to individuate the motivational states by representing their goals, in-
cluding by the agent herself, it is not the agentive state of desire that 
matters, but the causally efficient motivational state on a psychological 
level. But for as long as we are talking about intentional action, the 
 
Some of them might be necessary for perceiving the other person’s distress or 
figuring out what would be good for them, for instance. 
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action needs to be intentionally helping – the altruistic consequences 
of behaviour cannot be accidental. This is not a part of the definition 
of altruistic motivation, but a part of what constitutes helping behaviour 
when we talk about humans. 
Secondly, the issue is about the motivational mechanism that is a 
part of how the mind functions – not about individual acts as such. 
Empathetic concern is a habit of mind, a mechanism that is activated 
by perception of someone in need of help and produces an altruistic 
motivational state. It is not a property of an action or a behavioural 
trait. It is a psychological disposition that partly explains both helping 
behaviour and individual altruistic acts. An altruistic behavioural 
trait, in contrast, would be the tendency to act altruistically in the given 
context. If the empathy-altruism hypothesis is correct, it does not 
mean that humans act altruistically in every situation, and it does not 
even mean that everyone would act altruistically at least sometimes. 
Furthermore, it does not mean that the empathetic concern is behind 
all acts of altruism.  
An example will illustrate both points. I am helping a colleague 
with her funding application. I enjoy taking up such intellectual chal-
lenges (unless it is my own application, in which case this joy is 
masked by a sizable stress factor), so I am happy to assist. I have also 
bonded with this colleague strongly enough that the friendship-re-
lated altruistic concern produces purely altruistic motivation. I may 
recognize both motivational forces, and I might use both as a basis for 
attributing myself reasons to help her with the application. But it may 
be that only one of these motivational states (pleasure or altruism) is 
behind my helping. If this is the case, removal of this factor would 
stop me wanting to help – this is a causal explanatory claim. Both 
might be effective motivating states, but only one of them strong 
enough for me to use my time and energy on my colleague’s applica-
tion instead of doing my own work. My intention is to help with the 
application (without further goals), in both cases, and both reasons are 
valid in rationalizing my action, as well as simply saying that I helped 
her because I wanted to. But only one motivation mechanism is active. 
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Note that the difference between selfish and altruistic motivations is 
qualitative, but they are not the only ways to motivate the action, and 
several motives may be active at the same time. For example, a mother 
helping a child may both have an empathetic concern and be dis-
tressed at the same time, as well as feeling social pressure to be a good 
mother, et cetera.  
As mentioned above, there has been some controversy as to 
whether genuine altruistic motives exist. The proponents of altruistic 
motivation theory, such as Batson (1991 & 2011) and Sober and Wilson 
(1998), promote a pluralistic motivation theory that allows both selfish 
and altruistic motives. A pluralistic theory does not need to maintain 
that there are any situations where humans prefer others to them-
selves. Sober (1989) distinguishes between four motivation types: 
pure egoism, pure altruism, self-over-others, and others-over-self. If 
Beatrice is a pure altruist, she will always choose to help Amos, re-
gardless of the consequences to herself. If she is a pure egoist, she does 
not pay any attention to his needs. If she has a pluralistic motivation 
structure, she might prefer either herself (self-over-others) or Amos 
(others-over-self). In the first case, she will always choose an action 
that benefits herself, but if there is a choice that makes no difference 
for herself but does for him, she will choose the one that is beneficial 
to him. In the last alternative, she will think of him first and only then 
herself. We can call the kinds of altruism that include self-sacrifice as 
an element strong psychological altruism and the kind in which the 
others matter but only after the self weak psychological altruism.164 
Even weak altruism is a kind of altruism, since the welfare of the oth-
ers is a genuine goal (a factor triggering a motivational state), not a 
means to something self-serving – it is only that in case of contradictory 
 
164 Kitcher (1997: 285) also makes a distinction between strong and weak psy-
chological altruism. By “weak altruism” he means only that someone else’s 
wellbeing is considered, but the contrast (strong altruism) is not clear. Proba-
bly the distinction is approximately the same as the one made here. 
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goals, they prefer self-serving goals.165 This distinction between differ-
ent strengths of altruism can be applied both to psychological and be-
havioural altruism. In the latter case the quality of the motivation (whether 
it is empathetic concern or a selfish internal motivation mechanism of 
some sort) is left open, but the behavioural tendencies are the same. 
Another clarification concerns increasing another person’s wel-
fare. The important part of this condition is that the incentivising fac-
tor is the good of the other person. It should not be a part of the defi-
nition that welfare is actually increased. The attempt to help may 
cause only harm, but this does not make the motivation to act non-
altruistic. Furthermore, the measure of the good of the other could be 
various things, such as welfare as perceived by either party, or the re-
cipient’s pleasure, preferences, interests, achievement of their goals et 
cetera. An altruistic act may be directed to what the recipient of altru-
ism wants, or it may be paternalistic. The main thing is that the aim is 
something that the agent thinks is good for the recipient. Although the 
paradigmatic example of helping behaviour and altruism is a situa-
tion in which the target of help is in distress of some sort, the point is 
about attempting to increase the well-being of the recipient. This does 
not need to involve something being wrong – giving a free ticket to a 
jazz concert just to be nice to the recipient is an altruistic act under any 
circumstances and a relief of distress of the recipient only in some. The 
actual results of the action do not matter – the helping intention (with 
the right kind of motivation mechanism behind it) does. The good in-
tentions may lead to suffering (the jazz concert might turn out to be 
suffering for someone who does not enjoy complex music), but it is 
the intention that matters.  
 
165 The psychological debate is about the existence and the nature of altruistic 
motivation. If it does exist, however, whether the behaviour is guided by self-
ish, altruistic or a hybrid system is also contextual: the context, type of behav-
iour, the stakes, and the recipient, but also the individual and his or her per-
sonality matter. Some people are more helpful than others (on the behavioural 
level), and this may reflect their psychological tendencies. 
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With these modifications and clarifications, we can define genu-
ine psychological altruism, for now, as applied to a particular act, as 
an intentional act that 
 
PA 1)  intentionally increases another person’s welfare, pleas-
ure, preferences, or something else that the agent be-
lieves to be positive for this person, 
PA 2) does not require a further intentional goal for the action 
(whether such a goal exists as well), and 
PA 3) is guided by an altruistic motivational state, which is 
made altruistic by being triggered by the perceived need 
or possibility of increase in the other person’s welfare, 
pleasure, or something else positive to the person. 
 
If the third condition is not satisfied, the act is psychological pseudo-
altruism. It may still be genuine agentive altruism if the second condi-
tion is satisfied. If not, it is agentive pseudo-altruism. In the context of 
intentional action, psychological altruism is a form of agentive altru-
ism that has a further criterion for the psychological motivational 
states that guide it. But things get more complicated when we address 
behavioural traits.  
 
6.1.2. Behavioural Altruism in Psychology 
 
For now, it is sufficient to characterize behavioural traits as tendencies 
to act in a certain way in a specified situation. As discussed previ-
ously, folk-psychological descriptions are one way to understand 
what instances of behaviour go together, but this may be misleading 
for some purposes. Social psychologists, or anthropologists, for exam-
ple, might discover ways to classify types of helping behaviour on 
other epistemically justified grounds. For example, various relation-
ships, such as family, friendship, colleagueship, tribal membership 
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(literally or figuratively) may be relevantly different contexts for oth-
erwise similar behaviour, and the conditions for collaboration may be 
very different. Furthermore, although I have been calling all prosocial 
behaviour simply “helping,” developmental psychological studies 
seem to show that there are finer differences. Sharing (which involves 
understanding the other’s material needs) and comforting (which in-
volves understanding the other’s emotions) are psychologically dif-
ferent from helping with goals (which involves understanding ac-
tions), which might reflect differences in types of motivation or in the 
accompanying cognitive skills (Paulus 2018). Differences like this may 
be only partially acknowledged by the participants themselves. Some 
differences may also be constituted by cultural practices. 
When we move to behavioural traits, we move from explaining 
actions to explaining robust behavioural tendencies. We are not ex-
plaining people’s behaviour in the context through what they were 
thinking and what they intended to accomplish, but why they tend to 
think in certain ways and want certain things – or behave in some way 
even if they do not think at all. Even if all instances of a given behav-
ioural trait were rationalizable actions, we would cut the direct con-
nection with the agentive descriptions. There are folk-psychological 
ways of talking about behavioural tendencies, such as personality 
traits, and desire-like states and reasons can be standing dispositions, 
but agentive descriptions are about specific goals or reasons and usu-
ally about specific actions. If a person – let us say Beatrice, once again 
– has altruistic tendencies towards her friends, we might say something 
like “she always wants to help her friends,” but her intentional acts 
are intentional acts to help a specific friend in a specific matter. We 
would not say, within the folk-psychological framework, that she is 
guided by her desire to help her friends in all these situations. Making 
such statement sounds more like a statement of a principle: Beatrice 
wants to be a helper of friends. These two things may be true at the 
same time, of course. But the latter would make the specific friend in 
need – Amos, again – in the given situation a placeholder for friends 
in the abstract. Beatrice’s desire is to help friends, and her helping 
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Amos is derivative of this. Instead, what we mean if we say that Be-
atrice always wants to help her friends is that, in any given situation 
when Beatrice observes a friend in need of help, she has the tendency 
to desire to help that friend in that situation with no further goals.  
Beatrice’s tendency to help friends in need is her behavioural al-
truism towards her friends. Behavioural altruism is a characteristic of 
a trait, not of an action. It is a behavioural tendency to behave altruis-
tically whether this is guided by a psychologically altruistic motiva-
tion mechanism or not. This is the helping behaviour in social psycho-
logical research, and this is often the reference of “altruism” in these 
contexts, instead of empathetic concern. We can define genuine be-
havioural altruism as a behavioural tendency to help without any fur-
ther goal for the action. The psychological motivation mechanism for 
this may also be altruistic (empathic concern), but it may be a psycho-
logically selfish mechanism (such as distress from perceiving some-
one else in distress, guilt, need for affiliation, avoidance of social sanc-
tions, or enhancing one’s own social status) as well. It could also be 
something completely different, such as following an internalized so-
cial norm as an action script, following a moral judgment in the situa-
tion, compliance with requests, or goal contagion. These are not con-
ceptualizable as either altruism or egoism. (See Batson 1991 & 2011; 
Paulus 2018.) Behavioural pseudo-altruism, in contrast, would be the 
kind of helping behaviour that is conditional to some other external 
goal (that the act is instrumental to achieving) or a personal benefit, 
such as reputation. 
Focus on behavioural traits raises the question of what makes a 
trait. As previously discussed, this depends on the question setting. 
What we are interested in here, ultimately, is the evolutionary ap-
proach, and evolutionary functionalism. The starting point is that it 
must be repeated, robust pattern of behaviour. As discussed earlier, 
human behaviour has invisible future goals and backgrounds, and it 
is loaded with cultural significance. It cannot be defined in a behav-
iourist way. Even pancultural behaviour (when the trait is given a func-
tional definition) may be culture-specific in its phenotypes. For 
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example, if we give friendship a definition that refers to reciprocal al-
truism, the types of interaction and the scope of altruism within them 
may vary from culture to culture. Moreover, human behaviour is con-
text-sensitive, and phenotypically similar patterns may be function-
ally different across cultures. This also means that cultural meanings, 
not only folk-psychological interpretations, need to be considered in 
the definition of any particular behavioural trait, even in the evolu-
tionary functionalist framework. For now, the discussion on altruism 
in general, this complication does not arise. With all these caveats, we 
can use the intentionality of human behaviour as a guideline in choos-
ing which parts of behaviour are part of some behavioural trait rather 
than accidental results, even if we do not categorize the traits based 
on the reasons given to these actions.166 Defining a behavioural trait 
for an animal lacks this aspect, making it more straightforward in 
some senses and more complicated in others – I will turn to biological 
altruism now, after which I will return to how all these different kinds 
of altruism are related, and why all this matters. 
 
 
6.2. Biological Altruism 
 
In biology, there are three notions of altruism in play. First, there is 
evolutionary altruism, which is defined by the fitness consequences 
of the trait (which needs not be a behavioural trait, but this is what we 
are interested in here). Second, there is a concept of behavioural al-
truism – for example, Frans de Waal’s (1996 & 2009) concept of altru-
ism in his discussion on prosocial behaviour in animals is that of be-
havioural altruism. In addition, de Waal and his collaborator Stepha-
nie Preston present an empathy model that matches Batson’s empa-
thetic concern model in psychology and is therefore a theory of psy-
chological altruism when used to explain altruistic behaviour 
 
166 This is not always the case. Some behavioural traits may include uninten-
tional doings. We do not need to worry about this yet. 
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(Preston & de Waal 2002; Preston 2007; de Waal 2009; Batson 2011). I 
will discuss all these altruisms in the biological context, but I will start 
with a couple of remarks on the concept of fitness, which is central to 
the evolutionary concept of altruism. 
 
6.2.1. What Is Fitness? 
 
Fitness is a measure of an organism’s capacity to produce offspring.167 
It is not a measure of the actual number of offspring – identical twins 
have the same fitness even if they have a different number of off-
spring.168 Fitness depends on the phenotype: both on the individual’s 
capacity to produce offspring as such (fertility and ability to attract 
mating partners) and adaptivity to the environment. It would be 
wrong to say, however, that individual phenotypic traits cause fitness 
– fitness supervenes the phenotypic properties. It is an abstraction 
from the causal basis that defines how many offspring the organism 
is likely to produce. Fitness does not depend only on the traits, but 
 
167 There are two different ways to think about the number of offspring: short-
term or long-term (Sober 2001). Short-term fitness is the number of offspring 
that continue reproducing in the next generation, but long-term fitness refers 
to the number of offspring in the distant future, or some other measure, such 
as how many generations it takes for the genotype to become extinct. The no-
tion of short-term fitness is directly related to the mechanism of natural selec-
tion. Long-term fitness depends on short-term fitness and the ecological and 
population-level conditions. For example, male lions who replace the previ-
ous male of the pride kill the offspring of the previous male. This behaviour 
increases short-term fitness, but under some conditions (such as small popu-
lation size and frequent overturnings), this will lead lions with this tendency 
into extinction more quickly. Long-term fitness id of use in ecology, for exam-
ple, but as we are interested in the mechanism of natural selection here, the 
short-term notion is more adequate. 
168 Defining fitness as an actual number of offspring would also risk making 
natural selection explanations circular, but this can be solved with the pro-
pensity interpretation of fitness. See Brandon 1978; Mills & Beatty 1979. 
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also on how the traits work together in the configuration of the con-
crete individual that reproduces. The individual organism has only 
one fitness that binds the traits together (they have a “common faith”). 
The fitness differences between individuals are quantitative, but the 
phenotypic differences are often qualitative. The phenotypic differ-
ences can be quantified using the fitness difference between the indi-
viduals who share the different variants of the trait on the population 
level as a measure, but this does not make the differences between the 
traits quantitative. Furthermore, fitness also depends on the environ-
ment – the adaptivity of traits differs with the environmental varia-
tion, and the order of organisms measured in fitness may vary de-
pending on the environmental factors, including other individuals of 
the population that the organism interacts with, and how the organ-
ism modifies the environment itself. (See Futuyma 1998, 366–371; Ros-
enberg 1978; Dawkins 1982; Sober 1984; Odling-Smee et al 2003.)  
However, natural selection operates through the heredity of 
traits and their various contributions to the fitness differences be-
tween individuals. Fitness differences between variants are usually 
discussed and modelled as two (or more) phenotypes that differ only 
in this one trait, and the genotypes attached to the phenotypes are 
equally discrete types that are internally identical. This is a useful ab-
straction for modelling, but it is unrealistic in several significant ways. 
First, as stated above, the trait’s contribution to fitness depends on the 
overall phenotype. Therefore, for sexually reproducing organisms, the 
fitness of a genotype is defined as the additive sum of the fitness of its 
alleles, which in turn is the average fitness contribution of the alleles 
in the entire population (Futuyma 1998: 368). Second, since the phe-
notype is a co-product of the genotype and the environment, identical 
genotypes may have different phenotypes. Having phenotypic differ-
ences between the same genotypes in different environments may 
even be adaptive and a product of selection for functional, stimulus-
sensitive plasticity (see West-Eberhard 2003). Yet it is the genes that 
are replicated, not the traits. These considerations are one reason to 
think that it is the genes, or the replicators, that are central to evolution, 
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and we should be interested in their average fitness in the population 
– to take a gene’s eye view to the evolutionary process. However, this 
is a problematic solution. The concrete genes that get copied and par-
ticipate in the developmental processes, the D-genes (Moss 2004), are 
DNA sequences.169 The “genes” that are referred to in population ge-
netics, the P-genes (Moss 2004), are abstractions of DNA-genetic level 
factors on the population level that cannot be reduced to individual D-
genes. They are not what get copied. This entails some problems. 
First, the developmental processes are complicated interactions 
between the existing characteristics or developmental stages of the de-
veloping organism, the genetic factors, and the environmental factors, 
and the whole process takes place in stages (see Oyama, Griffiths & 
Gray 2001; Wolpert et al 2010; Griffiths & Stotz 2013). Second, the en-
vironmental factors may be alternative routes to reproduce traits and 
the evolutionarily significant differences (see Oyama, Griffiths & Gray 
2001; Jablonka & Lamb 2005; Pigliucci & Müller 2010). Since P-genes 
are abstractions from this process, it makes no sense to consider them 
the objects of evolution. That would be a reification fallacy. They are 
simply a shorthand for talking about the phenotypic differences that 
the genetic differences are responsible for on the population level – 
which is the relevant explanatory perspective on the population level 
but does not make P-genes entities. On the other hand, if we consider 
D-genes, the actual things that get replicated, to be the replicators of 
the replicator-based interpretation of evolution, we do not have any 
reason to differentiate between them and the other causal factors on 
which the process depends. After all, the process of natural selection 
requires fitness-relevant differences in traits between the individuals, 
and that they are reproduced – in other words, that there are relevant 
phenotypic hereditary patterns – but not that the process of reproduction 
 
169 Furthermore, only some of these genes “code” for a trait in the way proposed 
in the sequential hypothesis, from DNA through RNA and protein production 
to phenotypic traits. There are regulatory genes, for example, that only influence 
how other genes are read. (Wolpert et al 2010; Griffiths & Stotz 2013.) 
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is made of replications like this (see Godfrey-Smith 2009).170 Other ways 
to conceptualize the evolutionary process than the replicator-based 
ontology have been proposed. For example, the Developmental Systems 
Theory views reproduction as the reconstruction of similar phenotypes 
from the developmental resources, genetic and otherwise, some of which 
are inherited and some of which are not (see Griffiths & Gray 1994; 
Oyama, Griffiths & Gray 2001). In Peter Godfrey-Smith’s neoclassical in-
dividualism, the level of analysis is an organism that produces a similar 
organism with high fidelity (Godfrey-Smith 2009). They both have a 
more holistic view of individuals and a more modest role for genes.  
I will try to stay neutral on the ontology of evolution, but the rea-
sons for proposing alternatives are valid (for example, genes are not 
the only form of replication that should matter) and I will take them 
into account in my discussion later. One complication is rethinking 
the idea of inclusive fitness. I will return to the recent debates on the 
relationship between kin selection and group selection, but for now, it 
is sufficient to say that I have been referring only to direct fitness in 
my discussion so far. Replacing direct fitness with inclusive fitness in 
defining altruism would seriously disturb the framing of the very 
problem of altruism in evolution anyway (see Sober & Wilson 1998; 
Okasha 2006; Birch 2017). 
The general lesson is that talk about fitness of genes should be 
dropped, and fitness-talk should be limited to the interactor entities 
(individuals, superorganisms, and possibly groups of other kinds). 
This affects how we should approach kin selection and reciprocal al-
truism – solutions to the problem of altruism that use the gene’s point 
of view. It might be tempting to replace genes with the phenotypic 
traits they are associated with as the sub-individual units of fitness, 
and to think about the fitness of an individual as the sum of the fitness 
of its traits. In fact, it is common to talk about the fitness of traits in the 
 
170 The reproduction must involve, however, some units with a “minimal size” 
and fidelity in replication, or there could be no selection (Depew & Weber 
1996; Godfrey-Smith 2009). 
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philosophical literature. For example, Elliot Sober does so and defines 
the fitness of a trait as the average fitness of the individuals who have 
the trait (see Sober 1984 & 2001). However, since fitness is the measure 
of something that reproduces, it would be a category mistake to apply 
it to part of a phenotype. The perspective-dependence of what counts 
as a trait in the first place and the overlap of traits also make this much 
trickier than if we were talking about discrete alleles – especially in 
the case of behaviour. Furthermore, because of pleiotropy and other 
developmental connections between traits, as well as structural con-
nections and coincidences, the fitness of a trait as a statistical measure 
only would make no distinction between selection of and selection for 
(Sober 1984), which is a crucial part of understanding natural selection 
explanations. Therefore, the expression “fitness of a trait” should be 
understood as a shorthand for “the trait’s contribution to the fitness 
of the individual that has it,” which is a completely different thing. 
The final remark on fitness to be made here is about the distinc-
tion between absolute and relative fitness. Absolute fitness is a measure 
of reproductive capacity, relative fitness a measure of the reproduc-
tive capacity relative to the variation of reproductive capacity in the 
population, with a value between 0 and 1. Relative fitness is simpler 
in modelling and fitness compared to other individuals’ fitness is 
what matters for what gets selected. There are, however, differences 
between the definitions of evolutionary altruism, depending on which 
notion is used. Evolutionary altruism is defined as a property of a trait 
that is suboptimal for the individual (compared to the other variants) 
but increases some other individual’s fitness. If we use relative fitness 
in the definition, all suboptimal behaviour will be altruistic, since they 
increase the relative fitness of individuals who have more optimal var-
iants. One suggestion for a solution to this could be to restrict the traits 
to only those that do something directly for the benefitting individuals, 
but this would rule out all structural properties (such as the hooked 
sting of honeybees) that are (and should be) included in the general 
problem of altruism. Furthermore, cooperation tendencies that in-
crease fitness, but less than an alternative trait would, would still count 
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as altruism. Another suggestion could be to include a reference to 
group level in the definition. This is done in some treatments of altru-
ism under multilevel selection (MLS) models (for example, Peressini 
1993; D. Wilson 2002) and it would fit the evolutionary functionalism 
model assumed here for the individuation of traits. There are two 
problems here, however. First, this can be done only within the MLS 
framework, which is contested, and the phenomenon itself should be 
framed neutrally. Second, only those apparently altruistic traits that 
can be explained by group selection and not by individualist models 
would be included in altruism, which would be unintuitive and make 
the explanations of altruism group selection explanations by defini-
tion. This means that we should define altruism in terms of absolute 
fitness (as done explicitly by Rosenberg 1992, Kitcher 1997, Sober & 
Wilson 1998, and Nunney 2000, for example) even if relative fitness 
values are used in the calculations. 
 
6.2.2. Evolutionary Altruism 
 
It turns out that the choice of the concept of fitness has consequences. 
Altruism defined in terms of relative fitness can evolve in contexts 
where altruism defined in terms of absolute fitness cannot (Mitteldorf 
& Wilson 2000; Kerr et al 2004). David Sloan Wilson refers to the dif-
ference by distinguishing between strong and weak evolutionary altru-
ism (Mitteldorf & Wilson 2000; Sober & Wilson 2000b). But what Wil-
son shows is only that suboptimal traits can evolve if their existence 
benefits the other individuals in the group. This is an interesting result 
of using an MLS-model, but it does not address altruism specifically. 
There is, however, another possible distinction between a weak and a 
strong version of altruism: the difference between a trait that increases 
another individual’s fitness and decreases the individual’s own fitness 
and a trait that increases the other’s fitness without decreasing one’s 
own. If we define this in terms of relative fitness, the trait must in-
crease the individual’s own fitness at least as much as it increases 
other individuals’ average fitness. If we use absolute fitness as a 
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measure, as I think we should, weak altruism still decreases the rela-
tive fitness of the individual. This highlights the “self-sacrificing” na-
ture of helping from the evolutionary point of view even when there 
is nothing self-sacrificing as such in the behaviour itself. 
Benjamin Kerr, Peter Godfrey-Smith, and Marcus Feldman (2004) 
have shown that the various definitions of altruism that exist in liter-
ature behave differently in modelling evolution. The definitions they 
discuss vary in who is considered the benefitting party (other individ-
uals, the group complement of the altruist as a block, or the whole 
group including the altruist) and in whom the costs of altruism are 
compared (the individual fitness across the population or the local 
group only). Different conditions must be satisfied for “different al-
truisms” to evolve. This means that they are descriptions of slightly 
different evolutionary properties of the traits. Indeed, as Kerr, God-
frey-Smith and Feldman (2004) show, none of the definitions captures 
a sub-category within the extension of another definition, but they are 
genuinely different concepts. This is only partly a definitional issue, 
however. I will discuss this using a definition of generalized evolu-
tionary altruism presented by Anthony Peressini (1993: 584–585) as a 
point of departure: 
1) The altruistic trait is less fit than at least one of the alternative 
traits, when all traits are present. 
2) The relative frequency of an altruistic trait is more than zero in 
an optimal group.  
3) The altruistic trait must be causally responsible for the trans-
fer of fitness, which explains why the first two conditions are 
satisfied. 
Peressini’s first condition is needed to generalize the applicability of 
the concept to all variants in the population. Altruism is usually de-
fined and modelled in a system of two variants, altruistic and selfish. 
This hides the relativity of altruism and selfishness as evolutionary 
concepts: whether a trait is altruistic or selfish depends on other 
287 
 
variants. If an altruistic trait is selected because of group selection, for 
example, and the selfish counterpart disappears, this gets hidden. This 
is why we need a comparison to all alternatives.171 The trait can be 
more beneficial to the individual than some alternatives, as long as 
there are alternatives that are more beneficial. It cannot be a require-
ment for altruism that it is the worse alternative, and this is why the 
trait must be compared to all alternatives. The second condition ex-
presses the benefit for other individuals. Optimal group has the disper-
sion of alternative traits that increases the fitness of the whole group 
more than any other dispersion. If the first condition is satisfied, the 
second condition can be satisfied only by contribution to the fitness of 
others. The third condition is to rule out coincidental correlations.  
The second condition is problematic because of its reference to 
groups, for the reasons mentioned above. Furthermore, it follows 
from the condition that only those traits that maximize the fitness of 
others are altruistic: a trait that increases the fitness of others, but less 
efficiently than an alternative trait, would not be a part of an optimal 
group and therefore would not be altruistic. In other words, evolu-
tionary altruism as defined by group benefits does not define altruism 
but another property that we might call evolutionary groupism: being 
such that it maximizes the fitness of the group (despite being subopti-
mal for the individual). It may turn out that being evolutionarily 
groupist is the only way to be evolutionarily altruist, but this is an 
 
171 “All alternatives” is an ambiguous expression. The range of alternatives 
depends on the explanatory context the same way that all evolutionary com-
parisons between traits do, and it has context-dependent constraints. The rel-
evant alternatives to compare are usually those that actually exist, have ex-
isted, or whose appearance would be reasonable to expect. The last option 
may have stricter or looser and more or less realistic constraints, depending 
on the theoretical interests. A concrete consequence is that a trait could be 
altruistic with a wider comparison of alternatives but selfish within the his-
torical variation. This is a possible explanation for some traits, but we can con-




explanatory relationship. As a definition, it fails. The second condition 
needs to be replaced by a condition that refers to fitness effects in other 
individuals instead. Furthermore, the trait does not need to benefit the 
whole group (whether defined as a group or as individuals) to be al-
truistic, if the core meaning lies in increasing fitness in others. 
In the light of these considerations, I define evolutionary altru-
ism as follows: a trait is evolutionarily altruistic iff 
 
EA 1) at least one of the alternative traits would make the indi-
vidual fitter in the absolute sense of fitness when all traits 
are present, and 
EA 2) the trait contributes to the fitness increase of at least one 
other individual. 
 
The third condition is unnecessary since causality is included in both 
parts of the definition. It should be noted that this definition is only 
meant to pick those traits that are altruistic. In modelling the evolution 
of altruism, for example, relative fitness should still be used, and it is 
probably less complicated to model altruism as a groupist trait instead 
of “only” altruistic, as in the MLS paradigm. The differences in the 
definitions are a problem for theoretical completeness, but also high-
light that there is probably more than one explanation for evolution-
ary altruism if it exists. 
This definition, like all definitions of evolutionary altruism, lacks 
a definition for a trait. Consider the following example. There is an 
environment with only one species of predators that hunts a certain 
prey animal. For example, the predator species is the only species 
large enough to hunt prey animals above a certain size on a regular 
basis. Now, the members of the predator species also have some trou-
ble with the large prey animals and only succeed in injuring them se-
riously without capturing them on a regular basis. This is a failure in 
what they are trying to do. However, the injuries of the prey make it 
significantly easier to capture later. This benefits all the members of 
the species at the same region. This trait – injuring without capturing 
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– seems to be an altruistic trait according to any definition of evolu-
tionary altruism, at least if we stipulate the fitness effects in this 
thought experiment in the right way. 
But intuitively this is not an example of an animal behaving al-
truistically towards its conspecifics. The animal is failing at something 
that it is attempting to do and would do if there were no external con-
straints. This example is a variation of one provided by Jack Wilson 
(2002), who criticizes the definitions of evolutionary altruism of mak-
ing some behaviour “accidentally altruistic” (see also West et al 
2007b). He also points out that concentrating only on evolutionary al-
truism ignores apparently altruistic behaviour that can be explained 
as evolutionarily selfish and calls for something analogical to inten-
tion that could be used to define what the behaviour is about (see also 
Voorzanger 1994). It is therefore necessary to clarify the definition of 
behaviour in biology, and to have a behavioural-level trait definition 
for altruism. 
 
6.2.3. Behavioural Altruism in Biology 
 
According to the evolutionary functionalist approach for individuating 
traits that I proposed in the previous chapter, a behavioural trait is the 
collection of behaviours that jointly achieve something that has positive 
fitness consequences in the environment. We can define it as follows: 
 
BT1)  There are repeatable patterns of behaviour that have a 
robust correlation with an achievement (such as a change 
in the environment) and a mechanism explaining the 
connection between the behaviour and the achievement. 
BT2) The achievement has a positive correlation with the fit-
ness of an individual performing the behaviour. 
BT3) This behaviour is repeated as a behavioural tendency. 
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The first part of the definition binds the behaviour with an achieve-
ment. The second part distinguishes achievement as something that 
the behaviour is about (using its adaptive value) rather than the mere 
consequences of behaviour. There may be several ways to bring about 
the achievement. The various behavioural patterns may be classified 
as separate traits or the same trait, depending on the explanatory in-
terests and theoretical contexts. The same instance of behaviour can 
be a part of several behavioural traits. The mechanism that explains 
the achievement may consist of the bodily behaviours only (if the 
achievement is a direct result of the bodily movement) or include en-
vironmental factors, including responses from other individuals. It 
may be a combination of various things that the individual does and 
various capacities that it possesses, such as in the example of honey 
buzzard. Everything that is a part of the individual’s behaviour and is 
necessary for the mechanism that produces the achievement is a part 
of the behavioural trait. The third part of the definition distinguishes 
a behavioural trait from a single instance of behaviour. The difference 
between a few instances and a fixed tendency is gradual, which means 
that it cannot be quantified in the definition. What matters is that the 
behaviour is common enough to have the positive fitness benefits. 
This account does not state that the trait must be optimal, only 
that there is an evolutionary “purpose” for why an organism does 
what it does: a positive fitness effect through what is achieved. If a 
behavioural pattern does not have a fitness effect that unifies it in this 
way, it does not have an evolutionary function and it is not a trait that 
we could understand from this perspective. This requirement rules 
out characteristics that are harmful, but it does not rule out altruism. 
First, the evolutionary function of a trait may involve long-term con-
sequences that are beneficial and depend on other factors, including 
other individuals. The point of kin selection and reciprocity as expla-
nations lies in the indirect fitness benefits for the organism of its “ap-
parently altruistic” (or behaviourally altruistic) behaviour. As I will 
argue shortly, this implies that we should allow the behavioural traits 
under evolutionary explanation to be non-individualist. These traits 
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are usually thought to be evolutionarily selfish although behaviour-
ally altruistic, but even if they are evolutionarily altruistic, they ex-
pand the proximate-dimension analysis to multiple individuals and 
the fitness effects to all of them. Furthermore, if group selection is a 
theoretical possibility, we can approach the evolutionary functionality 
of a trait from this perspective, which allows evolutionary altruism to 
be evolutionarily functional. This may sound odd after I have just crit-
icized the use of group selection in the analysis of evolutionary altru-
ism. Some clarification is in order. 
I have been explicitly pluralistic about how to define a trait. We 
can define a trait from some other perspective than evolutionary func-
tionalist and discover that it is evolutionarily altruistic. In principle, 
we can define any robust pattern of behaviour as a trait. The problem 
with this regarding evolutionary explanations is that they can be com-
pletely random: there is no point in wondering how an altruistic form 
of behaviour in some context evolved, if it turns out to be a contextual 
consequence of behavioural tendencies that are beneficial to the indi-
vidual choosing that particular strategy in most cases, for example 
(see Johnson, Stopka & Bell 2002). Psychological structures that are 
overall adaptive or developmental pathways that connect different 
types of behaviour can make apparently altruistic behaviour be only 
a side-effect. But as I have argued, we also need to have a way to break 
the behaviour down into tasks (with achievements), since these are 
what matter to why the capacities and tendencies behind the behav-
iour get selected in the first place. Therefore, we need a definition of 
behaviour that is connected to an adaptive function. 
If we use some other criterion for defining what a trait is, we may 
conclude that the trait does not have an evolutionary function at all. 
Not all traits do, of course. For example, there is no evolutionary rea-
son why giant pandas cannot digest most of the food they eat or why 
they are so reluctant to have sex. These characteristics may have an evo-
lutionary explanation, albeit an evolutionary historical explanation that 
is not adaptationist. We could always take an evolutionary historical 
perspective and contrast adaptive and non-adaptive histories. This is 
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not, however, the route that I take here. First, the subject matter of the 
discussion here is evolutionary functionalism specifically. Second, my 
point about the usefulness of (ahistorical) evolutionary functionalism 
in understanding behaviour is precisely that it is a way to understand 
what something is about. This is not an empirically adaptationist 
stance. It is about structuring what the organism’s design is and what 
it does. Let us think about the giant pandas a little bit more. Eating as 
such has an evolutionary function, and we can break the design of the 
panda’s digestive system and eating behaviour into functional parts 
of the holistic system that has this function. Some details of this system 
are “bad design,” which should be replaced by something more func-
tional. But we can only say that something is badly designed in the 
context of approaching the system as one that has a design from an 
evolutionary perspective (see Orzack & Sober 1994a; Dennett 1995). 
The panda’s digestive system is almost a reverse situation with whales 
having lungs: the design of the whale’s respiratory system is very well 
adapted for being a sea creature with lungs, except for the premise of 
having a sea creature with lungs in the first place, which is not a very 
bright idea in terms of design. In the case of the giant panda, the be-
haviour is adapted to the environment (there is plenty of bamboo) but 
the digestive system is not adapted to that particular food very well. 
Still, the trait of interest here is the digestion of bamboo, which we 
identify with eating bamboo having an evolutionary function in the 
panda’s design. It just happens to be badly instantiated. 
In this example, bamboo digestion is a trait, and the alternative 
physiologies are mutually exclusive variants to achieve the same thing. 
Some possible physiologies do not achieve this very well, but the 
“achievement” that gives the function of the trait is fixed by the fact 
that the pandas are eating bamboo, which has the function of obtain-
ing nutrition. In the case of behaviour, different behavioural strategies 
are not always “aimed” at achieving the same thing, in the sense de-
fined above, but what makes them alternatives is that there is some-
thing of fitness value in the situation. There are different mutually ex-
clusive behavioural choices with mutually exclusive achievements 
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regarding the same behavioural context, which determines the fitness 
gains and losses. For example, the comparison between selfishness 
and altruism is between alternative behavioural variants in the same 
social context. They are comparable only in relation to something that 
is achievable. Furthermore, we cannot restrict the comparison to be-
haviour in one context only if we wish to talk about behavioural traits, 
not just behaviour. We need to think about the more general function 
of the behaviour in the specific context from the point of view of the 
organism’s form of life. In doing so, we can cluster all the mutually 
exclusive variants as a contrast class, including doing nothing. This class 
can be considered a trait in a broader sense – behaviour (whatever 
variant it takes) in relation to something at stake that is valuable in 
fitness in the context. This is analogous to digesting bamboo, and the 
behavioural traits in the narrow sense (what is done in this context, 
the manifest variant) are analogical to the alternative physiologies. In 
other words, we can use the evolutionary functionalist approach to 
define an actual trait but also to define a theoretical contrast class, 
which is essential for knowing the adaptive value of the variant in 
contrast to its alternatives. 
Our interest in modelling the competition lies in discovering the 
population-level dispersion of the alternatives: which of the alterna-
tives becomes dominant, or which frequency becomes stable – if there 
is an equilibrium in the first place (see McElreath & Boyd 2007). In 
modelling social evolution, the relevant alternatives are compared 
against each other. In the narrow sense of a trait, different traits are 
being compared, but in the broad sense of a trait, the alternatives are 
variants of the same trait. Identifying the evolutionary significance 
(the possible achievements) and figuring out the optimal variant are 
separate things to evaluate about the trait. We can identify the evolu-
tionary function of digesting bamboo and discover that pandas are 
very badly adapted to it. We can also identify a social behavioural trait 
according to what the evolutionary role of that kind of social interac-
tion is and discover that the actual behaviour is not optimal at all. In 
addition, it can increase other individuals’ fitness instead. If this is 
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what the behaviour is systematically correlated with, it is its “achieve-
ment”. It is not defined through its own positive fitness effect, but 
through it being an alternative to a trait that has an achievement with 
a positive fitness effect. An altruistic trait is a trait in an evolutionary 
functionalist framework because it is a variant to a selfish trait that 
defines what is at stake in the behavioural context. That said, the be-
haviour that appears to be altruistic may turn out to be beneficial in 
the end and, therefore, have an evolutionary function. This is the case 
with apparently altruistic behaviour that can be explained with kin 
selection or reciprocity-based models – and possibly with MLS mod-
els. I will return to this later.  
Whether or not a trait is genuinely evolutionarily altruistic, it can 
appear to be, and this can be called behavioural altruism. Just like in 
a psychological context, it is a characteristic of a behavioural trait to 
be directed to someone else’s wellbeing than the individual them-
selves in its goals. In psychological and biological contexts, the means 
to decide the directedness are defined differently (intentional goals 
versus the achievement) and the wellbeing is measured differently, 
fitness being the important factor in biology. There is no point in de-
fining altruism as a phenotype with actual fitness consequences, how-
ever, for the reasons discussed above. The difference between behav-
ioural and evolutionary notions of altruism is that one refers to the 
appearance of behaviour and the other to its actual consequences. 
From the evolutionary (functionalist) point of view, the appearances 
that matter are those that are connected to fitness. All this being the 
case, a behaviourally altruistic trait is a trait that systematically transfers 
resources that are normally associated with fitness with this species. For 
example, food has fitness consequences, so sharing food is behaviour-
ally altruistic.  
Behaviour must be non-accidental in order for it to be a trait and 
for the attribute of behavioural altruism to apply. However, there can 
be many different evolutionary rationales behind such behaviour, 
some of which we might not consider “genuine” altruism. It can be, 
for example, coerced behaviour, or done to appease an individual who 
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is higher in the social hierarchy, or it may be about trading goods.172 If 
there is a selected mechanism for the altruistic behaviour and there 
are no further goals to be achieved in proximate terms, I call it quasi-
intentional biological altruism. This is similar to the  agentive altruism 
defined earlier, with the difference being that in agentive altruism, the 
ultimateness of the goal is defined by the agentive description (no fur-
ther goals needed for there to be a reason to act) whereas here the 
functional design works as a quasi-intention, the “intention of the de-
sign.”173 In principle, this concept can be applied to both a particular 
behavioural instance and a generalized behavioural trait, but the in-
terest in biological approaches to behaviour is almost always the lat-
ter. Biological altruism can be either evolutionarily selfish or altruistic, 
depending on its actual net fitness consequences. The same applies to 
behavioural altruism that is not quasi-intentional but induced. That is, 
the behavioural altruism (in general) can turn out to be either evolu-
tionary pseudo-altruism (that is, it turns out to be evolutionary self-





172 As discussed earlier, Ronald Noë and Peter Hammerstein (1994, 1995 & 
2016) have proposed that some animal social behaviour could be understood 
as trading of goods and services on “biological markets,” especially in coop-
eration and partner choice. Whether this is an adequate explanatory device, 
much of the social activities of animals involve trading-like direct reciprocity 
(on the level of goods). This should not be confused with reciprocal altruism, 
which is “trading” on the level of fitness. 
173 It should be noted, once again, that the evolutionary “reasons” cannot be 
treated as analogical to agentive reasons. They are different dimensions of 
projecting teleology onto a complex functional system. Human behaviour, for 
example, might have both evolutionary and agentive reasons, and they would 
not compete or be directly related in any other way either. This applies to the 
notions of altruism as well, as we are about to see. 
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6.3. Kinds of Altruism and Why We Should Care about Them 
 
Now it is time for a systematic presentation of the kinds of altruism 
discussed above, how they are related, and why distinguishing be-
tween them matters for explanations. The “basic” concept is behav-
ioural altruism. I have used the same term in both psychological and 
biological contexts because I think the base concept is the same and its 
application requires various specifications in any case. Roughly 
speaking, it refers to behaviour that increases a good of some sort in an-
other individual. I will provide a full definition later. We can apply this 
to both an individual occurrence of behaviour and a behavioural trait. 
The good that is increased needs a content, something to use as a 
measure. Using Beatrice and Amos as our protagonists again, the al-
truism of Beatrice’s actions can be measured by the increase in Amos’s 
welfare, happiness, or accomplishment of his goals or preferences. These three 
measures do not necessarily capture the same behaviour. We could also 
measure altruism in fitness, but this is a measure in a different dimen-
sion. These two dimensions lead into psychological and biological (or 
evolutionary) notions of altruism and further distinctions within these 
notions. However, these dimensions are not entirely separate.  
 
6.3.1. Behavioural Altruism Elaborated 
 
Which goods Beatrice seeks to maximize makes a difference: welfare, 
happiness, or preferences. There is another difference between Be-
atrice maximizing the good of a given kind the way she perceives it, 
the way she thinks Amos perceives it, and as an objective matter. There 
is also a difference between the helping being both intentional and al-
truistic and it being intentionally altruistic. In the latter case, it is agen-
tively altruistic. The measure is bound to Beatrice’s cognitive limita-
tions: it can be altruistic only in the ways that Beatrice can think are 
altruistic. If the requirement is only that the instances of behaviour are 
intentional, and the behavioural trait overall is altruistic, the measure 
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can be objective, too. For example, if a parent has a tendency to scold 
their child for behaving badly, it may be a reaction born of annoyance 
and frustration but have an overall positive effect on how the child 
grows up.174 This is not necessarily an important distinction in practice 
but has to do with how the concept of human behavioural altruism is 
related to the concept of biological behavioural altruism. 
In animal contexts, but also in the human context from an evolu-
tionary point of view, fitness is relevant. We can define another meas-
ure of behavioural altruism as whatever typically increases welfare, as 
discussed in the previous chapter. This is the core biological notion of 
behavioural altruism and one that defines the biological phenomena 
that are the explananda in the evolutionary explanations of altruistic 
behaviour. We can assume that some behaviours measured in happi-
ness or by the accomplishment of agentive goals in human contexts 
are biologically altruistic in this sense, and welfare even more so, but 
this is not always the case. I will conflate the behavioural altruisms 
(the various ways in which it can be defined in human contexts and 
the fitness-related biological definition) on the level of analysis of the 
behaviour for the following reasons. Although the agent is limited in 
her ability to know what is good for the recipient, attempts to help 
nevertheless result in fitness increase more often than in decrease. The 
pleasure of the recipient is not necessarily fitness-increasing either,175 
but I assume that pleasure and distress are good proxies for the things 
that have fitness consequences and selected to be such. The same 
holds for helping with goals or preferences – not all goals and prefer-
ences increase fitness when accomplished,176 but generally speaking 
 
174 This is not to claim that this is the case – scolding might have negative over-
all effects just as well. 
175 For example, the pleasure from eating sweet and fatty foods, which are se-
lected preferences in scarcity, but are harmful in the contemporary Western 
abundance of sugar and fat. 
176  We may even have selected preferences that would decrease fitness if 
achieved, since they were selected for what we actually achieve while trying to 
achieve the goals. (See Sterelny 2003.) 
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helping to achieve them or to work towards their direction is fitness-
increasing rather than fitness-decreasing for the recipient. Human be-
havioural altruism, therefore, tends to be biological behavioural altru-
ism too. Selection for biological behavioural altruism in human con-
texts may mostly be selection of human behavioural altruism, and the 
evolutionary understanding of human behavioural altruism is the 
evolutionary understanding of biological behavioural altruism. But 
although I assume that the overlap between human and biological be-
havioural altruism is substantial enough to discuss them as generally 
the same, behavioural altruism is clearly distinct from both psycho-
logical and evolutionary altruism.177 
As discussed above, it may turn out that the altruistic conse-
quences of seemingly altruistic behaviour are not the (evolutionary or 
intended) function of the behaviour, but a side effect or an “error.” We 
need a further criterion for connecting the behaviour with its altruistic 
consequences, and I have presented two ways to do it: through inten-
tionality of helping, and through a selected mechanism to behave in a 
certain way, which I have called quasi-intentional biological altru-
ism. In both cases, we can distinguish between behaviour that has the 
altruistic consequences as its ultimate goal and behaviour that is in-
strumental to achieving something else. We can call these four kinds 
of altruisms genuine agentive altruism (as defined earlier), agentive 
 
177 The deliberate conflation I am performing here is not the one that Neven 
Sesardic (1995 & 1999) considers to be the evolutionary problem of psycho-
logical altruism: that psychological altruism tends to produce evolutionary 
altruistic behaviour. Once the concept of behavioural altruism is introduced, 
psychological and evolutionary altruism become two different additional 
properties of behavioural altruism. It could even be the case that the strongest 
evolutionary cases for psychological altruism as a mechanism for producing 
the selected behaviour are those in which the behaviour can be explained as 
evolutionarily selfish (with kin selection or as reciprocal altruism) and the 
strongest cases for evolutionary altruism do not involve psychological altru-
ism (the case being “altruistic punishment”).  I have argued for this coinci-
dental “paradox” elsewhere (Kokkonen 2003). 
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pseudo-altruism, genuine quasi-intentional biological altruism, 
and quasi-intentional biological pseudo-altruism. Again, these are 
not the same distinctions intensionally, and probably not extension-
ally identical either, but I will collapse them together in human con-
texts for simplicity. Agentive altruism is an agentive-level description. 
Quasi-intentional biological altruism is analogical to this in the sense 
that it is an interpretation of what an animal “attempts” to do. The 
direct equation of the two would be a case of the Freudo-Darwinian 
fallacy. We cannot do this in the case of an individual action. If we 
switch our focus to behavioural traits, however, we can think of both 
as behavioural altruism. In the human context, a behaviourally altru-
istic behavioural trait is a tendency to intentionally help under specific 
conditions. In the biological context, a behaviourally altruistic behav-
iour trait is, likewise, a tendency to be internally directed to help un-
der specific conditions. In human contexts these may almost be 
equated, with three caveats. First, this can be done, even in principle, 
only in the cases where we are providing an evolutionary explanation 
for a behavioural trait. This is, however, what we are interested in 
here. Second, human behavioural altruism is connected to two kinds 
of intentionality, as mentioned above: the intentionality of the action 
that we consider altruistic, and the intentionality of altruism (whether 
this is the instrumental or ultimate goal for the agent – we are not dis-
cussing psychological altruism yet). This binds the nature of helping 
to the agent’s understanding of the situation, including their epistemic 
constraints, which are not constraints on assessing something as be-
haviourally altruistic. 
But, again, we are discussing behavioural tendencies here. The 
psychological mechanisms involved in these tendencies (including ra-
tional reflection and deliberation) are the basis for wanting to behave 
in certain ways. We can assume that, in most cases, people understand 
that they are helping someone when they intentionally act in a way 
that is beneficial to that someone. We can also assume that the criteria 
for us to evaluate an act as altruistic on the agentive level lie in the 
recognition of some psychological feature that we would also identify 
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as a part of the altruistic behavioural tendency as a proximate mecha-
nism in the biological description. This does not need to be an altruis-
tic motivational mechanism, though. Furthermore, all other psycho-
logical mechanisms (for example, completely instinctual ones) would 
also be fallible. So, once more, I assume that behavioural altruism, as 
defined in the section on human altruism, and behavioural altruism, 
as defined in terms of quasi-intentionality, overlap enough that it 
makes sense to use “behavioural altruism” as a unifying concept in 
discussing the evolutionary basis of altruistic behaviour. I do not pro-
pose that they are the same thing or that human behavioural altruism 
(consisting of intentional actions) is a type of quasi-intentional biolog-
ical altruism. At minimum, quasi-intentional biological altruism in-
volves actual intentional helping and therefore human behavioural al-
truism in human contexts is enough for this to be the most typical case 
of quasi-intentional biological altruism in humans. Therefore, without 
presuming a conceptual equivalence or full extensional co-occurrence, 
I will talk about behavioural altruism in this limited context (evolu-
tionary perspective on human behaviour) as if it is both human be-
havioural altruism and biological behavioural altruism. 
Now, we can redefine genuine behavioural altruism as a char-
acteristic of a behavioural trait in which 
  
BA 1) the person contributes to another individual’s welfare or 
achievement of their preferences 
BA 2) without this behaviour having the aim of increasing the 
person’s own welfare or independent preferences. 
 
“Independent preferences” means that the agent would not have 
these preferences without the recipient of altruism. The agent may 
prefer to make the recipient happy, for example, and the helping is 
instrumental to this, but the preferences would not exist inde-
pendently. Helping may have positive consequences for the agent, for 
example, reputation or future reciprocity, but these cannot be what 
the behaviour is aimed at. For example, friendship as a form of 
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relationship includes a possibility or even expectation of reciprocation 
of help if a need occurs. But this possible future help does not need to 
be a condition for helping. If it is, the help is not altruistic. (The unin-
tended consequences may be, however, the evolutionary reason for 
the tendency to have evolved.) If the second condition is not satisfied, 
the helping behaviour is a case of behavioural pseudo-altruism.  
An important aspect of an altruistic trait is the context of behav-
ing altruistically, or the range of altruistic behaviour. Philip Kitcher 
(1997) distinguishes four dimensions in altruism: intensity, pervasive-
ness, extent, and empathy. Intensity refers to how much weight the 
agent gives the good of the recipient, compared to their own good. 
There is pure egoism at one end, and “ultra-altruism” (taking only 
others’ interests into account) at the other.178 Pervasiveness refers to the 
variety of interactions in which the agent behaves altruistically. Extent 
is the extent of the individuals who are targeted by altruism. Empathy, 
in this context, is the ability to correctly read the recipient’s needs or 
preferences. A fifth dimension, related to this, is proactivity of help; 
chimpanzees, for example, react only to signals of need, but bonobos 
(like humans) are proactive in helping (Melis 2018). Kitcher does not 
distinguish between psychological and behavioural altruism, and he 
uses the term “psychological altruism” in his discussion, but these di-
mensions may be applied to both: either they are properties of the al-
truistic behavioural tendencies or specify the contexts in which the 
empathetic concern arises.179 From the evolutionary point of view, the 
behaviour is what matters.  
Kitcher discusses differences between individuals in their ten-
dency to be altruistic, but it would be more accurate to make these 
evaluations trait by trait. In fact, it is extremely important to qualify 
the traits in the right way for the evolutionary analysis. A particular 
 
178 This is similar to the distinction by Sober 1989 between different strengths 
of altruism that was discussed earlier. 
179 Note that although the tendency to be an altruist may be quantified on the 
level of a trait, the difference between altruistic and selfish behaviour remains 
a qualitative difference. 
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kind of helping behaviour may seem like evolutionary altruistic in iso-
lation but turn to be part of a more general behavioural trait that, 
when all the occurrences and their contexts are taken into account, is 
fitness-increasing overall and there just happen to be some instances 
that would be fitness-decreasing in isolation. For example, helping be-
haviour might evolve because it is mostly directed to kin or recipro-
cating partners, but the selected behavioural inclinations result in sys-
tematic help of some other individuals too. There could be selection 
pressures to weed out the non-beneficial interaction, but if the psycho-
logical capacities to distinguish between the cases are not readily 
available, or if there would be other fitness consequences for doing so 
(for example, maintenance of the capacities or too much error in mak-
ing the distinction), this does not lead into the evolution of a differ-
ence-maker, even if natural selection is the only factor considered. 
 
6.3.2. Biology of Psychological Altruism 
 
Behavioural altruism includes the idea that there is a psychological 
tendency to help without this help being an instrumental means to 
something else. This is the function of whatever psychological mecha-
nism instantiates it. Psychological altruism is a specific kind of moti-
vation mechanism – empathetic concern, as discussed previously. 
There are alternative psychological mechanisms that could underlie 
the same behavioural disposition and make both behavioural and 
agentive altruistic descriptions true. There could be various egoistic 
motivation mechanisms that accomplish the same function in most 
cases (such as becoming distressed from perceiving distress), or moti-
vation mechanisms that do not consider the welfare or preferences of 
any party, such as making a moral judgement or executing an action 
script that may be, for example, an internalized social norm or just a 
habit. As Elliot Sober and David Sloan Wilson (Sober & Wilson 1998) 
point out, however, there is a significant causal difference between the 
different mechanisms: different interventions on the system have dif-
ferent effects. For example, if Beatrice’s helping of Amos depends on 
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the distress that she experiences from seeing him in distress and there 
is no empathetic concern, medication that leaves Beatrice numb to dis-
tress would remove the motivation. With genuine psychological al-
truism, this would not happen. According to the pluralistic motiva-
tion theory (Batson 1991 & 2011; Kitcher 1997; Sober & Wilson 1998), 
there are multiple mechanisms, both empathetic concern and distress, 
but also moral and reflective sources for action. 
Sober and Wilson (1998; Sober 1989) are careful to keep psycho-
logical altruism and what they call “apparent altruism” apart, pre-
cisely because of the different counterfactuals that the different mech-
anistic bases support (cf. Kitcher 1997), but they do not pay behav-
ioural altruism (their “apparent altruism”) the attention it needs. It is 
this tendency that is mostly relevant for fitness purposes, but also for 
other evaluations of someone being an altruist. Sober and Wilson 
rightly point out that the differences between the motivation mecha-
nisms translate into differences in the reliability of the selected behav-
iour, which is fitness-relevant (see also Batson 2011). This is their clas-
sical evolutionary argument for the existence of psychological altru-
ism, in a nutshell. They also point out, to undermine a counterargu-
ment, that there is no reason to believe that altruistic preferences 
would be less obtainable as the ultimate preferences, especially given 
that there are altruistic instrumental preferences anyway. However, 
the distinction between psychological and agentive descriptions 
makes a difference here. On the agentive level, there is indeed no con-
ceivable difference between ultimate and instrumental preferences. 
But this does not hold on the psychological level. If the cognitively 
primitive organisms we descend from had a simple motivation sys-
tem that worked through pain and pleasure only as proxies (that is, 
the motivation system is hedonistic), it would have been likely for us 
to evolve into beings whose altruistic tendencies were mediated 
through pleasure from helping and distress from others’ distress.  
As it happens, this scenario is not very likely to be true. Accord-
ing to Stephanie Preston and Frans de Waal (2002; Preston 2007; de 
Waal 2009), empathy at large is an evolutionarily very old and robust 
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motivation system, in which very primitive motivational and cogni-
tive structures (that is, empathy and mimicry) are layered with cogni-
tively more sophisticated layers of motivational and cognitive struc-
tures (as usually happens in evolution) (see also Batson 2011; Church-
land 2011). In de Waal’s “Russian doll model” (de Waal 2007), the in-
nermost layer consists of capacities and tendencies to motor mimicry 
and emotional contagion, which are connected to each other. They are 
automatic state-matching processes and do not involve higher pro-
cessing (as exemplified by contagious yawning).180 The next layer in-
cludes coordination and shared goals on the cognitive (mimicry) side, 
and empathetic concern181 and consolation on the empathy side. This 
involves understanding others’ situations. The final layer has “true 
imitation” and emulation (that is, cognition involved in simulation) 
on the mimicry side and perspective-taking and targeted helping on 
the empathy side. There is also both behavioural and neuroscientific 
empirical evidence for the evolutionary earliness of empathy, and the 
popular theory is that its origin lies in parental care, but the system 
has been adapted to participate in other contexts for other functions182 
(de Waal 2009; Batson 2011; Churchland 2011). As Preston and de 
Waal also point out, there is an increasing self-other distinction going 
higher in the layers. The core of empathy is direct mimicry and conta-
gion, bypassing any higher-level simulation. 
The empirical evidence indicates that genuine psychological al-
truism almost certainly exists. This is not important here as such, since 
the details of the mechanism that produces altruistic behaviour are not 
crucial in the discussion after this section. It is, however, instructive to 
take a closer look at how Sober and Wilson (1998) present the argu-
ment, and at Steven Stich’s (2007) criticism of it. Stich argues that a 
richer conceptualization on the psychological level allows for 
 
180 The processes on this level are also a good example of the enactive, non-repre-
sentational part of cognition that was discussed earlier (e.g. Hutto & Myin 2017). 
181 De Waal calls this “sympathetic concern”, but it is the same thing. 
182 The other functions include altruistic behaviour in other contexts, but al-
truism is not the only function of empathy. It also exists to reduce aggression. 
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alternative descriptions of preference structures that do not need to 
have ultimate altruistic preferences. It is enough that we have sub-dox-
astic states (Stich 1978; see also Fodor 1983; Stich 1990; Corey & Spelke 
1996) that are representational but are not inferentially integrated, 
conscious, or changeable. These representations could be innate (in 
the sense I define in the next chapter) and selected to direct altruistic 
behaviour, and they could make an instrumental altruistic preference 
reliably present. For example, if the content of the fixed sub-doxastic 
state is “I will feel bad if I do not help my child,” hedonistic motivation 
will reliably result in helping the child. This means that Sober and 
Wilson’s evolutionary argument from reliability for psychological al-
truism does not work.183 
The validity of the argument for the existence of altruism is not 
important for the main issue at hand, but there is another conclusion 
to be drawn from this critique. Within the distinction between psycho-
logical, behavioural, and agentive altruism, helping is both behav-
ioural and agentive altruism regardless of the psychological mecha-
nism involved. If we cannot distinguish between genuine psycholog-
ical altruism and agentively and behaviourally altruistic psychologi-
cal pseudo-altruism in any way that is connected to introspection, be-
havioural tendencies, or practically possible manipulations to the mo-
tivation structure of the individual, how important would a psycho-
logical altruism like this be? However, as Stich (2007) himself says, it 
is not clear what the hedonist and altruistic claims are. If the sub-dox-
astic state that Stich proposes were fixed and non-conscious and reli-
ably produced altruistic preferences (albeit strictly speaking instrumen-
tal), should we not consider this a part of the empathetic-concern 
mechanism that utilizes a hedonistic system as its subsystem? What ex-
actly would be the difference? Stich stipulates that the instrumental 
altruistic preference within this process is the only altruistic part of 
 
183 See also Rosas 2002 for criticism of the reliability argument. Nevertheless, 
as I said above, the empirical evidence for the existence of the empathetic sys-
tem seems to be strong anyway (de Waal 2009; Batson 2011; Churchland 2011). 
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the process, but if the fixed sub-doxastic state is bound to this prefer-
ence (and this is Stich’s stipulation, without which the argument 
would not go through), this pair together constitutes a robust altruistic 
motivational structure that has no further motivation behind it. The 
only reasons to keep the two parts apart would be to interpret the 
“preference” in question as an agentive-level preference and therefore 
distinct from the representative states on the psychological level anal-
ysis. On the agentive level of analysis, however, the action guided by 
this system would be altruistic anyway. 
But there are other, less speculative contexts in which failure to 
distinguish between the levels and the different notions of altruisms 
results in fallacy. For example, Joseph Butler (1726) famously argued 
against psychological hedonism by showing that internal hedonistic 
states are not the goals of actions. Elliot Sober (1992c; Sober & Wilson 
1998) has pointed out that this argument confuses the different types 
of motivational factors for action: external and internal. Sober does not 
make the distinction in these terms, but this is the difference between 
psychological and agentive. Philip Kitcher (1997) seems to make the 
same mistake in discussing altruism. As mentioned, he does not dis-
tinguish between psychological and behavioural altruism. He argues 
for altruism by claiming that even the hedonistic theory presupposes 
altruism. In his example, a child is hungry and crying and his mother 
feeds him to get rid of the distress this causes in herself. But, Kitcher 
argues, the mother’s distress presupposes that she is concerned for the 
child’s wellbeing, and the distress is caused by this concern. There-
fore, altruism exists in this situation. But which altruism? The distress 
is the motivation mechanism that the crying triggers. The action in this 
example would be psychologically selfish – but agentively and behav-
iourally altruistic. Again, what matters in helping is that there is an 
altruistic behavioural tendency that has a psychological implementa-
tion. This, in turn, is also behavioural altruism in the biological sense, 
as we have stipulated – it is about one person (mother) doing some-
thing to another person (child) that has the fitness-transferring prop-
erty as a type of activity. Evolutionary altruism, on the other hand, is 
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strictly about real fitness consequences. A mother helping her child 
increases her own fitness.184 
 
6.3.3. Kinds of Altruism 
 
To sum up the chapter, this is how the main altruism concepts are re-
lated: 
 
Seemingly altruistic behaviour: helping another individual (measured 
in goods that have fitness consequences). 
 
- Is helping voluntary and the intrinsic goal of the behaviour? If yes, it 
is genuine behavioural altruism, if not, it is behavioural 
pseudo-altruism. If we are discussing an individual action in a 
human context, genuine altruism includes the identification of al-
truistic intention, which makes it agentive altruism. If the in-
tended altruism is the ultimate goal of the action, it is genuine 
agentive altruism, but if it is an instrumental goal for something 
else that is self-serving, it is agentive pseudo-altruism. In a bio-
logical context, the behaviour needs to be a part of a behavioural 
trait that is altruistic as measured by its apparent fitness conse-
quences. This is quasi-intentional biological altruism. A psy-
chological trait is behaviourally altruistic if it is identified with a 
tendency to act altruistically. 
 
 
184 I will return to kin selection and inclusive fitness in the last part of the the-
sis, but it should already be noted that helping offspring should be considered 
an increase in direct fitness, not indirect. The core idea of fitness is not only to 
have offspring, but have them breeding further, which means that helping 
one’s offspring to grow to adulthood is a part of direct fitness. (However, the 
child using resources that could be used to raise the next child is against the 
parents’ evolutionary interests, which leads to parent–offspring conflict.) 
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- Is helping guided by empathetic concern? If yes, it is genuine psy-
chological altruism. If the guiding mechanism is different but 
there is a psychological basis directive to behavioural altruism, it 
is psychological pseudo-altruism. Psychological altruism may 
be strong or weak depending on whether altruistic motivation 
can override self-regarding motivation. 
 
- Does helping increase another individual’s fitness? If yes, it is evolu-
tionary altruism. If this increase is compensated for by increasing 
the fitness of the agent indirectly, it is evolutionary pseudo-al-
truism, but if not, it is genuine evolutionary altruism. Evolution-
ary altruism can be strong or weak depending on whether it de-
creases absolute fitness in the agent or only relative. 
 
If apparently altruistic behaviour is manipulated by the recipient or it 
is conditional to some other benefit for the agent, it is behaviourally 
pseudo-altruistic. The condition may be, for example, reciprocal help 
in the future, or direct reciprocation with other goods.185  Much of 
helping behaviour is probably conditional pro-sociality like this. But 
if the only (external) goal of the behaviour is the help, it is genuinely 
behaviourally altruistic. The altruism of the action can be measured in 
wellbeing, pleasure and pain, the accomplishment of the goals of the 
recipient’s action, or his or her preferences. These are different 
measures that entail different things being altruistic under different 
measures, but the core of the concept is other-directedness. In human 
contexts, the other-directedness is related to the intentionality of the 
other-directedness. An individual act that is intentionally other-
 
185 In animal contexts, things such as grooming in exchange for holding babies 
or sharing food in exchange for sex are examples, and these interactions can 
be modelled, for example, as biological markets, as trading of services and 
partner choice (Noë & Hammerstein 1994a, 1994b & 2016). The alpha male of 
a chimpanzee group who makes sure that the other individuals treat each 
other fairly in order to keep the subjects happy and stay in power (a better 
strategy to stay in power than bullying) is another example (de Waal 2013). 
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directed is agentive altruism, but traits do not have agentive descrip-
tions. In biological contexts, there must be some analogy to intention-
ality, and the measure of altruism is in the transfer of goods that have 
fitness benefits. This is quasi-intentional biological altruism. Speaking 
of human behavioural traits, (human) behavioural altruism and 
(quasi-intentional) biological altruism are not the same but overlap-
ping, and from the evolutionary point of view, the main target of ex-
planation is the existence and function of behaviourally altruistic traits 
that are both intentionally other-directed and transfer goods that have 
fitness consequences. Evolutionary functionalist explanations for be-
haviour like this try to show that the apparent fitness transfer has a 
function that makes it directly or indirectly selfish in the evolutionary 
sense, nevertheless. Evolutionary selfishness and altruism are related 
to the actual fitness consequences. 
The psychological mechanisms that guide altruistic behaviour 
are another object of explanation. However, the existence of genuine 
psychological altruism is not necessarily the most crucial issue in un-
derstanding altruistic behaviour. There is a variety of cognitive and 
motivation mechanisms that produce the behaviour together, and if 
we are interested in the basis of altruism, we should be interested in 
all these mechanisms in greater detail both on the neural and the psy-
chological level. These mechanisms manifest in capacities and tenden-
cies, and the mechanism that produces the behaviour in the given con-
text is constituted by these parts and their orchestrated activities in the 
context.186 Agentive altruism will not have evolutionary explanations 
of any kind – that would be a category mistake – and we should not 
let the agentive level guide our thinking too much about the functions 
of the psychological capacities either.  
Following Marr (1982), I have distinguished three levels of anal-
ysis: the function, how this function is accomplished in what the mind 
 
186 As a reminder: although I refer to human psychology in mechanistic terms 
and this as such is controversial, the notion of mechanism I discussed previ-
ously is very liberal in what things can constitute parts and connections. 
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does (the algorithmic level), and how this (what mind does) is instan-
tiated in neural processes. In the case of psychological altruism, the 
implementation is important, since altruistic tendencies are built upon 
more primitive operations (de Waal 2009; Batson 2011; Churchland 
2011) – one could even say that not only are there no hedonistic con-
straints on psychological altruism, but given the way the mammal brain 
works, there are empathetic constraints on purely hedonistic motivation sys-
tems.187 How psychological functions are implemented on the neural 
and algorithmic levels are two different explananda in the evolutionary 
explanation of altruism. But the “basics” of psychology, such as em-
pathetic concern or emotional contagion, are also associated in a vari-
ety of behavioural traits and no behavioural trait can be identified 
with a specific psychological capacity. There may be a rare exception 
and we can always define a behavioural trait as everything a given 
psychological characteristic is involved with, as discussed in the first 
subchapter of this chapter, but this changes the topic from function-
ally defined behavioural traits to something else. 
 
 
6.4. Individualism and Holism in Behavioural Traits 
 
Abandoning individualism by dissecting the cognition and motiva-
tion mechanisms in greater detail opens the door for holism. This may 
sound paradoxical, but just as cognitive processes can be selected for 
their functionality in an individual’s isolated behaviour, they can be 
selected for their role in social interaction. I will explicate this point 
next and define evolutionary individualism and holism in the proxi-
mate dimension. I will then argue for interactionist holism by discuss-
ing the evolution of reciprocal altruism. I will then make some re-
marks about human sociality and the possibility of collectivist holism. 
 
 




6.4.1. Individualism and Holism in the Proximate Dimension 
 
In an individualist evolutionary functionalist approach to behaviour, 
behavioural occurrences form traits according to the role played by 
the emerging behavioural patterns in the organism’s life, understood 
through how the behaviour results in an achievement that makes in-
dividuals more adaptive in its environment. This was discussed with 
the example of the hornet-hunting behaviour of the honey buzzard. 
The behaviour is produced by capacities and tendencies that we can 
understand as a mechanism for that behaviour. The mechanistic basis 
also includes environmental factors, but they do not need to be part of 
the evolving system. However, sometimes they may be, as in niche 
construction processes (Odling-Smee, Laland & Feldman 2003).  
What is of interest here is the possibility of cases where some-
thing that other individuals do is a necessary part of a mechanistic 
structure that contributes to the fitness-relevant achievement, and this 
doing of another individual is also a part of a mechanism that achieves 
something for this other individual. In other words, the evolving sys-
tem requires interaction between individuals and the evolution of this 
behaviour involves the co-evolution of individual behavioural 
tendencies that take the behaviour of the partner into account. This 
makes the behavioural trait interactionist (it only emerges within an 
interaction) and the explanation holistic. The trait is interactive in two 
senses: the phenotype is interactive, but it is also constituted in the 
interaction between individual traits and group properties – that is, 
the makeup of the group regarding the trait. The trait’s contribution 
to the fitness depends on the sum of the interactions the individual 
has in the various individuals they encounter within the group. There-
fore, the trait is holistic, not just relational. If understanding the func-
tionality of the behaviour requires the perspective of the whole group 
(such as in organized division of labour), the group forms a super-
individual regarding this trait, in which case the trait is a trait of the 
group. The difference between the last two cases is the difference be-
tween interactionist holism and collectivist holism. In all cases, we are 
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interested in the function of behaviour, and in all cases some of the 
component parts of the behaviour are psychological processes. The 
difference between individualism, interactionist holism, and collectiv-
ist holism lies in whether the psychological processes participate in 
the production of behaviour that is functional and intelligible at the 
level of individuals, forms of interaction, or groups. 
How realistic is it to assume such an interaction? What I describe 
above may sound like it requires intentional joint action of the kind 
that is studied in the action theory. This would make it something that 
could not plausibly be an object of the selection itself, although the 
capacity for such action might be. However, this is not the case if we 
abandon agentive explanation framework for behaviour, and ap-
proach behaviour as produced by cognitive capacities and tendencies, 
as I have argued.188 I have already discussed the dual process theories 
 
188 Dan Sperber (1997) has argued for sub-individual cognitivism against in-
dividualism in social sciences based on greater realism and explanatory 
depth. The distinction between the “agentive” level and “psychological” level 
that I used earlier coincides with this distinction between “individual” and 
“cognitive” in some respects. However, my “psychological” is a general cate-
gory of relevant sub-personal causal processes that participate in producing 
behaviour, regardless of the level of abstraction in description, and some of 
these might not be “cognitive”, strictly speaking. Sperber criticizes traditional 
individualism, which he calls “strongly individualistic” (the explanatory fac-
tors are individual-level properties) and “weakly cognitivist” (the role of cog-
nition is trivial), of being a non-realist and non-naturalist approach to human 
behaviour in the guise of being more realistic. He calls for a position that is 
“weakly individualist” and “strongly cognitivist” instead, in which explana-
tions refer to infra-individualistic cognitive processes and are naturalistic and 
mechanistic in the sense that it takes cognitive science and biology, for exam-
ple, more seriously. This also entails that cognitive factors are causes among 
other types of causes, not reason explanations sui generis. The rationale of 
behavioural economics (for example, Kahneman & Tversky 1979; Hogarth & 
Refer 1987; Kahneman 2003; Diamond & Vartiainen 2012) is to do exactly this. 
Jaakko Kuorikoski and Petri Ylikoski (2008) have criticized the speciality of 
individual agency in explanation – or intentional fundamentalism, as they call 
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of cognition and non-conscious behavioural guidance. There is strong 
psychological evidence suggesting that we react automatically to 
some cues in the environment, including the social environment, 
without deliberative processes, in ways that affect our social behav-
iour; some of our attitudes in social situations are non-conscious, and 
we may “tune in” with others automatically through direct emotional 
contagion and become motivated by the perceived needs of others, as 
discussed in earlier chapters (see Nisbett & Wilson 1977; Bargh & Chart-
land 1999; Haidt 2001; Preston 2007; Uhlmann et al 2008; de Waal 2009; 
Batson 2011). If these capacities and tendencies are selected, they may 
have been selected for interaction that is beneficial to participate in. 
If we break the proximate mechanisms of behaviour into finer 
parts than individuals and explain the occurrences of social behaviour 
as the results of (probably multiple) cognitive processes (in a specific 
context), we can cluster these interactive processes into traits at any 
higher level. It is still sensible to talk about individual behavioural 
traits, for example. The psychological (or cognitivist) perspective does 
not exclude this; it only implies that the individual (or agentive) level 
has an internal causal structure. In the same way, we can take a con-
text of social interaction and examine the behaviour of this “system” 
of individuals and how sub-personal psychological processes form a 
mechanism that guides the behaviour of this system.  
We can define individualism and holism as follows: 
 
Behaviour is individualistic if it can be adequately described in 
terms of individualistic goals and/or behavioural dispositions 
and mechanisms regarding its adaptive function. This adaptivity 
can be fully understood in terms of the consequences of the indi-
vidual behaviour that can be fully understood in terms of the in-
dividual aiming at something, whether this is an intentional goal 
 
it – for similar reasons. These are arguments about explanation in social sci-
ences, but they are also additional arguments for the importance of sub-per-
sonal processes in the causal explanation of human behaviour in general. 
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or something that we can attribute as the evolutionary function 
of the behaviour only. 
Behaviour is interactionally holistic if it is produced through the 
interaction of two or more individuals such that the behavioural 
dispositions of participating individuals jointly produce the 
adaptive achievement. The individual motivational mechanisms 
constitute a social mechanism that is responsible for the adaptive 
behaviour and the individual behaviour is instrumental to this, 
regardless of what the individuals themselves would state their 
goals to be. 
Behaviour is collectively holistic if the underlying mechanisms 
are fully socially contextualized in their function. That is, the 
proper function of the behavioural response to a social stimulus, 
for explanatory purposes, is on the collective level, not on the 
level of goal-oriented individual agents. The behavioural traits 
are traits of a collective (a group) and the adaptivity is on the 
group level. 
 
I will now further discuss interactionist traits through an example of 
reciprocal altruism. I will return to the collective traits after that. 
 
6.4.2. Reciprocal Altruism 
 
The evolutionary basis for some helping behaviour is future recipro-
cation by the recipient. As previously discussed, the evolution of help-
ing that is paired with reciprocation can be modelled as a tit-for-tat 
(TFT) strategy. In an open-ended Prisoner’s Dilemma game, a player 
of TFT strategy cooperates the first time and then mirrors the strategy 
of the co-player. This strategy does worse than pure selfish (S) when 
comparing two individuals, but in a population of selfish and TFT-
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players, it is likely to emerge as the winning strategy.189 This strategy 
reflects the logic of how reciprocity can promote helping behaviour, 
not necessarily the patterns of behaviour. A few clarifications related 
to this are in order.  
First, given these are evolutionary games and strategies, selfish-
ness and altruism are measured in fitness but not in the overall fitness 
consequences for the individuals participating – the altruism the evo-
lution of which we are interested in here is behavioural altruism as 
defined above, not genuine evolutionary altruism. Conflating the two 
would lead to the averaging fallacy, which fails to distinguish the trait’s 
fitness effect in the behavioural context and its net effect over the life-
time (see Sober & Wilson 1998; Okasha 2006); I will come back to this 
later. Second, the aims of the interacting individuals are not relevant 
as such. The agentive-level aims may be altruistic or not, and the psy-
chological motivation may be altruistic or not. Third, the logic of TFT 
tells us why helping is beneficial if it is reliably enough targeted at 
those individuals who eventually help back, and the key element in 
this is to react to the individuals according to what they are doing. We 
do not need actual turns of a game or anything like that, for example, 
and the actions that count as helping do not need to be clear-cut.190 
 
189 If there are pure altruists in the population, they do worse than TFT if there 
are selfish players, too – otherwise there is no difference between pure altru-
ists and TFT’s. Whether TFT or the selfish strategy emerges as dominant de-
pends on chance. 
190 One problem in interpreting models is that they do not only idealize the 
processes that they model, but they also abstract from their target system. If 
the model works, it captures some of the relevant behaviour of the system, 
and in the case of evolutionary game-theoretical models, I take it that they 
capture some relevant causal relations. They do not, however, specify what 
entities, properties, structures, interactions, or mechanisms instantiate these 
causal dynamics. A model does not need to be realistic in this sense to capture 
the logic of how traits get selected, for example. Conversely, just because a 
model works, it does not mean that there must be discretely identifiable coun-
terparts to its key elements in the system. Assuming this would be a reification 
fallacy of the misplaced concreteness kind. I will not discuss the nature of 
316 
 
There are also other ways than just reacting to past experiences to cou-
ple the help with those who reciprocate: observing interactions with 
others (which can be modelled as observer-TFT; Pollock & Dugatikin 
1992), the attitudes of others (that are based on experiences; Castro et 
al 1998), or reputation (Ohtsuski & Iwasa 2004). All of these lead into 
partner choice (which is direct reciprocity instead of reciprocal altru-
ism; see Noë & Hammerstein 1994a, 1994b & 2016; Noë 2006; Noë & 
Voelkl 2013) and punishing the defectors (strong reciprocity of Herbert 
Gintis; 2000a & 2006). All these additions make the behaviour both 
more realistic in human contexts and stronger against selfishness.191 
There are many ways to implement the evolutionary logic of sim-
ple TFT – or rather, there are several combinations of psychological 
configurations and behavioural interactions that can be explained as 
a TFT mechanism. The most straightforward psychological imple-
mentation is to have a directly conditional attitude. That is, Beatrice 
only helps Amos with the understanding that Amos will help her in 
 
models in this thesis on top of everything else, but I assume that above said is 
non-controversial. 
191 The border between reciprocal altruism and directly cooperative reciproc-
ity is not always clear. For example, if we look at the kinds of interactions 
instead of individual behavioural disposition, as I am suggesting and has been 
suggested (for somewhat different reasons) by Patrick Forbes and Rory 
Smead (2015), the standard evolutionary classification of behaviour falls 
apart. Second, if we are interested in an individual’s behavioural dispositions 
or psychology, the focus must be their overall behaviour and its consequences 
over their lifetime, which means that the same individual traits can participate 
in different kinds of interactions in this regard. There are two differences be-
tween reciprocal altruism and direct cooperative reciprocation: the timespan 
between the reciprocation, which is never immediate and can be overlapping 
in complex interactions where the benefits of action are spread over time; and 
whether the “enforcing activity” is partner choice or partner control. The dif-
ference between partner control and partner choice is not clear-cut in long-
term relationships, which may include both, and the underlying form of in-




the future. If she did not believe he would, she would not help him. A 
few remarks are needed again. If this psychological basis leads to sys-
tematic behavioural altruism, it is a psychological mechanism for be-
havioural altruism. If Beatrice has a reliable way to know that Amos 
will reciprocate and she chooses to help him because of this, the dis-
crimination (or partner choice) makes the behaviour a case of direct 
reciprocity in the evolutionary sense. If she does not know this and 
takes a leap of faith, it is reciprocal altruism. That is, this is the distinc-
tion between direct reciprocity and reciprocal altruism as it manifests 
in particular choices. However, for actual evolutionary mechanisms 
to exist, the psychological capacities and the related behavioural 
tendencies must be life-long tendencies. Furthermore, they need to be 
distributed across the population. The same psychological makeup 
could be selected by biological markets (direct reciprocity) and as a 
TFT strategy at the same time, if choosing the partner to interact with 
is easier at some times and more difficult at others, and this varies by 
the individual with the same psychological makeup. The psychology 
of reciprocity or reciprocal altruism like this cannot be altruistic (in the 
psychological sense) in any case, since helping is conditional by defi-
nition – it is not motivated by the need of the other but the projected 
future utility. Given that this conditionality is directed at external con-
ditions, its instances are not agentive altruism either. This is important 
because if the parties all realize the conditionality, they understand 
the expected help to be conditional and this cannot fail to affect the 
interactions between the individuals. 
There are alternatives to this homo economicus style of reciprocal 
altruism – for instance, friendship (see Hruschka & Heinrich 2006). One 
way to think about friendship is coalition-forming. Some of the litera-
ture on cooperation stresses control as a key component to rule out 
free riders (see Gintis 2000a, 2000b & 2006; Bowles & Gintis 2011) but 
partner choice may be a more efficient way to guarantee collaboration 
(Noë 2006; Sterelny 2012; Noë & Voelkl 2013). Keeping free riders out 
of coalitions for collaboration (such as hunting) could involve not only 
retribution and punishment but also commitment, signalling this 
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commitment in costly ways, and the trust this engenders. This has 
lately become a more common way to approach the foundations of 
group living. Coalition-building for things like hunting or power pol-
itics is, however, only one aspect of human social life and bonding 
between individuals. Other aspects include things like communal 
childcare (see for example Narvaez et al 2014), learning and teaching 
skills that do not necessarily involve only family members (Boyd & 
Richerson 2005; Sterelny 2014), sharing information (including “gos-
siping”, which may play an important social function in trust and co-
alition building), forming peer groups for various tasks, including 
learning social skills (see Narvaez et al 2014), and a multitude of more 
mundane everyday tasks that require smaller-scale collaboration. Not 
all non-kin relationships need to include high risks, either. There may 
be a multitude of evolutionary reasons for friendship to evolve and a 
multitude of psychological-level instantiations. One obvious one is 
compassion, an affective bond that creates empathetic concern be-
tween friends. As discussed above, empathetic concern probably 
evolved for parental care at a very early evolutionary stage (see 
Churchland 2001; Preston & de Waal 2002) and once the mechanism 
existed, it could be adopted for other uses, such as romantic bonding 
(it being one of the psychological foundations for romantic love; see 
Fisher 2016), or friendship.  
The details of the evolutionary history of friendship or its psy-
chology are not important here as such but building bonds with com-
passion is a crucial part of human psychology (see Hoyyat & Moyer 
2017 for the psychology of friendship and development of friend-
ships). Now suppose Beatrice and Amos are friends, there is an em-
pathetic concern between them, and this is why Beatrice is automati-
cally motivated to save Amos. The help between them is not condi-
tional on a predicted future. In fact, Beatrice may very well know that 
Amos will never be able to reciprocate to quite the same extent. Be-
atrice’s help is guided by pure psychological altruism. This behaviour, 
and the psychological altruism as its basis, could still be part of an 
overall psychological and behavioural tendency that fulfils the 
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conditions of reciprocal altruism on the scale of lifetime. Developing 
a bond that includes genuine psychological altruism is the part of psy-
chology that produces altruistic behaviour. The other part of TFT is to 
stop behaving in this way if there is a reason for it; there needs to be a 
capacity to disconnect the bond to avoid being a sucker. This can be 
implemented through negative feelings. For example, if Beatrice has 
helped Amos on several occasions and Amos is consistently reluctant 
to help her when she needs help, this may loosen the bond on Be-
atrice’s side or even make her feel used, bitter, and angry, and cause 
her to end the friendship. On the other hand, signalling compassion 
and affection with things like mutual care and attention, even if they 
are not costly, may be required to maintain the understanding of the 
nature of the relationship. The disposition to end a friendship in case 
of non-reciprocity does not mean that there is any conditionality of 
empathy at the moment of help. The form of reciprocal altruism is an 
evolutionary formula that describes certain properties of interaction 
on the behavioural level that can be abstracted into a TFT strategy over 
time. There can be selection for this form in interaction – for example, 
for friendship. There is also a selection to be able to participate in 
friendship relations, and for the psychological characteristics that are 
needed for this. 
Friendship-related behaviour and psychology are about relation-
ships between individuals. Because of our limited capacities for 
bookkeeping, selectiveness about the partners of interaction and 
forming long-term relationships with them might have selective ad-
vantages (Hruschka & Henrich 2006), but a form of interaction in 
which people collaborate can be about specific contexts or forms of 
interaction. Whether the evolving interaction is an individual behav-
ioural trait (that is, related to a specific achievement and specific type 
of interaction) or a person-directed form of relationship, and whether 
the explanatory mechanism is direct reciprocity (on the evolutionary 
rather than the psychological sense) or a TFT-type of selection logic, 
there are three different elements at play: behaviour, psychology, and 
the folk-psychological interpretation.  
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First, there is the form of behaviour as a behavioural trait. We can 
identify two different behavioural traits: the individual behavioural 
patterns and the interactive behavioural patterns. To understand the 
adaptive significance of reciprocal altruism, we need to pay attention 
to the interactive trait. The adaptive significance of participating in 
reciprocity (generally speaking) comes from the benefits in return, 
and this takes place only in interaction with suitable partners. Elliot 
Sober and David Sloan Wilson (1998) have argued that this shows that 
the evolution of reciprocal altruism as a TFT strategy is a form of mul-
tilevel selection, despite emerging within an apparently individual-
based model. The idea is this. In addition to the competition between 
individuals within the pairs of interactors (for example, between self-
ish (S), altruist (A) and TFT types), there is a competition between 
groups that consist of the interacting individuals: TFT/TFT, A/A and 
A/TFT pairs (which have group benefits) do better than S/S, S/A, or 
S/TFT pairs (which do not).192 I will return later to whether this is the 
case and what is a “group” for multilevel selection purposes. How-
ever, at minimum, there is an adaptively significant difference be-
tween the different types of interaction; whether these qualify as trait 
groups, they involve group traits. The benefits of participating in a ben-
eficial interaction depend on the partner, but they do not necessarily 
depend on the individual variant: TFT/TFT, A/A and A/TFT interac-
tions are identical. In a population with several possible types of in-
teraction, there is a competition between these types of interactions, 
just like there is a competition between individually implemented 
traits. Interactive traits (or interactive phenotypes) depend on the in-
dividual behavioural dispositions, which are constitutive parts of the 
interactive traits. These traits can have two adaptive functions: to en-
able participation in the interactive traits and whatever they achieve 
for the individual within the interaction.  
 
192 The selfish interactor receives the benefits from altruism of the altruism in 
the S/A pair, but this is not a case of a group benefit. 
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Furthermore, the traits cannot be singular occasions of behaviour 
from the evolutionary point of view; they must be behavioural pat-
terns over the lifetime of the individual. In principle, an individual 
behavioural trait could be a type of behavioural response, the set of 
alternative responses that are available to the individual in the same 
context, or all possible alternative behavioural responses that exist in 
the population. In the first case, the same individual behaving altruis-
tically towards one individual and not another would be two different 
traits. I have already argued for why this is not plausible, but to re-
phrase this with the case under discussion: we would not have behav-
ioural traits in the TFT form at all, just individuals with both selfish 
and altruistic behavioural tendencies, different traits being triggered 
in different contexts. This may be a sound way to conceptualize traits 
for some purposes, but it would lose the idea of behavioural strategies 
as traits and the connectedness between the behavioural responses. 
We need to include the entire behavioural repertoire of the individual 
in a given behavioural context as the trait, and the choice between the 
available responses is a part of the trait. This also means that the alter-
native repertoires of different individuals are alternatives of the same 
trait: selfishness, altruism, and different mixed repertoires with differ-
ent criteria for the choice of behaviour. The interactive traits, on the 
other hand, are constituted by interactions. The interactive phenotype 
of collaboration is constituted by the behaviour of collaborators, re-
gardless of whether they “play” A or TFT as individuals (that is, 
which other types of interactions the individuals participate in). The 
interactionist reciprocity trait is a trait of the pair reciprocating.  
A behavioural trait requires a psychological capacity for the be-
haviour. This includes a motivational mechanism that motivates (in 
this case) altruistic behaviour. The relevant sense of altruism to be mo-
tivated is behavioural altruism. 193  The details of a motivational 
 
193 To be more specific, behavioural altruism in the biological sense. We can 
conflate biological behavioural altruism and behavioural altruism measured 
in some psychologically accessible way (that is, well-being, pleasure, wants, 
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mechanism do not matter for this: the motivation may be empathetic 
concern (genuine psychological altruism) or distress from perceiving 
distress (a psychologically egoistic motivation for agentive altruism). 
It may also be something that does not lie on the egoism–altruism di-
mension at all, such as a behavioural script (in the sense of Tomkins 
1987; an automatized behavioural pattern that may be, for example, 
an internalized social norm), or a moral judgment or a principle.194 
What matters, however, is whether it is altruistic under the agentive 
description: is the intended achievement of the behaviour to help (or 
cooperate)? And if it is, is it the ultimate goal of the action (genuine 
agentive altruism) or an instrument for achieving something else 
(agentive pseudo-altruism)? If it is instrumental, what for? Another 
psychological capacity needed for reciprocal altruism (in any of its 
form) is to recognize whether the partner is reciprocating or not. Rec-
ognizing the psychological mechanism is not important, but recogniz-
ing intentionality is.195 In sum: reciprocally altruistic interactive traits 
include the individual psychological basis (including a motivational 
mechanism that may be psychologically altruistic or not, folk-psycho-
logical capacities, and the ability to both form and break a bond); be-
haviourally altruistic individual behavioural tendencies that can be 
 
or some such) as discussed above, although in real world cases there will be 
some discrepancy. 
194 There are different possible motivational mechanisms for producing simi-
lar behaviour. There may be differences between them, however, in other as-
pects that I discussed in the previous chapter: in their extent, strength, and 
reliability. Some of these differences may have adaptive consequences, which 
means that they are not evolutionarily exchangeable. However, motivational 
pluralism is the likeliest psychological configuration for both empirical and 
evolutionary reasons (see Kitcher 1997; Sober & Wilson 1998; Batson 2011).  
195 This is one reason why distinguishing agentive and psychological is rele-
vant. Knowing the psychological basis for wanting to help may be relevant to 
knowing how robust the tendency is, but this is not the same as asking 
whether the intention was really to help. Again, folk psychology may not 
make this distinction but conceptualizes the basis as “more ultimate reason” 
or something on those lines. 
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recognized as agentively altruistic; and the interactive phenotypes 
that the individuals form in various combinations. I will draw some 
conclusions from this and generalize them now. 
 
6.4.3. Psychological and Behavioural Traits in Interaction 
 
When a behavioural trait is selected for, the psychological traits that 
make it possible are selected. Psychological traits are selected for the 
behavioural consequences they have. Any given behavioural trait in-
volves several psychological capacities and behavioural tendencies, 
and any given psychological trait may participate in several behav-
ioural traits. This means that the functional structure of psychology 
and the functional structure of behaviour are not isomorphic. There is 
co-evolution of psychology and behaviour where both are relevant to 
each other. There may also be other factors involved; I return to this 
in the next sub-chapter. This entails that behavioural traits must be 
treated as separate traits for analytical and explanatory purposes: the 
adaptivity of the behavioural traits in which the psychological capac-
ity participates is what determines the adaptivity of the psychology. 
Behavioural traits are bound to psychology being caused by them 
(jointly with the environment) in two different ways: behavioural 
traits using the same capacities (having a shared causal component) 
ties the behaviours together proximately and evolutionarily. How-
ever, if the psychological capacities are flexible and several non-spe-
cialized capacities participate in the behavioural traits, they may have 
a too limited life of their own to be evolutionarily significant. 
The facts about the causal connections and behavioural patterns 
enable several sensible ways to break the behaviour into traits, but un-
der the evolutionary functionalist approach, the perspective is an 
adaptive achievement that is produced by repeatable patterns of be-
haviour. The patterns may be abstractions, as discussed. The psycho-
logical capacities and motivational mechanisms that are needed for 
the achievement constitute the mechanism for it. If there are no rea-
sons to restrict the analysis to individual traits, the analysis can in 
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principle be used to describe interactive traits as well. I have given 
some reasons for why individualism cannot simply be assumed and 
why (folk-psychological) intuitions about the primacy of the individ-
ual are misleading. For a trait to be an interactive trait, its achievement 
must be caused by the behaviour of multiple individuals in a way that 
the individual psychologies and behavioural dispositions form the 
mechanism to do so. 
New systemic properties can emerge simply as a result of indi-
vidual properties and their relations (see Wimsatt 2007) and there is 
no reason to consider the structurally emergent properties necessarily 
“holistic” – they can be part of an individualistic understanding of be-
haviour (see Ylikoski 2017). There must be some further criterion for 
what counts as a holistic approach and what difference it makes. I will 
discuss collectivist holism in the next subchapter; but for an interac-
tionist holistic perspective within the evolutionary functionalist 
framework, the criterion is adaptivity caused by interaction. I have 
been vague about whom the behaviour should be functional for, the 
individuals or a group they are constituting, since this is a further is-
sue about individual and multilevel selection. It could be either or 
both, but for now we can concentrate on individuals. Within this 
framework, all interactive behaviour that has emergent consequences 
that are not simply aggregates and make the individuals more adap-
tive because these emergent consequences, can be considered as inter-
active traits. This may be too permissive, however. It is no more per-
missive than any other adaptive functionalist analysis of an individual 
behavioural trait if the analytical perspective is simply the current use, 
but even then, there must be a reason for choosing the holistic evolu-
tionary functionalist perspective other than just because we can. As I 
have argued before, mere current use analysis may also be of use (eco-
logical function, analysis of evolutionary potential and maintenance 
of the structure, and so on). Things become more interesting, however, 
if the perspective is explanatory, whether historical or ahistorical. 
If the emergent structural properties are the source of adaptivity, 
these properties may be the reason for which they are or were selected. 
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There is a holistic mechanism, but this mechanism is evolutionary, not 
proximate. Consider the following simplifying thought experiment. 
Suppose there is a species of primates that eat fruit that grows in bun-
dles on the upper branches of a species of tall tree. Getting to the fruits 
is somewhat laborious and dangerous because of birds of prey, but 
once up there, it is no more trouble to drop the whole bundle down 
than it is to pick just a couple of fruits that the individual will eat. 
Consequently, other individuals get their share. This is an evolution-
arily altruistic trait that can perhaps evolve through group selection. 
It is also a trait that involves multiple individuals in terms of adaptive 
benefits. However, there is nothing in the behaviour itself that re-
quires the activity of several individuals and the behaviour itself does 
not make the dropper fitter. If group selection is operational, all the 
members of the group do better than members of the group of selfish 
primates that only eat the fruit themselves after reaching them, which 
means that there is a mechanism that makes altruism beneficial for the 
altruists, but this is a selection mechanism working over evolutionary 
time. 
Now contrast this with reciprocal traits. By definition, an altruis-
tic act by an individual is beneficial for the individual themselves only 
through reciprocal altruism. The adaptive achievement is the mutual 
aid and the mechanism for this is the participation of both parties in 
the interaction. In this case, the connection is in the proximate dimen-
sion. Furthermore, this is not a case of only putting individuals to-
gether and seeing what emerges from their interaction. Using a game 
theoretical model makes it look like that, but these models do not 
show the details of the causal structure of the interactions, as I have 
argued above. They show fitness effects but not what makes them. The 
phenotypes are not static; the same individual has the same behav-
ioural dispositions in all interactions and makes a choice depending 
on whom they are dealing with. In other words, the phenotype itself 
depends on the partner. As I have mentioned earlier, biologists Allen 
Moore, Edmund Brodie and Jason Wolf call such social traits 
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interacting phenotypes (Moore et al 1997; Wolf et al 1999). 196 The idea is 
that certain behavioural traits require a social trigger and emerge only 
in the social context. Furthermore, the behaviour of the partner is a 
part of the social selection environment, and the social evolution has 
an interactive dynamic which they are able to model using indirect 
fitness similar to that used in kin selection models. The same logic can 
be expanded from pairs to networks (Formica et al 2017; Montiglio et 
al 2017).197 These models are ostensibly individualistic in the evolu-
tionary dimension in the same way as game-theoretical and kin selec-
tion models. The multilevel-selectionist interpretation of reciprocal al-
truism in game theory (Sober & Wilson 1998) could be applied here, 
too, if it works in the first case. It seems, however, that there are two 
different ways to link the individuals and their traits with adaptivity: 
over evolutionary time through group selection and directly through 
connectedness of the traits.198 I will return to this issue in the final 
chapter.  
The point now is that individual behavioural traits are bound to-
gether through their adaptive function. The individual interacting phe-
notypes form a multi-individual interactive phenotype. Just as we can 
understand some individual behavioural occurrences by an individ-
ual only as a part of an individual behavioural trait that emerges dur-
ing their lifetime, we can understand some other individual behav-
ioural occurrences by an individual only as part of an interactive 
 
196 My discussion does not depend on this specific theoretical work or how 
these models work. However, it is noteworthy that the idea of phenotypes 
that only exist in social interaction and hence are not properties of the indi-
vidual alone, and that some behavioural traits are evolutionarily intelligible 
only when approached as a part of the interaction, has emerged within indi-
vidualist paradigm of theoretical evolutionary biology too, not only among 
the proponents of group selection. 
197 I am only discussing interactive pairs for simplicity, but presumably my 
discussion could be similarly generalized to groups of multiple interactors. 
198 There is also a third way: the link in the developmental dimension through 
dependency in reproduction of the trait. I will return to this in the next chapter. 
327 
 
phenotype. There is one crucial difference, however. The interactive 
traits are created by the interacting individuals as individual charac-
teristics of those particular pairs. A reciprocal altruist takes part in 
various relationships and each relationship has its fitness effects de-
pending on the reciprocity nature of that particular relationship. The 
underlying psychology, which is the most individualistic part of the 
interaction, stays the same. The psychological characteristics of a per-
son do not necessarily stay the same throughout their lifetime, but we 
can assume for the sake of simplicity that an individual has a more or 
less fixed psychology, regarding the interaction dispositions. The in-
dividual relationships and context vary. Say for example that Beatrice 
is a person who tends to be helpful and to intensify this helpfulness as 
the relationship is “tested” through time (this does not need to be con-
scious in any way), but also to distance herself after disappointing ex-
periences. This complex set of interacting psychological dispositions 
results in a pattern of behaviour over her lifetime that qualifies as a 
TFT strategy over evolutionary time. This same evolved psychology 
is present in all individual relationships, but if Amos reciprocates and 
someone else, say Curt, does not, the relationships will develop in dif-
ferent directions with different interactive characteristics. The same 
applies if the tendencies are only about a particular kind of interaction. 
The adaptive function of the psychological capacity to participate in 
reciprocal relationships comes from participation in those forms of in-
teraction that are beneficial. It is not the individual behaviour regard-
less of the context. There are two evolutionary mechanisms: the com-
petition between forms of interaction (that decide the fitness conse-
quences) and the competition between psychological makeups that 
enable participation in the beneficial forms of interaction and prevent 
entering or staying in dysfunctional ones. 
If there is selective competition between individual behavioural 
traits, there is selection for psychological dispositions that cause this 
behaviour. If there is selective competition between forms of interac-
tion, there is selection for psychological dispositions to participate in 
the interaction: to cause the behaviour under certain conditions. To 
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understand the psychology of interactions from the evolutionary 
point of view, it is necessary to understand how it fits with the differ-
ent contexts – what is the function within the mechanism that pro-
duces interactive traits. This makes a difference between individualist 
and interactionist approaches in understanding the proximate-level 
causal processes that are involved in social evolution. Consequently, 
this difference is significant for the use of evolutionary considerations 
as a guideline to understand human behaviour and psychology. The 
right way to do evolutionary psychology, for example, is not neces-
sarily the individualistic way. Furthermore, since the selections for 
psychology and for behaviour are different, the selfishness and altru-
ism of related psychological and behavioural traits do not necessarily 
go hand in hand either. Remember that the psychological traits are 
selected for their lifetime fitness effects in all the interactions they par-
ticipate in. In an environment of reciprocal altruists, being another re-
ciprocal altruist is an evolutionarily more selfish strategy than being 
behaviourally selfish. Having the psychological makeup of a recipro-
cal altruist may include having a psychologically altruistic motiva-
tional mechanism that leads to behavioural altruism (measured in fit-
ness, too) under right circumstances, but it is an evolutionarily selfish 
psychological configuration under these circumstances. This is not the 
case with pure behavioural altruists – this is not an evolutionarily self-
ish strategy even under those same circumstances. 
I will come back to the group selection issue and why treating 
TFT strategy as selfish is not an averaging fallacy (contra Sober & Wil-
son 1998 and Okasha 2006) while treating a pure behavioural altruism 
as being evolutionarily selfish would be. Sober and Wilson and others 
are, however, correct in highlighting the importance of focusing on 
the pairs of interaction (as groups) instead of individual traits. I will 
also agree that the evolution of altruistic or reciprocal tendencies as a 
TFT strategy is a form of group selection, but a different form. For 
now, the conclusion from the discussion so far is that from an evolu-
tionary functionalist point of view, human social behaviour involves 
supra-individual interactive traits, the individual behaviour involved 
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should be understood from this point of view (as component parts of 
something more holistic), and the underlying psychology should be 
approached as selected for participation in such holistically under-
stood forms of interaction. Agentive descriptions, on the other hand, 
may play a role within the practices in which the interactive traits 
emerge, but these descriptions should not be considered as descrip-
tions of what the behaviour is about (in the wider context), a part of 
the description of a behavioural trait, or as references to the relevant 
psychological mechanisms. 
 
6.4.4. Evolution, Sociality, and Collectives 
 
The main issues in the evolution of human social behaviour are to ex-
plain why we have prosocial tendencies in the first place and why they 
take the forms that they do. The approaches to these issues have been 
mostly individualistic in the proximate dimension: the interest has 
been in individual behaviour and its evolved psychology. Some of the 
approaches have been holistic in the evolutionary dimension, using 
group selection explicitly, and some have used models that can per-
haps be interpreted as being implicitly holistic. Some of these ap-
proaches attribute traits to whole groups. For example, some of the 
advocates of using group selection in human context have treated hu-
man groups as holistic entities in the sense that I have called collectiv-
ist, and attributed traits (and accompanying fitness consequence) to 
whole groups. I have argued so far that psychological and behavioural 
traits should be kept substantially apart in understanding human so-
ciality and that this entails a possibility of holistic behavioural traits, 
and I have argued for the interactionist version of such traits, but the 
collectivist version is possible within this framework too. However, 
these are two different ways for something to be a trait above the in-
dividual level. 
When group selection fell out of fashion the first time around, the 
evolutionary approaches to social behaviour became individualistic in 
other senses too (as discussed in chapter 4). The return of group 
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selection models changed this again to the degree that group selection 
was accepted. Cultural group selection (Boyd & Richerson 1985 & 
2005; Wilson 2002) added a group perspective to anthropology as a 
way to understand the differences between cultural groups. Group se-
lection also gave a new perspective on the major transitions in evolution, 
the transformations in biological organization where entities of one 
level unite into entities of another level, resulting in change of levels 
in where the biological individuality takes place (such as the origin of 
multicellular organisms; Maynard Smith & Szathmáry 1995; Calcott & 
Sterenly 2011; Bouchard & Huneman 2013). As David Sloan Wilson 
put it, the transition from “groups of individuals to groups as individ-
uals” requires group selection, since it is difficult to see how a group 
of individuals could suddenly become an individual of higher level 
without there being evolution of “group-level” properties and their 
harmonization that constitute the unity and individuality of the group 
before the transition already (Wilson 2002: 17). In addition to cooper-
ation between individuals, the division of labour is an obvious exam-
ple of an inherently group-level trait (see Hamilton & Fewell 2013).  
There are critics of this thinking, however. As already mentioned, 
the essential problem of group selection is that individual-level selec-
tion is too strong for group-level selection to establish group-level ad-
aptations. This is why collectivist or superorganismal traits are rare. 
There seem to be some examples of group selection, but critics such as 
Andy Gardner and Alan Grafen argue that since they are all cases of 
either kin selection or traits that have evolved to suppress within-
group conflict, they are not really cases of group selection (or group 
adaptation) but of individual selection (for example, Gardner & 
Grafen 2009; Gardner 2013b). Gardner and Grafen consider group se-
lection only where there are both competition between groups and 
lack of competition within the groups, since this is where the individ-
ual level does not trump the group level (see also Brandon 1982 & 
1988; Maynard Smith 1988). In other words, they consider groups as a 
unity for adaptation only when they have already become individu-
als; for example, Charles Goodnight, an evolutionary biologist 
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working in the multilevel selection framework instead, defines indi-
viduality as the lowest level of biological organisation that evolves ad-
aptations (Goodnight 2013). This also means, for them, that there are 
only individual level adaptations. 
I will not go deeper into the issues of individuality or the major 
transitions in general. I am only interested in the human context here. 
However, the disagreement over group selection is not only about 
what counts as group selection and an empirical issue of whether it 
exists. There is also an issue about the level of adaptation of the adap-
tive social behaviour, which I consider to be a separate question. My 
interactionist holistic account of social adaptations is a suggestion for 
a middle ground: regardless of whether the selective forces that soci-
ality work on the individual level or on multiple levels, adaptations of 
interaction emerge. They may be adaptations of individual behav-
ioural dispositions for emerging interactions, but as I have shown 
above, these interactions are the evolving traits that make the differ-
ence for the fitness consequences for the individuals participating in 
them. Psychological adaptations are for beneficial behavioural traits 
that are beneficial depending on an achievement that has fitness con-
sequences for the entities that bear fitness. This entails selection for the 
parts of the mechanism that produces the achievement, where mech-
anisms are abstract forms of interaction, the connections between 
parts are causal dependencies, and the parts of the mechanism are 
sub-personal psychological states and environmental factors. If the in-
teractive behavioural trait requires orchestration such as responsive-
ness to other individuals’ behaviour (the example of reciprocal altru-
ism) or division of labour, these traits cannot be reduced to individu-
alistic traits, the relations between individuals, and the emerging pat-
terns of social interaction only. However, they also involve individu-
alistic psychological selection, and, if individual selectionism is cor-
rect, these individuals are the beneficiaries of the fitness consequences 
that matter. On the other hand, if the evolutionary processes leading 
to reciprocal altruism, division of labour, and the like are multi-level 
processes, these traits may be conceptualized as group-level 
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adaptations if we consider the interacting individuals to be groups. 
This is partly a matter of defining a group – for example, are the trait 
groups of Sober and Wilson really groups, or should we go with the 
“broad sense individualist” interpretation (Sterelny 1996a; see also 
Kerr & Godfrey-Smith 2002)? – but there are also substantial differ-
ences between different kinds of groups from the evolutionary point 
of view, if we are liberal about what are groups. The third option for 
interactive traits is to be traits that also evolve in the interaction be-
tween individual- and group-level selection, as products of multilevel 
selection specifically. I will later return to why these distinctions mat-
ter and distinguish different notions of group selection. 
The levels of selection (as the level of biological organization at 
which natural selection operates) and the units of selection (the entities 
that do the adapting, or the level of adaptation) are usually thought to 
be the same, usually implicitly, sometimes explicitly (Okasha 2006), 
with notable expectations such as Robert Brandon (1982 & 1988) and 
Elizabeth Lloyd (2001). I will suggest later that not only are these sep-
arate questions, but that both issues have two different senses in 
which the units or levels of selection could be group-level. It is not a 
contested issue that if the group-level properties and selection pro-
cesses mask the individual level and the groups become superorgan-
ism, and the group fitness differences screen off individual fitness dif-
ferences (Brandon 1988), this is a case of group selection. It is just as 
clear that group selection involving multilevel selection is different 
from this (see Sober 1992d). However, what I have implicitly argued 
for in this part of the dissertation, and am about to make explicit, is 
that behavioural adaptations (or adaptively functional robust patterns 
of behaviour) can exist on an intermediate level between the individ-
ual and group levels. Even if individualism about selection is correct, 
an adaptation can be interactive, such as reciprocal altruism. 
Furthermore, there are two different, equally important evolu-
tionary notions of group that may be needed to analyse even the same 
cases. One way to understand a group is as the collective of individu-
als who inhabit the same region and form a social group, a collective 
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(such as a tribe), which includes all the individuals. Another way is to 
define a group as the network (or even a pair only) of individuals who 
interact (and maybe choose to interact) which each other in respect 
some behavioural trait (that is, Sober and Wilson’s trait groups). I have 
discussed interactive traits as traits that bind individuals together as 
groups in the latter way. If this facilitates a type of group selection, the 
group may still extend to be the whole collective. But it may also be 
that there is competition between interactive traits (and therefore trait 
groups) within the collective, and group selection between collectives, 
which may involve differences between the collective groups regard-
ing the frequencies in which they have different interactive traits, for 
example. I will return this in the last chapter. 
Pure group-level adaptations would be adaptations of the group 
as a collective, as a superorganism, where individuals (who still do 
the concrete behaving) are interchangeable with other individuals. 
This interchangeability may be absolute (any individual will do) or 
according to their role in the division of labour (such as the “castes” 
of social insects). The evolutionary functional perspective applies here 
the same way as with interactionist holism: the object of analysis may 
be current utility, historical explanatory functionality, or ahistorical 
explanatory functionality. The current utility specifies what the be-
haviour does from the perspective of the entire group. A behaviour 
may have a current use function for the group even if this function has 
no historical role in evolution or significance to understanding how 
the group works, but it is the starting point of analysis. The historical 
evolutionary functional explanation would make a stronger claim that 
the behaviour exists because it has evolved for its group-level func-
tion. The ahistorical evolutionary explanation makes the claim that the 
behaviour has a causal function as a part of a complex system that can 
be understood on the group level only, as a survival strategy of the 
entire group. 
There is a degree of such collectivism in human groups thanks to 
culture. Biologist Mark Pagel (2012) has argued for a superorganismal 
view of human cultural groups. According to him, cultures and 
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especially languages bind the individuals of the group together and 
differentiate groups from each other in ways that makes them effectu-
ally superindividuals. This would be an extreme case of collectivist 
holism in the proximate dimension and would make cultural groups 
individuals and also the central units of selection. Others who treat 
cultural groups as possible units for selection usually consider some 
particular traits to be group-level adaptations and some others (most) 
individual-level adaptations (see for example Boyd & Richerson 1985 
& 2005; Wilson 2002; Sterelny 2012). I will take the latter approach to 
be more realistic. Something being cultural does not automatically 
make it a group-level property either, but culture is what can make 
human groups collectivist if anything does. Culture-specific norms, 
normative expectations, and meanings may cause behavioural uni-
formity or orchestrated division of labour. The main significance of 
culture as a uniformizing force is not in the proximate dimension, 
however, but in the developmental dimension. Even if collective or 
interactive traits exist because of cultural factors, these factors are not 
independently existing proximate causal factors, but instantiated by 
individuals. Cultures influence behaviour by influencing what behav-
ioural traits (including reactive attitudes towards the other members 
of the group) individuals acquire. It is time to move to the develop-




7. Evolution, Replication, and Development 
 
The developmental dimension of evolutionary explanations is an im-
portant topic for the issue of evolutionary individualism and holism 
in two different ways. First, the individuation of the replication pro-
cess tells us what is being selected. Second, there is a direct connection 
to the proximate dimension. The trait must be replicated to evolve, 
and the details of its developmental processes and its interaction with 
the environment are important in understanding how this happens. 
Some of the mechanisms of inheritance are “external” to the develop-
ing organism and this opens up the possibility of supra-individual de-
velopmental mechanisms. Human culture is a candidate for such a 
mechanism. Culture introduces the social aspect to all stages of devel-
opment, from the development of psychological capacities to learning 
and behaviour modification as an adult. This can make the spreading 
of traits horizontal within the group of interacting individuals instead 
of vertical (in parental lineages only). This, in turn, can make the evo-
lution of social behaviour holistic in the sense that the competition be-
tween traits does not depend on only individual fitness effects but also 
on what traits spread socially. At the same time, the groups that are 
bound together by having acquired the same trait share the fitness 
consequences. This is the cultural group selectionist link between cul-
ture and fitness (Boyd & Richerson 1985 & 2005). The cultural origins, 
evolution, and maintenance of a behavioural trait also facilitate the 
interactionist traits I discussed in the previous chapter. As I concluded 
there, culture might even unify groups in a way that makes them col-
lectivist in all three dimensions. 
The role of culture in evolution is, however, much more compli-
cated than the “memetic view” in which culture is simply a different 
(possibly competing) medium of inheritance to the genetic inher-
itance. The received view of the logic of evolution has genes at its cen-
tre as replicators, and some views of cultural evolution build upon this 
framework. This received view has been challenged over the past two 
decades, mostly because of developmental considerations. The 
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developmental challenges have created a new field of evolutionary 
developmental biology (“evo-devo”) that has become an established 
field bridging evolutionary and developmental biology over the past 
few decades. The developmental challenge has been accompanied by 
new discoveries about the evolutionary process itself. Some of these 
challenges, discoveries and theoretical advances have been combined 
under the umbrella of the Extended Synthesis by some, calling for a par-
adigm shift in biology. Although the new framing has remained a mi-
nority position within evolutionary biology, its central insights are 
generally accepted as expansions to the Modern Synthesis at mini-
mum. Following many philosophers of biology, I consider the new 
paradigm to be worth taking seriously, especially in the human con-
text. I will also discuss the Developmental Systems Theory and its re-
conceptualization of evolution, based on developmental considera-
tions. The latter is a much older and much more radical suggestion for 
a paradigm shift, but its central insights are partly similar and, to the 
extent of detail relevant to my main topic, combinable. 
The Extended Synthesis has consequences for how we understand 
the role of social interaction and culture in evolution – and what culture 
is. A central topic in the new paradigm is the extended perspective on 
what factors participate in producing phenotype and what subset of 
them can function as a route for inheritance. Selection can work on some 
factors in the development, but it cannot work on others. What is im-
portant is the causal connection between a transferable factor and a spe-
cific difference-making outcome in the developmental process. Some of 
these factors can be shared by multiple individuals in a connected way 
that binds the replication of the traits that these factors contribute to 
produce. I call this “developmental holism” since the factors that are of 
interest here are part of the individual developmental process, but they 
are factors that bind individuals together. This contrasts with develop-
mental processes where all the developmental factors that are also 
routes of inheritance are individualistic routes of inheritance. These traits 
are innate. This is a contested concept and a contested idea, but I will 
argue for it and show that the core idea of nativism in nativist 
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evolutionary psychology is sensible – although it does not have its pre-
sumed consequences. I will do that in the next chapter.  
The emerging view about the connections between evolution and 
development also changes the biological understanding of culture 
and its role in evolution. Culture is an ambiguous concept, especially 
if it is given an explanatory role; I will make a few remarks about this 
later. But all things cultural are part of the non-genetic inheritance. I 
will next discuss the idea of the replicator and why genes are not it; 
the Developmental Systems Theory as a challenger to the gene-cen-
tred view; and the paradigm shift to the Extended Synthesis, and how 
the other forms of inheritance figure in, after which I return to culture 
specifically. The existence of these mechanisms alone does not imply 
the horizontal transmission of traits, which would make the spread of 
traits a holistic process, as cultures are supposed to be. But it might. 
Furthermore, some of the social interactions that affect development 
are about the modification of capacities, attitudes, behavioural habits, 
skills, and so on, in ways and at developmental stages where they can-
not be conceptualized as transmission of memes, representations, or 
any other mentalistic entities. From the biological point of view, cul-
ture is not one thing or one kind of mechanism, but a cluster of things 
and developmental mechanisms.199 Culture has a capacity to make 
cultural groups holistic, but the horizontality of transmission is a sep-
arate issue from external inheritance.  
 
 
7.1. Taking Development Seriously 
 
The classic Modern Synthesis, so termed by Julian Huxley (1942) and 
referring to the synthesis of Darwinian evolutionary theory and Men-
delian genetics, two fields that were long considered rivals in the 
study of population-level change (see Depew & Weber 1996), left 
 
199 There are, of course, attempts to define culture nevertheless. I will come 
back to this. 
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developmental processes in a black box. The basic idea was that it is 
enough to know of the existence of inheritable factors that participate 
in both developmental and evolutionary processes, and the systematic 
connection between the transferable entities and the phenotypic traits 
is enough. The gene-centred view essential to classic models of social 
evolution is based on the replicator-centred view on the general logic 
of evolution as explicated by Richard Dawkins (1976) and David Hull 
(1981 & 1988a). The developmental details matter, however. The epi-
genesis is an orchestrated process where the existing stage of devel-
opment determines which genes and environmental factors affect the 
next step, and a multitude of these factors determine what the next 
step is. Furthermore, the genetic “instructions” are “about” the devel-
opmental steps, not about the resulting phenotypes. (Wolpert et al 
2010.) It therefore seems that genes do not fit the ontological role given 
to them as the basic unit of copying itself and being the ultimate unit 
of the evolutionary process (as Dawkins 1976 and other genetic selec-
tionists would have it; see also Sterelny & Kitcher 1988). 
Accordingly, the gene-centred Modern Synthesis has been chal-
lenged over the past two decades – for many reasons, but mostly be-
cause of developmental considerations. The genes do not fulfil the role 
they were supposed to play (see Oyama 1985; Oyama, Griffiths & 
Gray 2001; Moss 2004), and the environment is an active part of the 
evolutionary process (ibid; Odling-Smee, Feldman & Laland 2003; 
West-Eberhard 2003; Jablonka & Lamb 2005). This has created new in-
terpretations of the evolutionary process that push the genes from 
centre stage. These approaches include the Developmental Systems 
Theory (Oyama 1985; Griffiths & Gray 1994; Oyama, Griffiths & Gray 
2001; Gottlieb 2001 & 2003), Peter Godfrey-Smith’s Neoclassical Individ-
ualism (2009), and the Extended Synthesis. The latter brings together 
various new insights into the evolutionary process, such as niche con-
struction (Odling-Smee, Feldman & Laland 2003), evolutionary devel-
opmental biology (Hall 2003; Carroll 2005; Müller 2007), and alterna-
tive routes of inheritance, labelled “soft inheritance” by Ernst Mayr 
(1980; see Jablonka & Lamb 2005 & 2008), reframing the general view 
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of how evolution works. The difference between replicators and in-
teractors is central to the logic of evolution, however, and to concep-
tualizing the levels and units of selection. I will return to this shortly; 
now I will take a closer look at some aspects of evolution and devel-
opment that are relevant to making this point. 
 
7.1.1. Replicators, Interactors, and Developmental Systems 
 
The debate over gene-selectionism (the gene as the basic unit of evolu-
tion; Dawkins 1976, 1984; see also Sterelny & Kitcher 1988) and the 
debate over the levels of selection, as in whether only individuals can 
be the loci for selective forces or other levels of biological organization 
can as well, are two separate issues (see Sober 1984; Sterelny & Kitcher 
1988; Lloyd 1992 & 2001). Robert Brandon (1982 & 1988) distinguishes 
between units and levels of selection. The unit is an entity that is se-
lected, and the level is the level of organization that has the properties 
relevant to the selection. I have already mentioned that I will make a 
further distinction between the level of selection and level of adapta-
tion. The last chapter argued for holistic adaptations in the form of 
interactionist traits while trying to be neutral regarding the levels of 
selection; so far, the argument regarding them has only been that the 
traits selected are created in the interaction between individuals, but 
this leaves open the possibility that the relevant selection processes 
work through individual fitness only. This is a separate issue. The is-
sue of units of selection, however, is how we should think about the 
entities that are replicated: genes or individuals. 
In the gene-centred view, Brandon’s distinction between units 
and levels coincides with Richard Dawkins’s distinction between rep-
licators and vehicles, refined by David Hull, whose terminology of 
replicators and interactors is more popular among philosophers 
(Dawkins 1976; Hull 1981 & 1988a). Replicators are entities that are 
replicated, and evolution happens because of their fitness differences, 
while interactors are the entities through which the replicators interact 
340 
 
with the environment and cause the fitness differences. In an individ-
ualist framework, an individual is both a replicator and an interactor, 
but the roles are separated in the logic of selection. One way to con-
ceptualize group selection is that groups act as higher-level interactors 
(Brandon 1988; Sober & Wilson 1994). In principle, any evolutionary 
process can be described both as the evolution of interactors and as 
the evolution of replicators (Sterelny & Kithcer 1988), and if gene-se-
lectionism were true, the gene’s-eye-of-view of social behaviour 
would be easily combined with a multilevel selection model (see Wil-
son & Sober 1994; Okasha 2006; Ågren 2016). Both issues (the identity 
of replicators and the nature of interactors) are contested. 
Our knowledge of genes and individual development has in-
creased enormously since the debates over replicators and interactors 
first emerged. The fundamental problem with the simplified image of 
genes is that the molecular genes that participate in the developmental 
processes and the “genes” of population genetics and evolutionary 
theory are different both conceptually and substantially (see Moss 
2001 & 2004; Stotz & Griffiths 2004; Griffiths & Stotz 2008 & 2013). 
Molecular genes, or Lenny Moss’s “D-genes” (Moss 2004), are defined 
by their causal powers in the developmental process and the popula-
tion-level genes, Moss’s “P-genes”, are defined by a phenotypic prod-
uct that is genetically transferred to the next generation. D-genes refer 
to a type of cause (with whatever effects these causes have) and P-
genes to whatever causes certain effects. There is no one-to-one causal 
relationship between D-genes and P-genes. The phenotypic properties 
are produced through combinations of D-genes, with different combi-
nations possible for any given property. A D-gene “for” a property 
can only be an abstracted invariant dependency between the molecu-
lar gene and a property when other genes and environmental factors 
are kept fixed in an explanatorily sensible way. An explanatorily sen-
sible way might be, for example, to fix all the genes that are shared by 
the whole population and are therefore of no practical consequence. 
Another sensible omission would be to concentrate on only those 
genes that have a specific effect on the phenotype (the instructive 
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factors) and omit the genes that are only necessary components for the 
development to take place (the enabling factors; see Gilbert 2003; Grif-
fiths & Stotz 2013; Calcott 2017).  
Nevertheless, a molecular gene “for” a property is an abstraction 
that only makes sense in a context not only of other genes (that partic-
ipate in the causal process) but also of equally necessary environmen-
tal factors, even if they are only enabling. Another problem is that 
there are also instructive environmental factors. For example, the sex 
of some reptiles (crocodiles and turtles, for example) is determined by 
the temperature of the sand where the eggs are buried. This all be-
comes much more relevant when we address behaviour, especially 
human behaviour. Moreover, if the D-gene “for” a phenotypic effect 
is whatever is the difference maker, it may actually be the lack of a 
molecular gene. In addition, P-genes are discovered as heritability 
patterns on population level. They are basically theoretical constructs 
for studying heritability on the population level – they cannot be the 
ontological basis of evolution.200 
Epigenesis is a holistic process in which genes and environmental 
factors interact. The various factors are not additive but interdepend-
ent in their functions, and the interactions are often non-linear and 
cyclical. The genes and other factors are causally symmetrical in this 
process.201 From the developmental point of view, genes are important 
 
200 The standard defence of gene-selectionism was that precisely because evolu-
tion works on the population level and genes are replicators, only correlation 
between the genes and all phenotypic traits that it is associated with on the pop-
ulation level matter. (See Sterelny & Kitcher 1988.) This, however, does not work 
for exactly the reasons why we need to distinguish the two notions of gene. 
201 Even if both genes and environmental factors affect height, we cannot say 
how much of the height of a given person is caused by genes, nor how much 
by environmental factors. The causal mechanisms determining the process on 
the individual level are too complicated. Relative measures can be used on the 
population level, but population-level measures do not measure the develop-
mental processes. The heredity of a trait basically measures the relevant ge-
netic variation relative to the relevant environmental variation as they exist in 
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but not unique factors. From the evolutionary point of view, what 
makes genes important is that they are a powerful way to transmit 
phenotypic properties relatively reliably. Again, they are important 
but not unique; non-genetic factors may also serve as developmental 
resources that can transmit phenotypic properties (see Griffiths & 
Gray 1994 & 1997; Sterelny 1996; Oyama et al 2001; Odling-Smee et al 
2003; Jablonka & Lamb 2005; Shea 2011; Tikhodeyev 2018). This is why 
individualist models of replication have emerged: it is the individual 
itself that is a replicator. One such model is Peter Godfrey-Smith’s 
generalized Darwinian model of evolution, which is based on Darwin-
ian populations that consist of Darwinian individuals that are capable of 
Darwinian processes (Godfrey-Smith 2009). These individuals do not 
necessarily coincide with individuals as organisms defined by metab-
olism (Dupré & O’Malley 2009; Godfrey-Smith 2013); instead, they are 
reproducing continuants. Godfrey-Smith’s theory abandons the gene-
centred view of evolution and is critical towards it, but it is a formal 
generalization of Darwinian logic and does not engage in develop-
mental processes as such. The sophisticated individualist theory 
based on development that we must look at more closely in this con-
text is the Developmental Systems Theory. 
The originator of both the term “developmental system” and one 
of the foundational ideas of the Developmental Systems Theory, de-
velopment as a system of interactions with emergent properties that 
cannot be reduced to individual genes, is Conrad H. Waddington 
(1952). The theory as we know it now has been most prominently de-
veloped by Gilbert Gottlieb (2001 & 2003), Susan Oyama, Paul Grif-
fiths, and Russell Gray (Oyama 1985; Griffiths & Gray 1994, 1997 & 
2005; Oyama et al 2001). According to the theory, the units of evolution 
are not genes but not phenotypes either, but whole life cycles of indi-
viduals, the developmental systems. A developmental system does 
 
the population at the moment of the measurement. What genetic and environ-
mental factors are relevant and to what extent depends on the developmental 
processes, and the population-level studies are silent about these. 
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not, however, replicate itself, but transfers developmental resources 
that (with other reliably present developmental resources, including 
those in the environment) reconstruct a similar next-generation devel-
opmental system. The resources include genes, organelles (such as mi-
tochondria), the system for gene expression (the mother’s sex-cell 
from which the new individual starts growing), but also all the envi-
ronmental factors that explain why the next generation resembles the 
previous. This may include the social and cultural environment. It is 
an almost trivial fact that external factors play a causal role in devel-
opment, but what the Developmental Systems Theory emphasizes is 
that non-genetic factors are not simply participatory or enabling fac-
tors, but sometimes instructive factors that have a specific effect on the 
phenotype and therefore participate in the construction of the pheno-
type.202 This construction process is holistic and has a high degree of 
contingency in it. Furthermore, the developmental system does not 
have an end-state or a “result phenotype”; rather the developmental 
process continues throughout the life cycle. This gives a natural evo-
lutionary perspective on the interaction between plastic phenotypes 
and the environments in which they produce adaptive traits. The 
traits whose development is influenced by or even depend on certain 
specific features of the environment may be adaptive in the ecological 
environments where these features exist (see Gilbert 2001 & 2003). 
Obvious problems with such a view are its holism and the fuzzy 
borders of the developmental system (Sterelny 1996), running the risk 
of “dissolving into an interactionist causal soup” (Shea 2011). The dis-
tinction between instructive and enabling factors aims to bring clarity 
to this. Another solution is to approach development as a process that 
 
202  This could be conceptualized as non-genetic factors transferring infor-
mation or “inherited representations” (Shea 2011), but the notion of biological 
information raises a whole range of problems and is rejected by most Devel-
opmental Systems theorists as highly misleading even (or especially) in the 
case of genes (for example, Oyama 1985; Griffiths 2001; Moss 2001). The no-




goes through a mechanistic structure where the parts of the mecha-
nism are the developmental resources, which enables us to give quali-
tative information about the causal structures and specific nature of 
relevant factors in the development (see also Griffiths & Tabery 2013). 
Developmental biology traces developmental processes and how the 
various factors (such as genes and environment-induced hormonal 
changes) interact within epigenetic processes that have a certain mech-
anistic structure, and the field can be understood as being about discov-
ering mechanisms.203 The mechanisms are self-building – earlier steps 
of the development enable later ones, not only because the process 
progresses in stages, but because the earlier stages build mechanisms 
that can produce later stages. William Wimsatt (1986a, 2001 & 2007) 
calls this layered productivity generative entrenchment. I will return to 
the virtues of the mechanistic approach later. Psychological development 
is an expansion of this process (see Griffiths & Gray 2005).  
I will not discuss the Developmental Systems Theory in detail, 
but I assume that something along this line is the correct way to un-
derstand the replication process: individual genes are not an adequate 
focus for understanding replication from the evolutionary point of 
view. The individuals – who are produced by different developmental 
resources and pass them on – are. This seems to be the general conse-
quence of what we know about how biological development is rele-
vant to evolution. There may be other ways to conceptualize this, but 
the Developmental Systems Theory is the most sophisticated and 
 
203 Developmental biology does not have a field-defining theory, but it uses a 
cluster of theories, models, and other tools, some of which have originated 
within the field, some of which have come from elsewhere. Alan C. Love 
(2014) has proposed that to understand the structure of the field, the perspec-
tive should not be from theories but from the problems that organize the field. 
This fits nicely with the view of scientific inquiry proposed by Matti Sintonen 
(1984, 1989 & 1990) and Jaakko Hintikka (1988). A compatible way to under-
stand developmental biology that I suggest here is that the development of an 
organism is a mechanistic process, and the various research questions that 
arise are about different components of the mechanism. 
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integrative model available. This position is also more problematic for 
group selection than the mainstream gene-centred view of social evo-
lution, which means that the case for the significance of the group-
level considerations becomes stronger if it is shown to be needed 
within this framework too. In the gene-centred framework, the fitness 
of a gene can be correlated with phenotypic differences on any level 
of biological organization, at least in principle,204 but the individualist 
framework requires more work. In most cases, the individual is also 
the interactor, seemingly breaking the distinction between replicators 
and interactors. But the logic that the distinction articulates does not 
break. There is still interaction between the individuals and environ-
ments and there are replication processes in forms of transfer, alt-
hough some forms might take external routes that are also forms of 
interaction, such as modifying the environment; I will return to this 
shortly. More importantly, even if replicators are individuals, interac-
tors may still be realized on several levels – or rather, the interactions 
with the environment that determine reproductive success may take 
place on the level of interactions between individuals or in their col-
lective behaviour. As I emphasized in the previous chapter, the inter-
active traits are instantiated by individuals and their interaction, and 
although the traits in the selective competition are holistic, they can be 
replicated through individuals, and the issue about the levels of selec-
tion, which is the third dimension, is left open by these considerations 
only. Before going into individualism and holism in development 
more closely, I will now briefly review some of the more precise con-
nections between evolution and development in greater detail. 
 
 
204 This can be derived from Price’s Equation (Price 1970). Covariance it shows 
is not, however, sufficient to characterize group selection, for it cannot handle 
soft selection (Wallace 1968) where each group determines the number of off-
spring to be the same, which seems to be a case of group selection but without 
fitness variations caused by groups (Okasha 2006). However, it shows how 
group-level selection is possible in the gene-centred view. 
346 
 
7.1.2. Evolution and Development 
 
Psychological and behavioural traits do not fall into fixed (innate, genet-
ically determined, or what have you) traits and completely acquired 
traits that are imprinted without predisposition; a lot of development 
possesses a plasticity in which both “intrinsic” and environmental 
characteristics affect the development in ways that are evolutionarily 
functional (see Gilbert, Opitz & Raff 1996; Gilbert 2001, 2003 & 2007; 
West-Eberhardt 2009; Pigliucci & Müller 2010; Wolpert et al 2010). Se-
lection is not only selection of phenotypes, but also the developmental 
pathways that lead there. Selection guides the pathways to rely on the 
developmental resources that are reliably present when fixity is 
needed – if environmental resources are reliably present, a pathway 
using them is enough and there will be no selection for dependence 
on genes or selection for any particular genes associated for this. The 
emergence of reliably present, adequate environmental factors can 
even break genetic control over a developmental process. On the other 
hand, the emergence of an adaptive phenotype through phenotypic 
plasticity, including learning, can lead to genetic assimilation of the 
trait (phenotype first evolution; see Waddington 1953; Piggliucci et al 
2006) and the fitness advantages from fast learning increases selection 
pressure on genetic evolution of faster learning and growing genetic 
control of the development (the Baldwin Effect; Baldwin 1896). How-
ever, if the environment contains variation that makes different phe-
notypes more adaptive in different contexts, there may be selection for 
phenotypic plasticity. 
There are two senses of phenotypic plasticity. It can be the organ-
ism’s ability to react to an environmental input (internal or external) 
with a change in form, state, movement, or rate of activity. That is, the 
organism can change or behave differently depending on the context. 
It can also mean the ability of a single genotype to produce more than 
one phenotype. That is, the environmental factors can trigger different 
developmental pathways such that a factor that is robustly connected 
to an adaptive need triggers a pathway that leads to a phenotype that 
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is adaptive in this environment. The trigger does not need to be in-
formatively connected to the challenge or the adaptive form – selec-
tion operates with robust causal connections, not connections in the 
content. This is true of both behaviour guidance and development. In 
complex and hostile environments, it becomes more useful for behav-
ioural guidance to become more precise with the connection between 
the relevant features of the environment and the perceptual data and 
to use multiple cues, decoupling the representation of an external 
thing from direct perception and moving gradually from stimulus-re-
sponse to cognition and robust motivational mechanisms (see God-
frey-Smith 1996; Sterelny 2001a & 2003). A similar process takes place 
in the plasticity of development: some features of psychological de-
velopment become more sensitive to more precise informational con-
tent, and as the behavioural responses become more flexible and per-
haps also include imaginative solutions, we can talk about learning. 
Regardless of whether general, universal learning exists or not, there 
is a gradual shift from causally triggered plasticity and powerful flex-
ible learning, and most human learning is biased and constrained, 
even symbolic learning (Sperber 1996; Deacon 1997).  
From the evolutionary point of view, developmental processes 
that are fixed or have robust, predisposed developmental pathways 
that have specific triggers are more reliable in producing adaptive be-
haviour but require relatively stable environments and enough time 
to evolve. Individual learning is faster and more suitable for changing 
environments but is constrained by individual epistemic and cogni-
tive limitations, and the cumulation of feedback from the environment 
and success is limited to one lifetime. (Sterelny 2003; Ylikoski & Kok-
konen 2009.) Social and symbolic learning lie somewhere in between: 
they are faster than genetic evolution but slower than individual 
learning, and they allow multi-generational cumulation but make in-
dividuals vulnerable to mistakes by the individuals they copy from. 
All three ways to adapt are good in some cases – cultural adaptation 




The overall point here is that the interaction of the internal and 
external factors in a specific way may be selected. Adaptations are not 
only passive adaptations of phenotypes to environments, but adapta-
tions to utilize environmental features, making the products of these 
interactions extensions of phenotypes (as suggested by Dawkins 
1982), but also in development. When organisms modify their envi-
ronments, they modify both the developmental environment for fu-
ture generations and their selection environment, causing loops and 
co-evolution between the environment and the population inhabiting 
it. John Odling-Smee and his collaborators dubbed this process niche 
construction (Odling-Smee et al 2003). Some aspects of culture can also 
be understood as niche construction (Laland et al 2001; Odling-Smee 
et al 2011). Humans in particular change their developmental condi-
tions actively, including social and cultural contexts, the skillsets that 
a child needs to learn, and so on. Human behaviour is both very flex-
ible and suggestible. This brings to the fore the importance of under-
standing social and cultural aspects of development not only in evo-
lutionary anthropology, but also in evolutionary psychology.  
At least some human psychological characteristics have a devel-
opmental connection with other people, and their evolutionary func-
tion is related to the nature of this connection. I discussed nativist evo-
lutionary psychology in a previous chapter and noted that there are 
alternative approaches. The styles of evolutionary psychology are re-
lated to one’s view on how evolutionary theory works. Karola Stotz, 
for example, has argued that nativist evolutionary psychology is a nat-
ural application of the (outdated) Modern Synthesis and has sug-
gested and outlined an alternative based on the Extended Synthesis 
and the Developmental Systems Theory instead (Stotz 2014).205 Darcia 
 
205 Furthermore, nativist evolutionary psychology assumes the “old school” 
of cognitive science, while Stotz suggests that the 4E movement (embodied, 
embedded, enactive and extended cognition) is a more suitable framework 
for understanding the object of evolutionary psychology. Generally speaking, 
evolutionary psychologists and Developmental System theorists have been 
antagonistic towards each other, although attempts other than Stotz’s to 
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Narvaez, with her collaborators, has in turn studied child develop-
ment and how social and other environmental factors and parental 
styles affect the development of empathy, intelligence, social emo-
tions, and psychological well-being, using evolutionary hypotheses 
about the evolutionary contexts of evolved psychological develop-
ment as a theoretical framework (Narvaez 2014; Narvaez et al 2012, 
2014 & 2016).206 Evolutionary psychology does not need to be meth-
odologically individualist in its approach to cognitive processes, in its 
assumptions of psychological development, nor in its views about 
evolutionary processes. However, acceptance of holism does not al-
ways entail the futility of individualist approaches in any of these di-




7.2. Individualism, Holism, and the Extended Synthesis 
 
The Extended Evolutionary Synthesis is an attempt to produce a new 
synthesis of evolutionary biology and other fields of biology that are 
relevant to understanding evolution, especially developmental biol-
ogy, but it also seeks to re-think evolution in the light of more recent 
discoveries in evolutionary biology proper. It builds heavily on evo-
lutionary developmental biology (see for example Gilbert 2001 & 2003; 
 
integrate the two projects exist (for example, Frankenhuis, Panchanathan & 
Barrett 2013). 
206 Narvaez integrates results from developmental and child psychology, an-
thropological research of hunter-gatherer childhood, and comparative studies 
of how other social mammals raise their offspring. According to her, there is 
an evolved developmental niche that she calls the Evolved Nest. For babies, it 
includes immediate responsivity to crying (no distress to babies), breastfeed-
ing for 2-5 years, and frequent touch; later in early childhood, it includes free 
play in natural world with multi-aged playmates, multiple adult caregivers, 
and a positive social climate. Deprivation of these features is deprivation of 
essential developmental resources. 
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Hall 2003; Carroll 2005; Müller 2007), which integrates developmental 
biology into the Modern Synthesis. In addition to the connections dis-
cussed above, it seeks to understand developmental processes from 
the evolutionary point of view, and things such as developmental con-
straints and homologies, by integrating the two fields. The Extended 
Evolutionary Synthesis aims at a much more fundamental paradigm 
change. It does not suggest a radically new ontology for evolution like 
the Developmental Systems Theory does, but other than that, these 
two approaches are compatible at the level of detail needed here. I will 
now provide a brief summary of the Extended Synthesis to give a sys-
tematic image of how developmental mechanisms interact with evo-
lutionary mechanisms, after which I will rephrase the individualism–
holism issue in developmental dimension within this context. 
 
7.2.1. The Extended Synthesis 
 
The Extended Evolutionary Synthesis (Piggliucci 2007; Müller 2007 & 
2017; Piggliucci & Müller 2010; Laland et al 2015) seeks to bring the 
core logic of the evolutionary theory up to date with recent discoveries 
and theoretical advances in biology across its subfields. Many of these 
ideas are present in “mainstream” evolutionary biology, and the crit-
ics of the paradigm shift idea do not so much refute any component 
of the Extended Synthesis as they downplay them as “add-ons” to the 
Modern Synthesis. They remain agnostic on how important these 
might be rather than either denying them or wanting to change the 
paradigm (see Wray, Hoekstra and colleagues in Laland et al 2014; see 
also Müller 2017). I take the Extended Synthesis, therefore, as being 
relatively non-controversial in its substance and important in the hu-
man context especially, given that all its “add-ons” are important in 
the human context. Furthermore, the “add-on” approach is telling of 
the theoretical status of evolutionary biology today: as Gerd Müller 
(2017) points out, it is a set of various topics, approaches and research 
programmes, not a theoretically unified field. We need to see how 
they all fit together – and what consequences this has. 
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The elements that the Extended Synthesis aims at integrating in-
clude the direct evolutionary significance of non-genetic or “soft” 
routes for inheritance (Mayr 1980; Jablonka & Lamb 2008) such as ep-
igenetic (see Jablonka & Lamb 1995 & 2005; Tikhodeyev 2018), behav-
ioural (including nurture, social learning, and transforming the envi-
ronment; see Avital & Jablonka 2000; Jablonka & Lamb 2005; Hoppitt 
& Laland 2013), and symbolic (Jablonka & Lamb 2005); the under-
standing of developmental processes as non-linear processes that both 
constrain and facilitate selectable variation (West-Eberhardt 2003; Gil-
bert 2007; Wolpert et al 2010); the forms of phenotypic plasticity, in-
cluding phenotype first sources for adaptation such as the Baldwin 
effect, the consolidation of epigenetic changes, or genetic assimilation 
(Jablonka & Lamb 1995; West-Eberhardt 2003; Piggliucci et al 2006); 
and widening evo-devo into eco-evo-devo with niche construction 
(Odling-Smee, Feldman & Laland 2003; see also Gilbert 2003). The 
proponents of the Extended Synthesis are less biased towards natural 
selection explanations when it comes to evolutionary explanations 
proper, but within natural selection explanations, they tend to accept 
multi-level selection (Müller 2017). 
According to one systematization of the Extended Synthesis (La-
land et al 2015), evolution proceeds in the following way. There is a 
population of developing organisms (or developmental systems). The 
developmental processes are influenced by genetic, epigenetic, and 
environmental factors. The relationship between genes and the devel-
opment is not one-directional: the developmental processes affect the 
gene expression. The factors that contribute to inheritance include 
genes, epigenetic mechanisms, modification of ecological factors, and 
culture. Genetic processes such as mutation and recombination are 
only one source of evolutionary novelty. For example, epigenetic pro-
cesses can affect gene expression in a novel way. Environmental induc-
tion, where new environmental factors create new phenotypes within 
the existing developmental possibilities due to developmental plastic-
ity, can lead to new variation and potentially adaptation through 
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selection.207 The behaviour of organisms can create new environmen-
tal conditions (niche construction). Finally, in phenotypic accommoda-
tion, developmental plasticity leads to novel adaptation through adap-
tive adjustment, where the negative effects of a mutation or environ-
mental induction are balanced by developmental processes (see West-
Eberhardt 2005; Badyaev 2009).208 The processes that modify the fre-
quencies of heritable variation (genes and other) include selection 
(working on multiple levels), drift, and gene flow, but there are pro-
cesses that are not a part of the Modern Synthesis which bias the se-
lection. One is developmental bias, which includes developmental con-
straints but also developmental drives that push the development to-
wards some directions (instead of preventing some directions), which 
might even facilitate adaptive evolution since the selection may shape 
the developmental bias itself (Uller et al 2018). Another biasing factor 
is niche construction, in which the organisms modify the selective en-
vironment, not only the other way around. These things together de-
termine phenotypic evolution, the change in the phenotypes and their 
frequencies on the population level. 
Now, the Extended Synthesis has four general consequences that 
change the image of evolution from the Modern Synthesis. First, it 
completely changes the role of genes, just like the Developmental Sys-
tems Theory. Neither denies their importance, but both deny their 
uniqueness as a developmental resource or as a route of replication. 
Consequently, the definition of evolution as a change in the gene pool 
of the population does not work – and it would be misleading to un-
derstand evolution as a change in the living world understood in 
 
207 This can be the case with some invasive species, for example, and it can 
lead to significant fitness advantages, making it a starting point for adapta-
tion. See Badyaev & Oh 2008. 
208 Phenotypic accommodation is not caused by the novel factors, it is not ran-
dom, and it is not systemic self-organization. It is an evolved property of the 
developmental system. The accommodation is caused by ancestral adaptive 
responses, making the new phenotype viable, but the phenotype itself may be 
new. (West-Eberhardt 2005.) 
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terms of phenotypes, since phenotypes can change without genetic 
change and genes can change without phenotypic change. Second, the 
details of the developmental mechanisms matter with regard to the 
units of evolutionary change within an organism. These mechanisms 
are, however, evolved properties, whether selected or not. I have re-
ferred to some of the results of evolutionary developmental biology 
such as environmental induction and developmental drive, where the 
effects of developmental systems on further evolution are because of 
adaptive selection of developmental processes in the past. The inter-
play between evolution and development is bidirectional and even 
the Developmental System theorists give selection a central role in 
shaping the developmental architecture of the developmental systems 
(see Griffiths & Gray 2005), although they emphasize contingencies 
and the fact that the new developmental system is constructed from 
similar resources every time – there is no predetermined, inherited 
plan for how this takes place. A special case of such processes that will 
soon be relevant to the discussion is canalization (Waddington 1942 & 
1957). Some phenotypic properties are such that they emerge in vari-
ous combinations of developmental resources. If a factor that is usu-
ally present and active in the development is missing, another devel-
opmental pathway emerges that results in the same phenotype. This 
is selected robustness of the outcome of crucial characteristics. Third, 
the environment plays an active role in producing the phenotype. I 
stated before that selection is not selection of phenotypic traits alone, 
but also the developmental mechanisms that lead to those traits (see 
Gilbert 2001 & 2003). Environment is a part of this and should be in-
cluded in the interactions that are selected, especially if there is loop-
ing in the form of niche construction. Fourth, the Extended Synthesis 
is an attack on adaptationism (see Müller 2017). Again, natural selec-
tion is important, but it is not the only source of adaptivity. Not direct, 
at least. 
I have already agreed about the genes above, and I elided the role 
of genes in the previous chapters when I was discussing evolutionary 
explanation and defining altruism. Heritability is essential to 
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evolution, but its route is not, which makes genes as such irrelevant 
to the general logic of evolution. Genes are still the most important 
route of inheritance, but the changed roles of the gene have some con-
sequences. First, the theory of kin selection requires re-interpretation. 
Second, if there are different systems of inheritance, it is theoretically 
possible that there are different fitnesses: the capacity to replicate 
takes different routes and different routes may have different compe-
titions between individuals. In practice this is almost never the case if 
individual is the replicator, and all the different inheritance systems 
participate in the development of this one entity. Culture, however, is 
an exception to this, potentially making human evolution different. 
How some culturally transmitted components of psychological devel-
opment spread is detached from other dimensions of inheritance.  
I also disagreed about adaptationism before. Recall that I distin-
guished between historical and ahistorical explanatory adaptation-
ism. The developmental phenomena discussed in this chapter makes 
the assumption of natural selection having been the primary causal 
factor in the evolutionary history of an adaptive trait problematic, 
among other previously mentioned reasons, and I alluded to these de-
velopmental factors earlier as well. However, the argument I made 
about understanding organisms as functional wholes in their environ-
ments from the point of view of adaptivity still holds. First, the origin 
and some evolution of adaptive traits because of developmental phe-
nomena is a competing historical explanation, not a competing view 
of adaptive functionality. Second, selection participates even in these 
processes, as explicated above. Adaptively dysfunctional characteris-
tics are still selected against, and functional characteristics are selected 
for – it is just that the entire process is more complicated than in the 
Modern Synthesis. Third, many of the more complicated developmen-
tal mechanisms that are significant for evolution are evolved mecha-
nisms themselves. Generally speaking, natural selection plays enough 
of a role in the process to make adaptivity an adequate perspective on 
the functionality of organisms and their behaviour. The other two con-
sequences, the centrality of developmental mechanisms and the active 
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role played by the environment, are central to the main topic. I will 
now define developmental individualism and holism, building on 
these considerations. 
 
7.2.2. Developmental Individualism and Holism 
 
The development of an individual organism is an interactive process 
between various factors that takes place in stages. Some of the stages 
are there only to enable later stages. William Wimsatt’s concept of gen-
erative entrenchment refers to the phenomenon in which earlier stages 
of the development are generative for the later ones but are en-
trenched in the process, so that if these processes get disturbed, the 
later stages are disturbed too, potentially making the organism invia-
ble. The more deeply entrenched the developmental process is, the 
more likely it is to be canalized (as an evolutionary response to vul-
nerability), making it more resistant to changes in both genome and 
environment. This resistance to change, together with the fact that 
change would make the organism inviable, makes these developmen-
tal processes and the phenotypic characteristics they produce more 
constrained with regard to evolutionary change. (Wimsatt 1986a, 2001 
& 2007.) As discussed above, different factors that play a causal role in 
the development play different kinds of role in terms of what exactly 
they affect in the phenotype: some are mere enabling factors and some 
are instructive.209 Within the enabling factors, there may be factors 
necessary for the development and factors that are alternatives to each 
other because of canalization. Among the instructive factors (that 
cause specific changes in the phenotype), there are differences in the 
scope of change in the characteristic affected. We can conceptualize 
the developmental process as a self-constructing mechanism (or sets of 
 
209 There is no reason that “instructive” and “enabling” should be clear-cut 
categories. There is, however, selection for both sensitivity and insensitivity 
to developmental factors regarding their effects. Both robustness and plastic-
ity can be selected and the very systems of inheritance are evolved systems. 
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mechanisms) and the various factors as components of the mecha-
nism, at different stages of the process. This process is holistic, with 
complicated interdependencies, and we cannot quantify the relative 
importance of the various components, but we may nevertheless dis-
cover the qualitative structures of the causal mechanisms that connect 
the factors to the development. 
Not all parts of the developmental mechanism are equally im-
portant to any given explanatory purposes. This depends on three 
things. First, the facts about the causal system. For example, instruc-
tive causes are more important to some questions than enabling 
causes. Second, they depend on the explanatory interest. Develop-
mental biology is (and should be) interesting in all factors, but not eve-
rything is necessary to evolutionary biology or to psychology. Third, 
not all the range of variation in the environment is important. For ex-
ample, the factors that are necessary for the development to take place 
at all (such as the right temperature or atmospheric conditions) are not 
relevant for most considerations. The range of variation depends on 
the explanatory questions. It may be, for example, theoretically inter-
esting to know how a plant grows in zero-gravity, but for most pur-
poses, it is reasonable to limit the relevant variation to actual or plau-
sible ecological conditions. If we are interested in the relevance of de-
velopmental processes to the evolution of a particular trait, the factors 
that are always a part of the developmental environment can be black-
boxed. They do not generate phenotypic variation even if they are a 
necessary part of the development. Furthermore, we can stipulate nor-
mal conditions even if the conditions do not always hold. There can 
be change events, for example, that disturb development but are rare 
and should not be considered as part of the normal range of the de-
velopmental environment. For example, it is possible that a child 
grows up without any linguistic environment at all, and this has hap-
pened and been recorded several times, but any theory of language 
acquisition works under an assumption that a linguistic environment 
exists. Sometimes it is more sensible to treat an omission as an explan-
atory cause. For example, parental care matters both in animals 
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(Klopfer 2001) and humans (Narvaez et al 2012; Berk 2013) and under-
standing exactly how is important, but for some explanatory pur-
poses, neglect of something that is normal is the change that explains 
abnormality in development. I will return to these topics in the next 
chapter where I discuss the concept of innateness and what theoretical 
or explanatory role considering something innate could have. 
From the evolutionary point of view, those parts of the develop-
mental mechanism that are inherited play a special role. Those envi-
ronmental factors that are present in all relevant environments are 
causal background only, even if they are part of how the phenotype is 
constructed. The same applies to the parts of the environment that 
vary and affect the phenotype through phenotypic plasticity but are 
not transmitted to the next generation. Take the sex determination of 
some reptiles by temperature for example. The development of both 
sexes are evolved processes, and which temperature is the borderline 
between different triggers is probably an adaptation for ensuring the 
optimal frequency of different sexes in the given environmental con-
ditions. The mechanism that produces two sexes is selected as a 
whole, and the varying environment is a decisive part of it, but only 
the parts of the mechanism that depend on the parents’ contribution 
to the developmental process are important from this perspective. 
This may sound at odds with Developmental System Theory, which 
holds that every generation of organisms is reconstructed and all the 
developmental resources are equally important, and the environmen-
tal factors that construct the next generation are a part of the inherited 
developmental resources that evolution builds the developmental 
systems on. I do not deny any of this. What I am saying is that all the 
parts of the mechanistic process that constructs the organism are im-
portant for understanding evolution, but hereditary resources are the 
only parts of the replication process that are important for selection. 
This difference is important. 
Consider a highly general and flexible learning process as an ex-
ample of one end of plasticity. If this capacity (C) is an adaptation, it 
has evolved for an environmental variation (E1…n) regarding the 
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context of learning. There is a multitude of possible learning results 
(L1…n). C is selected on the condition that the choice of L1…n in the given 
E is more likely to be more adapted in the E than most of the other 
L1…n or any fixed variant. This adaptive matching between E and L is 
the adaptive consequence that the learning is selected for. However, 
the capacity itself and whatever processes pass this capacity on to the 
next generation are what are selected, not the set of resulting behav-
iours L1…n. No phenotype is without some of the possible behavioural 
dispositions and understanding any given phenotype requires under-
standing the individual learning process, but none of the individual 
learning processes is selected for. The capacity is – and whatever con-
straints and default trajectories it might involve. There is a continuity 
between simple one-or-the-other triggers that choose between two de-
velopmental paths (such as the reptile sex determination) and compli-
cated general learning processes in evolved plasticity that involve in-
formation extraction from the environment and context-sensitive cog-
nizing before internalizing a habit. The same logic applies all along 
the continuum. The degrees of freedom in the variation of the pheno-
type as a function of environmental influences is what selection works 
on, based on the consequences of allowing variation. Selection does 
not work directly on the phenotypic properties. It is, however, crucial 
to understand the developmental processes and how they result in the 
phenotypes in any given context in order to understand the phenotypic 
evolution. This is the core of the developmental expansion of the Ex-
tended Synthesis.210  
How does the individualism and holism issue emerge, then? I 
have already fixed the assumption that replicators are individuals, but 
this does not mean that all replication processes are individualistic. I ar-
gued earlier that even if individuals are the interactors, some of their 
behaviour should still be understood as holistic, multi-individual 
 
210 To the extent that mainstream evolutionary developmental biology and the 
Developmental Systems Theory disagree on the unit of evolving trait, they 
frame the question differently. They are both right. 
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traits. I now propose a holistic interpretation of some replication (or 
reconstruction) processes. This is holism in a different dimension, and 
the traits that involve these processes do not need to be holistic traits 
in the proximate dimension, and the other way around. The idea is 
that some of the developmental resources in the developmental pro-
cesses of some traits are shared by multiple individuals (either the 
same tokens or same types with shared history; I will expand on this 
shortly). The evolutionary relevance of this is that some developmen-
tal resources that are difference makers for phenotype and therefore 
fitness of individuals may be passed to the next generation collec-
tively. The comparison is not between all factors but only those that 
exhibit variation within the population; sharing those elements in 
which there is variation in does. These elements may include collec-
tively transformed or constructed environments (including technol-
ogy and other artefacts that may influence the development) and hor-
izontally transmitted traits (through different forms of social learning, 
but also the behavioural effects to the children’s development that are 
similar to parental effects but caused by others). The core of the idea 
is that there is phenotypic variation between human individuals that 
are caused by developmental resources inherited from individuals 
other than parents (non-vertically) and these developmental resources 
(and their effects) are shared by other individuals too. If there is a sys-
tematic cofounder for sharing these resources, the replication process 
is holistic – not in the sense that the development of the individual is 
holistic, but in the sense that the development of the trait depends on 
the group-level reproduction or maintenance of the developmental re-
sources. 
If we approach development as a mechanistic process that made 
up of parts, the features of the developmental environments (includ-
ing social and cultural environment) are shared parts of several indi-
vidual developmental processes. The shared part does not need to be 
the same token of an environmental feature (any more than a shared 
gene needs to be the same token), but if two individuals share a same 
type of developmental resource and there is a joint explanation for why 
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this type of factor is shared (for example, the individuals share a cul-
ture), the developmental processes are dependent on the same explana-
tory factor. Mere externality of developmental resources does not make 
them holistic in any sense, of course. First, as stated above, the general 
features of the environment shared by the whole population do not 
count as inheritance with evolutionary significance. This requires dif-
ference-making between individuals in phenotypic variation. Second, 
if an external device for transmitting a trait to offspring, such as inher-
ited materials or modified environment, behaviour copying, or direct 
teaching, takes place only on parental lines, it is merely a case of exter-
nal individualistic reproduction.211 Some such behaviourally transmitted 
external developmental resources may, however, exist (and spread) 
widely in a group and not exist in another group – these are cultural 
differences. The consequences for selection are direct: if the replication 
is individualistic, the selection is between individuals, but if there are 
shared resources, helping to pass that resource on through another 
individual may be selected. This shared resource may also be a 
“shared gene” – kin selection is a form of developmental holism. I will 
return to kin selection and its relationship with other cases of devel-
opmental holism in the last chapter. What is important now is that 
other developmental resources may serve a similar role of connecting 
two individuals reproductively – this includes modified environ-
ments, if there are differences between them among different popula-
tions, and culture. 
We can distinguish between two senses of holistic process in the 
developmental dimension, just like in the proximate dimension. If 
 
211 Furthermore, a distinction needs to be made between selected non-genetic 
parental effects, whether they are epigenetic or some version of external trans-
mission, and transmission of information that parents have recognized to be 
adaptive and pass on, whether this is conscious or non-conscious, and 
whether the route is symbolic, material or behaviour copying. The distinction 
between these categories (selection-based and detection-based) applies to dif-




some individuals within the group (but not everyone) share develop-
mental resources and are connected through this, this is interactionist 
holism. The individuals constitute a cultural subgroup through the re-
sources; I call this “interactionist” since the paradigmatic case in the 
context of social behavioural traits is acquisition through interactions 
with others (through behavioural effects, copying, social learning or 
norm-enforcement, for example). If all the individuals of the group of 
individuals share a behaviour-shaping developmental resource nec-
essarily, by virtue of being a member of the group, this is collectivist 
holism.212 This takes place if there are shared cultural meanings and/or 
behavioural rules that all the members of the group share nearly uni-
versally because of identification, enforcement, or some other mecha-
nism. Development without holistic elements is individualistic. This 
may include external routes of inheritance too; cultural transmission 
from parents to offspring is still vertical and works similarly to other 
vertical forms of transmission from the evolutionary point of view. 
Those characteristics that are not reproduced but are, for example, in-
dividually learned through individual experiences and not passed 
forward as such, are not directly objects of evolution, as discussed 
above. A special case of developmental individualism is evolutionary 
nativism, which considers only innate traits to be an object of evolu-
tionary explanation.  
The usefulness of the concept of innateness is contested, and the 
developmental individualism it assumes is incorrect. However, there 
 
212 Note that this notion of collectivist holism is weaker than the collective re-
producers of Peter Godfrey-Smith (2009; 2014). Godfrey-Smith’s collective re-
producers are collectives in which some units of the collective reproduce 
while others only help to make this possible, examples being multicellular or-
ganisms (in which only sex cells reproduce) or superorganisms such as insect 
colonies (in which only queens and drones reproduce). Meerkats, among 
whom only alpha males and alpha females reproduce, are probably the closest 
mammalian example of this. In my sense of collective developmental holism, 
individuals reproduce but there are holistic elements that affect the develop-
ment of every individual. 
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is a (slightly revisionist) way to understand the concept of innateness 
that makes sense and reflects the function of the concept on the fields 
it is used in. I will define and defend this in the next chapter. Nativism 
in evolutionary psychology, if understood this way, is not as much an 
empirical claim as a (developmentally individualist) methodological 
choice may be justified in some contexts but narrows the object of ex-
planation in ways that the advocates of the methodology do not 
acknowledge. 
The development of human psychology and behaviour lies on a 
continuum with the rest of the biological development, with an in-
creasing amount of influence from outside and from other people. Ex-
ternal influences on brain development start before birth. Psychologi-
cal development takes place in stages with sensitivity periods, and dif-
ferent kinds of interaction are relevant to development in different 
stages.213 The idea of generative entrenchment applies here too, espe-
cially the relevant early life interactions that are difficult to conceptu-
alize as “learning”, especially if the notion of learning is too intellec-
tualist. A lot of early development is about practicing cognitive pro-
cesses and emotional responses in interaction with the environment 
(including the social environment), which provides feedback that is 
often necessary for the development and sometimes instructive. This 
may include seemingly trivial things such as a mother’s touch. As the 
child grows older, the specific features of the environment become 
more important in shaping cognitive skills, social emotions, and other 
capacities. Learning is a special case of plasticity; it is an extreme case 
of it rather than something qualitatively different. Learning involves 
cognitive processing of what is being learned, but to various degrees, 
and there is a continuum between brute causal influences and 
 
213 There is a slight discrepancy between phenotypic plasticity approaches and 
normal stage approaches, but both seem to be valid and there are ways to 
mitigate this discrepancy; see Love 2010. 
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symbolic learning.214 The capacity to learn is a developing capacity it-
self and it is constrained and directed by the already achieved psy-
chology. On the other hand, the developmental tendencies that seem 
to be species-typical and “pushing through” in development often 
rely on environmental factors. An important part of the interaction in 
psychological and behavioural development is the child’s activity: 
children develop their “natural” skills and capacities by doing things, 
especially playing. Social environments (especially playing with other 
children) are important for cognitive, emotional, and behavioural de-
velopment, and an important context for learning the social and cul-
tural rules and meanings of the particular culture in which they are 




Culture is a specific case of environmental influences. It is not the only 
thing that affects the development that we should consider a holistic 
factor from the evolutionary point of view, and I will not equate ho-
lism with culture. However, culture has a special role in thinking why 
human groups should be considered holistic units regarding behav-
ioural traits, so I will discuss it in more detail.  
Culture is also a very vague concept. “Culture” has multiple 
meanings even in the cultural sciences and it is not always clear when 
the term is supposed to be a classificatory term, an explanatory con-
cept, or simply a category in general theoretical discussion about the 
nature of the research objects (see Kuper 1999; Fox & King 2002a; Ram-
sey 2013b; Koskinen 2014). Furthermore, the concept of culture that is 
used in biological contexts when studying whether an animal species 
has a culture or not, for example, has a different function and possibly 
a partly different reference (see Laland & Galef 2009; Ramsey 2013b). 
 
214 There is, for example, a difference between imitating behaviour (replicating 
it) and emulating it (abstracting its goals and reconstructing rather replicating 
it), which I will discuss shortly. 
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The main difference between the biological notion of culture that 
is of interest in questions such as “do animals have culture?” (Boesch 
& Tomasello 1998; Hunt & Gray 2003; Laland & Galef 2009; St Clair & 
Rutz 2013) or “how did (human) culture originate?” (Leaky & Lewin 
1992; Boyd & Silk 2003; Boyd & Richerson 2005; Pagel 2012) and the 
one used in human sciences is that the biological concept of culture 
refers to the medium of cultural differences, and the various concepts 
of culture in human sciences refer to the contents within this medium: 
cultural systems, parts of them, or cultural entities. In the biological 
sense, humans have culture, in the singular. In the human sciences 
sense, humans have cultures, in the plural. I will not adopt any strict 
material definition of culture (such as specifying a form of learning) 
here. Since my perspective is evolutionary, I will follow Frans de Waal 
and Kristin Bonnie (2009; see also de Waal 2001) and characterize cul-
ture through its evolutionary function: horizontal social transmission 
of behavioural traits. The capacities involved, for example, are second-
ary to what is culture. The same capacities and processes may also be 
part of vertical transmission. But the nature of these capacities and 
processes matter. 
Explanatory references to culture are mostly not proximate ex-
planations, but shorthand for developmental explanations: the differ-
ence is due to the differences in the socially held beliefs, meanings and 
norms, as well as the material culture, that the people being compared 
have been exposed to. From the biological point of view, culture can 
be understood as something that comes with the “soft inheritance” 
(Mayr 1980; Jablonka & Lamb 2008), especially behaviour imitation 
and symbolic inheritance. 215  However, culturally transferred and 
 
215 This leaves two routes open for attempts to define (or characterize) culture 
from biological point of view: the reference may be this system itself (as it is 
in the context of human sciences) or the psychological capacity for culture. 
Culture as a system is usually characterized as information that is transferred 
from individual to individual (see Durham 1991; Heyes 1993 & 1994; Boesch 
& Tomasello 1998; Cronk 1999; Alvard 2003; Richerson & Boyd 2015; Ramsey 
2013b; Paul 2018). Grant Ramsey, for example, defines it as “information 
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socially enforced norms and rules are especially important for social 
behaviour (see, for example, Sober & Wilson 1998; Boyd et al 2002; 
Fehr & Fischbacher 2004; Gintis 2006, 2007 & 2009; Roughley & 
Bayertz 2019). Enforcing norms through punishment or rewards is a 
proximate dimension activity that incentivises others to behave in 
some specific way. The rules that are enforced are, however, socially 
acquired. These rules are not necessarily group-level properties: there 
may be variation within the group in which behavioural strategy to 
choose and there may be competing normative expectations. But if the 
group enforces some norms across the group, if some norms become 
prevalent for some other reason, or if some cultural meanings for ac-
tions become part of the social reality of that group, these norms and 
meanings become the group’s properties. This means that groups act 
as collectives in the proximate dimension regarding this trait. It may 
also enable collectivist group selection between groups based on cul-
tural differences. For example, in Robert Boyd’s and Peter Richerson’s 
(1985 & 2005) cultural group selection model, these culturally created 
differences loop back to biological evolution by causing selection pres-
sures for more efficient acquisition of these traits, which may result 
both in trait-specific selection and in selection for general forms of so-
cial learning, as well as other biological adaptations to the cultural en-
vironment (such as lactose tolerance in cultures that use milk). 
 
transmitted between individuals or groups, where this information flows 
through and brings about the reproduction of, and a lasting change in, the 
behavioral trait” (Ramsey 2013b: 466). The psychological side of the issue is 
usually the related human capacity for social learning (for example, Galef 
1992; Heyes 1994 & 2013; see also Call & Carpenter 2002; Call et al 2005; for 
criticism of equating culture with social learning, see McGrew 2009; Sterelny 
2009; Ramsey 2013b).  Yet others distinguish between cultures and a larger 
category of traditions based on the differences in the psychological mecha-
nisms for transferring information (for example, Galef 1992; Whiten 2009). 
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Cultural differences in behaviour are instantiated in individual 
psychologies and how individuals interact.216 They are learned from 
the social surroundings. There are various theories in psychology 
about how cultural features become internalized as part of psychology 
(see Zittoun & Gillespie 2015), but cultural differences in thinking 
styles, cognitive skills, emotional responses, and behaviour exist 
(Gauvain & Munroe 2012; Narvaez et al 2012; Berk 2013; Wang 2017). 
Participating in cultural and social practices and using cultural mean-
ings and artefacts shapes psychological processes and the underlying 
brain processes (Kitayama & Park 2010), being a part of our biological 
developmental environment. Some aspects of culture, such as narra-
tives and other representations, may function as entities that are cop-
ied from one mind to another, and the cognitive processes are just a 
selective environment for culture (Sperber 1996), which may still af-
fect cognition and behaviour in radical ways217, but at least some as-
pects of culture are developmental factors in psychological develop-
ment. Furthermore, humans have the ability (and, to some extent, a 
tendency) to imitate others’ behaviour whereas other animals emulate 
– humans do not only try to achieve the perceived goal of the behav-
iour, but copy parts of behaviour that would seem to be unnecessary 
or even pointless (Call, Carpenter & Tomasello 2005; Lyons, Young & 
Keil 2007; Whiten et al 2009; Heyes 2013; McGuigan et al 2017) and 
adults do this even more efficiently than children (McGuigan, Makin-
son & Whiten 2011). This serves as a starting point for cumulative cul-
ture and its evolution (Boyd & Richerson 2005; McGuigan et al 2017).  
The difference between hard and soft inheritance is not a signifi-
cant difference as such. There is no evolutionary difference between 
parents transferring behavioural traits through genes or behavioural 
 
216 The interactions may be governed by explicit (and sanctionable) rules of 
conduct, self-fulfilling expectations (empirical or normative; see Bicchieri 
2006), or internalized patterns of interaction, acquired through learning by 
experience or through imitating others, for example. 
217 For example, some elements of religion can be explained in this way; see 
Boyer 2001 and Atran 2002. 
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and other external forms of transference. Culture does not entail hori-
zontal inheritance. What is important, however, is that some of the 
forms of trait transfer are such that they can break parental linage. 
Even if they can, they do not necessarily do so. A trait that involves 
cultural transmission and becomes prevalent within a group may do 
so because every individual has got it from one of their parents. But it 
may be that “one of their parents” is exactly right – unlike in genetic 
inheritance where the acquisition of a trait depends on both parents, 
some forms of cultural transmission may be more efficient in spread-
ing a trait. Take tool making for example. It may be enough that one 
of the parents knows how to make tools but exposure to this activity 
makes all offspring likely to practice tool making too. This could ex-
plain tool making becoming prevalent in the given population rela-
tively rapidly without horizontal transmission. But in humans hori-
zontal transmission is prevalent. 218  Cultural transmission does not 
make replication holistic, but its horizontality does. 
Another important aspect of human culture is that it is not only 
a medium of inheritance and a developing environment; it is a selec-
tive environment. This aspect of culture has been the focus of Niche 
Construction theorists (see Laland et al 2000a & 2001; Laland & O’Brien 
 
218Related to this, there is a distinction between selected non-genetic parental 
effects and the transmission of information that parents have recognized to be 
adaptive and pass on (Shea 2013). Some selected non-genetic parental effects 
are epigenetic and some use external transmission, including social learning, 
but they are still part of selected transfer mechanism. If the parents pass on 
information and behavioural tendencies that they have learned through their 
own learning, there is not only a different route of inheritance but a qualita-
tively different route for phenotypic evolution: behaviour is not selected nat-
urally, but by individuals. The capacity for this is probably selected when it 
exists (see Tomasello 1999; Boyd & Richerson 2005; Baumeister 2005; Schaller 
et al 2010; Csibra & György 2011; Sterelny 2012), and there is probably overlap 
between the two processes (as, for example, in language acquisition). This 
type of transmission involves reliance on another individual’s learning, which 




2012): culture is part of the human-made environment (“engineered 
ecosystem”) that humans adapt to, in the usual niche-constructing 
loop. This connects culture nicely to the general view of the extended 
synthesis: culture (or various parts of the complex that is referred to 
as “culture”) plays various roles in the evolutionary understanding of 
humans. First, it is a part of the evolving phenotype (the psychological 
capacities that are its basis, the behavioural traits that we consider cul-
tural, and material culture as the modified environments with arte-
facts and technology as the extended phenotype). Second, culture is a 
part of the developmental processes. It is usual to treat cultural pro-
cesses as a further layer on top of individual developmental processes 
(for example, Boyd & Richerson 1985 & 2005; Sperber 1996; Jablonka 
& Lamb 2005; Odling-Smee & Laland 2011; Laland & O’Brien 2012), 
but this is only true of the cognitively higher parts of the culture: sys-
tems of belief, technologies, norms, et cetera that can be learned as an 
adult. The behaviour of others and the material culture (toys, for ex-
ample) are, however, part of the developmental environment of chil-
dren and can affect the psychological development of cognitive capac-
ities, attitudes, behavioural tendencies, social skills, et cetera. Further-
more, the relevant socio-cultural environment goes beyond parents 
only in humans. (See Kitayama & Park 2010; Gauvain & Munroe 2012; 
Berk 2013; Narvaez 2014; Narvaez et al 2016; Wang 2017.)219 Third, 
 
219 There are good reasons to think that some of the “channels” for cultural 
inheritance can (and should) be distinguished from biological channels; for 
example, Maria Kronfeldner (2021) argues this based on take-off autonomy 
(cultural creativity, change, and spread are independent of biological re-
sources), near-decomposability (the interactions between cultural elements 
and between biological elements in development are stronger than cross-in-
teractions), and differences in stability-granting temporal order (biological 
channels of inheritance convey more stability). This argument is mostly di-
rected towards the Developmental Systems theorists (Griffiths & Gray 1994 & 
2005, for example), who want to downplay the differences between different 
kinds of factors. They do not deny the existence of different kinds of factors, 
however, or some differences between them. Culture is not a homogenous 
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there is cultural evolution of its own in (probably most of) the various 
cultural entities. 
Cultural norms of behaviour occupy all these positions too. Be-
haviour according to the norms, as well as potential enforcement prac-
tices, are part of the evolving phenotype, and there is evolution in 
norms. Imitating others’ behaviour may be a part of children’s devel-
opment of behavioural dispositions that copies behavioural tenden-
cies through ontogeny, and behaviour towards children may also re-
sult in other effects in children that enforce the copying of the norms: 
for example, gender-biased choice of toys and the encouraged and dis-
couraged forms of play may enforce both gender-related norms and 
attitudes. Some cultural norms are replicated in early stages of devel-
opment. The acquisition of some other norms takes place in more com-
plex learning contexts, partly in adulthood, and are more strongly ver-
tical in their spread. The cultural replication mechanisms of these 
norms may also vary. To mention a few: deliberate acceptance of a 
cultural norm, explicit or implicit acceptance of the norm as a way to 
do things and accomplish goals in the social context, copying a suc-
cessful person or a person in an authoritative position (see Boyd & 
Richerson 1985 & 2005 for discussion of different strategies), submit-
ting to enforcement, or non-conscious internalization of the norm. The 
enforcement of norms by others is a part of the cultural replication 
mechanism, and the emergence and maintenance of norms by social 
structures may be considered as such as well, if the social structures 
are partly constituted by culturally reproduced contingencies. And fi-
nally, the norms (both their existence and their content) are part of the 
selection environment for psychological characteristics. 
The logic of cultural niche construction and how norms figure in 
it, and the integration of culture in the Extended Synthesis in general 
 
category, however, and different elements (or even the same elements) may 
influence the development in different ways. These issues are not crucial for 
the main topic at hand – but that culture can affect development in different 
ways, and that there are different kinds of connections between culture and 
biological evolution, are important. 
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(call this socio-cultural evolutionary developmental biology), show that 
replication of behavioural traits within a group can be holistic, it can 
facilitate the evolution of interactive traits, and it can facilitate group 
selection by creating relevant group-level differences. It should, how-
ever, be just as clear that the existence of cultural transmission does 
not imply collectivism. This depends on the replication mechanisms 
involved, and it may depend on the mode of the cultural transmission, 
for example. Luigi Cavalli-Sforza (2000) distinguishes between four 
modes of transmission. First, inheritance through soft routes may be 
just as vertical as genetic inheritance, making them individualist fac-
tors in development. Second, horizontal modes of transmission in-
clude one-to-one mode, magistral (or one-to-many) mode (such as cop-
ying from an authority figure), and many-to-one mode (such as the so-
cial group enforcing a norm). Horizontal transmission may result in 
similarity between some interacting individuals within the group (in-
teractionist holism) more likely than uniformity across the group (col-
lectivist holism).  
Furthermore, not all holistic developmental processes are as eas-
ily evolvable as the simple cases of individual beliefs or skills. If the 
development relies on resources provided by others and these re-
sources are reliably available during evolution, the development 
might become fixed to some degree. Take Darcia Narvaez’s idea of the 
evolved nest (or evolved developmental niche) for example (see Narvaez et 
al 2012, 2014 & 2014). According to her, there is a combination of be-
havioural effects (provided mostly by the parents, but other individ-
uals of the society are also an important part of the “nest”) that devel-
opment relies on during various stages of development. A lack of 
these developmental resources skews the development of emotions, 
cognitive capacities, and attitudes. These resources were present in 
the EEA, and the selected outcomes only appear if they are present now. 
Language acquisition may be a similar example: languages are cul-
tural, but they involve the language-specific cognition that develops 
only in the interaction between the psychological developmental 
tendencies and the linguistic environment. Many sociality-related 
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traits may be like this in their development: socio-cultural factors are 
enabling but not instructive. 
What consequences does this all have for evolutionary explana-
tions? Culture facilitates both interactionist traits and group selection, 
but neither is directly entailed. There is a temporary dimension in evo-
lutionary processes involving culture. Culturally specific social be-
haviour can be understood as a product of recent evolution in evolu-
tionary anthropological research. There is, however, a difference be-
tween a “cultural trait” being a trait of a group or spreading within 
the group culturally. These have different implications for whether we 
should expect to find holistic or collectivist traits under the evolution-
ary analysis, and for the levels of selection issues. But as noted above, 
the mere presence of cultural processes does not imply any of this di-
rectly. Furthermore, the existence of cultural factors in the develop-
ment of a trait does not mean that the trait could be an object of cul-
tural evolution alone. As for evolutionary psychology, culturally spe-
cific behaviour is not something that it is usually interested in at all. 
However, the capacities for culture have evolved in a social context 
and their function may be a part of an interactive trait (as I argued in 
the previous chapter), and many social capacities that evolutionary 
psychology is interested in might require a social developmental en-
vironment. Neither is an argument against evolutionary psychology, 
but it affects how to do it properly. On the other hand, just because a 
capacity develops in interaction with its environment does not neces-






8. Innateness and Nativism 
 
The previous chapter discussed some of the reasons to take the details 
of development seriously in thinking about evolution, as well as some 
reasons to consider how shared external developmental resources 
may connect individuals through the developmental processes in 
ways that are relevant for evolution. I will discuss this in more detail 
in the next, final chapter of the dissertation. However, it is not clear 
what developmental holism means if it is not properly contrasted to 
what the alternative, developmental individualism looks like. My aim 
is not only to point out the well-known fact that development and its 
environment matters in the Extended Synthesis framework, but to 
make the distinction between individualist and holistic developmen-
tal processes in a way that matters for evolutionary explanation. What 
does developmental individualism, which implies developmental iso-
lationism, even look like within this framework? Furthermore, alt-
hough (some of) evolutionary anthropology studies contemporary so-
cieties, and their cultures as part of the adaptive functionality of those 
societies, evolutionary psychology (in any of its forms) is interested in 
features of mind that are not culture-specific, or environment-specific 
in any other way. Does Extended Synthesis extended with culture 
(which I called “socio-cultural evolutionary developmental biology”) 
simply entail that this is impossible? My answer to both is: there are 
innate traits that are the object of developmentally individualist evo-
lutionary explanations. 
The concept of innateness used to be a central concept in contro-
versies over biological (especially evolutionary) approaches to psycho-
logical traits and human behaviour. The distinction between the biolog-
ical and cultural was often equated with the distinction between innate 
and learned, and many scholars considered only biological traits to 
have evolutionary explanations. This picture has become more compli-
cated in three ways: (1) The clear-cut distinction between innate and ac-
quired has been put in question in biological contexts. Furthermore, 
some have even considered the very concept of innateness to be 
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confused and unsuitable for scientific purposes in the first place (Grif-
fiths 2002 & 2009; Griffiths & Machery 2008; Mameli & Bateson 2006; 
Bateson & Mameli 2007). (2) Doubt has been cast on the usefulness of 
biology-inspired notions of innateness in psychological contexts. The 
proposed notions (for example, innateness as canalization (Ariew 1999 
& 2006)) do not seem to reflect the function of the concept of innateness, 
for example, in the language acquisition debate (see Griffiths & Ma-
chery 2008, Kiikeri & Kokkonen 2007; O’Neill 2015). (3) The priority of 
both genes and biological innateness in understanding evolutionary 
process has been challenged, especially by advocates of the Develop-
mental Systems Theory, as discussed in the previous chapter, and gene-
culture co-evolution theories emphasize culture in their evolutionary 
explanations of human behaviour (Boyd & Richerson 1985 & 2005). In 
the light of these considerations, innateness seems to have a lot less to 
do with evolutionary approaches to psychology or behaviour. On the 
other hand, the idea of nativism occupies a central place in cognitive 
sciences (Samules 2002, 2004, 2007 & 2009; Kiikeri & Kokkonen 2007; 
O’Neill 2015) and it seems like a natural starting point for evolutionary 
approaches to psychology (in contrast to behaviour). 
Much of evolutionary psychology is nativist. This is a form of 
methodological individualism in the developmental dimension: de-
velopment, when it comes to explanatorily relevance, is independent 
from others. Developmental holism, as an alternative, assumes con-
nectedness to others through developmental resources. Individualis-
tically understood developmental processes include individual learn-
ing, but the contents of individual learning are not an object of biolog-
ical evolution. The capacity to learn (and what is learned and how it 
is learned) is. The fixed features of development, including learning 
capacities (if not the results) are what we tend to call “innate”. Indi-
vidualism and nativism are not co-existent: individualism applies to 
both innate and individually learned traits and some innate traits have 
an evolutionarily meaningful reproductive dependency on others (for 
example, through kin selection). We can treat the latter as a special 
case with additional criteria (I will return to this later), and the 
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evolutionary considerations here will be about the innate traits. There-
fore, nativism and individualism can be equated most of the time. 
How nativist evolutionary psychologists approach their research 
makes them pure individualists along this dimension. 
In everyday thinking, the distinction between innate and acquired 
is usually thought to be both valid and mostly clear-cut. Furthermore, 
it is often equated with the distinction between biological and non-bio-
logical. This used to be the scientific view on the issue, for example, in 
ethology220, and continues to be shared by some. The complications 
for the distinction have however, been acknowledged by biologists, 
also by evolutionary ethologists since at least the 1960s221, and the use-
lessness of the concept of innateness is certainly already a truism 
among developmental biologists and philosophers of biology. Some 
contemporary philosophers have even argued that the whole concept of 
innateness is confused and not suitable for scientific purposes at all. 
However, the distinction continues to be an important theoretical 
presupposition for some evolutionary psychologists and a heuristic 
for many other psychologists (see Samuels 2004; O’Neill 2015), a situ-
ation which, minimally, calls for scrutiny regarding what they – or 
those who disagree with them – mean by the concept. Furthermore, it 
is certainly a part of the public understanding of evolutionary ap-
proaches to human beings, leading to false conclusions and misunder-
standings. For some, this is a further argument to abandon the concept 
of innateness altogether, but it could just as well be an argument to 
clarify a more scientific notion of innateness, as I will be doing. There 
are some cognitive scientists (probably the majority of them) and phi-
losophers of psychology (for example Khalidi 2002 & 2007; Mallon & 
Weinberg 2006; Samuels 2002 & 2007; Weinberg & Mallon 2008) who 
 
220 There used to be a somewhat clear distinction between innate instincts and 
learned behavioral patterns in the study of animal behavior. For more about 
the historical idea of innate instincts, see Griffiths 2004 and Brigandt 2005. 
221See especially Hinde 1968 and Tinbergen 1963. Even Konrad Lorenz, the 
most prominent defender of the concept of instinct, blurred the clarity of the 
distinction (see Lorenz 1965).  
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think that this can be done in psychology: there is a scientific concept 
of innateness to be explicated and some sort of nativism is defendable, 
even required, for psychological theory, and they use it successfully 
as an assumption in research. This raises the question of whether the 
notions of innateness criticized in biology and defended in psychol-
ogy are even the same (see Kiikeri & Kokkonen 2007; Samuels 2007; 
O’Neill 2015). If not, a corollary question emerges: which notion of 
innateness is used in the nativist evolutionary psychology? 
I will not try to evaluate the validity of any form of nativism as 
such, evolutionary-psychological or otherwise, in this dissertation. I 
will, instead, focus on the issue of the meaningfulness of the concept of 
innateness, its definition, and the role it plays (or should play) in ex-
plaining individual development and in evolutionary explanations, 
and in how these are connected. Nativism about any particular trait 
as such is an empirical issue and therefore outside my direct discus-
sion, although I will use some examples (all of them controversial, to 
be sure) to explicate what it would mean if a trait were innate. There are 
two sides to this issue. First, whether there is a scientifically meaning-
ful notion of “innateness” at all. I will argue that there is. Second, 
whether it makes an explanatory difference whether a trait can be 
called innate or not. I will argue that it does, especially from the evolu-
tionary perspective. I will, perhaps surprisingly, defend the nativist 
methodology in evolutionary psychology, framing it as a choice of ex-
planatory questions. It is, however, important to distinguish between 
the dimensions. Even if evolutionary psychology were only interested 
in the innate (psychological) parts of the social trait, the (behavioural) 
trait itself could be an interactionist trait, which determines its evolu-
tionary function, and this could be a product of group selection. None 
of this is determined by nativism, and these explanatory dimensions 
should inform even nativist evolutionary psychology. 
In the first section, I will discuss why some philosophers (and 
others) think that the concept of innateness is fundamentally faulty. I 
will discuss the folk notion of innateness and the difficulties it faces 
when applied to real biology. I will, however, argue that it makes 
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sense to try to find a meaningful notion of innateness and criteria for 
the definition to be successful. In the second section, I will build a 
working definition for the concept, a contrastive invariance account of 
innateness. I will also distinguish between biological and psychologi-
cal concepts of innateness. The concept of innateness has (or should 
have) different references in biological and psychological contexts, alt-
hough the explanatory role of the concept might be similar in struc-
ture and the developmental process referred to can be the same. I will 
also argue that the criticism against the usefulness of the biological 
concept and the defence of the usefulness of the psychological concept 
can coexist peacefully. Finally, I will return to individualism and ho-
lism issue and draw conclusions from my discussion for nativism de-
bates in evolutionary psychology and elsewhere.  
 
 
8.1. What Is Wrong with Innateness? 
 
The distinction between innate and acquired cannot be as clear-cut as 
it is thought to be in everyday thinking, for many reasons. Some phi-
losophers and scientists have, however, gone further to claim that the 
whole notion of innateness is just that – a part of everyday thinking. 
It is part of folk biology, a proto-scientific way of understanding biolog-
ical reality (see Atran et al 2001; Atran & Medin 2008), and it has no 
use in science. For example, Paul Griffiths and his collaborators Edou-
ard Machery and Stefan Linquist (Griffiths 2002 & 2009; Griffiths & 
Machery 2008; Griffiths, Machery & Linquist 2009) have taken this line 
of argument. According to Griffiths et al, when the concept of innate-
ness is moved from the folk-biological framework to a scientific con-
text, the connotations follow, with confusing results. Others, too, have 
pointed out that the use of the term “innateness” seems to be too 
vague for scientific purposes. Matteo Mameli and Patrick Bateson 
(2006; see also Bateson & Mameli 2007 and Bateson 1991), for example, 
have systematically discussed as many as 26 different properties that 
are or could be linked to innateness, none of which they find 
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satisfactory as a definition, and, furthermore, are not necessarily con-
nected to each other. The argument following from these considera-
tions is an eliminativist argument: the concept of innateness is con-
fused, it does not refer to anything substantive in biological reality, 
and therefore has no real use in biological sciences. In the following I 
will discuss the eliminativist challenge in greater detail and try to 
specify exactly what is wrong with innateness and see what can be 
saved. I will start with the idea of innateness as a folk-biological no-
tion and what can and cannot be inferred from the fact that it is one. I 
move on to explicate some of the problems with the concept in biology 
and then to the various strategies proposed to save the concept. 
 
8.1.1. Innateness as a Folk-theoretical Concept  
 
As already discussed in the context of folk psychology, human beings 
have sets of “common sense” ways to deal with reality around them – 
ways to conceptualize what they perceive, ways to make inferences, 
predictions, and so on and so forth. These commonsense ways, folk 
theories, include substantial but usually non-explicated presupposi-
tions about the nature of their subject matters. At the heart of folk bi-
ology is its essentialism: species, races, and other taxonomic levels re-
flect how individuals are bound together by their shared essences; the 
shared essence explains why all the members of the species (and other 
groups, below and above the species level) tend to possess certain 
traits; and these essences can be used to make generalizations and pre-
dictions across the species and other folk-taxonomic levels. (See Me-
din & Atran 1999 & 2004; Medin & Ortony 1989). According to Grif-
fiths (2002), innateness is best understood as a quasi-theoretical con-
cept central to folk biology. The essential traits (perceivable properties 
caused by the unperceivable essence) are primarily thought to be in-
nate, and this essence is the source of innateness. The traits have also 
a function derived from the essence – they have a purpose from the point 
of view of the organism’s overall design. More specifically, innateness 
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is connected to three different ideas: (1) Fixity222 – the outcome of the 
development of the trait is fixed in individual development and it is 
hard to change through external intervention; (2) Typicality – the trait 
is universal or at least typical among the members of the species; and 
(3) Teleology – the trait has a purpose or a function (which translates to 
the evolutionary framework as being an adaptation). The problem is, 
for a start, that the essentialist way of thinking (or typological thinking 
in a broader sense) about species (or biological entities in general) is 
fundamentally faulty223, and to be more precise in this particular case, 
the connotations noted above are not necessarily connected in the real 
world.224 This leads to imprecise use of the concept of innateness and 
erroneous inferences when it is used in scientific contexts. 
Folk biology and its development in children has been studied for 
some time, and the essentialist nature of folk biology (including think-
ing about human ethnic groups) is well known (see Atran 1990; Atran 
et al 2001; Atran & Medin 2008; Berlin 1992; Gelman 2003; Gil-White 
2001; Hirschfeld 1995; Keil 1989; Medin & Atran 1999 & 2004; Medin & 
Ortony 1989).225 Some external, perceivable properties of an organism 
 
222 I use the terminology from Griffiths, Machery & Linquist 2009. 
223 For differences between essentialism and typological thinking on the one hand and 
biological population thinking on the other, see Futuyma 1998; Mayr 1959; Sober 1980. 
224 Mameli and Bateson (2001) go even further and distinguish eight so-called 
“i-properties” that do not go hand in hand; I will return to this later. 
225 It should be noted that the word “essentialism” is used here in its psycholog-
ical meaning, referring to a substantial way of thinking about certain entities. 
Much of the philosophical discussion about essentialism has been on the dis-
tinction between essential and accidental properties and whether some objects 
have essential properties that are necessary for them to be those objects. This 
may lead to quite minimalistic views. In philosophical terms, it might be more 
correct to say that psychological essentialism is the tendency to presuppose vari-
ous classes of objects being natural kinds. Insofar as the tendency to attribute un-
derlying essences to, say, animal species, does not depend on observable prop-
erties but explains them when they exist (as the experiments with children seem 
to suggest; see Keil 1989 and Gelman 2003), it might not even be necessary for 
these natural kinds to be essentialistic natural kinds (Ellis 2001), just a propensity 
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are thought to be caused by its inner nature, while others may be 
caused by the environment. Even essentialist external properties may 
be subject to influences from the environment (for example, under a 
direct causal intervention), but they are not thought to develop in in-
teraction as in (a real biological) gene–environment interaction; they 
can only be distorted. Furthermore, the essence stays unchanged by 
the environment and is permanent. For example, even relatively small 
children think that (1) the species-typical appearance of an animal 
comes from within, (2) it can be changed by an external intervention 
to resemble the appearance of another species, but (3) changing does 
not affect its other species-typical properties (Keil 1989). Nor do envi-
ronmental changes (such as being raised by animals from another spe-
cies) change an animal’s species-typical behavioural dispositions (Gel-
man 2003). The essence is related to external properties in a star-
shaped causal structure (that is, each property is caused by the essence 
independently; see Kokkonen & Pöyhönen 2012), and environmental 
influences can disturb some of these causal connections at most. 
The organism does not have only one essence; there is a (non-
overlapping) taxonomic hierarchy of essences. The core level is what 
Douglas Medin and Scott Atran (1999) call generic species (which may 
coincide with a scientific species, but often coincides, for example, 
with a genus), but an individual organism has, for example, the es-
sence of its race (or another sub-species group) and broader kinds, 
such as animal or plant, and a sub-group of animals or plants, and each 
essence has a range of properties associated with it (see Atran 1990; Ber-
lin 1992; Medin & Atran 1999). At least some non-group-distinctive 
subgroup differences such as personality types may also be included 
 
for properties to cluster when the underlying essence (in a vague sense) is pre-
sent. On the other hand, this vague idea of essence includes the idea of true es-
sences of things (contra natural kind ideas after the fashion of Dupré 1993). 
However, the precise philosophical characterization of folk essentialism is of no 
real consequence here. The main point is that the folk essentialism sees some 
traits as being (purposeful) consequences of an underlying, kind-shared, fixed 
essence that has explanatory and predictive force. 
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as part of psychological essentialism in addition to group-distinctive 
differences like those between ethnic groups (see Prentice & Miller 
2007; Spears et al 1997; Yzerbyt et al 2001). Categories based on these 
essences are used in generalizing and explaining and predicting be-
haviour. Some levels are more important than others (the species level 
being clearly the most important), but they all exist, enabling, for ex-
ample, inferences across species based on “essential” commonalities, 
instead of commonalities in form and function. For example, ostriches 
are thought to be more similar to owls than bats are, based on the 
knowledge that ostriches and owls are both birds, although bats and 
owls share more in their ways of life. The problem with this all is, of 
course, that the biological reality does not work like this.226 
The idea that vernacular use of the concept of innateness has 
something to do with folk biology and psychological essentialism 
seems plausible enough and I will not dispute it. In the Griffithsian 
view, innateness is connected especially to species level essences (Typ-
icality as species-typicality), as well as with Fixity and Teleology. Grif-
fiths, Machery & Linquist 2009 empirically tested the idea that Typi-
cality, Fixity and Teleology are three dimensions that people associate 
with innateness. They tested people’s intuitions with various combi-
nations of these dimensions in the development of singing in birds 
and discovered that people use them all in deciding whether a trait is 
innate or not, although Fixity seems to be the strongest and Teleology 
 
226 See Wilson 1999 for an overview of classic problems as well as some attempts 
to save biological species as a natural kind concept, even if not an essentialist 
one. Non-essentialism of species is foundational for evolutionary theory (see 
Mayr 1959; Sober 1980; Futuyma 1998; Gould 2002), and although homologies 
are an important phenomenon related to higher taxonomies (see Griffiths 2006; 
Ereshefsky 2007 & 2012), locating a species in a higher taxon has limited explan-
atory consequences. Furthermore, many everyday classifications are erroneous. 
For example, fish, wasp, reptile, crow, and tree are all polyphyletic classifica-
tions. There might also be pragmatic reasons to use different classification sys-
tems for different purposes in biology (although this is not the practice at the 
moment), leading to ontological pluralism (see Dupré 1993). 
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the weakest predictor for the judgment. Their later studies fail to asso-
ciate Teleology with innateness at all (Linquist et al 2011), so this con-
nection will be best left open, but I will include it in the discussion, just 
in case.227 Since people connect all these ideas to innateness, they will 
also connect these ideas together and make inferences from one to an-
other. The conclusion is that an adequate analysis of the folk concept 
of innateness needs to include all these dimensions but also some idea 
of their relative weights and interaction. They also make a more im-
portant point that both philosophers’ and scientists’ use of the concept 
of innateness probably also has a lot to do with folk biology – folk-bio-
logical categories guide thinking even in some scientific contexts, just 
like folk-psychology does, as I argued earlier. The problem with this is 
that folk biology is wrong about biological reality in this. Typicality, 
Fixity and Teleology are empirically separate (and there are also evolu-
tionary reasons for them to be separate; I will discuss this later in this 
chapter). This entails the main point, the eliminativist stance on innate-
ness: the concept is always the folk concept, with no reference in reality, 
and its use in biology, psychology and elsewhere should be stopped.  
I agree with most of the above. Folk biology is likely to be an im-
portant source of confusion and vagueness in the use of the term “innate-
ness” in biology and sciences in general (perhaps resulting in the many 
unnecessary uses of the term as argued by Mameli & Bateson 2006 and 
discussed in the next section), and philosophical intuitions about in-
nateness are probably mostly the products of applying folk biology.228 
But I have a few objections to Griffiths and his collaborators. 
 
227 In fact, they find a connection between Teleology and being genetic, even with-
out the connection between Teleology and innateness. This is somewhat puzzling, 
if being innate is being a part of essence, and genes are interpreted as essence-
bearers in everyday thinking. However, this may say more about the superficial-
ity, plurality of ideas, and lack of coherence of folk theories in general that was 
discussed in the context of folk psychology in an earlier chapter. 
228 The most revealing (although anecdotal) example of pure folk biology in 
action in philosophical analysis must be Devitt 2008. 
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First, it is one thing to point out that the folk theories of individ-
ual development are unscientific and even substantially contradictory 
to what is scientifically known. It is a completely different thing to 
claim that a central concept of these theories has no reference. The 
claim is, of course, not as simple as that. According to Griffiths et al, 
the concept of innateness is a conceptual connector of unrelated ideas, 
a cognitive structure that guides the use of the term “innateness” and 
connects it closely with the ideas of Fixity, Typicality and Teleology. 
But this can be disputed. Consider the following alternative interpre-
tation. The folk concept of innateness refers to (developmental) Fixity 
alone (this is the strongest correlation), but folk biology also includes 
ideas about what traits are likely to be traits of this kind. In other 
words, there are criteria for judging a trait as innate or not based on 
the substantial presuppositions of folk biology. For example, folk biol-
ogy presupposes essences (or “inner natures”) that are universal 
within the species (and to some degree within some other “levels” of 
folk taxonomy), and obviously, essential properties must be inborn, 
not acquired, since the essence is shared and internal, not caused by 
external similarities in environment. Species-typical traits must be de-
velopmentally fixed. The connection between Fixity and Typicality is 
not conceptual, but a substantial claim about common cause for them 
that enables inferences. Folk biology also sees nature in general as pur-
poseful (the properties of an organism are for something), and so Typ-
icality gets bound with Teleology: whatever the species-typical traits 
are, they must have a function for that species. Typicality entails both 
Teleology and Fixity. 
Since the examples used by Griffiths, Machery and Linquist 
(2009) in their survey are already about how different bird species de-
velop singing, people use their intuitions about species essences in the 
test. This might be adequate for studying folk biology in general but 
inadequate for studying the concept of innateness in particular, or at 
least to test the hypothesis that innateness is bound to the idea of Typ-
icality (on the species level). Even leaving this aside, if most traits that 
are fixed in development are thought to be species-typical – given that 
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the species-level is the most essential level – Fixity, Typicality and Tel-
eology should substantially entail each other to some degree. But this 
is about the substance of folk biology, not about the meaning of the 
concept of innateness. I would propose that the core idea of even the 
lay concept of innateness is simply the idea of developmental fixation, 
and the notion is perfectly compatible with properties that are neither 
species-typical nor functional. This is, of course, an empirical claim 
that I will not defend here as such.  
The meaning of the vernacular concept is also beside the point if 
our interest is in whether there can be a scientifically useful concept of 
innateness. But there are two relevant issues here. First, eliminativists 
propose that folk biology biases how scientists (and philosophers) 
think about innateness within science. This is a potential biasing factor 
to be taken seriously – especially since I have voiced similar worries 
about folk psychology myself in an earlier chapter. Secondly, espe-
cially if the first point is correct, the use of the term “innateness” in the 
first place must be justified: the lay concept must be similar enough to 
the scientific concept. I take the results of Griffiths et al to be evidence 
for this point: Fixity has the strongest correlation with being innate, 
and if my interpretation of the rest of the results is defensible, they 
have not demonstrated the necessity of the inclusion of the other di-
mensions in the meaning of the concept directly. 
Furthermore, why should one focus on species-typicality in the 
first place? True, it is the strongest level of essentialism according to 
the studies, but not the only one. People use both higher and lower 
taxonomic levels to make similar inferences. Higher taxonomic levels 
could be interpreted as similarity-groupings of species-level essences, 
but the levels below species cannot exhibit species-typicality. For ex-
ample, differences between ethnic groups are sometimes (errone-
ously) considered to be (generic) innate differences. Other, non-taxo-
nomic examples of sub-species group-level innate (perhaps essential) 
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differences could be personality types and different learning styles.229 
This is, however, easily correctable. Griffiths et al could expand Typi-
cality to encompass other levels as alternatives – a trait could be spe-
cies-typical, bird-typical etc. But what does not fit their scheme is in-
nateness on the individual level. It seems that people speak of indi-
vidual-level innate differences in capacities, innate diseases, and so 
on. These differences between individuals are assumed (even if often 
falsely) not to be acquired. Person-typicality as a notion seems like a 
stretch, although a person’s innate capacities, behavioural tendencies, 
etc. are undoubtedly typical to them. Species-typicality does not, of 
course, require monomorphism (for example, sex-differences are spe-
cies-level properties) and the range of variation in differences between 
two individuals (for example, in hair-colour) is species-typical as such. 
But the difference between two individuals is not a population-level 
trait and being, for example, exceptionally talented in music is an innate 
characteristic of an individual in vernacular use of the concept.  
Most scientific debates that have something to do with innateness 
are about species-typicality (such as nativism about certain features of 
natural language), but the idea of innate properties of an individual – 
personal but not acquired characteristics – would seem to accord with 
the vernacular use of the concept.230 But even some scientific debates 
are about whether specific differences between individuals such as 
sexual orientation or gender identification are innate or acquired. 
Even if the range of possible orientations is considered a species-level 
 
229 It may be the case that neither personality types nor learning styles really 
exist, but they are attributed to people as groups and they are thought to be 
internal, inborn, not learned, and virtually immutable.  
230 Languages differ in how they express individual inborn differences. For 
example, in Finnish, the equivalent of the English phrase “natural born” (e.g. 
“natural born violinist”) is “synnynnäinen”, which means innate. A “natural 
born violinist” is not, of course, born with the related skills but a capacity to 
acquire them efficiently and a potential for reaching a high level. The logic 
behind the idea is still the same: there is a set of innate capacities distinguish-
ing the person from others that makes this possible. 
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property, the debates on innateness of sexual orientation and gender 
identification are about individual-level differences and individual-
level factors. If the species level is abandoned, the idea of Teleology 
also becomes more problematic. Biological species are thought to be 
functional in their environments, but individual innate properties 
such as innate diseases can be dysfunctional just as well. 
In other words, I would dispute the idea of Typicality and espe-
cially Teleology being conceptually connected with innateness in folk 
biology. I would say, rather, that the core idea of innateness is Fixity. 
This is also the main focus of all the accounts of innateness that I will 
discuss shortly. Folk biology, however, has an essentialist theory about 
fixity. The connection of the three ideas lies in the substance of folk-
biological ideas. We should distinguish between the folk concept of 
innateness and the folk explanations of innateness.231 Of course, all 
this is relevant only to the justification of the use of the vernacular 
word “innateness”, whether something like Fixity can be defined and 
found to be a useful concept and, more importantly, whether this con-
cept is of valid scientific use. This does not, however, mean that the 
exact folk-biological concept of innateness can be explicated in terms of 
modern biology (or psychology). What I will do in the next subchapter 
is a minor revision of the concept in a way that fits the biological real-
ity. The danger of revisionist projects is that the meaning of the con-
cept can change too much in the process for it to really be the same 
concept anymore – it becomes a stipulation with a familiar name. A 
successful revision should give a more precise meaning for the con-
cept, one that is more projectable to the subject matter, but not change 
the core content and the reference altogether. This has been done in 
 
231 This is similar to the compatibilist take on the notion of free will. The con-
cept of free will has certain functions in moral practices, and there is a folk-
metaphysical theory that explains why people have free will. Compatibilists 
take the concept of free will (with its function) but replace the folk-theory with 
some determinism-compatible account of what it means to have free will. (See 
Dennett 1984; Kane 2002; Mele 2009.) 
386 
 
science successfully, when our knowledge of, for example, physical 
reality has increased.  
Let us take a closer look at the example that Griffiths et al (2009) 
mention as an analogy: heat and a snow-shovel with wooden and 
metal parts. According to folk physics, heat is a one-dimensional quan-
tity: it is something that an object has more or less of, it is capable of 
warming other things up, and it is perceived as the hotness of the ob-
ject. So, for example, if the metal part of the shovel feels colder, it 
should have less heat. We now know that what was considered heat 
(and still is in folk physics) is a much more complicated phenome-
non.232 First of all, it is not an independent quality, but reducible to the 
movement of the particles of an object. The more kinetic energy is pre-
sent in this movement, the more thermal energy that object has. The 
mean kinetic energy of these particles defines its temperature. Two ob-
jects may have the same temperature but a different amount of ther-
mal energy, depending on the structure of the substance that the ob-
ject is made of. If objects are in connection, there is a transfer of energy 
from the hotter to the colder as long as there is a difference in the tem-
perature, but the amount of thermal energy does not spread evenly. 
Heat, in its proper physical sense, is the energy that transfers from one 
body to another through contact or thermal radiation. If the object has 
a higher temperature than its surroundings, the more thermal energy 
it has, the hotter it is (in the same surrounding temperature) – this is a 
matter of thermal energy, not temperature. Finally, there is the phe-
nomenological aspect of heat: how it feels. This, of course, depends 
highly on the actual physical heat. But in the example of a snow-
shovel, which is not hot but cold (we are out in the winter frosts now), 
all these aspects are separate. The metal part of the shovel feels colder 
(it sucks heat from your hand more aggressively) – from a phenome-
nological point of view, the wooden part is “hotter”. The metal part, 
however, has more thermal energy, so it is “hotter” in this sense. The 
temperature is the same. In both cases, the heat proper is negative (the 
 
232 For more about the scientific use of word “heat”, see Brookes et al 2005. 
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shovel has lower temperature than hand) – so in a sense the wooden 
part actually is “hotter”, but you cannot make any inferences based on 
that which would depend on the properties of temperature or thermal 
energy, which is the core metaphysical property that the folk concept 
of heat might be considered to be attempting to refer to in most cases.  
So, it seems that the folk-physical concept of heat turns out to be 
four different things: thermal energy (the prior physical property, re-
ducible to the more fundamental property of kinetic energy), tempera-
ture (a property derived from thermal energy and its behavioural 
tendencies related to the material properties of the object), heat (in its 
proper physical sense, which is also a derived property), and phenom-
enological heat. This does not mean (and Griffiths et al do not suggest 
that it does) that the folk-physical concept of heat lacks even a vague 
reference, or that the scientific use of the concept should be stopped, 
or that the folk notion and the scientific notion are trying to refer to 
totally different things. It is more correct to say that the scientific un-
derstanding of heat has revealed the phenomenon to be more complex 
than presupposed by folk physics, that folk physics gets things sub-
stantially wrong, and that the folk notion of heat succeeds in referring 
to only one aspect of the phenomenon it tries to refer to (heat proper). 
There is no reason to eliminate the concept of heat, just to update the 
folk understanding of heat. This is precisely what I will propose with 
innateness. There is a way to define “innateness” scientifically and it 
is close enough to the folk-biological concept for the same word to be 
used. Furthermore, the debates on psychological nativism are mostly 
about this property, although the connotations driven by folk biology 
may lead intuitions and inferences astray. But folk biology gets the 
underlying biology wrong. Innateness is the fixity of the outcome of a 
developmental process (the core meaning of the folk concept, just as 
heat proper is the core meaning of the vernacular concept of heat), 
under certain conditions. The folk-biological understanding of the un-
derlying mechanisms (the biological essence) is wrong and leads to 
incorrect conclusions (just as folk physics gets the physics of heat 
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wrong).233 In the following, I will discuss possible obstacles to this ap-
proach. 
 
8.1.2. Problems for a Scientific Concept of Innateness 
 
There are two problems that the scientific concept of innateness needs 
to handle. One of them is in continuation with what is discussed 
above: the concept of innateness seems to have several meaning com-
ponents in the sciences as well. The properties or processes that are 
referred to as “innate” are not substantially connected in biological 
reality. Another is that the genes (and other internal developmental 
factors) and the environment of an organism interact in too complex 
and orchestrated a fashion for a meaningful distinction to be made 
about what traits are caused by internal factors and what are caused 
by the environment. As long as innateness is thought to be something 
that comes “from within”, it is simply a meaningless concept. In the 
following, I will detail these issues. In the next section of this subchap-
ter, I will outline some of the strategies that try to avoid these prob-
lems and in the next subchapter I will follow the line that I am taking 
myself. 
 
233 There is a crucial difference between the cases: the concept of innateness 
has social consequences; the concept of heat – not so much. This is also a point 
frequently made by the eliminativists, but I would question the effectiveness 
of the strategy of dropping difficult concepts. If the concept of innateness 
(with all its confusions) is going to be a part of folk-biological understanding 
anyway, whether the actual word is used or not (for example, in a popular 
science books), it would be more useful to define the concept properly and be 
explicit about the connections between innateness and other biological prop-
erties than to just drop the use of the term or, even worse, say that there is no 
such thing. A folk-biological reading of such a statement would be that this is 
a substantial (and a radical) statement about the extent of innate traits (namely 
that there are none), not about the dichotomy of innate and acquired. This is, 
however, another matter. The main issue here is whether a useful scientific 
concept of innateness can be defined in the first place. 
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Let us start from the simplified, lay-based distinction between in-
nate and acquired. As discussed in the previous section, I will equate 
innateness only with developmental fixity for the present purposes. 
At the heart of this distinction, between innate (or inborn) and ac-
quired, is the idea of some things coming from within, being already 
present at birth, and some things appearing because of the environ-
ment. The presence of a trait at birth is does not have to be concrete in 
this distinction: it is something that is waiting for appearing in the 
normal course of development without any guiding external causal 
contribution. For example, adult characteristics that appear during 
puberty are still innate. Neither is it necessarily fixed in the sense of 
being not changeable. For example, things like innate speech defects 
or postural anomalies are considered innate even if they can be, and 
indeed are, actively changed. The point is that they are not caused by 
the environmental causes, but that the “normal course of events”, 
without direct intervention, is somehow determined by what is “within”. 
There is also an idea of partial innateness even in the vernacular un-
derstanding: being innate can come in degrees. A trait being partly 
innate means that the development of the trait cannot be explained by 
external factors alone. A reference to something internal is also 
needed, and this “something” is conceptualized as being innate.  
It therefore seems that the crucial difference is between what 
comes from within and what comes from outside the organism in the 
development. An obvious idea to look for innateness is to look, then, 
for what this “something within” is in development, and the obvious 
hypothesis would be equating innateness with “being genetic.” How-
ever, this fails just as obviously, for the reasons discussed in the pre-
vious chapter. Genes are not the only internal factors in the develop-
mental processes: a gene plays a causal role in development only if the 
environment (internal to the organism) is such that the gene will be 
activated as a part of the causal process and the exact way in which it 
contributes to the process is determined by other factors (including 
other genes indirectly), and so on. There is no direct connection be-
tween genetic “information” or “encoding” that could be simply 
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equated with innateness234 and the phenotypic traits that are the end-
product of a developmental process. (Godfrey-Smith 2000; Jablonka & 
Lamb 2005; Wolpert et al 2010.) Especially if we take the Developmen-
tal Systems Theory approach, genes lose their specific status, and the 
distinction between internal and external loses its meaning as well.235 
Being merely “genetic” would not be enough anyway, if being 
genetic means only that genes play a role in development. Specific en-
vironmental factors could still be necessary and the outcome of the 
trait’s development could be highly sensitive to different environ-
ments to the extent that talking about innateness would be absurd. 
Additionally, no form of learning is without some contribution from 
genes, even if only in the development of the capability to be sensitive 
to the relevant factors in the environment. At first sight, a tempting 
solution might be to introduce degrees of innateness that reflect the 
graduality of being genetic. There is, after all, a measure for this: her-
itability. (See for example Horvath 2000 for this suggestion.) But her-
itability is a population-level, not an individual-level, notion. It is a 
local measure that expresses the extent to which the (actual) variation 
in the genome results in the variation in the phenotype in the given 
range of environments. It also depends on the actual developmental 
mechanisms, but the value of heritability can change if the range of 
environment changes or if the genetic variation changes, regardless of 
the developmental mechanisms being the same on the individual 
level. It just is not a quantitative measure of the causal contribution of 
the genes on a population level under specific conditions. And even if 
we had a way to know, for example, that 60 % of my height is due to 
 
234 It is not difficult to get the impression that innateness and “being genetic” 
is also often equated in the lay understanding of biology by many psycholo-
gists and philosophers (see e.g. Buss 2003; Chomsky 2000; Fodor 2001; Pinker 
1998a & 2002; Plotkin 1997; and Tooby & Cosmides 1992 for characterizations 
in genetic terms). Sometimes an exact equation is made explicitly: e.g. Fodor 
et al (1974: 450) states straightforwardly that “Language is innate iff it is en-
coded in the gene code.”  
235 This is, of course, a part of the background of the eliminativism about innateness. 
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my genes and 40 % is due to my diet in childhood, it would not mean 
that the genes grew 110 cm of me, and the rest was built by eating. 
(Lewontin 1974; Sober 1988b, 1998.) 
The interaction between genes (and other internal developmental 
resources) and environmental factors is non-additive in an even more 
radical way: it could be necessary for the development of a trait to 
have both a certain genetic makeup and a certain developmental en-
vironment for the trait to develop in the first place. This is the case 
especially with psychobiological development, in which the consen-
sus within the research community is that most traits, even universal 
and species-typical, use environmental resources non-additively in a 
continuous interaction between the organism and its environment 
(see Bateson & Mameli 2007; Griffiths 2009; Michel & Moore 1995). 
Consider the example perhaps most familiar to philosophers (after So-
ber 1998a): the development of singing in different bird species. Some 
species of birds start to sing in a species-typical way236 even if they 
have never heard any kind of singing at all. This may be taken as a 
paradigmatic case of innateness. Other species need to hear other 
birds of their species to sing in the same way. Merely observing this 
does not specify the cognitive mechanism of acquisition: whether it 
involves only a series of triggers or if there is more substantial infor-
mation processing involved. However, we may consider this as a case 
of learning. But there are species that are different from both of the 
above-mentioned types. Members of this third kind do not sing at all 
unless they are exposed to birdsong, but they begin to sing in their 
species-specific way regardless of what kind of birdsong they are ex-
posed to. This not a case of learning, nor is it “partly innate, partly 
learned,” since there is nothing in the triggering birdsong that would 
teach the bird the song it starts to sing. The development of the singing 
is not plastic or sensitive to the variance in the environmental cue 
 
236 Notice that species-typicality does not do conceptual work in this example: 




either. The developmental process simply requires a certain kind of 
external input for certain pathways of development of the singing 
ability to be triggered. 
One proposal could be that innateness is associated with con-
straints on the development of a trait: development is sensitive to cer-
tain factors in the environment, but which and what they do is con-
strained (for example, Bjorklund and Pellergini 2001; Elman et al. 
1997). This type of innateness could be called dispositional innateness. 
However, innateness cannot be equated with a mere disposition to ap-
pear. Any developmental process usually requires the presence of 
some specific external enabling conditions: introducing or omitting 
certain aspects in the environment could actively prevent the trait 
from developing. This is why the innateness of a trait is often thought 
to be relative to the “normal range” of environments (see Stich 1975; 
Sober 1998). But because innateness depends on the causal relation 
between the trait’s development or activation and the environment, 
the problem arises of where to draw the line between the presence of 
a “normal” environment and the causal contribution of the environ-
ment that would make the trait acquired. In particular, the distinction 
between what is innate and what is learned becomes blurred: all learn-
ing is directed and constrained in some way.  
Equating innateness with internal causes or internally deter-
mined dispositions does not work, given how biological development 
works. This has led to attempts to discover a more developmentally 
realistic interpretation of innateness. A crucial step here is to move the 
focus from the causes of development to its end-product. The main func-
tion of the distinction between innate and acquired is whether the trait 
can be affected. I argued for distinguishing the concept of innateness 
from the folk-biological explanatory context in the previous sub-chap-
ter. An adequate scientific account of innateness can and must be 
based on a biological understanding of developmental processes that 
produce a particular end-result robustly and reliably regardless of 
changes in environmental factors. The attempts in this direction in-
clude approaches that I will call invariance and separatist accounts. The 
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invariance accounts equate innateness with developmental phenom-
ena in which the end-product is fixed or severely constrained. The 
general idea was outlined by Steven Stich (1975) and Elliot Sober 
(1998) and developed further into accounts of innateness as canaliza-
tion (for example, Ariew 1996, 1999 & 2006), generative entrenchment 
(Wimsatt 1986 & 1999), noninduction (that is, not being environmen-
tally induced; Birch 2009), and insensitivity to a range of environmen-
tal variation (O’Neill 2015). The separatists consider the concept of in-
nateness to be a valid concept in fields such as cognitive science and 
linguistics even if it is not so in biology: some psychological properties 
can be treated as primitives that a human mind can simply be as-
sumed to possess, without any further explanation being needed, and 
these assumptions fruitfully guide the research on the field (Samuels 
2002, 2004, 2007 & 2009; Kiikeri & Kokkonen 2007; O’Neill 2015; see 
also Cowie 1999). I will discuss these accounts in the next subchapter. 
But these accounts have some prima facie problems that I will address 
before getting there. 
The problem with separatism is that it does not really give an ac-
count of innateness, although it is a strong argument for having one. 
The problem with invariantism is that all the accounts included in it 
refer to a specific biological developmental phenomenon that we 
might call a case of innateness in most cases, but equating innateness 
with either of them may force the reference of “innateness” to move 
too much for the concept to maintain its semantic closeness to the folk 
concept. Furthermore, they both raise the question of whether the con-
cept of innateness has a definite meaning at all in the sciences. It is 
very possible that psychologists and biologists are referring to differ-
ent things, and as a biological concept, it might bundle together dis-
crete properties. As we have seen, the eliminativists claim that the sci-
entific use of the term “innate” is just an extension from folk biology 
(see especially Bateson & Mameli 2007 and Griffiths 2002 & 2009). As 
already discussed, Paul Griffiths (2002) distinguishes between three 
unrelated dimensions out of which I have narrowed down to Fixity as 
the core meaning of innateness. Matteo Mameli and Patrick Bateson 
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(2006) go even further in distinguishing 26 distinct meanings in which 
the term “innateness” has been or could be used in science237. They 
abandon most of them as vague or nonsensical (and most of the defi-
nitions are variants and refinements of others) and they end up with 
eight “finalists” that they call “i-properties” (ibid: 177–178): “(3) relia-
bly appearing in a particular stage of the life cycle; (12) being such that 
environmental manipulations capable of producing an alternative 
 
237 The complete list of their definitions is this: (1) It is not acquired. (2) It is 
present at birth. (3) It reliably appears during a particular stage of the life cy-
cle. (4) It is genetically determined. (5) It is genetically influenced. (6) It is ge-
netically encoded. (7) Its development does not involve the extraction of in-
formation from the environment. (8) It is not environmentally induced. (9) It 
is not possible to produce an alternative trait by means of environmental ma-
nipulations. (10) All environmental manipulations capable of producing an 
alternative trait are abnormal. (11) All environmental manipulations capable 
of producing an alternative trait are statistically abnormal. (12) All environ-
mental manipulations capable of producing an alternative trait are evolution-
arily abnormal. (13) It is highly heritable. (14) It is not learned. (15) (i) It is 
psychologically primitive and (ii) it results from normal development. (16) It 
is not produced by developmental mechanisms adapted to produce different 
traits in response to different environmental conditions. (17) (i) It is not pro-
duced by a mechanism evolved to map different environmental conditions 
onto different phenotypes and (ii) it results from normal development. (18) (i) 
It is not produced by a mechanism adapted to map different environmental 
conditions onto different phenotypes and (ii) it does not result from the im-
pact on development of evolutionarily abnormal environmental factors. (19) 
It is generatively entrenched in the design of an adaptive feature. (20) It is 
insensitive to some range of environmental variation. (21) It is developmen-
tally environmentally canalized, i.e. there exists an evolved mechanism 
adapted to ensure that the development of the trait is robust with respect to 
some environmental perturbations. (22) It is post-developmentally environ-
mentally canalized, i.e. there exists an evolved mechanism adapted to ensure 
that the continuance of the trait is robust with respect to some environmental 
perturbations. (23) It is species-typical. (24) It is a Darwinian adaptation. (25) 
It is a standard Darwinian adaptation. (26) It is prefunctional. (From a table in 
Mameli & Bateson 2006: 177.) 
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trait are evolutionarily abnormal; (18) not produced by a mechanism 
adapted to map different environmental conditions onto different 
phenotypes and, at the same time, not produced by the impact of evo-
lutionarily abnormal environmental factors; (19) generatively en-
trenched; (21) developmentally environmentally canalized; (22) post-
developmentally environmentally canalized; (23) species-typical; (25) 
standard Darwinian adaptation.” (The numeration is the numeration 
of the original candidates; see the footnote above. I will discuss these 
proposals later.) Mameli’s and Bateson’s main point is that none of 
these properties alone seems to correlate with the folk notion, and the 
i-properties themselves do not depend on each other sufficiently to be 
considered to be properties of the same biological “phenomenon”. 
When biologists use the term, what they are usually really referring to 
is one of these things. And, as Bateson (1991) notes, if it is something 
else (and something more precise) that you mean by “innateness”, 
why not say just that? 
 
 
8.2. A Contrastive Invariance Account of Innateness 
 
To sum up, the problems with innateness seem to be the following: (1) 
Intrinsic versus extrinsic does not seem to be a valid distinction. (2) 
The folk notion seems to rely on something like this (even if narrowed 
down to Fixity). (3) The biological properties that could replace “in-
nateness” do not cluster sufficiently. However, there is no need to give 
up a concept altogether just because it is sometimes used in a confused 
way or because our folk-biological thinking connects it to an essential-
ism that scientific biology explicitly refutes. Even if the consequences 
of some trait being innate were widely misunderstood, there might 
still be a useful and non-redundant way of using the concept. I will 
argue for such an account. My account is a variant of the accounts I 
have labelled “invariance accounts” above. I will start by discussing 
the earlier invariance accounts, moving to a psychological explana-
tory context of the notion of innateness and the need to distinguish 
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between different notions of innateness, then presenting my formula-
tion of the general invariance account of innateness, and finally expli-
cating its relevance for evolutionary explanations. 
 
8.2.1. Invariance Accounts of Innateness 
 
The general idea of innateness as invariance is that the outcome of de-
velopment is fixed: it is invariant regarding external factors in devel-
opment. Innateness is contrasted with plasticity rather than being ac-
quired – the same genotype produces the same phenotype in all nor-
mal environments, even if environmental factors are contributing (but 
only enabling) factors in development. According to the invariance 
theories, the development of a trait is innate across a somehow fixed 
set of environmental factors. An influential account of innateness put 
forward by Andrew Ariew (1996, 1999, 2006) that equates innateness 
with canalization is an example of this. Canalization is a form of devel-
opmental overdetermination found especially in the early stages of 
development. For example, when basic tissue types start to develop 
into specialized tissues, the same developmental process can be trig-
gered by different hormones, even though the hormones have other-
wise different effects. The development of organs is canalized as well: 
the organs develop into morphologically identical forms in different 
internal environments that nevertheless make a causal contribution to 
the development. The original state, determined by the genome as a 
whole and the environment, sets the development into a certain canal, 
in which the causal interaction between the genes and the environ-
ment produces the same pre-determined outcome regardless of the 
specific causal factors. The end states of the possible canals are deter-
mined by the intrinsic properties of the developmental system, but the 
process itself is an interactive process. (See West-Eberhardt 2003; 
Moore 2003.) The idea of innateness as canalization is that the same 
phenomena extend beyond these basic contexts, including to psycho-
logical contexts. Equating innateness with canalization also means 
that the distinction between innate and acquired is not a distinction 
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between genetic and environmental causes, which may be unintuitive 
to some (see Moore 2003), but we have already moved from defining 
innateness with kinds of causes to the fixity of end-results.  
Other problems arise if innateness is equated with canalization. 
For one, canalization is not about a trait appearing regardless of the en-
vironment, but about the same trait appearing in causal interaction be-
tween several different sets of environmental and genetic factors. There is 
a logical continuum between a trait that is dependent on a particular 
causal makeup of the environment and a trait that is canalized across 
all possible environments. More importantly, there is no logical differ-
ence in the actual developmental process between these two extremes 
if the causally necessary characters of the environment are reliably pre-
sent in all actual environments. This is especially true if we are inter-
ested in the consequences for evolutionary explanations. Furthermore, 
the outcome of any trait is influenced by some possible environmental 
causes (if only by preventing the trait’s development). Consequently, 
the innateness of a trait is always relative to the environment. This may 
be counter-intuitive but probably unavoidable (see Sober 1998a; Khalidi 
2007; Kiikeri & Kokkonen 2007; Birch 2009; O’Neill 2015). This means 
that there must be a way to constrain the environmental conditions un-
der which the development needs to be canalized (see Mameli & 
Bateson 2006; Kiikeri & Kokkonen 2007; Birch 2009; O’Neill 2015) and 
the same requirement follows for any invariance account. 
Another problem with equating innateness with canalization is 
that canalization is a specific biological phenomenon that has evolved 
to fix certain crucial developmental outcomes. It seems that there are 
other ways in which the development of the trait can be robust and its 
end-product fixed across the relevant environments (see Moore 2005; 
Griffiths & Machery 2008).238 Either Ariew’s “canalization” must be in-
terpreted as a general property of insensitivity, in which case referring to 
 
238 Strictly speaking, canalization refers to insensitivity to variation both in en-
vironmental and genetic factors. This is why Ariew (1999 & 2007) qualifies 
that he is focusing on the environmental canalization only. 
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the phenomenon of canalization is misleading, or canalization is only 
one example of innateness (see Bateson & Mameli 2007; Kiikeri & Kok-
konen 2007; Birch 2009; O’Neill 2015). Either way, a simple equation 
does not do the necessary work. Rather, canalization (in the proper 
developmental context) is a clear example of a developmental phe-
nomenon that counts as innate and of a mechanistic basis that explains 
it. The accounts of innateness as a property must be less specific and 
reference to a specific biological phenomenon is not necessary. 
There are, however, other invariance accounts of innateness. Ron 
Mallon and Jonathan Weinberg (2006) refine the basic idea as closed 
process invariance. Jonathan Birch (2009) defines innateness through 
the contrast of not being environmentally induced and Elizabeth O’Neill 
(2015) as insensitivity to environmental variation. I will return to Birch’s 
and O’Neill’s accounts later in greater detail and build my own ac-
count as an amalgamation of their views. The invariance, however, 
comes in degrees. Even canalization comes in degrees in two different 
ways: how wide a range of environmental factors the trait is canalized 
across and how fixed the specific outcome is. The change from high 
environment-dependency to developmental fixation across a wide 
range of environments is gradual.  
Both concentrating on the outcome instead of the process and the 
relativity to the environment may seem unintuitive from the folk-bio-
logical point of view, but this also highlights an important difference 
between folk biology and scientific biology: the former is a metaphys-
ical project, the latter is not. If we abandon essentialism, the relativity 
of innateness should not be a surprise or a problem. Too much rela-
tivity, however, waters down the idea. We cannot just choose the en-
vironments in which a particular trait happens to develop and state 
that the trait is innate in these environments. Every developable trait 
would be innate in some environments. The concept should be in-
formative to be useful. The graduality of innateness might tempt us to 
propose a continuum in which one end, “truly and fully innate”, 
would be developmental fixation across all possible environments, 
and the fewer possible environments are included, the less innate a 
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trait is. However, setting all possible environments as the point of 
comparison is irrelevant for any imaginable use for the concept of in-
nateness once we have discarded the folk-biological metaphysics of 
innateness. We are interested in a smaller range of possible variation 
– for example, a range of environments normal to the species. After 
(and only after) we fix the environmental range (which will include a 
set of causal factors as background conditions), different causal factors 
may play different roles in the development with respect to the out-
come. Some affect how the trait turns out (they are instructive) and 
some are just a part of the causal network that produces the trait (en-
abling factors). I will now turn to the issue of the relevant contexts. 
 
8.2.2. Psychology, Innateness, and Primitivism 
 
The main scientific context for nativism debates is not biology but psy-
chology. It seems that regardless of biology, the distinction between 
innate and acquired has done some work in this context, given that 
the debates themselves are substantial debates.239 Furthermore, nativ-
ist evolutionary psychology presupposes its object of study to be in-
nate in the psychological context. It would be natural to think that in-
nateness in psychological contexts is the same thing as innateness in 
biological contexts. However, although the concept of innateness has 
a similar function in both contexts, it seems to have substantially dif-
ferent uses in biology and psychology, as pointed out before by myself 
 
239 Probably the most heated debate over innateness has been in linguistics. 
Linguistics is a pluralistic study of language and there are different ways to 
understand its object. The most obvious one is to study how language as a 
public medium of communication works, and what kind of regularities and 
phenomena can be found in it. Another is to study language as a psychologi-
cal phenomenon. Whether there are language-related specific cognitive capac-
ities that enable its use and acquisition, and whether the development of these 
capacities and the acquisition of language using these capacities are innate, is 
a psychological question.  
400 
 
and Mika Kiikeri (Kiikeri & Kokkonen 2007) and Elizabeth O’Neill 
(2015). The concept of innateness is used as an explanatory concept in 
both contexts: it has to do with what guides the development of a trait. 
But when the context of explanation is shifted to a different level of 
abstraction in description of the processes, the relevant aspects of the 
environment change, and the relevant contrast between what is innate 
and what is not is likewise shifted. The interest might be in the same 
developmental process, but different things are included in the causal 
background and different interventions are relevant.  
The biological interest in the development of a trait is in the bio-
logical processes guiding it, and innateness in biology has to do with 
independence of the developmental outcome from any relevant 
causal features. Psychological interest is in the psychological pro-
cesses and their role in development: if the trait, such as mastery of 
the syntax of a language, develops in any linguistic environment with-
out anything that could be called learning taking place, it is innate – 
no matter what exactly causally guides the development at the biolog-
ical level. It is trivial that the linguistic environment plays a crucial 
role in language acquisition by the linguistic environment triggering 
developmental pathways in the development of linguistic cognition, 
and a linguistic environment with different syntactical features would 
trigger different syntactic competence, but the idea of innateness is 
that the acquisition of the syntax of a particular language does not in-
volve learning of the syntax, understood as extracting it from the in-
formational environment. The debate on whether “language is in-
nate” is about the nature of the interaction between the developing lin-
guistic cognition and the linguistic environment. This is why, for ex-
ample, Muhammad Ali Khalidi (2002 & 2007) has defended a defini-
tion of innateness in psychology that does not reduce psychological 
innateness to a certain kind of biological developmental process but 
refers to triggering and poverty of stimulus in an old-fashioned way. 
Before returning to the more complicated example of human lan-
guage acquisition, let me return to birds. The birds that learn the sing-
ing are usually not able to learn just any singing whatsoever (although 
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there are some birds that are very flexible in their learning capacities), 
so their learning capacity is strongly directed to a certain type of song 
at least. This, however, is always the case with learning to a certain 
degree – there is some sort of capacity for acquiring and some capaci-
ties are more limited than others. This is one problem in drawing the 
line between learning and innate developmental processes. A capacity 
that is directed to learning only one kind of thing might lie on the bor-
derline, but we can always use the example of a bird-species that can 
learn several different songs. The main idea is that the bird somehow 
imitates a feature of the environment. The environment does not just 
trigger the singing, but there is some sort of information processing 
from the environment. Contrast this to the third type of birds that are 
a clear case of not being a clear case. They need to hear birdsong to 
start singing but it does not matter what kind of singing they hear. It 
does not even have to resemble their species-typical singing, but nev-
ertheless they start singing in a species-typical way. This is usually 
considered to be a further example of the fuzziness of the concept of 
innateness, but I would argue that there are two different levels (or foci) 
of explanation and hence two different concepts of innateness here.  
The main idea is that the singing birds of the third kind do not 
possess biologically innate song, since its development is causally de-
pendent on a specific external factor that cannot be considered part of 
the causal background for developmental psychobiological explana-
tory purposes. But it is not learned either. The development does not 
utilize any psychological mechanism by which the bird acquires its 
singing from what it hears by processing information. The environ-
ment is part of what guides the development and determines the out-
come, but in a more brute-causal way than in learning. However, this 
process utilizes some cognitive capacities that are needed for the bird 
to be exposed to the triggering factors in the first place. There are two 
possible intuitions about innateness here – one has to do with the de-
velopment’s dependence on a specific causal input, the other with this 
not being a case of learning. 
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The biological and psychological levels of description and expla-
nation are interested in different kinds of factors in the third case. 
From a biological point of view, the environment consists of all the 
features of the environment that are causally relevant to the develop-
ment. Some of these are part of the causal background and can be left 
out of consideration. Biological innateness would be insensitivity of 
the developmental outcome to the other causally relevant features of 
the environment. Dependency of the outcome on a specific feature of 
the environment makes this not a case of innateness. To simplify the 
situation a bit for now, the relevant environment for psychology is the 
informational environment: the features of the environment that the 
bird can perceive as units of information for its cognitive processing. 
If the bird were to gather information from what it heard, this would 
be a case of learning. It is not: the outcome of the development is in-
sensitive to the informational details of the singing that the bird hears. 
The singing only triggers (or participates in) the relevant developmen-
tal processes producing the singing. Hence, from the psychological 
point of view, this is a case of innateness. 
There is no clear-cut distinction between learning and highly spe-
cialized capacities to react to specific features of the environment, and 
the distinction between a causal process and information processing 
is not clear either. Therefore, I do not attempt to distinguish between 
psychological and biological innateness with the concept of infor-
mation. For now, I am simply trying to make a point about them being 
different concepts – or the same concept (playing the same conceptual 
role) but having a different extension in different contexts, with dif-
ferent substantial conditions. What the concept of innateness is in-
tended to do in the biological context and what it is intended to do in 
the psychological context are different things. Still, they face similar 
problems (probably inevitable vagueness in borderline cases), and 
there is no simple way to draw the line between causal contribution 
to the psychological development and being an information source for 
a learning process. But equating the two types of innateness still 
causes greater confusion. Furthermore, the notion of psychological 
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innateness is compatible with how the concept is used in the language 
acquisition debate, and confusing it with a stronger biological notion 
of innateness is a source for confusion in the debate. 
Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that something like the 
Chomskyian view of language acquisition (see Chomsky 1980, 1986, 
1988, 1993 & 2000) is correct.240 This means that developing mastery of 
syntax in the first language involves more than just learning. The envi-
ronment does not provide the information that the child needs to de-
velop the mastery of that particular syntax just by learning from it (“the 
poverty of stimulus” argument). However, the acquisition of language 
is not independent of the triggers of the linguistic environment even in 
the most radical version of this idea. There is a predisposition to pay 
attention to certain features of the linguistic environment and the clues 
in this environment trigger developmental pathways that eventually 
lead to the mastery of the syntax of the language that the child is ex-
posed to. Since certain features (syntactic characters of this language) 
causally guide the development to a certain direction (to the mastery of 
this language), the syntax that the child develops is not biologically in-
nate. It “grows” under the precise causal guidance of the environment. 
In fact, the specific language determines the syntax that the child learns. 
But the child does not learn the language from the contingent features 
of the linguistic environment through “general” learning either, only by 
making hypotheses and testing them. Instead, there are specific features 
in the structure of the child’s psychological development that predis-
pose them to pay attention to specific features of the overall auditory 
environment, and there is a limited number of possible developmental 
pathways that can be triggered by these features. If this model of ac-
quiring the syntactic rules of a language is correct, it is not a case of 
learning, but it is still controlled by the environment.241 
 
240 Noam Chomsy’s theory of language acquisition has not remained the same 
in details but this does not matter for the illustrative purposes. 
241 I am not defending nativism about language here. Chomsky seems to be 
wrong at least in his characterization of the passivity of the child in language 
acquisition. He says explicitly that “[l]anguage learning is not really something 
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The Chomskyian way to conceptualize this is that the child has in-
nate knowledge of possible linguistic structures. Whatever this knowledge 
of possible structures of a language is supposed to be on the cognitive 
level of description, it is an abstraction of cognitive dispositions that 
translate into implicit knowledge during and after the learning process – 
it is not explicit knowledge of abstract rules prior to that. On a biological 
level, this process has to do with what neurological developments are 
possible and what constraints there are on development. Which path-
ways of development are taken is guided by the relevant aspects of the 
linguistic environment that interacts with this process. Even if certain 
properties of the syntax that the child develops mastery of are innate in 
this sense, their actual development is guided by the environment and 
depends greatly on certain aspects of the linguistic environment. An al-
ternative way to conceptualize the same phenomenon is to say that 
there is an innately primed learning process (see Pullum & Scholz 2002). I 
consider these two conceptualizations alternative descriptions of the 
same process.242 The innateness of syntax in the Chomskyian sense is 
psychological innateness, but not biological innateness. 
 
that the child does; it is something that happens to the child placed in an appro-
priate environment” (Chomsky 1988: 134). However, children are active in lan-
guage use from early stages on, and active participation in communication 
seems to make a difference between children in how efficiently they learn (Ro-
meo et al 2018). This does not, however, undermine the basic idea that the struc-
ture of human psychological development has language-specific features that 
guide and constrain language learning specifically. If there were none, this 
would be quite anomalous among developmental processes of complex fea-
tures of human psychology. See Cowie 1999 and Pullum & Scholz 2002 for the 
criticism of the poverty of stimulus argument; see also Khalidi 2002 & 2007; 
Kiikeri & Kokkonen 2007; Dediu 2015; and O’Neill 2015. 
242 The historical context for Chomsky’s theory of innateness was to make a 
contrast to the Skinnerian behaviourist theory of language learning (see Skin-
ner 1957; Chomsky 1959). The accuracy and adequacy of this criticism can be 
disputed (see Palmer 2006), but Chomsky’s main point, in my estimation, has 
always been that learning of language involves more structure from the cog-
nitive process than general learning mechanisms. Regardless of how 
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It also seems that a part of the nativism debate on language is 
about the specificity of langue-related skills, not innateness itself. It is 
enough for innateness that there are guiding and constraining features 
in the developmental system. Terrence Deacon (1997) turns the Chom-
skyian idea of positive guidance of “innate knowledge” about the syn-
tactic structures, appearing as the abstract “Universal Grammar”, into 
the limitations that human psychological capacities place on the pos-
sible syntaxes. These limitations, too, can be expressed as an abstrac-
tion of the rules of possible grammars – that is, the “Universal Gram-
mar”. If we adopt a systems approach to psychological development, 
these are just two different approaches to the same phenomenon. Dea-
con’s main point is the co-evolution of language and the human brain: 
the earlier stages of the evolution of language were constrained by 
more primitive capacities, the importance of language placed selec-
tion pressures on our abilities to learn language, and the evolution of 
the brain enabled further evolution of language. (See also Tomasello 
2008 and Donald 1998, 2001 & 2017 for a co-evolutionary view.) As 
discussed in the previous chapter, there is nothing peculiar, from the 
evolutionary point of view, in evolved developmental mechanisms 
where the outcome depends on both the internal features of the devel-
opmental process and specific environmental triggers – or in a learn-
ing process where paradigmatic learning (like the learning of the 
meanings of words) and blunter influences from the environment are 
mixed. On the other hand, even if language significantly influenced 
the evolution of our cognition (which it most certainly did), this does 
not necessarily entail language-specific capacities. Yet it would entail 
innateness in language acquisition. Let me explain this by returning 
to William Wimsatt’s idea of generative entrenchment. 
 
successful his theories are about what this involves, this main claim about “in-
nateness” is hardly a radical or even controversial claim within the context of 
contemporary psychology. Chomsky’s more specific theories of language ac-
quisition are an entirely different topic that we do not need to touch on here. 
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Wimsatt (1999) proposes that “innateness” could be replaced by 
“generative entrenchment” in most contexts, although he explicitly 
says that it is not a suitable definition for or a theory of innateness. In 
both the developmental and the evolutionary process, traits do not 
evolve independently of each other, but instead depend on already 
developed and evolved structures, and these dimensions are con-
nected (Wimsatt 1986a, 1999, 2001 & 2007; see also the previous chap-
ter). The “deeper” traits might also develop in interaction with the en-
vironment, but their development is more fundamental, more rigidly 
fixed, more likely to be canalzed, more likely to rely on stabile causal 
factors in the environment, more likely to be species-typical, and so 
on (Wimsatt 1999). This applies to psychological contexts of “innate-
ness” as well: development is constrained, and the characteristics of 
the developmental system and its possible pathways direct how the 
causally relevant factors of the environment are able to influence de-
velopment through their interaction (see also Elman et al 1996; 
Bjorklund & Pellergini 2001; Kiikeri & Kokkonen 2007). If we fixed the 
context to the environments where a child is exposed to a linguistic 
environment (which is almost always the case), this alone could ac-
count for linguistic development having general features that cannot 
be explained by children always learning the same things in the same 
ways. The earlier stages that are generative for further development 
(in Wimsatt’s sense) explain the apparent “generative grammar” (in 
Chomsky’s sense; Chomsky 1986), which should be understood as an 
abstraction of the systemic features of human psychological develop-
ment. This depends, of course, on the theory of learning used. And, 
once again, I am not defending this view about language acquisition 
as such. However, if language acquisition involved something like 
this, some of its features could be characterized as psychologically in-
nate (they appear regardless of the details of the environment) but not 
biologically (there are specific features in the environment that trigger 
the neural developmental pathways). And more generally, generative 
entrenchment is a common property of developmental systems that 
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may explain some robustness in outcome without a specific (evolved) 
mechanism that ensures this, such as canalization. 
The idea that characterising something as innate has different 
aims in biology and in psychology has been pointed out before. Fiona 
Cowie (1999) considers innateness to be a black box for biologists that 
is opened in psychology.243 Richard Samuels (2002, 2004, 2007 & 2009), 
in turn, has defended a version of nativism in cognitive science that 
he calls primitivism. According to him (Samuels 2002: 246), a psycho-
logical structure S is primitive if and only if 
1) S is a structure posited by some correct scientific psycho-
logical theory; and 
2) there is no correct scientific psychological theory that ex-
plains the acquisition of S. 
According to primitivism, psychological primitivity is what is meant 
by innateness in psychology. It is worth noting that Samuels refers to 
correct psychological theories and explanations. Innateness is not rel-
ative to the current status of theorising within psychology (Samuels 
2002: 246, fn. 20).  
The primitivism account seems to capture the general idea of 
what I have been characterizing as psychological innateness. It has 
some limitations, however. The second condition does not apply to 
cases where abnormal environmental conditions affect the develop-
ment of brain directly, where the acquisition of a psychological char-
acteristic is not characterizable by a psychological theory, yet it is a 
psychologically relevant developmental process. Samuels acknowl-
edges this by adding a normalcy condition, but this is not completely 
satisfactory to cover all relevant cases (see Khalidi 2007). Furthermore, 
it does not account for innate differences between people in 
 
243 Cowie belonged to an eliminativist camp herself. She did not think the no-
tion has a clear meaning and did not argue for a separation along the discipli-




psychological characteristics or capacities. The definition does not 
acknowledge that innateness comes in degrees either. These are, how-
ever, problems with the definition. I will next argue for an account of 
innateness that subsumes Samuel’s basic ideas. There will be two 
main differences. First, my account is perspectivist with respect to the 
meaning of the concept and it theoretically allows several well-de-
fined concepts of innateness. Second, in the same breath, I do not con-
sider the above distinction a disciplinary issue. I have used the distinc-
tion between “biological” and “psychological” as a placeholder for 
two different approaches, but the difference that counts is the substan-
tial difference between different causal explanatory questions posed 
of the developmental process. 
 
8.2.3. A Contrastive Account of Innateness 
 
The general notion of innateness that I propose is the following. “In-
nateness” is an explanatory concept that leaves a developmental pro-
cess, or parts of it, in a black box. It is not about a specific ontology of 
the developmental process (that is, requiring a certain kind of cause) 
but about relevant causal dependencies, or the lack thereof. Develop-
ment depends on causal factors that can be genetic, systemic or envi-
ronmental, but none of the environmental factors that contribute to 
the development are explanatorily relevant difference-makers. If the 
outcome of the development is robust within a relevant invariance do-
main (a range of environmental variation), and this development is in-
sensitive to the factors that are used in the relevant explanatory field, 
the trait is innate. This makes innateness relative to both a range of 
environmental variation and the explanatory perspective taken. I will 
now take a closer look at the accounts of innateness by Jonathan Birch 
and Elizabeth O’Neill that are close relatives to my account, before 
going into it in greater detail. 
Jonathan Birch (2009) defines innateness as non-induction: a trait 
is innate if and only if it is not environmentally induced. Environmental 
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induction refers to a process in which a particular change in the envi-
ronmental conditions causes a particular change in the outcome (see 
West-Eberhard 2003; Gilbert 2007; Wolpert et al 2010). However, the dis-
tinction between induction and mere causal contribution that can 
change the outcome is notoriously difficult to make. The environmental 
factor must be instructive, not merely enabling. One option here is to use 
the manipulability of the trait with external factors as a criterion (see for 
example Mameli & Bateson 2006, but Birch considers this too permis-
sive. Instead, he defines induction as follows (Birch 2009: 298): 
 
A trait T is environmentally induced in an organism O iff an environ-
mental mechanism features in a causal explanation of why O developed 
T rather than a trait from a pragmatically determined contrast class of 
alternatives T*. 
 
In other words, the inductive environmental factor is the difference-
maker within the relevant contrast class. The contrast class is deter-
mined by both the developmental dispositions of the developmental 
system (which traits are possible at all) and the pragmatics of expla-
nation: only some alternatives are relevant. Innateness is the comple-
ment:  
 
A trait T is innate to an organism O iff it is not environmentally in-
duced. (ibid) 
 
The strength of this definition, compared to canalization, is that it de-
fines the fixity of the outcome as a general property of a developmental 
process instead of identifying innateness with a particular developmen-
tal phenomenon or a mechanism. Furthermore, it treats innateness as 
an explanatory instead of an ontological concept, which is also the view 
argued for here. It is still vulnerable to one of the main criticisms posed 
by Matteo Mameli and Patrick Bateson (2006; see also Bateson 1991 and 
Bateson & Mameli 2007) against the very notion of innateness: what is 
the point of talking about innateness in the first place? What does it 
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accomplish to say something is innate, especially if it is supposed to be 
an explanatory concept? Birch’s reply to this is basically that calling 
something innate is shorthand for an unnecessarily long explanation. 
For example, if we tell a four-years-old that it is innate for humans to 
develop eyesight (instead of remaining blind), we are giving a sketchy 
explanation, but an explanation nevertheless (Birch 2009: 299). 
This reply is highly unsatisfactory if it is precisely the develop-
ment of eyesight that we are interested in. As previously pointed out 
by many, since the very object of research in developmental biology is 
to understand how the developmental process of a given trait unfolds, 
the very notion of innateness does not make any sense if the whole 
point is to black-box this process (Lehrman 1953; Kiikeri & Kokkonen 
2007; Griffiths 2009).244 Black-boxing might be good enough for some 
other fields that are not interested in development, but it still matters 
whether a trait simply appears (under some pragmatic conditions) or 
if its existence must be separately verified or explained. This may be 
the case in psychological sciences, as discussed above, possibly ex-
cluding developmental psychology, but also in some fields of biology. 
Elizabeth O’Neill (2015) defends another variant of the invari-
ance account245 which she calls the insensitivity account. Unlike Ariew 
and Birch, she discusses the need for a notion of innateness in psy-
chology specifically, although, crucially, not only in human psychol-
ogy, but also regarding animal cognition. Significantly, she also rela-
tivizes innateness to specific environmental variation. O’Neill defines 
innateness as follows (O’Neill 2015: 216): 
 
244 Personal interactions with developmental biologists provide anecdotal ev-
idence for this, too. They seem to be genuinely puzzled about what “innate-
ness” could even mean. 
245 O’Neill herself contrasts her account with invariance accounts on the basis of 
the differences that, I agree, are significant refinements to the previous accounts. I 
will, however, categorize her account as an invariance account in my more general 
distinction between eliminativism, separatism, and invariantism. 
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A trait T is innate with respect to variations in an environmental factor 
F within a specified range of F if and only if the appearance of T is in-
sensitive to variations in F within the specified range of F. 
 
A claim about innateness combines a range of variation in a cluster of 
factors that, according to O’Neill (2015: 217), “should be determined 
by the interests of the scientist or scientific community.” This is a cru-
cial condition in two ways. First, on doing so, innateness is relativized 
to specific research programmes, in contrast to both discipline-speci-
ficity and universal innateness. Second, this moves the question about 
the environmental variation relative to which the trait is innate from 
the end-result of the research into the research questions. The invariance 
accounts, as well as separatist accounts, generally approach innate-
ness as something we have discovered or want to discover (being a 
psychological primitive or a known developmental fixation that we 
can use as a shorthand in explanations). Innateness of a trait is what 
we want to learn. Instead, O’Neill argues that the main reason to be 
interested in the concept of innateness is that the assumption of in-
nateness is “a useful tool that helps scientists ascertain whether the 
appearance of a trait is influenced by particular environmental factors 
that interest researchers.” (O’Neill 2015: 220.) For example, the claim 
that there is an innate Universal Grammar guided a productive re-
search paradigm in linguistics – whether we should abandon it now 
or hold onto it. This is an epistemic point, but an important clarifica-
tion of the function of the concept of innateness. 
The accounts by Birch and O’Neill are quite similar and combin-
able, and the positive insights of the other accounts seem to be accom-
modable to them. They both build on the idea of the fixity of the trait 
across various developmental conditions (instead of a source for this 
fixity) and relativize the truth conditions to a range of environmental 
factors and, instead of a normality condition of some sort, to prag-
matic interests. I will take this general idea, Birch’s approach to in-
nateness as an explanatory black box and use of the idea of contrast 
class in the definition, and O’Neill’s relativization of the domain of 
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interest as the basis for a definition for innateness. I should also add 
that I have presented, independently of Birch and O’Neill, and jointly 
with Mika Kiikeri, a notion of innateness that belongs to the same fam-
ily (Kiikeri & Kokkonen 2007). We defined innateness as fixity of the 
end-result of the developmental process in which the causally contrib-
uting factors of the environment are not included in the explanatory 
resources of the given domain of research. This results in distinguish-
ing between biological and psychological concepts of innateness, 
where the first is insensitivity to any biologically relevant causal in-
fluences and the latter is insensitivity to psychological explanatory re-
sources, which we understood in terms of information processing 
(similarly to and independently of Khalidi 2007). We concluded that 
eliminativism about innateness may be warranted in the biological 
realm, but innateness might nevertheless be a useful concept in psy-
chological research, while whatever developmentally explains the in-
nateness of a psychologically innate trait will be a developmental bio-
logical explanation without a reference to innateness in a biological 
sense. However, this is not the account presented here. Instead, I de-
fine a contrastive invariance account of innateness as follows.  
 
The trait T is innate in organism O with respect to the range of 
variation of environmental factors F within a research pro-
gramme R, iff 
Inn 1)  T is fixed across all the possible alternative developmen-
tal processes within F; 
Inn 2) F is the relevant domain of R independently of T; and 
Inn 3) the differences between O1…On regarding T are either ex-
plainable by non-environmental variation between 
O1…On or attributable to abnormal conditions falling 
outside F (either by range or by factors not included). 
 
In other words, there is an invariance domain with respect to the in-
nateness of the trait, but this domain is not determined by the choice 
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of the trait (which would make the claims about innateness empty and 
post-hoc) but by whatever is considered the proper domain of the re-
search field or a research programme: only some contrast classes and 
counterfactual scenarios are relevant. The claim about innateness is a 
substantial assumption about fixity within this domain. Not all envi-
ronmental factors or ranges are relevant to all fields or research pro-
grammes. For instance, the context of language acquisition relevant to 
a linguistic model that maps the structure of ordinary language acqui-
sition and the importance of the informational content of the linguistic 
environment may include cognitive aspects only and exclude contexts 
of language deprivation, whereas how auditory triggers specific to 
spoken language trigger neural pathways may be important to some 
other explanatory questions. The contrast class of the latter includes 
the situations in which language is not learned at all, whereas the first 
does not. Extraordinary end-results (such as an inability to develop 
language in the first place) and the difference-makers explaining them 
are not included in the contrast classes relevant to the explanations 
within R but are changes in the (implicit) background assumptions; in 
the case of language acquisition, these might include things such as 
genetic mutations, developmental disorders and abnormally de-
praved linguistic environments (for example, feral children). 
Generally, some psychological models are interested in the “nor-
mal range” of psychology (defined by the field) and others in abnormal 
psychology, and some theories of psychological development are inter-
ested in the development of “normal” psychology and others in the 
causes of abnormal developments. As discussed in the previous chap-
ter, in the context of development in general, regular development may 
take place in generalizable stages where an appearance of something 
may not have a specific explanation, while explaining deviations from 
this does. Deviation may require moving into a different research field 
and its explanatory resources. Furthermore, the explanation of a devia-
tion may involve an omission of something that is usually present (and 
hence a part of the causal background) rather than a reference to an ab-
normal positive cause. (See Berk 2013; Narvaez et al 2012.) 
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Shifting into another field of research for explanation may be 
needed either to deepen the explanation (for example, when a detailed 
explanation is given for a fixed trait) or to explain an abnormality. 
However, this does not necessarily involve crossing disciplinary bor-
ders. Both the models of normally functioning human cognition and 
the development of abnormal psychology are within the psychologi-
cal discipline, but they are different sub-fields that have different ex-
planatory interests, aims and resources. Similarly, the various fields 
within biology may have different explanatory interests. The criticism 
of the confused use of the notion of innateness put forward by Mameli 
and Bateson (2006; Bateson 1991; Bateson & Mameli 2007) is probably 
right in its substance, but different uses of the concept within various 
fields of biology may also be justified. I will not go further into this 
issue here. However, I reject the distinction between informational 
and causal environments as a relevant marker for innateness (contra 
Kiikeri & Kokkonen 2007 and Khalidi 2007) for a similar reason. De-
velopmental psychology is interested in a plurality of contributing 
factors in development (see Berk 2013). For example, Darcia Narvaez’s 
theory, which maps various causal factors that make a difference in 
the development of empathy, includes factors as different as physical 
touch in infancy, free play in nature, and surrounding adults’ atti-
tudes towards strangers (Narvaez 2014; Narvaez et al 2016). The over-
all developmental process is long and complicated, and which factors 
it makes sense to highlight depend on the specific explanatory inter-
ests (what is explained in contrast to what), the structure of the pro-
cess, and the variability in the relevant factors within the relevant 
range of environments. The range in turn depends, among other 
things, on how specific are the conditions that we are interested in, 
versus how theoretical and all-encompassing our interests are. There 
is no point in restricting the types of causal factors allowed – the aims 
of the research programme should entail this. Conversely, when the 
research programme is fixed, various characteristics in the develop-
mental processes or in their outcomes can be fixed as “innate”, and 
the justification for this is internal to the research programme.  
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The causal background is fixed by the explanatory interests. 
There is a set of possible counterfactual causal interventions that de-
fine the contrast class for the given explanatory resources. A trait is 
innate when its developmental outcome is immune to this set of inter-
ventions. If the explanatory process includes the effects of the con-
stantly present causal factors of the environment, there is no point in 
talking about innateness in the first place. If, however, we are inter-
ested in the behaviour of an animal, for example, it might be useful to 
keep certain dispositions and capacities fixed and explain others via 
the influence of the environment. The criteria for the range of environ-
ments relevant to innateness are objects for pragmatic consideration. 
I think this is unavoidable after the revision of the concept from a met-
aphysical to a naturalistic (explanatory) concept sketched above. But 
this does not make the concept of innateness arbitrary unless the ex-
planatory projects choose their targets randomly.  
One last qualification needs to be made. For any trait, there may 
be parts or aspects of it that are innate and other parts and aspects that 
are not. As discussed above, the possibilities of development may 
simply be constrained by the structure of the developmental system 
and the end-result determined by environmental factors, but the 
range can still be said to be innate. If there are general features that 
can be abstracted from all possible human syntaxes and described as 
an abstract Universal Grammar, this is an innate part of human lan-
guage that could play an explanatory role in describing language ac-
quisition, possibly depending on the research programme within 
which this is done. If the sex of a reptile is induced by the external 
temperature of the eggs at a certain developmental stage, the potential 
for male development and female development (and presumably for 
a range of intersex developments) is innate. An obvious counterargu-
ment is that accepting this would make everything trivially innate. But 
it does not. It means that most traits have some characteristics that are 
innate, but not everything about these traits are innate, and only 
within some frameworks. 
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Now, let us take another look at the i-properties that Mameli and 
Bateson (2006) propose as the cluster of innateness. As a reminder, 
they include 
 
i) reliability of appearance (at a specific stage of the life cy-
cle); 
ii) evolutionary abnormality of the environmental manip-
ulations that could produce an alternative; 
iii) not being produced by an adapted mechanism to map 
between environmental conditions and the alternative 
phenotypes (plus the previous condition); 
iv)  generative entrenchment; 
v) being developmentally environmentally canalized; 
vi) being post-developmentally environmentally cana-
lized;  
vii) being species-typical;  
viii) being an adaptation. 
 
The account developed here identifies innateness only with the first. 
How are the others related? The i-properties iv–vi are specifications 
of developmental processes that may explain why the trait is innate. 
Species-typicality does not need to be connected to innateness at all. 
However, there are reasons why they may be connected in practice. 
First, biology is generally interested in making species-typical gener-
alizations, which means innateness-attributions are also on the species 
level. Second, if something is species-typical (either universally or in 
some other sense; see Griffiths 2002), this requires an assumption that 
there is a species-typical developmental reason for this, and innate-
ness (in the relativized sense) may be a sensible yet fallible hypothesis. 
Nevertheless, I do not consider species-typicality to be a required en-
tailment for the definition of innateness, and I agree with Mameli and 
Bateson that using them interchangeably is a confusion. Likewise, 
there is no reason why references to adaptation of the trait or the de-
velopmental mechanism producing it should be conceptually 
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connected to innateness. Again, these may be connected on the level 
of substantial biological assumptions. This in turn is the main reason 
to bring the issue of innateness into the discussion in this dissertation. 
I will move on to this issue now. 
 
 
8.3. Nativism and Evolution 
 
Let us return the topic of developmental individualism and holism 
now and integrate it with the above detour to the innateness debates. 
There can be natural selection only between traits that are inherited. 
The contents of individual learning processes (or the resulting behav-
iour) cannot be selected but the capacity for this learning (based on 
the resulting behaviour in the selection environments) can, as I have 
discussed earlier. With more complicated traits, such as language ac-
quisition in the hypothetical case that it involves innateness, learning, 
and all the processes in between, the object of selection becomes more 
complicated, too. Language, and many other human traits, including 
many forms of social interaction, involve social learning and culture 
and other externalized channels of inheritance that participate in the 
replication of the trait, which enables natural selection to operate but 
makes the replication holistic. This means that the evolution of the 
trait must be explained as a trait of the group sharing the developmen-
tal resources – I will explicate what this means in the next chapter. 
However, the existence of holistic replication does not mean that all 
explanatorily interesting aspects of these traits or practices they par-
ticipate in are holistic in this sense, or that all human psychology or 
behaviour are holistic. We need a methodologically sound way to dis-
tinguish between when holistic approach is needed and when devel-
opment can be approached as an individualist process. Furthermore, 
we need to know what it means for a psychological or behavioural 
trait to be individualist in this sense, if the context includes all the fac-
tors that enable holistic replication.  
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My suggestion is that developmental individualism can be 
equated with innateness in the sense that I have defined it. If the con-
tents of individual learning are not an object of evolutionary explana-
tion, and the holistic aspects of replication are excluded, we are left 
with those traits (or aspects of traits) that develop with insensitivity to 
the relevant environmental variation. My other suggestion is that 
choosing nativism as a perspective of evolutionary study is a method-
ological choice of what to focus on. Choices like that are always 
choices to narrow the object of study and give partial knowledge only. 
We probably need both nativist and holist approaches to understand 
human psychology and behaviour. Doing so, it is important to under-
stand the limitations of each approach and their division of labour, 
and not to overstate what a particular approach says about human 
behaviour, or whatever object of research. As discussed before, this is 
not trivial when it comes to human behaviour. I have argued for the 
distinction between psychological, agentive, and behavioural earlier 
in the dissertation, which helps making some of the analytical work. 
What I will do now is to explicate the possible extent of nativistic ap-
proaches and how this juxtaposes approaches that acknowledge the 
holistic forms of replication. 
 
8.3.1. What is Innate in Evolutionary Psychology? 
 
Much of evolutionary psychology is nativist: the object of study is de-
fined as the innate structure of mind. This innate structure is also 
thought to be species-typical and evolutionarily functional. Not all 
forms of evolutionary psychology make all these assumptions. Further-
more, it does not follow from making these assumptions about the spe-
cific research object of evolutionary psychology that mind is entirely 
about these structures only. This would be an overstatement of the re-
sults of the research, no matter how well based they were. For now, I 
will articulate what nativism in evolutionary psychology means in a 
charitable interpretation, after which I will move into discussing how 
this narrows down the theoretically possible objects of such research. 
419 
 
I summarized the assumptions of nativist evolutionary psychol-
ogy to include the four following theses in the chapter 4.2.1.: 
 
A) The mind has a modular, functional structure; 
B) This structure is innate; 
C) The modules are domain-specific adaptations; and 
D) The adaptations are for the needs of the Environment of Evo-
lutionary Adaptedness (EEA) 
 
Nativism of some sort seems to be a natural assumption for evolved 
structure of mind – and a potential problem for the whole research 
programme if it is false. There is a vast literature criticizing nativism 
(see, for example, Karmiloff-Smith 1992 & 2006; Elman et al 1997; 
Cowie 1999; Buller 2005; Ylikoski & Kokkonen 2009; Smith 2020). 
Much of this criticism relies on a strong notion of innateness, however 
– nativism cannot work because developmental processes are not pre-
determined enough. Subrena Smith (2020) has recently given a formu-
lation for the core problem of nativism: the matching problem. She ar-
gues that nativist evolutionary psychology depends on the idea that 
the similarities in the cognitive architecture between the ancestral hu-
mans and contemporary humans must be connected in a “homology-
like” link by being hard-wired. If there is no such link across the line-
age, the past does not explain the present. Even if we knew that the 
cognitive architecture and behaviour were similar, we would not 
know if this was because of hard-wiring or because of developmental 
reasons: similar experiences produce similar architectures. Further-
more, the architecture may be different because of plasticity of mind, 
and whatever stays the same down the lineage cannot be as detailed 
as what the nativist evolutionary psychologists think. The core meth-
odology of matching contemporary cognitive architecture with ances-
tral cognitive architecture is not justifiable. 
The matching problem does not need to be crucial, however. The 
level of detail that the nativists seem to assume the innate mind has is 
undeniably problematic and I do not defend it here. However, as I 
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have already argued in chapter 4, it is not crucial how finely-grained 
the structure is, since this only affects what level of specificity the ob-
ject of evolutionary psychology can have. Similarly, the mind could 
also have a fine-grained modular structure that is not innate, but a 
product of environment-sensitive individual development (see 
Karmiloff-Smith 1992, 1998 & 2006; Buller 2005; Smith 2020), and in 
this case the explananda of evolutionary psychology would not be the 
modules but something more general. But the crucial issue is the in-
nateness. How do we interpret innateness in this context and how big 
of a problem is the matching problem? 
As discussed in the previous chapter, natural selection has two 
targets: the outcome of the developmental process and the develop-
mental process itself. For the latter, reliability of production of the se-
lected outcome is the key issue. Therefore: “innateness.” It does not 
matter, however, what causal factors are included in the developmen-
tal interaction. Even if natural selection worked only on the variation 
in the genes, the outcome for which the genes are selected could still 
be partly produced by external environmental factors, as long as the 
specific factors are reliably present in all the developmental environ-
ments in the EEA or the development is canalized across the variation 
within the EEA. If a particular feature of the environment is reliably 
present in practically all environments where the members of a spe-
cies grow up, like the singing of fellow members of a bird species, it is 
just as good as if the singing were encoded into genes. There is a dif-
ference between a developmental process that involves learning in the 
sense of imitation or other cognitive processes, and a developmental 
process that only utilizes the auditory environment in some more di-
rect causal way. The learning route may be selected against because 
of the cognitive burden it poses, but dependence on a specific envi-
ronmental factor that is reliably present may not. This is an evolution-
ary reason for the fact that we find “strange” cases where, for appar-
ently no reason, the developmental process relies on a seemingly ran-
dom external developmental resource. 
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The same applies to human psychology. If there is selection for a 
specific psychological trait, its development must be passed on to the 
next generation reliably. This does not mean that the influence of ex-
ternal factors is minimized. In other words, if we make the crude dis-
tinction between biological and psychological innateness, where bio-
logical innateness is insensitivity to difference-makers that are rele-
vant to biological explanations and psychological innateness is insen-
sitivity to difference makers that are relevant to ordinary psychologi-
cal explanations, what matters for evolutionary psychology is psycho-
logical innateness, not biological. Evolutionary psychologists also 
seem to explain phenomena within the framework of psychology. It is 
both charitable and probably more correct to assume that evolution-
ary psychologists make assumptions of innateness in this sense and 
not in any more demanding sense, upon which the criticism is usually 
based. However, even if there are psychologically innate evolved 
traits that are not biologically innate, it means that the opposite of be-
ing (biologically) innate is not being psychologically modifiable. If 
there is no individual or social learning or cultural transmission with 
regard to these structures, and the developmental interactions pro-
duce the same outcome in all the relevant environments, this is suffi-
cient for the nativist methodology in evolutionary psychology.  
Things are more complicated than this, however. If the research 
programme and its aims define what claiming something to be innate 
means, and the explanatory interests and the relevant contrasts deter-
mine the kinds of difference-makers that are relevant, the straightfor-
ward distinction between psychological and biological does not apply 
always. Biopsychology, for example, is not restricted to the same ex-
planatory types as psychology proper. Furthermore, if the develop-
mental environment has changed, the psychological development 
may also be different with respect to the psychological structures. A 
new environment could change even an ancient developmental pro-
cess that is canalized across a wide range of other environments, but 
the relatively new adaptations (in the evolutionary scale of time) that 
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evolutionary psychologists are mostly interested in have not had time 
to adapt to a wide range of environments.  
One lesson to be drawn from this is that evolutionary psycholo-
gists should draw more attention to developmental interactions with 
the environment. And there are many examples of this.246 But another 
lesson is to be more precise and less ambitious in what exactly is the 
explanandum. I have discussed the difference between a trait as a psy-
chological trait (capacity or inclination) and a trait as a form of behav-
iour in some of the previous chapters. All the behaviour that is associ-
ated with a given psychological trait is what is selected for or against, 
and all the psychological traits that are associated with a form of behav-
iour that is adaptive are selected for. There is no one-to-one mapping. 
Now we must expand this with a developmental dimension. Take fear 
as an example. If there is an innate capacity to develop fears of certain 
things, but what exactly an individual ends up fearing is a matter of 
personal experiences and observing others being afraid, then it is the 
capacity to develop fears that is being selected, not the individual fears. 
The usefulness of learning to fear the specific things that people learned 
to fear within the EEA is the evolutionary explanation for why people 
fear the things now, but the proper object of the evolutionary explana-
tion is the developmental capacity to develop fears. It might even be 
the case that no fears were triggered during the individual develop-
ment, in which case the person would feel no fear. Still, in case they 
developed fears, fear itself as a category would be innate, and the ex-
planandum of evolutionary psychology, but not any specific fear. This 
move may seem like a trick: in the end, everything is (partly) innate. 
 
246 To mention a few examples, Karola Stotz (2014) has outlined a theoretical ap-
proach to evolutionary psychology that would take developmental plasticity and 
non-genetic forms of transmission into consideration; Darcia Narvaez (2014; Nar-
vaez et al 2016) has a multidisciplinary, empirical research programme that pays 
attention to precisely the evolved developmental processes; Christina Moya and Jo-
seph Heinrich (2016) have proposed coevolutionary psychology as a functionalist 
perspective on cultural differences in psychology; and the evolution of cultural 
mind itself is an entire research field of its own (see for example, Schaller et al 2010). 
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Does this not make innateness empty again? Not if we consider nativ-
ism to be a methodological stance and a way to identify the research 
object instead of a radical substantive statement about human mind. 
 
8.3.2. Methodological Nativism as Methodological Individualism 
 
I argued in chapter 4 that we should approach nativist evolutionary 
psychology as the first approximation of what it would be to do evo-
lutionary psychology that goes beyond the evolutionary history of 
mind and attempts to develop heuristic tools to understand human 
cognition and behaviour. I also suggested in the Introduction that the 
success of evolutionary psychology should be used in the evaluation 
of evolutionary psychology as a research programme, not theoretical 
arguments alone. Theoretical arguments are, of course, part of this 
evaluation, but only a part. What this means regarding nativism spe-
cifically could be something like this. Nativism is a working hypothe-
sis: it is a research programme-related practice to leave some develop-
mental processes in black boxes to answer some other questions (that 
is, function). We do not need to interpret this to mean something else 
on a completely different field, and the justification of the nativist as-
sumption comes partly from the productivity of this assumption. As 
a working hypothesis about mind, nativism is also a way to define the 
research object. 
Some of the claims that evolutionary psychologists make are 
about very specific capacities (such as the cheater detection module 
described in chapter 4). This might work occasionally. In some other 
cases, it may turn out that the development of the capacity under 
study is plastic or depends on some environmental factors that are not 
the same as within the EEA. This means that the phenotypical trait 
does not have a direct evolutionary psychological explanation. The 
range of phenotypic possibilities in plastic development and the fact 
that there is plasticity in the development may, however, be an object 
of evolutionary psychological explanation. In other words, the ex-
plananda may be things like the capacity to learn certain things in 
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certain situations. What is innate, then, is the capacity to learn and its 
constraints. This may sound like an ad hoc defence of nativism – there 
was something there after all – and watering down innateness, but it is 
in line with the concept of innateness that has been discussed in this 
chapter. Whatever can be considered innate within the explanatory 
framework is the criterion for what can be an explanandum within that 
field. If a proposed object of nativist evolutionary psychological ex-
planation is not innate, it falls out of the domain of nativist evolution-
ary psychology, and the focus of research needs to change. 
I am not proposing that all psychology ends up being innate in 
some sense, or that evolutionary psychology captures what is essen-
tial about it – I am proposing that nativist evolutionary psychology 
makes substantial innateness claims about its explananda in the very 
act of taking them as its explananda. Consequently, some of the claims 
of evolutionary psychology (such as tight domain-specificity) may be 
watered down in the process, and nativist evolutionary psychology 
may not turn out to be a very useful approach to understanding hu-
man mind in general. These are entirely empirical matters about hu-
man mind. My point here is only that the assumption of innateness is, 
or should be, a methodological principle to identify the proper objects 
of explanation as well as a substantial claim about a specific part of 
the mind’s architecture, not about mind in general. How far this meth-
odology goes in our attempts to understand human mind remains to 
be seen from the results it can produce and how well these results can 
be integrated with the rest of psychology and other human sciences. 
Evolutionary psychology may turn out to be a valid research pro-
gramme, but by saying far less than it promises to say about hu-
mans.247 Evaluating this, however, falls outside my discussion here. 
 
247 Evolutionary psychology is sometimes associated with the idea of human 
nature. Human nature is an essentialist concept that combines innateness, spe-
cies-typicality, and normativity. Maria Kronfeldener (2019) has recently pre-
sented a revisionist, post-essentialist, and pluralist account of human nature 
that naturalizes the concept. She distinguishes between three different epis-
temic roles that the concept of human nature is supposed to have: descriptive, 
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Although nativist evolutionary psychologists are probably in the 
camp of Modern Synthesis,248 I have approached the notion of innate-
ness and its connection with evolution from the framework of the Ex-
tended Synthesis in a way that I hope is compatible even with the De-
velopmental Systems Theory.249 Individual development may rely on 
the environment, but only some of it is relevant to selection: only those 
factors that can transfer selected effects. Nativist evolutionary psy-
chology does not need to deny the existence of environmental contri-
bution to innate traits if innateness is properly understood. Further-
more, if a trait involves plasticity, the object of the explanation is the 
plasticity and its range. In learned behaviour specifically, the capacity 
to learn, the context of learning, the potential range of learned behav-
iour, and so on, are the trait. A capacity to learn something is only 
selected for the resulting behaviour and how it increases the adapted-
ness of the organisms with that capacity, given that the variety of re-
sulting behavioural traits is better adaptively matched to the variety 
 
explanatory, and classificatory. Her definition of descriptive human nature is 
constituted by all the traits that “are conserved over evolutionary time by bi-
ological rather than cultural inheritance” (Kronfeldner 2019: 165). If human 
nature is defined in this way, evolutionary psychology may indeed be in 
search of human nature. However, Kronfeldner’s conception of descriptive 
human nature is very thin compared to how the concept of human nature is 
usually understood. What I am saying about the “innate mind” of the nativist 
evolutionary psychology is something similar and the issues are directly con-
nected. There is a human nature but there is not much of it – and if nativist 
evolutionary theory studies it, it leaves much of human mind outside. 
248 I am not aware of any explicit endorsement of the Extended Synthesis in 
this camp and the basic theoretical tools are rooted in the gene’s point of view 
(see Barkow et al 2002; Buss 2014). 
249 There is a strong personal overlap between the critics of innateness and the 
proponents of the DST (most notably, of course, Paul Griffiths) and naïve con-
ceptions of innateness are certainly incompatible with the DST approach to 
development. There are no incompatibilities between DST and the invariance 
accounts, however, as I hope my discussion has implicitly shown. 
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of the environmental conditions than if there were one fixed trait 
across all different environmental conditions. 
Nativism may be a valid methodological choice when it comes to 
some psychological structures in isolation, but not when it comes to 
human behaviour, especially social behaviour. Behaviour is a part of 
the developing phenotype, and understanding its evolution requires 
understanding all the factors that systematically affect it. This includes 
both proximate and developmental considerations. I discussed the 
difference between psychological and behavioural traits in chapter 5 
and I further distinguished between individualistically and holisti-
cally individuated behavioural traits. Nativist evolutionary psycholo-
gists are interested in behaviour, too, not just cognition, but they link 
behaviour to cognition directly as part of the function of specific ca-
pacities, and in doing so they are restricted to the individualistic per-
spective in the proximate dimension. I argued that the function of 
some individual behavioural dispositions cannot be understood ex-
cept in the light of the role they play in a holistic view of social inter-
actions where the forms of interaction, or interactive traits, compete. 
This as such could also be integrated into evolutionary psychology. 
There is, however, the consequence that the evolutionary function of 
the cognitive characteristic is not what the individual achieves, but 
what the interaction with others achieves. The perspective on evolu-
tionary functionality must be holistic. In other words, proximate di-
mension individualism does not follow from developmental individ-
ualism – and neither does evolutionary individualism. 
As argued in the previous chapter, various kinds of social interac-
tion and forms of culture can make the replication of social behavioural 
traits a holistic process, either in the interactionist sense (limited hori-
zontal transmission within the group) or collectivist (the whole group 
acquires the trait). This means that even if the interest of evolutionary 
psychology is in those features of mind that stay fixed, understanding 
their evolutionary function may require understanding what their func-
tion is in a culturally changing context, where the ancient cultural set-
tings were not only the selection environment for this psychology, but 
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the psychological characteristics were functional only as they partici-
pated in the behavioural traits that are partly cultural. Furthermore, the 
development of the innate parts of psychology may still be functionally 
linked to holistic replication systems. Consider language again. Even if 
certain parts of language cognition were innate in the Chomsky style, 
the full story of language development (even in this respect) requires 
the language community that collectively provides the environment 
that triggers the developmental pathways to the correct syntactic com-
petence. The evolution of language is a complicated issue (see Gibson 
& Tellerman 2011; Hauser et al 2014) but understanding it will probably 
require both psychological-level and language community level ac-
counts of the various social functions of language. 
I have now given the most charitable reading of individualistic 
assumption of development within the context of evolution of human 
social behaviour that I am able to. It seems that just like in the proxi-
mate dimension, where individualist psychological traits may be con-
nected to holistic behavioural traits, innate psychology may be con-
nected to holistic replication of behaviour. In the proximate dimen-
sion, the holistic trait defines what the behaviour is for, which gives 
the psychology its adaptive function. In the developmental dimen-
sion, both vertical and horizontal channels of replication are relevant 
for understanding what is being selected. In both cases, individuals 
are evolutionarily bound together, although in different ways. In both 
cases, behavioural outcome is the primary concern for understanding 
evolutionary functionality – psychology is only a component part. It 
is time to bring these topics together now and to move to evolutionary 
explanation and see what consequences the discussion thus far has for 




9. Group Selection and Holistic Adaptation 
 
A key goal of this dissertation is to distinguish between methodolog-
ical individualism and the various plausible forms of holism in the 
evolutionary explanations of human behaviour. The purely individu-
alist approach takes the adapting units to be individuals (in a social 
selective environment) whereas the holistic alternatives take human 
groups to have been the adapting units, one way or another. In other 
words, if we want to understand the evolution of a social behavioural 
trait, we should understand how it is adaptive as a part of how the 
group functions. As discussed in earlier parts of the book, this is a 
methodological question about adequate causal explanations, not an 
ontological issue about causal processes in evolution. Even if the 
causal processes can be traced to concrete interactions between indi-
viduals, other individuals, and the environments, and to individual 
reproduction, the evolutionary explanation (by selection or otherwise) 
abstracts away from this to more general features and structures of 
these processes that express what is causally relevant. These struc-
tures, however, can make a difference – they can be difference-makers 
that are relevant to explanation.  
As discussed in chapter 3, processes of natural selection can be 
understood as mechanistic processes through a causal structure that 
instantiates the mechanism of natural selection. Assuming such a 
mechanism for explanatory purposes involves assumptions about 
what connects the behaviour of an individual to the fitness effects in 
the proximate dimension and how the behavioural disposition is 
transmitted to the next generation. Both may involve other individu-
als in a difference-making way, as discussed in the past few chapters. 
These are two ways in which the group may become a relevant unit 
for adaptation by making two different kinds of causal connections 
between individuals for evolutionary purposes. The third causal di-
mension is the evolutionary dimension itself: the individuals directly 
increase each other’s fitness. This is the case with a group of evolu-
tionary altruists, for example. 
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In this final substantial chapter of the book, I will look at the issue 
of group selection – or, more precisely, how the discussions so far are 
related to it. I will start with a brief look at the levels of selection con-
troversy and how levels, units, and groups can be understood in the 
first place. I will then distinguish between the various topics of inter-
est in the groups along the lines of the different causal dimensions that 
I have discussed. I will argue that both proximate and developmental 
considerations may be reasons to consider some traits to be holistic 
adaptations, understood as adaptive products of the selection process 
even if individual selection is the driving force, but they may also con-
stitute a causal foundation for group-level selection. 
 
 
9.1. The Levels of Selection 
 
The problem of the levels of selection – that is, what levels of biological 
organization selection takes place on – has been one of the “big prob-
lems” in the philosophy of biology and theoretical biology for several 
decades. I take the hierarchical nature of selection to be a settled issue, 
at least in theory. Some issues about its nature remain, and I will take 
a brief look at some of them. There are some derivative issues, such as 
the nature of biological individuality (for example, Gould 2002; Good-
night 2013a; Clarke 2016)250 and the major transitions in individuality 
(Maynard Smith & Szathmary 1997; Sober & Wilson 1998; Okasha 
2005a & 2006; Clarke 2014), which are largely irrelevant here, and I 
will not discuss them. The topic here is levels of selection in a very 
narrow special case: human groups that consist of individuals inter-
acting with each other. I will now take a brief look at the topic of the 
 
250 There are many ways to approach individuality in biology (see Bouchard 
& Huneman 2013) but the one that is relevant for the current issue is evolu-
tionary individuality. This can be understood, following Charles Goodnight 
(2013), as the lowest level of biological organization that is relevant to selection, 
to avoid presupposing individualism about selection. 
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levels of selection and articulate the issues that are relevant to this spe-
cial case. 
 
9.1.1. The Group Selection Controversy and Multilevel Selection 
 
Natural selection is based on competition and this competition has 
mostly been understood as individualistic ever since Herbert Spencer 
(1864). However, alternative ideas have been around for just as long. 
Charles Darwin himself was open to the idea that selection could 
work on higher levels of biological organization, although he did not 
study the idea (Darwin 1871; see also Gould 2002). Pyotr Kropotkin 
(1902) drew attention to the evolutionary benefits of collaboration and 
mutual aid while living in social groups, based on both theoretical ar-
guments and empirical observations of animals and indigenous peo-
ples. The modern debate about individualism and group selection, 
however, is usually rooted in the work of Vero Copner Wynne-Ed-
wards and his critics. Wynne-Edwards (1962) argued that population 
size regulation by individual decrease in reproduction (to correlate 
population with the food supply at the time) cannot be explained by 
individualistic selection but requires group-level adaptation that is 
not directed by individual competition.251 His critics, most notably 
George C. Williams (1964) and John Maynard Smith (1964), showed 
quite convincingly that this idea of selection for the good of the group 
cannot possibly work, and this coincided with William Hamilton’s 
theory of inclusive fitness (Hamilton 1964a & 1964b), which seemed 
to be able to reduce seemingly group-level selection to individual se-
lection, as discussed in chapter 4.252  
 
251 The phenomenon itself had already been empirically demonstrated in the 
late 1920s and early 1930s by Royal Chapman (1928), Raymond Pearl (1932) 
and David MacLagan (1932).  




It is generally agreed that Wynne-Edwards’s good-for-the-group 
selection does not work, although the jury is still out on whether the 
phenomena he discusses are cases of group selection (Hamilton & Di-
amond 2012). The more recent theories of group selection are based 
on the concept of multilevel selection or MLS (see Wilson 1975 & 1989; 
Sober 1984a; Heisler & Damuth 1987; Damuth & Heisler 1988; Good-
night et al 1992; Wilson & Sober 1994; Goodnight & Stevens 1997; So-
ber & Wilson 1998; Okasha 2006): there can be Darwinian selection 
processes on different levels of the biological organization at the same 
time. If populations have structure, there may be emergent differences 
between the different parts (or groups) of the population; that is, dif-
ferences that cannot be reduced to mere aggregates of individual dif-
ferences.253 If the differences are relevant to survival, some groups are 
fitter, and selection takes place because of this. There is no selection of 
individual traits for the good of the group but Darwinian selection be-
tween different parts of the population on the same level of biological 
organization. The selection on different levels may have opposite im-
pacts, however, such as in the case of group selection for altruistic 
groups and individual selection for selfishness within. Wynne-Ed-
ward’s theory, however, set the stage for the later controversies. It 
made the individualist position the default and switched the burden 
of proof to the proponents of group selection (see Sober & Wilson 
 
253  Charles Goodnight (2015), however, cautions against placing too much 
weight on the difference between aggregate and emergent properties, since the 
individuals in the different groups “experience” traits differently in both cases. 
Furthermore, the difference between emergent properties and aggregate prop-
erties is not clear-cut but comes in degrees (see Wimsatt 1986b, 1997 & 2007), 
and this may also mean that group-level differences that are relevant to selec-
tion may be much more common than usually thought (for this approach to the 
levels question, see Wimsatt 1980 & Lloyd 1988; see Godfrey-Smith 1992; Sober 
& Wilson 1994; and Okasha 2006 for discussion and criticism). This has no rele-
vance to the topic at hand for the most part, however, so I will not go more 
deeply into the issue. I will, however, make a more specific argument on these 
lines in later in this chapter in the case of interactive social traits. 
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1998; Leigh 2010a; Hamilton & Diamond 2012), and this could explain 
some of the remaining scepticism towards group selection approaches 
and biases in interpreting the evidence given for it. Even when group-
level selection is accepted theoretically, special conditions are some-
times required to interpret an empirical finding as an instance of 
group selection. 
There are two components in the issue of group selection: a theo-
retical question about how adaptation works and an empirical issue 
about whether group selection actually occurs (Goodnight & Stevens 
1997). These two are intricately connected. There seem to be both exper-
imental results demonstrating the effects of higher-level selection (see 
Goodnight & Stevens 1997) and empirical observations of its existence 
in the wild (for example, Donohue 2004; Weining et al 2007; Formica et 
al 2011; Pruitt & Goodnight 2014; Searcy et al 2014). What the critics con-
test is whether these cases demonstrate adaptation processes at the 
group level (see Gardner 2013b, 2015a & 2015b; Gardner et al 2011; West 
& Gardner 2013; West et al 2007a & 2007b). However, this criticism 
seems to be conceptual rather than empirical. For instance, Andy Gard-
ner (2015a & 2015b) even acknowledges that there is selection at group 
level (that is, based on population-structural differences), but since the 
resulting adaptations are on the individual level, there is no group level 
adaptation process. This would require selection for group-level proper-
ties that works against individual selection. In other words, even if the 
group structure makes a difference (and even if you call this group se-
lection), it is not selection for group-level traits and therefore not group 
adaptation or “true” group selection. 
This line of criticism echoes Robert Brandon’s screening-off crite-
rion for higher level interactors (Brandon 1988). Brandon understands 
group selection as selection for group level interactors (or group-level 
interactor properties). Since group-level differences may simply be 
aggregates of individual differences and the selection takes place on 
the individual level, the higher-level differences must screen off the 
lower-level effects on reproduction in order it to be real group 
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selection.254 According to this interpretation, selection is individualist, 
and the local social environment is a selective environment. Group se-
lection would occur only when the groups form superorganisms. How-
ever, this is clearly too strong a criterion: it ignores relational properties 
that are emergent structural properties even if they are not independent 
of the individual properties (Sober & Wilson 1994; Okasha 2006; Good-
night 2015). Furthermore, there would be group adaptation only with 
evolutionary altruistic individual traits that are optimized for the 
good of the group instead, which is an unreasonable requirement for 
both conceptual reasons (conflating adaptation process on the given 
level with an adaptationist assumption of the process being able to 
reach optimal adaption on that level) and empirical reasons (since 
there is never perfect adaptation on one level if there is selection on 
different levels). (Cf. Pruitt & Goodnight 2015; Goodnight 2015.)  
The main lesson from this interpretation controversy is that the 
multiple selection processes on different levels of biological hierarchy 
cannot be interpreted as if they were simply different force vectors. 
The higher levels of biological organization do not behave in the same 
way as the individuals for selection purposes. Groups are defined pre-
cisely by their being groups of individuals – they are not superorgan-
isms. And if they become superorganisms, there is a transformation 
in individuality. Multilevel selection is a selection process in which 
differences on multiple levels of biological hierarchy determine what 
gets selected. Individuals, at least in the case of human groups and 
groups like them, play a special role in this: they are functionally 
 
254 Kim Sterelny, too, criticized the multilevel selection of failing to have gen-
uine group selection in it in the 1990s (see Sterelny 1996a & 1996b). He pro-
posed what he called broad sense individualism to be an alternative interpreta-
tion for how structural properties affect selection that is still somehow a case 
of individual selection (see also Kerr & Godfrey-Smith 2002). I will lump this 
view into the broader category of views with overtly demanding criteria for 
what counts as group selection. Furthermore, Sterelny has later changed his 
mind on the issue. 
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integrated, and this is the lowest selectively relevant level of hierar-
chy255, and individuals are the replicators. It is a matter of semantics 
whether one calls the group level of multilevel selection “real” group 
selection or not. There is, however, a real difference between group 
properties that evolve as “design” properties of groups and individ-
ual properties that evolve because of group-level selection. I believe 
that this is the distinction Gardner (2015a) makes when he distin-
guishes between group selection and group adaptation. Elisabeth 
Lloyd (1992, 2001 & 2017) discusses this as the distinction between the 
interactor question and the manifestor-of-adaptation question, which 
are theoretically different issues about levels of selection. I will return 
to this shortly. However, the group traits in the stronger sense need to 
emerge before there can be selection between them in this stronger 
sense, and this emergence is guided by group-level selection in the 
sense of the multilevel selection theory (see Sober & Wilson 1998; Mi-
chod 1999; Okasha 2005a & 2006). The substantial issue is about the 
relationship between the properties on different levels: should we ap-
proach human social behaviour, for instance, as behavioural adapta-
tions of an individual (that is, individual traits), or as interactions on 
the group level (holistic traits)?  
The issue is closely related to another asymmetry between differ-
ent levels in the multilevel selection model: how fitness benefits func-
tion. MLS can be given two interpretations that John Damuth and Lor-
raine Heisler (1988) call multilevel selection 1 (MLS-1) and multilevel 
selection 2 (MLS-2) (see also Okasha 2006). In the MLS-1 interpreta-
tion, the differences between groups are the group’s contribution to 
the fitnesses of the individuals in the group (hence the selection pro-
cess works through individual fitness differences). In the MLS-2 inter-
pretation, groups as collectives have fitness (group fitness) and they 
have more or fewer offspring, understood as different types of groups, 
even if the reproduction of groups takes place through individuals. 
 




This is not mere difference in conceptualization but in types of repro-
duction. There may be one type of MLS process without the other, alt-
hough they may also be simultaneous and drive the same adaptations. 
(Okasha 2005a & 2006.)  
MLS-1 describes processes in which the evolving traits may be 
individual or relational while the group structure matters to what gets 
selected, although group-level properties may emerge as a result. The 
MLS-2 approach is required when group-level properties are evolving 
that have emergent properties depending on more precise organiza-
tion. This is required in understanding major transitions where the 
adaptive independence of higher levels is evolving, the fitness in dif-
ferent levels become decoupled, and the lower levels are eventually 
“de-Darwinized” (see Michod 1997; Michod and Nedelcu 2003; Oka-
sha 2005a; Birch 2020), but also in the evolution of some social behav-
ioural traits such as division of labour (Hamilton & Fewell 2013). Fur-
thermore, if there are cultural differences between groups that are 
maintained regardless of which part of the individual (psychological) 
variation exists in which groups, this is a case of MLS-2. In other 
words, all processes with evolving group properties that are not re-
ducible to individual properties include MLS-2. In contrast, the group 
selection in MLS-1 is about the group environment’s contribution to 
overall individual fitness in comparison to other individuals, includ-
ing individuals that are similar in their individual phenotype in other 
groups. The difference between MLS-1 and MLS-2 as well as the dif-
ference between the relevance of group structure to evolving individ-
ual properties on one hand and evolving group-level properties on 
the other are two dimensions in which intuitions about what group 
selection is become diversified. It also raises the question of what con-
stitutes a group for evolutionary purposes and why all evolving struc-
tural properties should be about group selection (see Sterelny 1996a & 
1996b; Kerr & Godfrey-Smith 2002; Lion, Jansen & Day 2011). I will 
address these issues shortly. 
The different interpretations of MLS are, in turn, directly con-
nected to another vestige from the Wynne-Edwards era group 
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selection controversy: the causal interpretation of models with indi-
viduals, their direct fitness, and fitness contribution from others. Kin 
selection was supposed to be an individualist model with the expan-
sion of fitness from direct to inclusive fitness, but as it turned out, 
modelling evolutionary processes with multilevel selection models 
and with models using inclusive fitness are mathematically equiva-
lent (see Lion, Jansen & Day 2011; Marshall 2011; Frank 2013; Birch 
and Okasha 2015; Okasha 2016). What is important for kin selection is 
not kinship as such, but whether the recipient of the benefits is likely 
to have the same genetic factors that guide the development of the 
benefiting behaviour. This can be modelled by both generalized Ham-
ilton’s rule (Queller 1992; see also Gardner et al 2011) and by Price’s 
rule, which is derived from the general Price’s equation (Price 1970) 
by assuming population structure. Price’s equation, in turn, simply 
describes the covariance between genetic inheritance and phenotypic 
traits, and it can be applied to multiple levels of biological organiza-
tion at the same time (see Okasha 2006).256 The mathematical equiva-
lence, however, does not mean that they model the same causal pro-
cesses. To be precise, the models may trace the same outcomes of the 
process, but they are too abstract to specify all the relevant causal as-
sumptions. At the same time, the motivation behind the different 
models is in the background assumptions that make different causal 
assumptions about the process. Accordingly, some theorists consider 
 
256 Price’s equation is a common way to understand multilevel selection for-
mally. There is, however, an alternative, contextual analysis, introduced by Lor-
raine Heisler and John Damuth (1987), that is favoured by others (for example, 
Goodnight et al 1992; Stevens et al 1995; Weinig et al 2007; Goodnight 2013b). 
Contextual analysis considers individual traits, aggregate traits (the group 
means excluding the focal individual), and emergent traits, which can only be 
measured in the context of the group. It is not equivalent with the Price’s equa-
tion approach in all cases (see Okasha 2006; Goodnight 2013b) but this is not 
relevant to the current purposes. The kin selection approach and contextual 
analysis remain compatible, just focusing on slightly different measures (see 
Goodnight 2015; Birch 2020). 
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kin selection to be a special case of multilevel selection rather than 
equivalent (for example, Sober & Wilson 1998; see also Nowak et al 
2010), while some others consider them to refer to different causal pro-
cesses (for example, Okasha 2016; Birch 2017, 2019 & 2020). I will de-
fend a version of the separation stance later in this chapter. What is 
important now, however, is to distinguish between the fitness effects 
and the mechanism responsible of them.  
As Elliot Sober and David Sloan Wilson (1998) have famously ar-
gued, the selectionist logic of kin selection is that of group selection 
regardless of kinship. What matters is to match the benefits from (evo-
lutionarily) altruistic behaviour to those individuals who have the 
same behavioural tendencies. This is the causal connection in the evo-
lutionary dimension alone. Relatedness is a way to build the condi-
tions for this in the developmental dimension. (See also Okasha 2016.) 
Living in kin-centred groups, as many social animals do, is a way to 
assure multiple reciprocal connections that can enforce each other, 
and this makes relatedness special (see also Birch 2017 & 2020). This 
does not change the fact that the selectionist connection is on the group 
level and has nothing to do with relatedness. Furthermore, sharing ge-
netic (or any other reproductive) resources that are associated with the 
development of altruistic tendencies is not even necessary for group se-
lection. Multiple ways to develop the same tendencies may be selected 
under the same selection pressures. Recall the earlier discussion about 
the evolution of behavioural altruism. If there is group selection for it, 
even different psychological mechanisms may be selected for achieving 
the same behaviour, and the selection may be blind to both this and the 
different developmental pathways to achieve them. 
To further summarize this brief review of group selection de-
bates, there are three causally explanatory dimensions that are rele-
vant to group selection: the evolutionary, developmental, and proxi-
mate dimensions. The evolutionary dimension is about the logic of 
adaptive processes and the relevance of population structure to fitness 
benefit allocation. The developmental dimension is about how the 
replication processes connect individuals in ways that allocate the 
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fitness benefits such that they support group selection; that is, 
whether there are inter-individual dependencies in reproducing de-
velopmental factors such as genes but also environmental elements, 
as discussed in previous chapters. The proximate dimension is about 
what the evolving traits themselves are – are they individual proper-
ties or properties that require multiple individuals, such as group 
properties? These dimensions should not be conflated, but they are 
connected. Next, I will take a closer look at this and at the different 
levels and units of selection, especially Elisabeth Lloyd’s work, which 
I will partly build upon. I will also define the holistic approach in the 
evolutionary dimension alone and give a first approximation of how 
the other dimensions are related to it. 
 
9.1.2. Units, Levels, and Individualism and Holism in the 
Evolutionary Dimension 
 
In chapter 3, I sketched an idealizing mechanistic model of how the 
causal dimensions in the evolutionary explanations of social behav-
iour are related. According to the model, a behavioural trait being a 
historical adaptation requires three kinds of mechanistic assumptions. 
First, the assumption that a natural selection process guided the evo-
lution of the trait – keeping in mind my comments about adaptation-
ism. This is the evolutionary dimension of the explanation. Second, 
there is an assumption of a robust (psychological, physiological) basis 
that produces the behaviour in interaction with the environment, so 
that we can talk about behavioural traits instead of incidental behav-
iour that might not have an evolutionary explanation at all. Third, 
there is an assumption that the trait is transferred to the next genera-
tion in some way that enables its evolution. All these three dimensions 
may include assumptions about individuals only, or about their con-
nectedness: via the population structure’s effects on fitness allocation, 
via the replication process depending on shared developmental re-
sources, or via the proximate mechanisms for the behavioural traits 
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being distributed among multiple individuals. In other words, the 
evolutionary explanations of the behavioural trait may be individual-
istic or holistic, as I have defined them, and holism has two forms in 
all dimensions: collectivist and interactionist. Before going into this in 
greater detail, I will look at some of the previous conceptual work on 
the issue of units and levels of selection. 
The expressions “levels of selection” and “units of selection” are 
often defined in relation to each other: the unit of selection is the struc-
tural unit (an individual, a group) of the type the tokens of which are 
the objects of selection, while the level of selection is the level of bio-
logical hierarchy on which these entities exist (see Okasha 2006 for ex-
ample).  Others make a distinction between the level of selection as 
the level on which the selection processes take place and units of se-
lection as the entities that evolve under these conditions, which may 
simply be individuals even if there is group-level selection, for exam-
ple (see Lewontin 1970; Brandon 1982 & 1988; Kokkonen 2003). This 
is a relevant distinction given some of the controversies discussed in 
the previous section, but the same distinction could be reformulated 
as a distinction between levels and units of selection on one hand and 
the levels and units of adaptation on the other hand, retaining the def-
initional connection between the level and the unit but making the 
distinction that Gardner, for instance, takes to be crucial, as discussed 
above (see also Lloyd 1992, 2001 & 2017). Furthermore, the units of 
evolution should be distinguished from both, as the level of biological 
organization that is the unit of the evolutionary process: the entire 
population, or lineage.257 This is definitional for Darwinian evolution-
ary processes to take place at all (see Godfrey-Smith 2009), but this is 
not just about framing what natural selection is. First, other evolution-
ary forces may be at work on the population level too. Second, there 
may be quasi-selection processes between species, species sorting, 
 
257 For Richard Dawkins, the reply would be genes (see Dawkins 1976, 1982 & 
1984), but we do not need to revisit the ontology of evolution here that was 
discussed in chapter 8. 
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where two or more species compete for the same resources and one 
drives the other(s) into extinction, but the selection processes take 
place within the population (see Vrba & Gould 1988; Lloyd & Gould 
1993; Gould 2002; Lieberman & Vrba 2005). Moreover, as discussed in 
a previous chapter, replication remains another relevant issue. It has 
been discussed in the context of levels of selection especially since the 
rise of kin selection and the gene’s eye view (discussed in chapter 4), 
although gene selectionism (for example, Dawkins 1984) is clearly a dif-
ferent topic (see Sterelny & Kitcher 1988; Sober & Wilson 1994 & 1998; 
Lloyd 2017). As I argued in a previous chapter, the units of replication 
issue is further divided into the replicator issue and the contributing 
factors to replication process issue. 
Elisabeth Lloyd (1992, 2001 & 2017) identifies four basic questions 
(which all have sub-questions): the interactor question, the replicator 
question, the beneficiary question, and the manifestor-of-adaptation ques-
tion. The interactor question is about the levels of biological organiza-
tion on which the selection processes take place. This entails existence 
of fitness-relevant differences between the units on that level but not 
evolving adaptations on that level. The manifestor-of-adaptation level 
refers to the level of organization at which the adaptations emerge. As 
Lloyd points out, much of the discussion conflates the notions of ad-
aptation as product of selection and engineering (see Brandon 1978 and 
Sober 1984 for the distinction; see also chapter 3); understanding ad-
aptation as a product of selection conflates the two notions of level, 
while the engineering conception requires there to be design on the 
given level. I will return to this shortly. This distinction, which I have 
called the distinction between levels of selection and levels of adapta-
tion, is crucial in clarifying some of the confusions in the debates men-
tioned above. The replicator question is as previously discussed. The 
beneficiary question is about the ultimate beneficiary of the selection 
processes – the answer to which is either the evolving lineage or the 
genes that survive in the lineage. This is what I referred to as the unit 
of evolution above. This question is about the ontology of evolution 
and is not important for the current purposes, but it is important to 
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keep it separate from the other questions. Omitting this question, 
there are three remaining questions about the levels of selection, as I 
have already stated: levels of selection issue in the narrow sense, the 
level of adaptation, and the replicator issue. 
I will now revisit these questions based on the discussions of the 
earlier chapters. Let me begin with the adaptation issue. I distin-
guished between three forms of sensible adaptationism in chapter 3: 
current use functionalism, historical explanatory functionalism, and ahis-
torical explanatory functionalism. In current use functionalism, the adap-
tive function is the perspective of analysis only. It is minimally explan-
atory but of minimal use, although it is the form of descriptive adap-
tationism in behavioural ecology (see chapter 4). Historical explana-
tory functionalism assumes that the adaptive function also plays a role 
in the historical explanation of the trait’s origin. This has two criteria: 
being a product of selection and having a function. Ahistorical explan-
atory functionalism assumes that the adaptive function of the trait is 
a useful guiding principle for the functional analysis of the organism 
and its behaviour. As discussed in greater detail in chapter 3, this is a 
methodological device for discovery that makes assumptions about 
natural selection having been a causal factor in the shaping of the trait, 
but more moderate and different ones than historical explanatory ad-
aptationism. 
The question about the level of adaptation depends on the notion 
of adaptation, and not only the distinction between adaptation as 
product and adaptation as design. As I argued in chapter 3, analysing 
traits in evolutionary functionalist framework is an instrumentalist 
choice and its rationale depends on what it is used for. One possibility 
is to give the trait’s evolutionary history an adaptationist explanation 
– that is, abstracting the natural selection dimension of the evolution-
ary process as the focus of explanation. Another possibility is the re-
verse engineering perspective which, I argued, depends on its fruit-
fulness while making moderate assumptions about historical adapta-
tion processes. It does, however, involve a proximate dimension 
mechanistic analysis of the complex causal relations between the 
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individual’s capacities and the environment, including other individ-
uals’ function, from the point of view of the causal role played by the 
given factor to the fitness benefits. This is what I have discussed in the 
chapters related to the proximate dimension of the evolutionary func-
tionalist explanation. I argued that we should abandon the folk-psy-
chological assumption of individualism – that is, that the agent is al-
ways the locus of causing behaviour, which is (typically) conceptual-
ized as intentional action. If we are interested in the evolutionary anal-
ysis of either behavioural traits or the psychology underlying them, 
we should take the functionality of a trait in a wider context as a 
guideline instead. Since ahistorical explanatory functionalism is es-
sentially an analytical perspective (evolutionary design stance), we 
can choose an individualist or a holistic perspective. However, not all 
perspectives will be fruitful. The fruitfulness depends on the proxi-
mate dimension mechanisms underlying the behaviour, the fitness 
consequences of various parts of the mechanisms, and how well the 
functional analysis maps to the proximate interactions. This is an em-
pirical case-by-case issue. However, I also argued that there is a multi-
individual mechanistic basis for at least some social behaviour under 
an evolutionary functionalist analysis. 
Another issue to be clarified further is what exactly counts as a 
group and what group traits are. There are two ways to think about 
groups in the human context, as previously discussed: a collective of 
individuals who form a group that lives together and interacts with 
each other in various ways to various degrees (such as the groups in 
which our ancestors lived), and a group as individuals in interaction 
within such a group, such as a coalition or individuals engaging in an 
organized collaborative effort. David Sloan Wilson (1975), in introduc-
ing his group selection model, defined groups as collections of indi-
viduals who interact with each other in fitness-affecting ways. Fur-
thermore, this interaction is related to a particular trait that is being 
selected – hence his notion of trait group. In the original model, the 
groups are collectives of individuals, but later Wilson and Elliot Sober 
distinguished between groups as collectives and groups as interaction 
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groups (Sober & Wilson 1998; my terminology). Interaction groups can 
be brief temporary coalitions such as pairs, in which the individuals 
engage in reciprocal altruism, for example. The main idea is that this 
liberal notion of a group enables to correctly identify the level of hier-
archy where selection takes place. According to Sober and Wilson, the 
evolution of reciprocal altruism is not individual selection but selec-
tion between groups of mutual altruists and groups of selfish individ-
uals, just like in the original trait-group model where the groups were 
stationary collectives (over the lifetime of individuals).  
Some critics of Sober and Wilson (for example, Sterelny 1996a; 
Maynard Smith 1998) consider this too liberal and require some sort 
of selected group-level properties such as division of labour in order 
for the groups to count as groups for evolutionary purposes. This crit-
icism fails on two accounts. First, they are making criteria for group-
level adaptation, not for group-level selection (see Okasha 2006 and 
Lloyd 2017 for more detailed discussion). Second, they assume that 
only groups as collectives can have structured superindividual prop-
erties. As I showed previously, the forms of interaction can be selected 
traits constituted by individual behaviours that are sensitive to other 
individuals’ behaviour. I will return to this in the next subchapter. 
Furthermore, the other direction of criticism for group selection takes 
the possibility of structural properties without group structure as its 
starting point: there is more to social organization than just groups, 
whether collectives or interactive groups (for example, Kerr & God-
frey-Smith 2002; Lion, Jansen & Day 2011).258 The first point is crucial 
for the logic of selection within the MLS model. The second point has 
to do with the traits that are being selected. The MLS itself is ambiva-
lent about what constitutes the conditions for there to be the kind of 
interactions that enable group-level selection to be effective enough to 
 
258  I will not discuss the second point here. The neighbourhood structure 
model of Kerr and Godfrey-Smith is a model that can be used to understand 
evolution in structured populations without groups but the interest here is 
precisely in the groups. 
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be important. Connecting structures in the proximate dimension is 
one: the fitness benefits for the different parties are directly connected 
in participating in the interaction. Connecting structures in the devel-
opment is another. 
As discussed in the previous section, the kin selection model can 
be interpreted to be a form of group selection, and the kinship itself is 
irrelevant. I will return to this in the last section of this chapter, but I 
take this to be true for now. However, the idea of kinship as a part of 
an explanation is connected to another reproductive level connected-
ness that is a part of the explanation for why group selection works. 
In the proximate dimension, an individual’s fitness depends directly 
on others, but in kin selection, the relatedness of the individuals en-
tails that the behaviour that benefits the entire group or others in the 
group259 is more likely to promote the fitness of those who have a ten-
dency to participate in similar interactions. The Dawkinsian gene’s 
eye view of evolution places the genes to the fore in the replication 
part of the evolutionary process. However, if we take the position that 
individuals are the replicators and the replication itself involves mul-
tiple factors that are relevant to evolution, genes do not play a special 
role. There are other factors that affect the development of behav-
ioural tendencies that in turn promote the transmission of these same 
developmental factors. In the human case, as discussed, the various 
forms of cultural transmission are highly significant. From the point 
of view of the logic of selection, there is no difference between genes 
and cultural transmission. 260  There are, however, two important 
 
259 There is a difference between these cases. See the chapter on altruism. Note, 
however, that selection for behaviour that is good for the group is not always 
altruistic. Collaboration and division of labour can increase individual fitness 
directly but also involve group selection. 
260 It should be remembered that something being culturally transmitted does 
not mean that either what is being transmitted or what effects on behaviour 
are possible could be just anything. Furthermore, under the co-evolutionary 
approach to human social behaviour, the routes of cultural transmission are 
ways of maintaining behavioural tendencies, jointly with genetic 
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differences between genes and culture. First, cultural properties, such 
as social norms shared within the group, may be independent of indi-
vidual properties. Second, cultural properties may be properties of the 
group: for example, group-specific modes in division of labour, or 
rules of conduct that bind everyone in the group. This means that cul-
ture can directly promote MLS-2 processes. 
Returning to the initial proposition that I have argued over the 
course of this dissertation: there are three dimensions, proximate, de-
velopmental, and evolutionary in the narrow sense (which is about 
selection logic), that are relevant to the methodological question of 
whether human social behaviour should be approached individualis-
tically or holistically when it comes to evolutionary explanations. That 
is, if we have an evolutionary functionalist analysis of human social 
behaviour, there are three dimensions that matter for whether we 
should take a design stance towards an individual or the social group. 
The evolutionary dimension is about the levels of selection. A meth-
odological individualist approach along this dimension assumes that 
the behaviour is “designed” for whatever increases the fitness of the 
individuals themselves. A holistic approach sees the behaviour as a 
part of wider network of social interactions in the form of what the 
behaviour does for the group as a whole that increases the fitness of 
the group. As I stated in the very beginning, there are two forms of 
holism in each dimension: interactionist and collectivist. In the selec-
tion dimension, this is the distinction between MLS-1 and MLS-2: 
whether “group fitness” is understood as the fitness effects from the 
social interactions within the group on the individual or as the fitness 
of the group itself.  
The proximate dimension is about the level of biological hierarchy 
on which the traits to be explained through their fitness contribution are 
 
contribution. Cultural change is faster than genetic, but this should not be 
overstated in evolutionary functional analysis of human cultural lineages or 
even the species history. Some cultural forms may be universal to our species. 
The interest here, however, lies in the variation. 
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assumed to be. In other words, this is the level of adaptation. The in-
dividualist approach takes them to be individual traits, the holistic ap-
proach to be traits of a group. Along this dimension, the distinction 
between interactionist and collectivist holism is about what is the 
group: interaction groups (such as those discussed by Sober and Wil-
son) or collectives. What counts as a trait and what counts as a group 
are two sides of the same coin along this dimension. I will go on to 
discuss that next. Along the developmental dimension, individualism 
assumes nativism, whereas holism takes culture and other shared de-
velopmental resources into account as a group-level way of transmit-
ting traits.261 There are also weaker interactionist and stronger collec-
tivist versions along this dimension: the existence of cultural forms of 
transmission that connect and differentiate individuals within the col-
lective group, and the norms, meanings, and other forms of culture 
that unify the whole group regarding some behavioural traits. 
 
 
9.2. The Evolutionary and Other Dimensions 
 
Whether to make an individualist, interactionist or collectivist as-
sumption on any dimension is, to reiterate a central point, a case-by-
case issue and depends on the empirical facts. All these dimensions 
are logically independent from each other but holistic processes in one 
dimension may contribute causally to the holistic processes along 
other dimensions; the major transformations are all about collectivisa-
tion in all three dimensions, resulting in transformation in individual-
ity, for example. I will next discuss in greater detail how the proximate 
dimension relates to group selection and move on to the developmen-
tal dimension in the one after that. Then we are done. 
  
 
261 I will discuss how kin selection fits here in the last subchapter. 
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9.2.1. The Proximate and Evolutionary Dimensions 
 
I have discussed the proximate dimension of evolutionary explana-
tion in previous chapters solely from the perspective of how to per-
form an evolutionary functionalist analysis on the proximate mecha-
nisms of behaviour. I argued that behavioural adaptations should be 
analysed in the full contexts of the behaviour, which might include 
the behaviour of others. If the benefits of the social behaviour are de-
livered by interaction where the partner (or multiple partners) ac-
tively participate in delivering the benefits, the behavioural adapta-
tion is the interaction. The same point has been made in different ways 
by some biologists who call these traits interactive phenotypes (Moore 
et al 1997; Wolf et al 1999; Formica et al 2017; Montiglio et al 2017). Fur-
thermore, Patrick Forber and Rory Smead (2015) have argued that 
what matters in the game-theoretical models of social interaction are 
the types of interactions, not the types of individual behaviour as such. 
When this is combined with my take on the evolutionary functional 
analysis of social behaviour, it can be understood as a holistic inter-
pretation of the game-theoretical models. I have not connected this to 
the group selection debate yet. I will do it now. I will first discuss Da-
vid Sloan Wilson’s trait group model, especially in the contexts of re-
ciprocal altruism, and I will argue that trait groups define group traits, 
and this is what is important. After this I will break down the different 
traits involved in the interaction and how individual and group selec-
tion are intertwined. Finally, I will discuss the connection between ho-
lisms in the proximate and evolutionary dimensions. 
David Sloan Wilson’s 1975 version of group selection is quite 
straightforward. Suppose we have two alternative phenotypes, one 
evolutionarily altruistic and the other evolutionarily selfish. Suppose 
the population has group structure and different groups have differ-
ent (random) frequencies of altruist and selfish phenotypes. All indi-
viduals in altruist-heavy groups do better, and the selfish do better 
than altruists in all groups. Within some range of variables, there will 
be more altruists in the next generation than in the previous on the 
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population level. If the groups reform randomly in the next genera-
tion, the group-level selection can maintain altruism. As mentioned 
above, Sober and Wilson (1998) apply this explanatory principle to re-
ciprocal altruism. Interactive pairs, according to them, are trait groups 
regarding the traits that are relevant to the interaction. The same indi-
vidual may participate in numerous such groups over their life. In the 
usual game-theoretical interpretation, pairs that are constituted of 
A+A (two altruists), TFT+TFT (two tit-for-tat players), or A+TFT, do 
better than any combination that includes a selfish player. 
I discussed reciprocal altruism in greater detail in earlier chapters 
as an example of an interactive trait. As a reminder, I argued, first, that 
we should distinguish between behavioural traits and psychological 
traits, and second, that the reciprocal interactions should be consid-
ered interactive traits. There are thus three different kinds of traits: 
psychological, individual behavioural, and interactive behavioural. 
Models of social behaviour, including the TFT-model of reciprocal al-
truism, model the individual behavioural disposition explicitly. Re-
ciprocal altruism is a tendency to help or cooperate unless there are 
reasons not to – bad experiences of not being reciprocated by the same 
partner in the standard model, observation of free-riding in OTFT, 
some models expanding this to gossiping, and so forth. However, the 
patterns of behavioural interactions that emerge are the traits that pro-
duce the fitness benefits, and the interactions are the evolving traits. 
This is implicit in the model, but it is the driving cause for selection. If 
the interactions are beneficial, there will be selection for individual be-
havioural dispositions to participate in such interactions and the selec-
tion for these interactions over other interactions (or not interacting at 
all). There can be selection for an individual’s interaction disposition 
only if there is selection for resulting interactions. 
Furthermore, there is selection for whatever underlying psychol-
ogy instantiates the behavioural disposition. As discussed in an earlier 
chapter, this is multiply realizable, and it is realistic to assume a plu-
rality of psychological capacities and tendencies that participate 
jointly in decision-making in social contexts. However, psychological 
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traits are the primary evolving characteristic on the individual level – 
the individual behavioural tendencies are a function of the psycholog-
ical makeup within a context. The psychological traits are selected by 
virtue of what behaviours they entail in the selective context. The con-
text for the multitude of reciprocity-related psychological capacities 
and tendencies lies in participating in the interactive behavioural 
traits. Therefore, as I argued in greater detail earlier, the relevant traits 
in social interactions for the evolutionary purposes are the evolved 
psychology and the interactive forms of behaviour – not really the in-
dividual behavioural tendencies that are used as proxies in the mod-
elling practices. 
What consequences does my argument have for the group selec-
tion issue? First, although the psychological and behavioural traits co-
evolve, they are quite distant from each other. In modelling interac-
tions through behavioural strategies (A, S, TFT), it may appear that 
the interactions are simply (non-additive) combinations of individual 
strategies. This is not the case, however. Suppose a behavioural con-
text C where there is a choice to interact prosocially or refrain from 
doing so. “Amos playing TFT with Beatrice in C” and “Amos playing 
TFT with Egon in C” are not psychological traits but descriptions of 
individualized behavioural interactions based on the same psycholog-
ical tendencies. Suppose Beatrice and Egon have different personali-
ties and tendencies – Beatrice is a behavioural altruist and Egon not so 
much. The interactions with them turn out to be different, but there 
are no evolutionary grounds to partition Amos’s behavioural traits 
into “interacting with Beatrice in C” and “interacting with Egon in C”. 
Instead, there is a psychological basis that is involved in interacting 
with both Beatrice and Egon, and everyone else, in C. This overall dis-
position is what is selected on the individual level. Its fitness, in turn, 
depends on the types of interaction in which it participates in the to-
tality of the person’s social interactions. The interactions with various 
individuals, however, are the various interaction groups, as Sober and 
Wilson calls them. The interaction groups, or trait groups, are defined 
by the interactions that have fitness consequences, and these 
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interactions constitute the traits of those groups – the group traits. 
There is selection between different types of group traits that are in-
stantiated by different interactions, just as there would be selection 
between different individual traits instantiated by different individu-
als. Is this a case of group selection? Yes and no. 
Let us start with the “no”. If we examine the evolving individual 
traits, they seem to be evolutionarily selfish and selected through in-
dividual selection. The psychological capacity to either participate in 
or refrain from an interaction in the given context, depending on what 
type of interaction it will be, is the fittest psychology.262 The group 
traits, on the other hand, are selected based on how beneficial they are 
for the individuals who participate in them. Now, this is not a purely 
individualist scenario since the level of adaptation is the trait group 
level – the interaction types are the selected interaction group traits. But 
the level of selection does not need to be higher than the individual 
level. Consider the original Wilson model of trait groups with selfish 
and altruistic types. In any given group, altruists are selected against. 
The group structure is what is responsible for reproduction of more 
altruists in the next generation – focusing only on the population-level 
net effect of different selection processes would be an averaging fallacy, 
bypassing the processes themselves (see Sober & Wilson 1998; Okasha 
2006). It is a tautology that what gets selected has the highest net fit-
ness within the MLS-1 framework, but this may mask the contribution 
of the group structure. But this needs not be the case with social inter-
actions that form the structure of reciprocal altruism (in the evolution-
ary analysis).  
Consider a single group (in the sense of a collective) where all 
interact with everyone else in the behavioural context C. They choose 
different strategies with different individuals, however. This means 
that the different individual interactions form different interactive 
traits. In the Wilson model, the phenotypes are the same across the 
 
262 As discussed earlier, however, this psychological makeup is likely to in-
clude psychologically altruistic components. 
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groups (altruists are always doing worse in interactions with egoists) 
and the group structure (differential allocation of different pheno-
types in different groups) is the causal difference-maker. This is not 
the case here. Making the behavioural choice is a part of the evolved 
psychology, and the individual’s ability to choose how to interact with 
different individuals is a part of the selected behavioural capacity. 
Furthermore, the psychological makeup is selected for the overall fit-
ness effect it has on the individual, just as all traits are selected for the 
overall fitness effect they have on the individual: the fitness of the psy-
chological makeup depends on all the interactions that it facilitates 
with all the individuals the individual interacts with. As stipulated in 
the setting of the example, there is no hidden group structure that 
would determine who the individual interacts with – but there are dif-
ferent traits that the individuals construct, and the evolutionary basis 
for this is in the individual benefit. In other words, this is a case of 
individual selection for (interaction) group traits, not a group selection 
against individual selection as in the Wilson model. 
One could argue that partner choice creates a group structure 
within the collective of individuals. However, I have argued previ-
ously that if the individual has a choice in which course of actions they 
are taking, choosing to not interact with someone is a part of the indi-
vidual trait, which includes all the possibilities that are on the menu 
for that individual, and this is the fitness effect that is relevant for the 
individual selection. Furthermore, I stipulated that everyone is inter-
acting with everyone else in this example. But the point becomes even 
clearer when considering partner choice as group formation. Some in-
dividuals form interactive traits and groups, some do not – there is no 
selection between existing and non-existing groups or traits, but indi-
viduals form groups for their own benefits.263 
 
263 Both the interactive phenotype theory (Moore et al 1997; Wolf et al 1999) 
and the biological markets approach (Noë & Hammerstein 1994, 1995 & 2016) 
model emerging social interaction as individual selection that results in adap-
tation on the level of interactions. This is a weak point for individualism as 
such, however, since the same reservations that I have presented towards 
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Now, let us move to the “yes” side of the answer. Although in-
teraction group traits can evolve without group selection, I suspect 
this to be a theoretical possibility only. The evolution of interactive 
phenotypes also creates conditions for MLS-1. I stipulated above that 
there is no selective group structure, which includes the assumption 
that everyone encounters everyone else equally in behavioural context 
C. That is, everyone interacts with all the same individuals. This is an 
unrealistic assumption. It is more realistic to assume that there is an 
interaction group structure within the collective; that is, individuals 
interact with other individuals in C unevenly. This means that differ-
ent individuals interact with different partners, which entails that 
some individuals participate in reciprocal interaction groups more of-
ten than some other individuals with the same psychological makeup. 
This means that there is also group selection for the very same interac-
tive traits. Furthermore, I stipulated that there is only one collective of 
individuals. If there is a collective group structure (geographically dif-
ferent groups), there will be differences between collectives regarding 
interactive traits, creating another layer for group selection to operate: 
groups with more positive interactive traits do better. My argument is 
not that we should or even could do without group selection with re-
ciprocal altruism. It is that we should make the distinction between 
selection for group traits and group selection of those traits. Those 
who say that reciprocal altruism is a selfish trait (on the individual 
level) are not wrong, and its evolution can be understood as individ-
ual selection in principle. But it does not produce only individual ad-
aptations, it produces group adaptations (for forming interaction 
groups) and the causal factors making the fitness differences cannot 
be understood without group level perspective. Furthermore, the 
emergence of such trait facilitates group selection. Let us have a closer 
look at these points. 
 




The first point is about the distinction between group-level selec-
tion and group-level adaptation. One consequence of the distinction is 
that there can be group-level selection without group-level adaptation, 
such as is the case in the basic Wilson model of the evolution of altruism: 
there is no selection for group-level properties or structures, but a struc-
tural explanation for selection of individual traits that would not be se-
lected without the group structure. The other consequence is that there 
can be group-level adaptations without group-level selection. Given 
“group selection” has traditionally been understood to be both of these 
things at the same time – or, as discussed above, even more about 
group-level adaptation than about selection – this is an argument for 
the possibility of one part of “group selection” without another. Fur-
thermore, the main issue here is about whether the evolutionary func-
tional design can be found on the group level or on the individual level 
only, not about the level of selection processes as such.  
Second, the conceptual and theoretical separateness of the level 
of adaptation and the level of selection does not mean causal separate-
ness. As I said, even if interactive traits do not require interaction 
group selection, they are likely to create a context for MLS-1 too. There 
is no reason why there could not be both individual and group selec-
tion at the same time while both guide to the same direction. Recipro-
cal altruism may be an example of this, especially if mechanisms like 
partner choice create interaction group-structure within the collective 
group. There is a tendency in the literature to discuss multiple levels 
of selection only when the different levels select different things. The 
idea seems to be that group selection is important only when it opposes 
individual selection and becomes necessary for explanation. In this 
case (and probably many others), both levels select for interactive be-
havioural traits and the individual psychology related to it. 
The main lessons from reciprocal altruism can be generalized. 
Whenever social interaction forms non-aggregative traits that have 
non-additive effects on the individuals, there is an individualist selec-
tion for psychological tendencies to participate in or avoid these inter-
actions, based on the individual fitness consequence. This may result 
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in the evolution of interactionist traits that are interaction-group level 
adaptations. This in turn creates conditions for group selection. Group 
selection, furthermore, may turn out to be stronger than individual 
selection. The core idea here is that there are two relevant group-level 
causal dimensions: evolutionary (selective) and proximate, both of 
which bind the individuals together in their fitness. Both make the 
group context relevant for understanding adaptation, and both may 
lead to group adaptation, but the causal structures are different. 
My discussion on the proximate and evolutionary dimensions 
has been about the interaction groups and MLS-1 so far. Groups as 
collectives are a relevant level for MLS-1 when belonging to the col-
lective is a decisive factor, which also means that the evolving group 
traits will be traits of a group as a collective. However, this is not a 
difference in selection process but in the proximate dimension (the 
level of trait and the level of group). MLS-2 processes involve groups 
of one kind outcompeting groups of other kinds by producing more 
groups of the same kind than groups of other kinds produce of their 
own kind. In human evolution, MLS-2 processes with collective group 
selection would have included cases where, for example, the differ-
ences between collectives caused groups with one alternative prop-
erty to go extinct more often, and the groups with another alternative 
to split into two groups and take over the region. As discussed before, 
culture has often been considered a medium that can introduce, main-
tain and develop beliefs, behaviour norms, action types, and skills that 
are shared by all or many members of the group and make a difference 
between groups that constitutes a basis for group selection (see for ex-
ample Boyd & Richerson 1985 & 2005; Wilson 2002; Richerson & Boyd 
2005; Bowles & Gintis 2011; Boyd et al 2011; Pagel 2012; Richerson & 
Henrich 2012). 
Biologist Mark Pagel (2012) has gone as far as claiming that culture 
(especially language) made hunter-gatherer type groups de facto super-
organisms and many aspects of human thinking are group adaptations. 
David Sloan Wilson (1997 & 2002; Wilson et al 2000) has made similar 
points about group cognition. I will not evaluate these ideas, since I am 
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only exploring the theoretical space of explanatory possibilities – but 
some aspects of human culture (that have already been discussed) such 
as the human tendency to rely on acquired beliefs and behavioural 
scripts, socially enforced behavioural norms, shared meanings, socially 
constructed roles and institutions, cumulativeness of cultural change, 
and so on and so forth, seem like they could unify groups internally and 
make differences between groups in a relevant way. The relevant psy-
chological capacities may even be adaptations for this. For example, cul-
turally transmitted norms for reciprocity in the given context could en-
force the evolution of psychological altruism in that context. This could 
be called the Baldwin group effect. 
Culture, however, does not need to unify collectives, nor make 
differences between them either, to be relevant to group selection. As 
discussed earlier, theories of cultural evolution approach cultural en-
tities as something that spreads from mind to mind (competing with 
alternative cultural entities) and co-evolutionary theories are inter-
ested in the co-evolution of mind and culture and how humans copy 
each other, who from, and why (see especially Boyd & Richerson 2005 
& Richerson & Boyd 2005). There may be various traditions within a 
collective. Some forms of interaction (that are the traits of interaction 
groups) may be consequences of innate psychological tendencies (as 
implicitly assumed in the discussion in this sub-chapter), but some 
may be learned – and some may be something in between. If a form 
of interaction is culturally available, it may or may not be acquired, 
whether this is a matter of acquiring tendencies while growing up, an 
explicit choice, or directed by other individuals (by enforcement, con-
stituting action types, or some other way) who have assumed these 
forms of interaction. This means that interactive traits may have a cul-
tural basis, too. This, in turn, may constitute a group selection process, 
for (genetic) selection of psychological characteristics as well. Culture, 
however, is not an independent proximate force, but a shorthand for 
a collection of externalist ways in which people acquire psychological 
characteristics, and the reactions from other people whose reaction 
dispositions are likewise acquired in those ways. Culture’s role in 
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group selection, therefore, requires another look at the developmental 
dimension. 
 
9.2.2. The Developmental and Evolutionary Dimensions 
 
As I discussed in the earlier part of the dissertation, in the context of 
reciprocal altruism, if there is selection for certain behavioural out-
comes (for example, participation in a particular kind of interaction), 
there is a selection for whatever psychological makeup allows this. It 
may be multiply-realizable, and the selection may result in pluralism, 
either on the population level (several alternative traits) or on the indi-
vidual level (several psychological mechanisms at the same time). There 
may, however, be differences between the ways in which the behav-
ioural outcome is produced, such as reliability, which causes a second-
ary selection.264 The same goes for development, as already discussed. 
The same outcome can develop in multiple ways, all of which will be 
selected, but there may be differences in reliability, specificity, general-
ity, and so on. But how development works can also affect the individ-
ualism–holism issue. If some of the contributing factors of individual 
development are such that transferring them to the next generation is a 
“collaborative” project, this can promote group selection as well.  
I have mostly omitted kin selection from the discussion so far, 
but it becomes important now. I briefly commented on the relation-
ship between group selection and kin selection in the beginning of this 
chapter. I sided with the position that, from the selection point of 
view, kin selection is a form of group selection: the group selection 
describes the logic of the selection. At the same time, I agreed that 
there is also something else going on in kin selection. 
Samir Okasha (2016) has argued that there is a difference be-
tween causal processes in the paradigmatic group selection examples 
 
264 Sober and Wilson (1998), for instance, argue for psychological altruism on 




and kin selection. Although the models predict the same outcomes, 
they model different kinds of processes. In group selection (such as 
the Wilson model), the group mean fitness (which is determined by 
the local individual fitness values) and the allocation mechanism 
(which distributes the group fitness effect on individuals) determine 
the individual fitness values. In kin selection, individual fitness values 
determine the group mean fitness. The group mean fitness is not a 
difference maker and there is no allocation mechanism. However, as 
pointed out by Jonathan Birch (2020), this interpretation seems to 
make an unwarranted causal connection between individual fitness 
values and group mean fitness. The fitness of the group necessarily 
depends on individual fitnesses in a constitutive, not a causal way.265 
Birch (2017 & 2020), instead, looks for the difference-maker in the pop-
ulation structure. Kin selection takes place when the individuals tend 
to interact with their genetic relatives, while group selection takes 
place when the population has a well-defined group structure. He in-
troduces two measures: K, which measures the structural property of 
how differentiated the interactions are between kin and non-kin (run-
ning from no difference to kin exclusivity), and G, which measures the 
robustness of social structures (running from no structure through 
Godfrey-Smith’s neighbourhood structure to Wilson-style group 
structure). The measures form a two-dimensional K-G space in which 
both measures can be high and low. 
 
265 Okasha and Birch describe the relation as supervenience, but I think we can 
use a stronger notion here. The problem Birch rises is not necessarily a crucial 
problem if we do not interpret the causal relations metaphysically (as Okasha 
does) but only talk about difference-makers (see chapter 2 for the distinction). 
The problem is, then, that the characterization of the different causal relations 
does not tell us anything about why there is a difference in the causal relations, 
which is the whole point of explicating the difference as a difference between 
causal processes or mechanisms. This is what both Okasha and Birch are after, 




I share the intuition that kin-based biases and population-organ-
ization based biases are of causally different kinds.266 Furthermore, the 
multilevel selection models (and the Price’s rule formalization) and 
the kin selection models (and the Generalized Hamilton’s Rule for-
malization) seem to be aimed at capturing different mechanisms in 
their conceptualizations although they trace the same selection results 
and are mathematically equivalent in their predictions of these out-
comes (Okasha 2016). I suggest that the key difference is the difference 
between the causal dimensions that are connecting and dividing indi-
viduals into groups. MLS refers to the fitness effects caused (in the 
proximate dimension) by social structures that bias the benefits while 
kin selection refers to fitness effects caused by reproductive connect-
edness. Both dimensions are involved in the process. Modelling with 
only fitness effects abstracts away from both. MLS and kin selection 
models are not so much modelling different processes as approaching 
the same (or sometimes different) processes from different perspectives. 
Abstracting to fitness effects and modelling them only masks this.  
Okasha’s (2016) discussion on how the models differ in their im-
plicit causal assumptions when they are articulated with causal 
graphs seems to point to this direction too. The problem raised by 
Birch (2020), that the fitness of the group depends on individual fit-
nesses in a constitutive, not a causal way, could probably be avoided 
by adding mechanistic detail to the causal graphs (for example, re-
placing the causal relations between fitness to causal relations be-
tween characteristics relevant for fitness before translating them into 
fitness effects), and the argument would hold. This would complicate 
the comparison of the models, though – but the issue is not important 
here. The two dimensions in Birch’s own K-G space approach could 
also be re-interpret this way: The K-dimension measures how con-
nected the individuals are measured in kinship, and the G-dimension 
 
266 Furthermore, as I mentioned earlier, kinship makes shared traits cluster, 
which is an additional virtue for effective social evolution. For example, it re-
solves the Greenbeard problem (cf. Birch 2017 & 2020). 
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measures the robustness of the proximate dimension structures. Both 
are factors that facilitate the same basic logic of group selection. As 
argued in the previous section, the logic of selection is the same in the 
cases of paradigmatic group selection and kin selection (the trait in-
creases its own positive contribution to fitness on the population level 
by increasing the fitness of individuals sharing it more often than those 
who do not), even if the connection between individuals is realized in 
different parts of the instantiation of a natural selection mechanism. 
I would add that, as argued in the previous section, the logic of 
group selection can be implemented both by the organizational struc-
ture (where the group structure alone is responsible for implementing 
the structure – that is, the causal connection is in the evolutionary di-
mension alone, such as in the Wilson model) and by connection 
through group traits. The latter, as I argued, does not necessarily pre-
suppose group selection, since group traits can be products of indi-
vidual selection, which means that this is not an additional dimension 
to the model – although, as I also argued, it is plausible to think that 
the emergence of group traits constitutes the conditions for group se-
lection. Taking this into account, the G-dimension should be branched 
into the group structure and behavioural trait connection dimensions, re-
sulting in a three-dimensional K-G-B model. 
The models and their relationship are not important here, how-
ever. The causal adequacy of a model is not important for all practical 
or even explanatory purposes (although it may be for some; see Oka-
sha 2016). Furthermore, even if an interaction-group trait evolved 
through individual selection, since the fitness benefits for individuals 
participating in it come from participating in a multi-individual activ-
ity, it would not do harm to model this as MLS-1 case. This would be a 
smaller loss in detail than modelling an MLS-1 process as kin selec-
tion. However, it is important that all these connections (in proximate, 
developmental, and evolutionary dimension) may contribute to adap-
tation on group level, making group-level perspective a relevant op-
tion in any form of evolutionary functionalism.  
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Sharing genes is not the only way to make a connection in the 
developmental dimension either. I sided with the individualist model 
of replicators in a previous chapter and rejected gene-selectionism in 
all its forms. Genes as such are not important. They can facilitate the 
relevant connection in the form of kin selection, but they are not the 
only type of developmental factor capable to this. In the cycle of indi-
viduals developing and reproducing, all difference-making, transfer-
able developmental resources are important. For example, the effects 
that the behaviour of the parents and wider community in the devel-
opmental community have on the development processes, including 
but not restricted to direct teaching, are external factors that can be 
difference-making transferable factors and are shared by a group of 
individuals. For instance, some parental effects may affect all the off-
spring, and the same tendencies may be copied by them for their par-
enting, making this an external route of parent-offspring inher-
itance.267 These effects may be universal, culture-specific, or family 
traditions, for example. Then there are belief systems, skills, behav-
iour scripts, norms, et cetera, some of which are acquired by some (as 
individual preferences from what is available), some of which are 
group-specific, either for interaction groups (they are acquired as part 
of an interaction type) or for the whole collective (for example, 
 
267 If a trait is inherited from parents, this can be genetic or behavioural, but 
also a complex in which there is a “genetically biased” tendency to behave in 
a way that has a certain effect on development. I mentioned Darcia Narvaez’s 
theory of the evolved nest earlier (Narvaez 2014; Narvaez et al 2012, 2014 & 
2016). According to this theory, the parents and other members of the com-
munity create a selected developmental environment. Their creation of this 
“nest” is a result of both instinctual and leaned (to use a shorthand dichotomy 
for a complex continuum of developmental interactions) tendencies, both of 
which have been transferred from generation to generation for most of our 
evolutionary history. She describes general developmental conditions and 
takes a normative stance on a particular nest being optimal for human devel-
opment, but there could also be selected difference-making differences be-
tween different family traditions and cultural groups. 
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normative behavioural expectations). Their importance is this: cul-
tural factors that modify an individual’s behaviour may function in an 
analogous way to genes when it comes to group selection. 
Cultures can enforce behavioural unity or group-wide organized 
division of labour, making groups act as super-organisms, but this is 
not a proximate level connectedness, rather a result of a shared source 
for acquiring the behaviour.268 There can also be behavioural types 
that are copied by some, and they are selected if acquiring them pro-
motes their further spread. Theories of cultural representations (Sper-
ber 1996) and memes (Blackmore 1999) that approach the spread of 
some such types as ideas adapting to human minds as a separate layer 
of evolution. This layer alone explains only temporary fashions at 
most, if not amended with a long-term co-evolutionary aspect. Co-
evolutionary theories (see especially Boyd & Richerson 2005; Richer-
son & Boyd 2005; Bowles & Gintis 2011) are interested in how cultural 
group-level differences affect biological fitness in the long run, caus-
ing selection between groups on the basis of cultural lineages and pro-
moting both certain (externally inherited) cultural forms and the evo-
lution of mind to be biased towards those forms (see also Tomasello 
1999; Sterelny 2012). What I am suggesting here is that this process can 
take place both between collectives and between traditions within a 
collective. In the latter case, cultural relatedness through external inher-
itance (by whichever mechanism) works the same way as genetic re-
latedness. 
The idea of cultural relatedness was introduced by Luigi Luca 
Cavalli-Sforza and Marcus W. Feldman (1981). Jonathan Birch (2017) 
has recently developed and defended the idea of cultural relatedness 
regarding cultural fitness. He distinguishes, as I do above, between cul-
tural differences that affect reproduction directly and those that act 
upon cultural fitness and hypothesizes that they were decoupled in 
the course of human evolution. This is plausible: being cultural and 
 
268 The behaviour may be enforced by others, which is a proximate source, but 
even in this case, the enforcers have acquired the shared norm. 
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adapting through culture is a key human adaptation, and the cultural 
evolution may have become too fast for the biological evolution to re-
act even if culture has an impact on biological fitness. Pure cultural 
evolution is outside my topic, but Birch’s idea of cultural relatedness 
is still helpful. The idea of cultural fitness is the capacity to attract ap-
prentices (see Sterelny 2012). Networks of interaction bias the spread 
of cultural variants269 such that the individuals affected by one variant 
are more likely to interact with each other. This may promote cultur-
ally spread norms of prosociality analogically to kin selection – and 
this may have been one of the driving forces in the biological evolu-
tion of prosocial tendencies.  
 
269 Birch defines “cultural variant” as “(i) a property of an individual that (ii) 
varies between individuals, (iii) originates, at least in part, in a process of so-
cial learning, and that (iv) admits of a quantitative characterization.” (Birch 
2017: 196.) The definition is deliberately vague to abstract away from the con-
crete processes for modelling purposes (see also Richerson & Boyd 2005; Lew-
ens 2015). Note that I have been even vaguer about what cultural factors are, 
for opposite reasons: it is a pluralistic category of factors. Co-evolutionary the-
orists often characterize cultural variants as information acquired in social 
learning, but this is not the only form in which culture can affect an individ-
ual. None of the items in the definition above is a necessary condition for a 
contributing cultural factor in general. The properties of the given factor de-
termine what role it can play in evolution. Furthermore, talk about “cultural 
variants” is just as vague as talk about memes (see Ingold 2007; see Sperber 
2000 and Boyd & Richerson 2005 for the problems of memes as abstract enti-
ties with causal powers). Genes have a robust physical manifestation, but cul-
tural factors are a multitude of different causal connections between individ-
uals. Some cultural factors, however, come in types with connecting causal 
histories: the same kinds of factors affect several individuals and there are 
nonarbitrary reason for this. I have been calling this an interactionist form of 
holism in the developmental dimension. There is sameness in behaviour be-
cause of similar, connected developmental processes. The definition is not im-
portant here, however. Birch’s cultural kin selection model captures the basic 
dynamic in an abstract theoretical framework even if the idea of a cultural 
variant remains ambivalent. 
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Biological and cultural kinship are similar in connecting individ-
uals in the developmental dimension and promoting the evolution of 
shared traits through the “common fate” of the inherited developmen-
tal factors. Furthermore, cultural connectedness clusters properties 
just as kinship does, which enables the effective evolution of complex 
behavioural traits. There are also significant differences. Kinship is 
based on genes, which are a part of the fixed guidance of develop-
ment, alongside with the non-changing features of the environment. 
Some of the cultural developmental environment (the behaviour of 
others that is practically always present, existence of language in the 
environment, et cetera) may be part of the fixed guidance of develop-
ment for all practical purposes, as discussed in the previous chapter. 
The space of developmental possibilities that is created by these fac-
tors is what we can consider innate psychology. It evolved in the con-
text of culture existing in particular social structures (see Tomasello 
1999; Boyd & Silk 2003; Bowles & Gintis 2011; Sterelny 2012; Narvaez 
2014; Birch 2017) – but culture and social structures have changed, 
changing both the context in which evolved psychology operates and 
what the resulting behaviour is.  
Why is all this important to thinking about the methodology of 
evolutionary human social sciences? After all, even the nativist evolu-
tionary psychologists have always taken something like this to be 
their starting point.270 There is, however, a further assumption that the 
evolved psychology is fixed in its manifestation, and the social behav-
iour it involves is directly connectable to that in the ancestral environ-
ments. Its function within the overall context may be different, but this 
does not matter for evolutionary social psychology. As I argued in the 
previous chapter, focusing on the fixed (innate) aspects of human psy-
chology is a possible methodological choice, but it is likely to have 
serious constraints (even if there were some innate modules, there 
 
270 For the explication of the fundamental assumptions of the paradigm re-
garding this, see especially Cosmides & Tooby 1987, 1992, 2005a & 2005b; 
Tooby & Cosmides 1989 & 1990a; Buss 1995 & 2014. 
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might also be innateness in the form constraints and directedness in 
development, which may be articulated in abstract only, similarly to 
Chomsky’s “Universal Grammar”), and the evolution of many psy-
chological capacities may have taken place in a social environment 
that has also been a part of its developmental environment. Alterna-
tive approaches integrating developmental considerations have been 
proposed, for example, by Kim Sterelny (2003, 2007, 2014) and Karola 
Stotz (2014), and practised by Darcia Narvaez (2014; see also Narvaez 
et al 2012 & 2016). The methodological proposal I am making is along 
the same lines, but also considering group aspects. 
There are three possible targets for what I called evolutionary so-
cial science at the beginning of the dissertation: the sociality of our 
ancestors, the social psychology we have inherited, and the forms of 
sociality as they manifest in contemporary societies. I have implicitly 
argued that there are reasons to approach the sociality of our ancestors 
holistically, in three dimensions relevant to evolution. (1) Some of the 
evolving social behavioural traits are likely to have been interactionist 
traits or traits of a collective. (2) The development of behavioural traits 
was under the influence of cultural factors, whether they were de-
pendent on specific individuals (forming a developmental interaction 
group) or unified the entire collective regarding the given develop-
mental factor. (3) Group selection (both interactive and collective) was 
a relevant level of selection, whether facilitated by the connections in 
the proximate or developmental dimension, or in the evolutionary di-
mension only, because of the group structure. Consequently, when we 
approach the social behaviour of our ancestors from an evolutionary 
functionalist perspective, we should not assume that the behavioural 
traits are individual adaptations. We should approach them through 
what function they have in group living, as a part of group “design”. 
As discussed in chapter 4, there are two strategies in applying 
evolutionary methodology to understanding contemporary human 
sociality: evolutionary psychology and evolutionary anthropology. 
Evolutionary psychology depends on assumptions about the behav-
iour that the psychology relates to, especially regarding social 
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behaviour. Behaviour gives psychology its evolutionary function. I 
made a clear distinction between psychological traits and behavioural 
traits in chapter 5: they are distinct even if coupled; behavioural traits 
and psychological traits are decoupled: any psychological trait is con-
nected to multiple behavioural traits, and the other way around; and, 
finally, some behavioural traits should be understood as holistic traits. 
Even if evolutionary psychology is only interested in psychological 
makeup (a proximate-level individualist choice of perspective), and in 
particular the innate part of it (a developmental-level individualist 
choice of perspective), some of the relevant behavioural traits that de-
termine the selective function (in the EEA) may be holistic, these traits 
may have had a holistic cultural basis (which may have changed), and 
group selection may have been important in the selection of the trait 
for various reasons. In other words, evolutionary psychology cannot 
be done independently of holistic evolutionary historical considera-
tions which locate the evolution of the psychology in its selective con-
text. 
Evolutionary anthropology studies human behaviour directly 
and often studies it as adaptive to current conditions. As discussed 
before, this does not necessarily require an adaptation process to the 
current conditions, but the evolutionary functionalist methodology 
here may be ahistorically explanatory, as discussed in chapter 3. This 
assumes that the combination of evolved psychology, culture, and cre-
ative human thinking enables humans to adapt to the ecological con-
ditions. In the case of anthropology, all the arguments given for ho-






The question I have now given a lengthy answer to was: given hu-
mans are social beings who evolved in groups, should we understand 
the evolutionary functionality of human social behaviour from the in-
dividual or group perspective? In other words: if we give an evolu-
tionary explanation for social behaviour, or apply adaptationist heu-
ristics in our attempts to understand human sociality, should we 
adopt individualistic or holistic approaches and frameworks? 
I started the discussion by distinguishing three causal dimen-
sions that are relevant to an evolutionary explanation: proximate, de-
velopmental, and evolutionary proper. I also distinguished two dif-
ferent senses in which the causal factors can be supra-individual or 
holistic: they may exist on the group level of biological organization 
in terms of the concrete organization of individuals in groups (collec-
tivism), or they may be non-reducible properties of the interactions of 
individuals (interactionism). Interactions bind individuals into inter-
action groups with respect to the interaction, while collectives are the 
fixed groups of individuals living together. 
My first substantial issue was to define what an evolutionary ex-
planation is, from the contrastive-counterfactual and mechanistic 
point of view, including how the different dimensions are connected. 
I then argued that there are three defendable forms of evolutionary 
functionalism (or adaptationism) that make different claims and differ-
ent assumptions. Any of them may be an adequate approach to hu-
man social behaviour in certain cases. Current use functionalism is an 
analysis of evolutionary functionality of behaviour in the current en-
vironment without making any assumption about its evolution. It is 
purely descriptive and has minimal explanatory power. I interpreted 
behavioural ecology mostly as a project of this kind. Historical explanatory 
functionalism is evolutionary functional analysis for historical pur-
poses: it analyses traits as historical adaptations. Ahistorical explanatory 
functionalism uses adaptationist thinking as a guide to discover the 
proximate and developmental functionality of the organism. I argued 
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that this form of evolutionary functionalism is distinct from both of 
the other forms. Importantly, it makes assumptions about natural se-
lection having been a significant factor in evolution but does not need 
to assume any particular trait that is analysed as if it is or has been an 
adaptation. Most evolutionary psychology and evolutionary anthro-
pology can be understood either as historical or ahistorical explana-
tory functionalism. The distinction does not exist in the literature, nei-
ther within evolutionary human sciences nor in the philosophical lit-
erature. Evolutionary human sciences are usually understood as his-
torical, but it would be more charitable, and justified, to consider them 
ahistorical. Ahistorical interpretation would be sufficient for the role 
that the evolutionary considerations are given as a heuristic to dis-
cover proximate and developmental mechanisms. Whichever meth-
odological choice is made, it does not affect the inidividualism issue 
in the proximate or evolutionary dimensions, but it does affect what 
assumptions need to be made in the developmental dimension, which 
is an issue for evolutionary psychology especially. 
My main argument about the proximate dimension was that 
some social behaviour should be understood as interactive traits: they 
emerge in the interaction between the individuals, and it is these traits 
that are selected for. The individual behavioural dispositions are sec-
ondary; individual traits are selected by virtue of their enabling the 
individuals to participate in these interactions. Furthermore, the ob-
ject of selection is the psychological makeup on the individual. Behav-
iour for which the psychological characteristics are selected, are se-
lected for the consequences of the behaviour that they participate in 
producing. If we approach behaviour from the evolutionary function-
alist perspective the way I proposed (as a general way to analyse be-
haviour from the evolutionary point of view), the proper objects of 
evolutionary explanation are the individual psychological traits and the 
interactive behavioural traits.  
As part of making this argument, I discussed the folk-psycholog-
ical understanding of what human behaviour is, and I argued that this 
is not a proper way to understand human behaviour from the 
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evolutionary point of view, although, at the same time, folk psychol-
ogy is a part of the phenomenon under study, and we should under-
stand the role it plays in social behaviour – which is primarily not to 
attribute psychological states but to represent agents’ dispositions. I 
made the distinction between psychological, agentive, and behavioural 
descriptions of traits and applied this to the concept of altruism, dis-
tinguishing between psychological, agentive, and behavioural altruism. I 
then used reciprocal altruism to illustrate and develop further the point 
about interactive behavioural traits and individual psychological 
traits. The social interactions characterized by reciprocity are the in-
teractive behavioural traits that determine the fitness benefits and get 
selected, while the psychological makeup that is selected includes 
whatever capacities are needed for participating in these traits. Con-
sequently, the individual traits that are selected are not parts of the 
interactive traits. Psychological traits are selected based on their over-
all fitness effects during the individual’s lifetime. The forms of inter-
action that the individual participates in compete against each other, 
and their totality determines the fitness consequences of the psycho-
logical traits.  
The major consequence of this argument is that there may be su-
pra-individual adaptations even if they are not properties of a collec-
tive, if the replication of these traits goes vertically through individu-
als only (no social learning or any other influence from other individ-
uals in the development is assumed here), and if the selection pro-
cesses are individualistic. A minor consequence is that the evolution 
of reciprocal altruism does not require group selection: the competi-
tion between interactive traits is between which interactions make the 
individuals fittest, and the competition between the individual psy-
chological traits is individualist selection for the makeup that makes 
the individual fittest given the social interactive environment. There 
is, however, a significant supra-individual element in this process that 
cannot be reduced to individualist presuppositions – it is, however, 
about the proximate-level presuppositions. We must understand the 
evolutionary function of reciprocal altruism from a holistic 
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perspective. This also highlights the importance of the connection be-
tween the proximate and evolutionary dimensions. 
I presented two major arguments about the developmental di-
mension. First was about the role of culture. Building upon the Ex-
tended Synthesis, I argued that social interactions that transmit traits 
can be individualist, interactionist, or collectivist. Human cultures are 
characterized by horizontal (non-individualist) transmission, but this 
does not entail directly that culture makes cultural groups units of 
replication. The interactionist alternative is most plausible. However, 
my main point was about developmental individualism. I argued for 
a concept of innateness that makes sense in the context of the Extended 
Synthesis, and that this is the concept through which we should un-
derstand nativism in psychology, including evolutionary psychology. 
Furthermore, I suggested that nativism is a methodological choice for 
defining explanatory interests. This, however, has consequences for 
how to interpret the results of the research and its constraints. Again, 
these are not positions within the literature (neither in evolutionary 
psychological nor in philosophical), but my methodological recom-
mendation. At the same time, I pointed out that this qualification of 
the research object highlights the limitations of nativism and calls for 
alternative approaches in evolutionary psychology. 
The proximate and developmental dimensions are connected. I 
discussed the interactionist traits in the proximate dimension without 
holistic developmental components. However, if the reproduction of 
social traits is cultural, this enforces the existence of interactionist 
traits: the forms of interaction do not solely depend on the individual 
capacities in the interaction of which the interactive traits emerge, but 
they can be reproduced directly though social interactions. The con-
nection works in the other direction, too: the existence of culturally 
transmitted traits that make the participating individuals fitter creates 
selection for individual psychological characteristics with the function 
of participating in these interactions. 
The last dimension I discussed was the evolutionary, by which I 
mean the causal dimension of purely evolutionary factors – natural 
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selection being the only one of interest here. The individualism issue 
in this dimension is whether natural selection only works at the level 
of individuals (in the human context), or whether there is group selec-
tion too. Group selection has two senses, MLS-1 and MLS-2, which 
makes the distinction between interactionist and collectivist sense of 
groups and explanatory holism analogical to that in the other two di-
mensions. I discussed the relationship between MLS and kin selection, 
which has been the main recent theoretical controversy about the re-
lationship between individuals and groups along this dimension, but 
I mostly concentrated on the relationship between the evolutionary 
and other dimensions in the group selection controversies. Partly 
building on Elisabeth Lloyd’s work on the issue, I argued that keeping 
the different dimensions apart but analysing their connections using 
the ideas that I have developed over the course of the dissertation clar-
ifies many of the remaining problems and mutual misunderstandings 
in the debate – especially what it means to have a group adaptation. 
Having a group selection process guiding the evolution, having a 
group-level adapting trait, and having a group-dependent replication 
process are three different dimensions. The group level may be 
needed in any one of them without a corresponding need in the oth-
ers. Yet at the same time the supra-individual processes at any level 
may contribute causally to the emergence of supra-individual pro-
cesses at the other levels. Furthermore, it is important to make the dis-
tinction between collectivist and interactionist versions of holism. 
They are different (in each dimension), but it is easy to equivocate be-
tween them in theoretical debates. 
Generally speaking, I have concentrated on the interactionist 
forms of holism. Full-blown collectivism in both developmental and 
proximate dimensions are basically assumptions that the interaction-
ist processes and mechanisms have taken over the whole group in a 
uniform fashion. Collectivism is an extreme version of the same holis-
tic ideas that I have been discussing as interactionism. At the same 
time, there is a qualitative difference that emerges from this as the 
group becomes uniform. MLS-1 group selection can work on both the 
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interaction groups and collectives at the same time. MLS-2 group se-
lection takes place between collective groups, but it does not require 
collectivism of the evolving trait in other dimensions. MLS-2 selection 
may enforce interactive traits as well if they make a difference be-
tween the collectives within which they exist. In short, interactionist 
processes in different dimensions reinforce each other, and interac-
tionism may move towards collectivism in each dimension. Further-
more, if the evolutionary functions of different social traits are con-
nected and cultural transmission connects the transmission of differ-
ent traits (with whole traditions being transferred), this can make 
groups more and more like superorganisms. 
To return to the main question: are human social behavioural 
traits adaptations of individuals or groups? The answer is likely: usu-
ally neither. If we take an evolutionary functionalist perspective on 
human social behaviour, both exclusively individualist and superor-
ganism-evoking collectivist perspectives may be correct regarding 
some traits, but my methodological proposal is to approach it with a 
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